Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XLVI.

Cap. I.

Quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, in nullo cassari potest.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Hic oritur quaestio. Dictum est enim in superioribus¹ et auctoritatibus communitum, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est vocaturque beneplacitum eius, cassari non potest, quia illa voluntate quaecumque voluit, fecit in caelo et in terra: cui, teste Apostolo, nihil resistit. « Quaeritur ergo, quomodo accipiendum sit quod Apostolus de Domino ait²: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Cum enim non omnes salvi fiant, sed plures damnentur, videtur utique non fieri quod Deus vult fieri, humana scilicet voluntate impediente voluntatem Dei. Dominus quoque in Evangelio impiam civitatem compellans: Quoties, inquit, volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti! Ita³ haec dicuntur, tanquam Dei voluntas superata sit hominum voluntate, et infirmissimis nolendo impedientibus, non potuerit facere potentissimus quod volebat. Ubi est ergo illa omnipotentia, qua in caelo et in terra, secundum Prophetam, omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit? Et quomodo voluntati eius, secundum Apostolum, nihil resistit, si colligere filios Ierusalem voluit, et non fecit? » Haec enim praedictis plurimum obviare videntur.

Cap. II.

Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti, et illud: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.

Sed audiamus solutionem; ac primum, quomodo accipiendum sit illud quod Dominus ait, videamus. « Non enim ex eo sensu illud dictum est, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio⁴, praedictam solvens quaestionem, quasi Dominus voluerit colligere⁵ filios Ierusalem, et non sit factum quod voluit, quia ipsa noluerit; sed potius illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit, qua tamen nolente, filios eius collegit ipse omnes quos voluit; quia in caelo et in terra non quaedam voluit et fecit, quaedam vero voluit et non fecit, sed omnia p. 815 quaecumque voluit, fecit», ut sit sensus: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti! id est, congregavi voluntate mea semper efficaci, te nolente feci. — Ecce in evidenti positum est, quod⁶ illa Domini verba superioribus non repugnant.

Nunc videre restat, quomodo etiam praemissa verba Apostoli praedictis non contradicant, qui de Deo loquens ait: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Quorum occasione verborum multi a veritate deviaverunt dicentes, Deum multa velle fieri, quae non fiunt. Sed non est intelligendum, ea ratione illud esse dictum, quasi Deus voluerit aliquos salvari, et non salventur.

« Quis enim tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit et quando voluerit et ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? Non est utique verum quod in Psalmo dicitur: Quaecumque voluit, fecit, si aliqua voluit et non fecit; et quod est indignius, ideo non fecit, quoniam, ne fieret quod volebat Omnipotens, voluntas hominis impedivit ». Ideoque « cum audimus et in sacris Litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines salvos fieri, quamvis certum sit nobis non omnes homines salvos fieri⁷, non tamen ideo debemus omnipotentissimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, sed ita intelligere quod scriptum est: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri, tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri salvum, nisi quem fieri⁸ ipse voluerit; non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salvum fieri velit, sed quod nullus fiat salvus, nisi quem velit salvari; et ideo rogandus est, ut velit, quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ». « Non est enim credendus Omnipotens aliquid voluisse fieri, quod factum non sit ». « Sic etiam intelligitur illud⁹: illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, non quia nullus hominum est, qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminatur. Potest et alio modo illud intelligi, dum tamen credere non cogamur, Omnipotentem aliquid voluisse fieri, factumque non esse, qui sine ullis ambiguitatibus, si¹⁰ in caelo et in terra, sicut Veritas cantat, omnia quaecumque voluit fecit, profecto facere non voluit quaecumque non fecit ». — Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod Deus ea voluntate, quae ipse est, non vult aliquid fieri, quod non fiat, neque non fieri, quod fiat.

Cap. III.

Utrum mala Deo volente vel nolente fiant.

Ideoque cum constet, omnia bona, quae fiunt, eius fieri voluntate, quae si fieri nollet, nullatenus fierent; recte quaeri solet: utrum et mala omnia, quae fiunt, id est peccata, Dei fiant voluntate, an nolente eo fiant. — Super hoc diversi, varie¹¹ sentientes, sibi contradicere inveniuntur. Alii enim dicunt, quod Deus vult mala esse vel fieri, non tamen vult mala. Alii vero, quod nec vult mala esse nec fieri. In hoc tamen conveniunt et hi et illi, quod utrique fatentur, Deum mala non velle. Utrique vero rationibus atque auctoritatibus nituntur ad muniendam suam assertionem¹².

Qui enim dicunt, Deum mala velle esse vel fieri, suam his modis muniunt intentionem. Si enim, inquiunt, mala non esse vel non fieri vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent, quia, si vult ea non esse vel non fieri, et non potest id efficere, scilicet ut non sint vel non fiant, voluntati eius et potentiae aliquid resistit, et non est omnipotens, quia non potest omne quod vult, sed impotens est; sicut et nos sumus, qui quod volumus quandoque non valemus. Sed quia omnipotens est et in nullo impotens, certum est, non posse fieri mala vel esse, nisi eo volente. Quomodo enim, invito eo et nolente, posset ab aliquo malum fieri, cum scriptum sit: Voluntati eius quis resistit? Supra etiam dixit Augustinus¹³: « Quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ». Sed vult mala fieri, aut non fieri. Si vult non fieri, non fiunt; fiunt autem: vult ergo fieri. — Item, bonum est mala esse vel fieri, alioquin summe bonus non permitteret ea fieri. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio: « Quamvis ea, inquit, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sunt bona, tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotenti Bono, cui proculdubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc¹⁴ nisi credamus, periclitatur nostra confessio, qua nos in Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur ». — Ecce hic aperte habes, quod bonum est mala esse, omnis autem boni Deus auctor est, qui vult, omne bonum esse quod est. Cum ergo bonum sit mala fieri vel esse, ergo¹⁵ et mala vult fieri vel esse. — His atque aliis huiusmodi rationibus et auctoritatibus utuntur qui dicunt Deum velle mala esse vel fieri.

Illi vero, qui dicunt, Dei voluntate mala non fieri vel non esse, inductionibus praemissis ita respondent dicentes, Deum nec velle mala fieri, nec velle non fieri, vel nolle fieri, sed tantum non velle fieri. Si enim vellet ea fieri vel esse, faceret utique ea fieri vel esse, et ita esset auctor malorum; non est autem auctor malorum, ut Sanctorum protestantur auctoritates: non ergo eius voluntate fiunt mala. Item, si nollet mala fieri vel vellet non fieri, et tamen fierent, omnipotens p. 816 non esset, cum eius voluntas humanae voluntatis effectu impediretur. Ideoque non concedunt, Deum velle mala fieri, ne malorum auctor intelligatur; nec concedunt, eum velle mala non fieri vel nolle fieri, ne impotens esse videatur; sed tantum dicunt, eum non velle mala fieri, ut non auctor, sed permissor malorum monstretur. Unde et Evangelista, ubi ostendit, Deum auctorem esse omnium bonorum, dicens¹⁶: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, consequenter malorum auctorem esse negat dicens: Et sine ipso factum est nihil, id est peccatum. Non dixit, per eum factum esse, vel eo nolente et invito, sed tantum sine eo, id est sine eius voluntate, quia non eius voluntate fit peccatum. Non ergo Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia non subest Dei voluntati, ut malum fiat vel non fiat, sed ut fieri sinat¹⁷, quia bonum est sinere mala fieri; et utique volens sinit, non volens mala, sed volens sinere, ut ipsa fiant; quia nec mala sunt bona, nec ea fieri vel esse bonum est.

Cap. IV.

Quomodo intelligendum sit illud Augustini: mala fieri bonum est.

Quod vero Augustinus ait: Mala fieri bonum est, nec sinerentur mala ab omnipotenti Bono fieri, nisi hoc esset bonum, ut ea essent; ea ratione dictum esse asserunt, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, Deus bona elicit, nec ipse permitteret ea fieri, nisi de eis boni¹⁸ aliquid faceret. Unde Augustinus in eodem libro Enchiridion¹⁹, aperte indicans, praedictorum verborum talem esse intelligentiam, ait: « Deus omnipotens, cui rerum est summa potestas, cum summe bonus sit, nullo modo sineret, aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo ». Item in eodem: « Melius iudicavit Deus de malis bona facere quam mala nulla permittere ». Ex hoc itaque sensu dictum est ac verum est, bonum esse mala fieri, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, bonis, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti²⁰, accidit bonitas, id est utilitas. Talibus enim, ut ait Apostolus, in bonum cooperantur omnia, etiam mala, quia eis prosunt, quae aliis facientibus obsunt. Unde etiam aliquando in Scriptura legitur, malum appellari bonum, ut Hieronymus super Marcum²¹: « Malum, inquit, Iudae bonum fuit, scilicet nobis. Nec si bonum est illi vel illi, inde sequitur, quod simpliciter bonum sit. Proprie enim ac simpliciter bonum est, quod in se et facienti bonum est ».

Cap. V.

De multiplici acceptione boni.

Est enim aliquid, quod in se bonum est et cui fit, sed non est bonum facienti, ut cum subvenitur pauperi, sed non propter Deum. Et est aliquid bonum in se et facienti, sed non ei cui fit, ut cum veritas propter Deum alicui non obedienti praedicatur. Et est aliquid in se et facienti et ei cui fit bonum, ut cum veritas praedicatur propter Deum credenti. Unde Apostolus²²: Bonus odor sumus Deo, aliis odor vitae, aliis odor mortis. Est autem aliud, quod nec in se bonum est et facienti nocet et damnat, nisi poeniteat, ut malum, valet tamen ad aliquid. Ut enim ait Augustinus in Enchiridio²³: « A summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona; sed tamen bona etiam singula. Simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis ».

Cap. VI.

Quod mala universitati valent.

Hinc patet, quod ex malis, quae fiunt, aliquod provenit bonum, dum bona magis placent et laudabiliora existunt. Ipsis etiam facientibus ex malis, quae faciunt, interdum bona proveniunt²⁴, si secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti. « Talibus enim, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Correctione et gratia, usque adeo Deus omnia cooperatur in bonum, ut, si qui horum deviant et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum eis faciat proficere in bonum, quia humiliores redeunt atque doctiores », ut Petrus. « Illa etiam mala, quae ab iniquis fideles pie perferunt, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Trinitate²⁵, ipsis utique prosunt vel ad delenda peccata, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam, vel ad demonstrandam huius vitae miseriam ». Ideoque et p. 817 Iob Dei manum, et Apostolus satanae stimulum sensit; et uterque bene profecit, quia malum bene portavit.

Si quis igitur diligenter attendat quae scripta sunt, facile est ei percipere, ex malis bona provenire, et ea ratione dictum esse, quod bonum est mala fieri vel esse, non quia malum sit bonum, vel quia bonum sit malum fieri. Non est enim bonum malum fieri ab aliquo, quia non est bonum, ut aliquis faciat malum²⁶. Si enim hoc esset bonum, profecto huius Deus auctor esset, qui est auctor omnis boni. Quodsi huius Deus auctor est, eo ergo auctore homo agit malum, et ita eo auctore homo fit deterior. Et si eo auctore homo fit deterior, tunc eo volente homo fit deterior. Idem est enim dicere aliquid fieri Deo auctore quod Deo volente; Deo autem auctore homo non fit deterior: ergo nec Deo volente, ut Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum²⁷ aperte astruit a minori dicens ita: « Nullo sapiente homine auctore fit homo deterior; tanta enim est ista culpa, quae in sapientem hominem cadere nequeat. Est autem Deus omni homine sapiente praestantior: multo minus igitur Deo auctore fit homo deterior. Multo enim est praestantior Dei voluntas quam hominis sapientis. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur. Est ergo vitium voluntatis, quo est homo deterior. Quod vitium, si longe abest a Dei voluntate, ut ratio docet, a quo²⁸ sit, quaerendum est ». — Ecce aperte dicit hic Augustinus, Deo auctore vel volente hominem non fieri deteriorem, sed vitio voluntatis suae. Non est ergo Deo auctore, quod malum fit ab aliquo, et ita Deo volente mala non fiunt.

Cap. VII.

Quod in Deo non est causa, ut sit homo deterior.

Deinde idem Augustinus quaerens, quae sit causa, ut homo sit deterior, in Deo non esse asserit, in eodem libro sic dicens: « Ut sit homo deterior, aut in ipso causa est, aut in alio, aut in nihilo. Si in nihilo, nulla causa est; si in alio, aut in Deo, aut in alio²⁹ quolibet homine, aut in eo quod neque Deus neque homo sit. Sed non in Deo; bonorum enim Deus tantum causa est: ergo aut in homine est, aut in eo quod nec Deus nec homo, aut in nihilo »³⁰. — Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod non est bonum, ut sit homo deterior, quia non est Deus eius rei causa, qui tantum causa bonorum est. Et si non est bonum, ut homo fiat deterior, non est igitur bonum, ut ab eo fiat malum: non igitur vult Deus, ut ab eo fiat malum.

Item aliter etiam ostenditur, quod Deo auctore, id est volente non fiunt mala, quia ipse non est causa tendendi ad non-esse. Tendere enim ad non-esse malum est. Ipse autem auctor mali non est; tendit vero ad non-esse qui operatur malum: non ergo Deo auctore est, quod aliquis operatur malum. Non est ergo bonum, quod aliquis operatur malum, quia tantum boni Deus auctor est. Hoc autem Augustinus in eodem libro³¹ aperte explicat ita dicens: « Qui omnium quae sunt, auctor est, et ad cuius bonitatem id pertinet, ut sit omne quod est, boni tantummodo causa est. Quocirca mali auctor non est, et ideo ipse summum bonum est, a quo in nullo deficere bonum est; et malum est deficere: non est igitur causa deficiendi, id est tendendi ad non-esse, qui, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est; quia omnium quae sunt, auctor est, quae in quantum sunt, bona sunt ». — Ecce aperte habes, quod deficere a Deo, qui summum est bonum, malum est: mala ergo facere malum est: non ergo Deo auctore vel volente mala fiunt.

Iam sufficienter ostensum est, quod Deo auctore non fiunt mala. Quidam tamen sophistice incedentes, et ideo Deo odibiles³², probare conantur, ex Deo auctore esse, quod mala fiunt, hoc modo. Quod mala fiunt, verum est; omne autem verum, quod est, est a veritate, quae Deus est: a Deo igitur est, quod mala fiunt. Quod autem omne verum a Deo sit, confirmant auctoritate Augustini in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum³³ ita dicentis: « Omne verum a veritate verum est; est autem veritas Deus: Deum igitur habet auctorem omne verum ». Est autem verum, quod mala fiunt vel sunt: Deo ergo auctore est, quod sunt vel fiunt mala.

Quibus facile est nobis respondere; sed indignum responsione videtur quod dicunt: « Omne namque verum a Deo est », ut ait Augustinus, cui consonat Ambrosius³⁴, qui tractans illud verbum Apostoli: Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu sancto, dicit, quod « omne verum, a quocumque dicitur, a Spiritu sancto est ». Cum itaque verum sit, quod mala p. 818 fiunt, hoc verum, quod dicitur illa locutione, scilicet mala fiunt, a Deo est; sed non inde sequitur, quod a Deo sit, ut mala fiant. Si enim hoc diceretur, auctor malorum Deus esse intelligeretur. Quod ex simili manifeste falsum ostenditur: Deus prohibet furtum fieri; sed furtum fieri verum est: ergo prohibet verum. Non sequitur.

Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi inania relinquentes, praemissae quaestionis parti saniori faventes, quae Sanctorum testimoniis plenius approbatur, dicamus, Deum non velle mala fieri, nec tamen velle non fieri, neque nolle fieri. Omne enim³⁵ quod vult fieri, fit, et omne quod vult non fieri, non fit. Fiunt autem multa, quae non vult fieri, ut omnia mala.

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DISTINCTION XLVI.

Chapter I.

That the will of God, which is himself, can in no way be frustrated.

Here a question arises. For it has been said in the things above¹ and confirmed by authorities, that the will of God, which is himself and is called his good pleasure, cannot be frustrated, because by that will whatsoever he willed, he did in heaven and in earth: to which, by the Apostle's testimony, nothing resists. « It is asked therefore how this is to be taken which the Apostle says of the Lord²: He wills all men to be saved. For since not all are saved, but the more are damned, it seems indeed that what God wills to be done is not done, namely, the human will impeding the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel, addressing the impious city: How often, he says, did I will to gather thy sons together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not! So³ these things are said, as though the will of God had been overcome by the will of men, and, the weakest by their unwillingness impeding, the most mighty could not do what he willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in heaven and in earth, according to the Prophet, all things whatsoever he willed, he did? And how does nothing resist his will, according to the Apostle, if he willed to gather the sons of Jerusalem and did not? » For these things seem very greatly to stand in the way of what has been said before.

Chapter II.

How this is to be understood: I willed to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not; and this: Who wills all men to be saved.

But let us hear the solution; and first let us see how this is to be taken which the Lord says. « For this was not said in such a sense, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion⁴, in resolving the aforesaid question, as though the Lord had willed to gather⁵ the sons of Jerusalem, and what he willed had not been done, because she did not will it; but rather she indeed did not will her sons to be gathered by him, while she nevertheless being unwilling, he himself gathered all of her sons whom he willed; for in heaven and in earth he did not [will] some things and do them, and again some things he willed and did not do, but all things p. 815 whatsoever he willed, he did », that this may be the sense: How often did I will to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not! that is, I gathered them by my will, always efficacious, while thou wast unwilling. — Behold, it is plainly set forth, that⁶ those words of the Lord do not contradict what has gone before.

It now remains to see how the foregoing words of the Apostle do not contradict what has been said, who speaking of God says: He wills all men to be saved. By occasion of which words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But it must not be understood, as if that were said on this ground, as though God had willed certain ones to be saved, and they are not saved.

« For who would be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn the evil wills of men, which he has willed and when he has willed and where he has willed, to good? It is certainly not true that what is said in the Psalm — Whatsoever he willed, he did — [is true], if he willed some things and did them not; and what is more unworthy, that on this ground he did not do [it], namely, lest there be done what the Omnipotent willed, the will of man impeded [him] ». Therefore « when we hear and read in the sacred Scriptures, that he wills all men to be saved, although it is certain to us that not all men are saved⁷, yet we must not on that account take anything away from the most omnipotent will of God, but rather understand what is written — He wills all men to be saved — as though it were said, that no man is made saved, except him whom he himself has willed to be made⁸ [saved]; not that there is none of men except him whom he wills to be saved, but that none is made saved except him whom he wills to be saved; and therefore he is to be entreated to will [it], because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». « For it must not be believed that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, which has not been done ». « So also is to be understood that⁹: he enlightens every man coming into this world, not because there is no one of men who is not enlightened, but because none is enlightened except by him. And in another way also this can be understood, provided we be not compelled to believe that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, and it has not been done — [he] who without any ambiguities, if¹⁰ in heaven and on earth, as the Truth sings, did all things whatsoever he willed, certainly did not will to do whatsoever he did not do ». — From these things it is plainly shown, that God by that will which is himself does not will anything to be done which is not done, nor anything not to be done, which is done.

Chapter III.

Whether evils come to pass with God willing or unwilling.

And therefore, since it is established that all the goods that come to pass come to be by his will — which if it were unwilling them to come to be, they would in no way come to be — it is rightly wont to be asked: whether all the evils also which come to pass, that is, sins, come to be by God's will, or come to be while he is unwilling. — Concerning this, different men, thinking variously¹¹, are found to contradict one another. For some say that God wills evils to be or come to pass, but does not however will evils [themselves]. Others, however, [say] that he neither wills evils to be nor to come to pass. In this however both these and those agree, that both parties confess that God does not will evils. But each side relies upon reasonings and authorities to fortify its assertion¹².

For those who say that God wills evils to be or to come to pass, fortify their intention in these ways. If, say they, he were to will that evils not be or not come to pass, in no way would they be or come to pass, because, if he wills them not to be or not to come to pass, and cannot effect this — namely, that they not be or not come to pass — then something resists his will and his power, and he is not omnipotent, since he cannot [do] all that he wills, but is impotent; as we ourselves are, who sometimes cannot [do] what we will. But since he is omnipotent and in nothing impotent, it is certain that evils cannot come to pass or be, except with him willing. For how could evil be done by anyone against his will and while he is unwilling, when it is written: Who resists his will? Augustine also said above¹³: « Because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». But [God] either wills evils to come to pass, or [wills them] not to come to pass. If he wills [them] not to come to pass, they do not come to pass; yet they do come to pass: therefore he wills [them] to come to pass. — Likewise, it is good for evils to be or to come to pass, otherwise the supremely Good [one] would not permit them to come to pass. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion: « Although those things, he says, which are evil, in so far as they are evil, are not good, yet that there be not only goods but also evils, is good. For unless this were a good — that there should be also evils — in no way would they be allowed to be by the omnipotent Good [one], for whom undoubtedly it is as easy that what he wills not to be, he should not allow to be, as it is that he should do what he wills. Unless we believe this¹⁴, our confession is imperilled, by which we confess that we believe in the Father almighty ». — Behold, here you plainly have [it], that it is good that evils be, and God is the author of every good, who wills every good to be that is. Since therefore it is good for evils to come to pass or to be, therefore¹⁵ he wills evils too to come to pass or to be. — By these and other reasonings and authorities of this kind do those use, who say that God wills evils to be or come to pass.

But those who say that by God's will evils do not come to pass or are not, to the inductions set forth respond thus, saying that God neither wills evils to come to pass, nor wills [them] not to come to pass, nor is unwilling [them] to come to pass — but only does not will [them] to come to pass. For if he were to will them to come to pass or to be, he would certainly cause them to come to pass or to be, and thus he would be the author of evils; but he is not the author of evils, as the authorities of the Saints testify: therefore evils do not come to pass by his will. Likewise, if he were unwilling evils to come to pass, or were to will them not to come to pass, and yet they came to pass, he would not be omnipotent p. 816 since his will would be impeded by the effect of the human will. And therefore they do not concede that God wills evils to come to pass, lest he be understood as the author of evils; nor do they concede that he wills evils not to come to pass or is unwilling [them] to come to pass, lest he seem to be impotent; but they say only that he does not will evils to come to pass, that he may be shown to be not the author, but the permitter of evils. Whence also the Evangelist, where he shows that God is the author of all goods, saying¹⁶: All things were made by him, consequently denies that he is the author of evils, saying: And without him was made nothing, that is, sin. He did not say, that it was made by him, or with him unwilling and against his will, but only without him, that is, without his will, because sin is not made by his will. Therefore evils do not come to pass with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subject to God's will that evil come to pass or not come to pass, but that he allow it¹⁷ to come to pass, because it is good to allow evils to come to pass; and surely willing he allows, not willing the evils, but willing to allow, that they themselves come to pass; because neither are evils good, nor is it good that they come to pass or be.

Chapter IV.

How that saying of Augustine is to be understood: it is good that evils come to pass.

But [as for] that which Augustine says: It is good that evils come to pass, nor would evils be allowed to come to pass by the omnipotent Good [one], unless this were good — that they should be; they assert that it was said on this ground, because from the evils which come to pass God draws goods, nor would he himself permit them to come to pass, unless from them he were to make something of good¹⁸. Whence Augustine in the same book Enchiridion¹⁹, plainly indicating that the understanding of the aforesaid words is such, says: « God omnipotent, to whom the supreme power of things [belongs], since he is supremely good, would in no way allow some evil to be in his works, unless he were to such an extent omnipotent and good as to do good even out of evil ». Likewise in the same: « God judged it better to make goods out of evils than to permit no evils ». From this sense therefore it has been said and is true that it is good for evils to come to pass, because from the evils which come to pass, to the good — who are called Saints according to purpose²⁰ — goodness, that is, utility, accrues. For to such, as the Apostle says, all things work together for good, even evils, because they profit them, which to others doing [them] hurt. Whence also sometimes in Scripture it is read that evil is called good, as Jerome on Mark²¹: « The evil of Judas, he says, was good, namely to us. Nor, if it is good for this man or that, does it follow on that account that it is simply good. For properly and simply that is good which is good both in itself and to the doer ».

Chapter V.

On the manifold acceptance of "good."

For there is something which is good in itself and to him to whom it is done, but is not good for the doer — as when help is given to a poor man, but not for God's sake. And there is something good in itself and for the doer, but not for him to whom it is done — as when truth is preached for God's sake to one not obeying. And there is something good in itself and for the doer and for him to whom it is done — as when the truth is preached for God's sake to one believing. Whence the Apostle²²: We are a good odor to God, to some an odor of life, to others an odor of death. There is yet another, which is neither good in itself and harms and damns the doer, unless he repent — as evil [is] — yet has its worth toward something. For as Augustine says in the Enchiridion²³: « By the supremely and equally and immutably good Trinity have been created all things — not supremely nor equally nor immutably good; but nevertheless good also taken singly. But all together very good, because from all consists the admirable beauty of the universe; in which even that which is called evil, well ordered and put in its place, more eminently commends the goods, that they should the more please and be the more praiseworthy, when compared with evils ».

Chapter VI.

That evils are of value to the universe.

Hence it is plain that from the evils which come to pass some good comes forth, while the goods more please and are more praiseworthy. To the very doers themselves also, from the evils which they do, sometimes goods come forth²⁴, if they are called Saints according to purpose. « For to such, as Augustine says in the book On Correction and Grace, God so far cooperates all things unto good, that, if some of them deviate and stray, this very thing he makes profit them unto good — because they return more humble and more learned », as Peter. « Those evils also, which the faithful piously endure from the wicked, as Augustine says in the book On the Trinity²⁵, are surely of profit to them either for blotting out sins, or for exercising and proving justice, or for showing the misery of this life ». And therefore p. 817 Job felt the hand of God, and the Apostle the goad of Satan; and both profited well, because [each] bore evil well.

If anyone therefore diligently attend to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that goods come from evils, and that it has been said on this ground that it is good for evils to come to pass or to be — not because evil is good, or because it is good for evil to come to pass. For it is not good that evil come to pass through anyone, since it is not good that anyone do evil²⁶. For if this were good, surely God would be its author, who is the author of all good. But if God is the author of this, then with him as author man does evil, and so with him as author man becomes worse. And if with him as author man becomes worse, then with him willing man becomes worse. For it is the same to say that something comes to be with God as author as [to say] with God willing; but with God as author man does not become worse: therefore neither with God willing — as Augustine in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions²⁷ plainly establishes, arguing a minori thus: « With no wise man as author does a man become worse; for so great is this fault, that it cannot fall on a wise man. But God is more excellent than every wise man: much less therefore with God as author does a man become worse. For God's will is much more excellent than that of a wise man. When with him as author is said, with him willing is said. Therefore there is a vice of the will, by which man is made worse. From which vice — if it be far from God's will, as reason teaches — must be sought, from whom²⁸ it is ». — Behold, here Augustine plainly says that with God as author or willing, man is not made worse, but by the vice of his own will. Therefore it is not with God as author that evil is done by anyone, and so with God willing evils do not come to pass.

Chapter VII.

That in God there is no cause that man should be made worse.

Then the same Augustine, asking what is the cause that man is worse, asserts that it is not in God, saying in the same book thus: « That man be worse, either the cause is in himself, or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, there is no cause; if in another, either in God, or in some other²⁹ man, or in that which is neither God nor man. But not in God; for God is the cause only of goods: therefore either it is in man, or in that which is neither God nor man, or in nothing »³⁰. — From these things it is plainly shown that it is not good that man be worse, because God is not the cause of that thing, who is the cause only of goods. And if it is not good that man be made worse, it is not therefore good that evil be done by him: God does not therefore will that evil be done by him.

Likewise it is also otherwise shown that with God as author, that is, willing, evils do not come to pass, because he himself is not the cause of tending to non-being. For to tend to non-being is evil. But he himself is not the author of evil; whereas he tends to non-being who works evil: therefore it is not with God as author that anyone works evil. It is not therefore good that anyone work evil, since God is the author only of good. This Augustine in the same book³¹ plainly explains, saying thus: « He who is the author of all that is, and to whose goodness it pertains that there should be all that is, is the cause only of good. Wherefore he is not the author of evil, and therefore he himself is the highest good, from whom in nothing it is good to fall away; and evil is to fall away: therefore he is not the cause of falling away, that is, of tending to non-being, who, as I may so say, is the cause of being; because he is the author of all that is, which in so far as they are, are good ». — Behold, you plainly have [it], that to fall away from God, who is the highest good, is evil: therefore to do evils is evil: therefore evils do not come to pass with God as author or willing.

It has now sufficiently been shown that with God as author evils do not come to pass. Some however, advancing sophistically, and on that account hateful to God³², attempt to prove that with God as author it [is] that evils come to pass — in this manner. That evils come to pass is true; but every truth which is, is from the Truth, which is God: from God therefore it is, that evils come to pass. That every truth is from God, they confirm by the authority of Augustine in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions³³ saying thus: « Every truth is true by the Truth; but the Truth is God: therefore every truth has God as author ». But it is true that evils come to pass or are: therefore with God as author it [is] that evils are or come to pass.

To these it is easy for us to answer; but unworthy of answer seems what they say: « For every truth is from God », as Augustine says, with whom agrees Ambrose³⁴, who treating the saying of the Apostle: No man can say: The Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit, says that « every truth, by whomsoever it be said, is from the Holy Spirit ». Since therefore it is true that evils p. 818 come to pass, this truth, which is said in that locution, namely evils come to pass, is from God; but it does not follow from this that it is from God that evils come to pass. For if this were said, God would be understood [to be] the author of evils. Which from a similar [example] is manifestly shown to be false: God forbids theft to be done; but that theft be done is true: therefore he forbids the truth. It does not follow.

These things therefore and other vain things of this kind setting aside, favoring the sounder side of the foregoing question, which is more fully approved by the testimonies of the Saints, let us say that God does not will evils to come to pass, nor however wills them not to come to pass, nor is unwilling them to come to pass. For all that he wills to come to pass³⁵, comes to pass, and all that he wills not to come to pass, does not come to pass. But many things come to pass which he does not will to come to pass — such as all evils.

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