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Dist. 5, Part NaN, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I

De comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.

Quaestio I

Utrum substantia sive essentia generet.

Circa primum, quod substantia non generet, ostenditur sic:

1. Generare dicit relationem: ergo cui convenit generare, convenit et1 referri; sed essentiae non convenit referri: ergo nec generare.

2. Item, generare importat distinctionem: ergo cui convenit generare, per consequens et2 distingui; sed essentia cum sit una, non distinguitur: ergo etc. Aut si generat, plures sunt essentiae. Et ad haec duo inconvenientia ducit Magister.3

3. Item, generare dicit actionem personalem: ergo de illo solo dicitur, quod vel supponit personam; sed essentia non significat4 personam, cum sit communis, nec personam supponit, cum sit omnino abstractum: ergo etc.

4. Item, generare est proprietas personae, communicabilitas5 est essentiae: ergo sicut se habet communicabilitas ad personam, ita proprietas personalis ad essentiam; sed communicabilitas nunquam est personae, quia haec est falsa: Pater est communicabilis; ergo nec proprietas personalis erit essentiae: ergo nec generare, cum sit personae.

Contra:

1. Quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est idem alii, et non habent diversas proprietates, quidquid dicitur de uno, et de altero6; sed persona et essentia sunt huiusmodi, quia persona est essentia, nec habent diversas proprietates, quia proprietas in divinis est relatio distinguens; sed si essentia haberet aliquam proprietatem, tunc distingueretur et referretur: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod quamvis persona et essentia non habeant diversas proprietates, tamen differunt per habere proprietatem et non habere; contra: summa oppositio est contradictio7, sed talis diversitas est per contradictionem: ergo magis differunt essentia et persona quam persona et persona; sed persona non praedicatur de persona: ergo nec persona de essentia; hoc autem est falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum praedicatur de altero, unum supponit pro altero, quia subiectum vere subiicitur praedicato8; sed essentia vere praedicatur de Patre; unde haec est vera: Pater est essentia: ergo et supponit: ergo sicut Deus Pater generat, sic potest dici, essentia generat.

3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio9; sed generare est sicut propria passio Patris; sed haec est vera: divina essentia est Pater: ergo et haec similiter: divina essentia generat.

4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur definitum, et definitio10; sed definitio patris est filii pater. Cum igitur haec sit vera: divina essentia est Pater, et haec erit vera: divina essentia est Filii Pater: ergo a convertibili: Filius est Filius essentiae.

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Conclusio

Haec locutio «divina essentia generat» est omnino impropria et neganda, vel saltem pie exponenda.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod fides vera11 dicit quasi fundamentum, Deum esse trinum et unum, et ita trinum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita unum, quod unitas non multiplicatur. Si ergo quod credimus oportuit significare, opportune inventa sunt nomina in divinis, immo a Deo nobis manifestata, quae significent trinitatem sub distinctione et unitatem sine omni multiplicatione. Sicut igitur nomina imposita personis omnino sunt incommunicabilia et quantum ad suppositum et quantum ad significatum; unde haec oratio12 est falsa: Pater est Filius, vel Pater est communicabilis; ita ex parte essentiae vel naturae oportuit nomina imponi, quae non distinguerentur nec quantum ad significatum nec quantum ad suppositum.

Triplex genus nominum. Notandum autem, quod triplex est genus nominum significantium essentiam. Quaedam enim significant in concretione, ut hoc nomen Deus; quaedam in omnimoda abstractione, ut hoc nomen essentia; quaedam medio modo, ut lumen, sapientia, voluntas et consimilia; et ista dicuntur medio modo significare, quia non concernunt suppositum per modum inhaerentiae, sed concernunt suppositum ratione eius, quod dicunt aliquam rationem actus vel originis, quae sunt ipsorum suppositorum. Cum igitur tres sint nominum differentiae, nomen concretum supponit pro persona proprie; nomen medium supponit partim proprie, partim improprie; nomen abstractum et absolutum non supponit nisi omnino improprie.13

Unde haec est propria: Deus generat, et in usum adducenda; haec autem: sapientia generat14 de sapientia, partim propria, partim impropria; ideo est sustinenda, sed non extendenda; haec autem: essentia generat, omnino impropria, et ideo neganda est, et si legatur alicubi, est exponenda. Sancti enim quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressius loquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.

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1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod essentia et persona non habent diversas proprietates; dicendum, quod diversitas rationis dupliciter15 est in divinis. Uno modo per habere diversas proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; alio modo est per habere proprietatem et non habere; et illud non inducit distinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen, quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in Petro et homine: Petrus est individuum, homo non; et tamen homo vere praedicatur de Petro.

Ad illud, quod summa oppositio est affirmationis et negationis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi negatio nihil ponit, sicut inter aliquid et nihil; sed ubi ponit extrema, minima potest esse et surgit ex quantulacumque parva differentia sive rei sive rationis; unde non sufficit ad distinguendum.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod praedicatum supponit pro subiecto; dici potest uno modo, quod — sicut in inferioribus est praedicatio secundum substantiam, ut homo est animal, et est praedicatio secundum rationem, ut animal est genus; et praedicatum16 supponit pro eo de quo praedicatur secundum substantiam, sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem, quae est secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; unde non sequitur: animal est genus, homo est animal, ergo homo est genus — similiter dicunt in divinis, quod cum sint ibi res et ratio, est ibi praedicatio secundum substantiam; et illa salvata, quidquid dicitur de praedicato, et de subiecto; sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; et talis est hic17: Pater generat, divina essentia est Pater: ergo divina essentia generat.

Sed ista similitudo non videtur conveniens, quia in divinis ratio18 praedicatur de essentia, unde haec est vera: essentia est paternitas et generatio; quod quidem in inferioribus non reperitur. Et19 propterea aliter dicendum, quod in divinis est duplex modus praedicandi: per identitatem et per inhaerentiam. Per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: essentia est Pater; per inhaerentiam sive denominationem, sicut faciunt adiectiva et verba.20 Praedicatio per identitatem est in divinis ratione summae simplicitatis, quae non patitur personam minus esse simplicem quam essentiam; quae quia non est in creaturis, ideo in eis non reperitur praedicatio per identitatem omnimodam, nisi idem enuntietur de se, ut cum dicitur: humanitas est humanitas; sed omnis propria praedicatio est21 per inhaerentiam, quia nihil est omnino simplex; unde haec est falsa: humanitas est animalitas. In praedicatione vero per inhaerentiam terminus22 aliud significat et aliud supponit, quia significat formam communem et supponit pro inferiori, et in tali verum est, quod illud quod praedicatur de altero, supponit pro illo. Sed in praedicatione per identitatem idem significat et supponit. Unde tunc est sensus, quod significatum per hunc terminum Pater est idem, quod significatum per hunc terminum essentia, et ideo paternitas est essentia; et quia hoc nomen essentia non significat personam, ideo pro ipsa non supponit, cum nullo modo de ipsa praedicetur nisi praedicatione per identitatem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de passione et subiecto et consimilibus, dicendum, quod duplex est species vocabulorum: quaedam sunt vocabula in divinis substantialia, quae claudunt intra se rem, circa quam ponunt formam importatam per ipsa, ut hoc nomen Pater; et talia possunt praedicari per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: essentia est Pater, id est, ille qui est Pater. Quaedam sunt, quae sunt omnino in adiacentia, sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta23, ut generat et genitus et natus; et talia ponunt rem suam circa ea, de quibus praedicantur, ideo tantum per inhaerentiam praedicantur. Et ideo generare ponit distinctionem, quam importat, circa essentiam, cum de ea dicitur; et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat; haec tamen vera: essentia est generatio. Et quando a praedicatione per identitatem itur24 ad praedicationem per inhaerentiam, potest esse ibi accidens. Quod ergo dicitur: de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio, istud habet instantiam, ubi proprietas est extranea ei, de quo praedicatur subiectum, ut haec intentio species, quamvis sit proprietas hominis, et homo dicatur de Petro, non tamen dicitur de eo hoc quod est species.

Et si obiicias, quod in divinis non cadit ratio extranei, quia non cadit ibi accidens; dicendum, quod etsi non sit extraneitas nec diversitas quantum ad rem, est tamen quoad rationem sive quoad modum praedicandi, qui triplex est in divinis, sicut infra patebit. Unde sicut hic est accidens: essentia est persona; sed persona distinguitur: ergo et essentia; ita et in proposito.

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4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de hac: essentia est Pater Filii; distinguitur a Praepositivo, quod Pater potest ponere suam rem sive respectum per ipsum importatum circa ipsum subiectum, quod est essentia; et tunc est locutio falsa; est enim sensus, quod essentia refertur ad Filium. Vel potest claudere intra se rem sui substantivi, ut sit sensus: essentia est Pater Filii, id est, essentia est ille qui refertur ad Filium; et hoc modo vera est locutio, et non valet argumentum: ergo Filius est Filius essentiae, immo est ibi accidens. Sicut enim non sequitur: Filius refertur ad illum qui est Pater, et ille est essentia: ergo refertur vel distinguitur ab essentia; sic et in proposito.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec est circa principium quod divinarum productionum, quod secundum fidem catholicam ipsae sunt divinae personae producentes. Conclusiones huius et primae quaestionis sequentis articuli sunt contra abbatem Ioachim, cuius doctrina censurata est in Concilio Lateranensi IV, can. de Fide catholica, cap. Damnamus: «Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro [Lombardo], quod una quaedam res est incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis… et illa res non est generans nec genita nec procedens». — Hanc doctrinam catholicam Seraphicus gravissimis argumentis confirmat.

II. In solut. ad 1 distinguit S. Doctor duplicem diversitatem rationis in divinis secundum differentiam, quae est inter habere diversas proprietates et habere vel non habere unam eandemque proprietatem, de quo cfr. hic dub. 4 et infra dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Affirmat etiam alteram inducere distinctionem realem, alteram non. Tres enim sunt in divinis proprietates personales, scil. paternitas, filiatio et spiratio passiva, et habere distinctas has proprietates inducit realem personarum distinctionem; unde etiam una nequit praedicari de alia. Sed diversitas rationis, quae exsurgit ex habere aliquam proprietatem et eandem non habere, non importat realem distinctionem. Essentia enim divina non habet proprietatem generandi, quam habet Pater; nihilominus paternitas et essentia divina non distinguuntur realiter et possunt de se praedicari. Nec valet argumentatio (1 ad opp.), quod habere proprietatem et non habere sint contradictorie opposita, et quod exinde maiorem differentiam inducant inter personam et essentiam, quam quae est inter personas ad invicem. Nam bene distinguit S. Doctor inter contradictionem, cuius unum extremum nihil ponit (ut inter aliquid et nihil) et illam contradictionem, cuius extrema aliquid ponunt. Si unum extremum nihil ponit, non potest verificari de aliquo termino positivo, bene tamen si aliquid ponit. Insuper minima rationis distinctio sufficit ad hoc, ut contradictoria de distinctis dicantur. Sic terminus incommunicabilis verificatur de paternitate et praedicatur de ipsa, non de essentia, licet haec non realiter distinguatur a paternitate. Cfr. infra dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, per totam; et d. 33, q. 2; et S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1.

III. Prima opinio in solut. ad 2 posita, quae distinguit inter praedicationem secundum substantiam et secundum rationem, Praepositivi fuisse dicitur. Secunda opinio distinguit inter praedicationem per identitatem et per inhaerentiam, sive denominationem, quae a Scoto dicitur praedicatio formalis. De hac distinctione cfr. infra d. 33, q. 3; et d. 34, q. 2. Praedicatio identica fit per abstracta; praedicatio per inhaerentiam fit semper in concreto et ratione suppositi. Differunt hae praedicationes, tum quia abstractum eandem rem significat et supponit, concretum vero saepe aliam significat et pro alia supponit (supra, d. 4, q. 1); tum quia abstractum nomen imponitur formae et a forma denominatur, concretum vero non imponitur formae, sed supposito; tum quia identica omnimodam identitatem complectitur, praedicatio vero per inhaerentiam aliquam diversitatem. Unde falsa est ratiocinatio, quae transit a praedicatione identica ad alteram et ab abstracto ad concretum; et in hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, teste S. Thom. (Summa I, q. 39, a. 5). — In creatis locum non habere praedicationem identicam in proprio sensu, est sententia communis, si excipias Franciscum Mayronis.

IV. Quoad ipsam conclusionem cfr. supra d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (ubi affert et solvit 25 argumenta contraria); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 2, aa. 1 et 2. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; et a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I

On the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the account of principle.

Question I

Whether substance or essence begets.

On the first point: that substance does not beget, it is shown thus:

1. To beget expresses a relation: therefore to that to which it belongs to beget, it also1 belongs to be referred; but it does not belong to the essence to be referred: therefore neither does it belong [to the essence] to beget.

2. Likewise, to beget imports distinction: therefore to that to which it belongs to beget, consequently also2 [it belongs] to be distinguished; but the essence, since it is one, is not distinguished: therefore, etc. Or if it begets, there are several essences. And to these two inconveniences the Master reduces [the argument].3

3. Likewise, to beget expresses a personal action: therefore it is said only of that which either supposits for a person; but the essence does not signify4 a person, since it is common — nor does it supposit for a person, since it is altogether abstract: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, to beget is a property of the person, communicability5 of the essence: therefore, as communicability stands to the person, so personal property stands to the essence; but communicability is never of the person — for this is false: «the Father is communicable»; therefore neither will personal property be of the essence: therefore neither to beget, since it is of the person.

On the contrary:

1. Whatever things are such that one is the same as the other and they do not have diverse properties, whatever is said of one is also said of the other6; but person and essence are such, because the person is the essence, nor do they have diverse properties, because a property in divine things is a distinguishing relation; but if the essence had any property, then it would be distinguished and referred: therefore, etc. — If you say that, although person and essence do not have diverse properties, yet they differ through one having a property and the other not having it; on the contrary: the highest opposition is contradiction7, but such a diversity is by contradiction: therefore essence and person differ more than person and person; but person is not predicated of person: therefore neither is person predicated of essence; but this is false: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, whatever things are such that one is predicated of the other, one supposits for the other, because the subject is truly subjected to the predicate8; but essence is truly predicated of the Father — whence this is true: «the Father is essence»; therefore it also supposits: therefore, just as «God the Father begets», so it can be said «essence begets».

3. Likewise, of whatever the subject is predicated, also its proper property9; but to beget is as it were the proper property of the Father; and this is true: «the divine essence is the Father»: therefore likewise this: «the divine essence begets».

4. Likewise, of whatever the defined is predicated, so also its definition10; but the definition of father is the father of a son. Since, then, this is true: «the divine essence is the Father», this too will be true: «the divine essence is the father of the Son»: therefore, by conversion: «the Son is the Son of the essence».

Conclusion

The expression «the divine essence begets» is altogether improper and is to be denied, or at least piously expounded.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it should be noted that the true faith11 says, as a kind of foundation, that God is triune and one — and so triune that the trinity is not confounded, and so one that the unity is not multiplied. If therefore what we believe had to be signified, names were aptly invented in divine matters — indeed, manifested to us by God — which signify the trinity under distinction and the unity without any multiplication. Just as, therefore, the names imposed upon the persons are altogether incommunicable, both with respect to the supposit and with respect to the signified — whence this expression12 is false: «the Father is the Son», or «the Father is communicable» — so on the side of the essence or nature it was necessary that names be imposed which would not be distinguished, either with respect to signification or with respect to supposition.

Threefold genus of names. It should be noted that there is a threefold genus of names signifying the essence. For some signify in concretion, as this name God; some in every kind of abstraction, as this name essence; some in an intermediate mode, as light, wisdom, will, and the like — and these are said to signify in an intermediate mode because they do not concern the supposit in the manner of inherence, but they concern the supposit by reason of what they express — some account of an act or origin, which belong to the supposits themselves. Since, therefore, there are three differences of names, a concrete name properly supposits for a person; a medium name supposits partly properly, partly improperly; an abstract and absolute name does not supposit except altogether improperly.13

Hence this is proper: «God begets», and is to be brought into use; but this: «wisdom begets14 from wisdom» is partly proper, partly improper — therefore it is to be sustained but not extended; but this: «essence begets» is altogether improper, and therefore it is to be denied — and if it is read anywhere, it is to be expounded. For the Saints sometimes, in order to confound heresies, speak more expressly than the propriety of speech sustains.

1. To the first objection, that essence and person do not have diverse properties: it must be said that there is a twofold15 diversity of account in divine things. In one way — through having diverse properties; and this induces distinction, and in this way they differ in account and are not predicated of the same [subject], as Father and Son. In another way — through one having a property and the other not having it; and this does not induce distinction, nor does it cause one not to be predicated of the other; but it does cause that something is said of one which is not said of the other — as is clear in Peter and man: «Peter is an individual», «man [is] not»; and yet man* is truly predicated of Peter.

To the [objection] that the highest opposition is of affirmation and negation: it must be said that this is true where the negation posits nothing, as between something and nothing; but where it posits extremes, it can be minimal and arises from however small a difference, whether of thing or of account; whence it does not suffice for distinguishing.

2. To the second objection, that the predicate supposits for the subject: it can be said in one way that — just as in lower things there is predication according to substance, as «man is animal», and there is predication according to account (ratio), as «animal is a genus»; and the predicate16 supposits for that of which it is predicated according to substance, but when the predication according to substance is changed into a predication that is according to account, there is an accident there; whence it does not follow: «animal is a genus», «man is animal», therefore «man is a genus» — similarly they say in divine matters that, since thing and account are there, there is predication according to substance; and this being preserved, whatever is said of the predicate [is said] also of the subject; but when the predication according to substance is changed into a predication according to account, there is an accident there; and such is this17: «the Father begets», «the divine essence is the Father»: therefore «the divine essence begets».

But this similitude does not seem suitable, because in divine things ratio [account]18 is predicated of the essence — whence this is true: «the essence is paternity and generation» — which indeed is not found in lower things. And19 therefore it must otherwise be said that in divine things there is a twofold mode of predicating: by identity and by inherence. By identity, as when it is said: «the essence is the Father»; by inherence or denomination, as adjectives and verbs do.20 Predication by identity exists in divine things by reason of the supreme simplicity, which does not allow the person to be less simple than the essence; and since this [simplicity] is not in creatures, therefore in them is not found predication by every-mode identity, unless the same be predicated of itself, as when it is said: «humanity is humanity»; but every proper predication is21 by inherence, since nothing is altogether simple; whence this is false: «humanity is animality». But in predication by inherence the term22 signifies one thing and supposits for another, because it signifies a common form and supposits for an inferior, and in such [predication] it is true that what is predicated of another supposits for it. But in predication by identity the same [thing] is signified and supposited. Whence then the sense is that what is signified by this term Father is the same as what is signified by this term essence, and therefore paternity is essence; and because this name essence does not signify a person, therefore it does not supposit for it, since it is in no way predicated of it except by predication by identity.

3. To the third objection concerning property (passio) and subject and the like: it must be said that there is a twofold species of terms: some are substantial terms in divine things, which enclose within themselves the thing about which they place the form imported through themselves, as this name Father; and such [terms] can be predicated by identity, as when it is said: «the essence is the Father», that is, He who is the Father. Some are [terms] which are altogether in adjacency, like verbs and nouns retained adjectively23, as begets and begotten and born; and such [terms] place their thing about those of which they are predicated, and therefore they are predicated only by inherence. And therefore to beget places the distinction which it imports about the essence, when it is said of the essence; and therefore this is false: «the essence begets»; this, however, is true: «the essence is generation». And when one passes24 from predication by identity to predication by inherence, an accident can be there. As to what is said: «of whatever the subject is predicated, so also the proper property» — this has an instance, where the property is extraneous to that of which the subject is predicated, as this intention species, although it is a property of man, and man is said of Peter, yet what is species is not said of him.

And if you object that in divine things the account of the extraneous does not fall, because no accident falls there: it must be said that, although there is no extraneousness nor diversity as to the thing, there is nevertheless [a diversity] as to the account or as to the mode of predicating, which is threefold in divine things, as will appear below. Whence just as here there is an accident: «the essence is the person»; but «the person is distinguished»: therefore «also the essence»; so also in the matter at hand.

4. To the final objection concerning «the essence is the Father of the Son»: it is distinguished, following Prepositivus, that Father can place its thing or [relative] respect imported through itself about the very subject, which is the essence; and then the expression is false; for the sense is that the essence is referred to the Son. Or [Father] can enclose within itself the thing of its substantive, so that the sense is: «the essence is the Father of the Son», that is, the essence is He who is referred to the Son; and in this way the expression is true, and the argument does not hold: «therefore the Son is the Son of the essence»; rather, there is an accident there. For just as it does not follow: «the Son is referred to Him who is the Father», and «He is the essence»: therefore «[the Son] is referred or distinguished from the essence»; so also in the matter at hand.

Scholion

I. This question is concerned with a principle — namely, that of divine productions, which according to the Catholic faith are the divine persons themselves as producing. The conclusions of this question and of the first question of the following article are against Abbot Joachim, whose doctrine was censured at the Fourth Lateran Council, de Fide catholica, chap. Damnamus: «We, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard] that there is one certain thing — incomprehensible, indeed, and ineffable… and that thing is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding». — The Seraphic confirms this Catholic doctrine by the gravest arguments.

II. In the reply to 1, the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold diversity of account in divine things, according to the difference between having diverse properties and having or not having one and the same property — on which cf. here dub. 4, and below dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. He affirms also that the one induces a real distinction, the other does not. For there are three personal properties in God — namely paternity, filiation, and passive spiration — and having these distinct properties induces a real distinction of the persons; hence even one cannot be predicated of another. But the diversity of account that arises from having some property and not having the same does not import a real distinction. For the divine essence does not have the property of begetting which the Father has; nevertheless paternity and the divine essence are not really distinguished and can be predicated of each other. Nor is the argument (1 ad opp.) valid — that to have a property and not to have [it] are contradictorily opposed and therefore induce a greater difference between person and essence than that which is between the persons among themselves. For the Holy Doctor rightly distinguishes between a contradiction whose one extreme posits nothing (as between something and nothing), and that contradiction whose extremes both posit something. If one extreme posits nothing, it cannot be verified of any positive term, but well can if it posits something. Moreover, the smallest distinction of account suffices for contradictories to be said of distinct things. Thus the term incommunicable is verified of paternity and predicated of it, not of the essence, though the latter is not really distinguished from paternity. Cf. below dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, throughout; and d. 33, q. 2; and St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1.

III. The first opinion placed in the reply to 2, which distinguishes between predication according to substance and according to account (ratio), is said to have been that of Prepositivus. The second opinion distinguishes between predication by identity and predication by inherence (or denomination), which Scotus calls formal predication. On this distinction, cf. below d. 33, q. 3; and d. 34, q. 2. Identical predication is made through abstracts; predication by inherence is always made in the concrete and by reason of the supposit. These predications differ: in that the abstract signifies and supposits for the same thing, while the concrete often signifies one thing and supposits for another (above, d. 4, q. 1); in that the abstract name is imposed upon the form and is named from the form, whereas the concrete is imposed not on the form but on the supposit; and in that the identical predication embraces every kind of identity, while predication by inherence [embraces] some diversity. Hence reasoning is false that passes from identical predication to the other and from abstract to concrete; and in this Abbot Joachim erred, as St. Thomas testifies (Summa I, q. 39, a. 5). — That in created things identical predication in the proper sense does not obtain is the common opinion, if Francis of Meyronnes be excepted.

IV. On the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (where he brings forward and solves 25 contrary arguments); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 2, aa. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; and a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat., omisso non bene et, in fine argumenti post nec repetit convenit, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition, omitting et (not well), at the end of the argument repeats convenit after nec — but against the mss. and ed. 1.
  2. Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet et per consequens etiam.
    Thus most codd. with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, which has et per consequens etiam.
  3. Hic c. 1.
    Here c. 1. [Lombard, Sent. I, d. 5, c. 1.]
  4. Vat. cum cod. cc ordine inverso ponit hic supponit pro significat et mox significat pro supponit, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with cod. cc, in reverse order, here puts supponit for significat and shortly after significat for supponit; but the older codd. with ed. 1 stand against this.
  5. Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc. ter communitas loco communicabilitas, sed minus bene.
    Many codd. (A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc.) read three times communitas for communicabilitas — but less well.
  6. Aristot., VII Topic. c. 1. — Mox post quia cod. O addit quidquid est.
    Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1. — Shortly after, codex O adds quidquid est after quia.
  7. Aristot., X Metaph. text. 13 (IX, c. 4): Horum (oppositorum) primum contradictio.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 13 (IX, c. 4): «The first of these [opposites] is contradiction.»
  8. Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 7 (VI, c. 3): Subiectum autem est, de quo cetera dicuntur. Cfr. et libr. Praedicam. in princ. — Paulo ante post quod unum cod. Z adiungit vere et essentialiter; cod. O vero paulo infra post de altero addit essentialiter, et in fine argumenti habet ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 7 (VI, c. 3): «The subject is that of which the rest are said.» Cf. also the Categories at the beginning. — A little earlier, after quod unum, cod. Z adds vere et essentialiter; cod. O, a little further on, after de altero adds essentialiter, and at the end of the argument has ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat.
  9. Aristot., I Topic. c. 7 (c. 6) init.: Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim (de re sive subiecto) praedicatur. — Cod. M addit hic illius subiecti. In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ergo et similiter illa est vera pro ergo et haec similiter.
    Aristotle, Topics I, c. 7 (c. 6) at the beginning: «For this was the proper, which is predicated convertibly (of the thing or subject).» — Cod. M here adds illius subiecti. At the end of the argument, the Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, reads ergo et similiter illa est vera for ergo et haec similiter.
  10. Cfr. Aristot., VI Topic. c. 1 (c. 3), ubi ostendit ad bonam definitionem requiri, quod ipsa conversim praedicari possit de definito; et Petr. Hispan., Summula tract. de Syllog. topico. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 definitio et definitum; sed propter formam argumenti minus bene. Codd. O Z addunt et e converso. Paulo infra multi codd. cum ed. 1 post et haec omittunt erit vera: cod. H habet ergo et haec: divina etc.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1 (c. 3), where he shows that for a good definition it is required that the definition itself can be predicated convertibly of the defined; and Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract on the topical syllogism. — The Vatican edition, against most codd. and ed. 1, reads definitio et definitum; but, on account of the form of the argument, less well. Codd. O Z add et e converso. A little further on, many codd. with ed. 1, after et haec, omit erit vera: cod. H has ergo et haec: divina etc.
  11. Ed. 1 nostra pro vera. Paulo infra codd. V W X et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas; lectio certe quoad sensum praeferenda. Mox cod. I cum ed. 1 post ergo addit hoc.
    Ed. 1 reads nostra for vera. A little further on, codd. V W X read et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas — a reading certainly to be preferred as to sense. Shortly after, cod. I with ed. 1, after ergo, adds hoc.
  12. Codd. V X Z omnino pro oratio. Paulo infra cod. T (ab altera manu correctus) quibus non distingueretur loco quae non distinguerentur.
    Codd. V X Z read omnino for oratio. A little further on, cod. T (corrected by a second hand) reads quibus non distingueretur for quae non distinguerentur.
  13. Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 transponit non ita bene non supponit omnino nisi improprie.
    The Vatican edition, against the older mss. and ed. 1, transposes — not so well — non supponit omnino nisi improprie.
  14. Codd. M Y Z hic addunt vel sapientia. Mox Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit sed non extendenda; cod. O ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda.
    Codd. M Y Z here add vel sapientia. Shortly after, the Vatican edition, against the older codd. and ed. 1, omits sed non extendenda; cod. O reads ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda.
  15. Nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum ed. 1 duplex, et paulo infra multi codd. ut A C G K L R S T V X etc. post et addunt per, sed minus apte. Deinde sensu non mutato codd. D T nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater. Cfr. de hoc d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X post eodem legit glossando: nam alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius.
    Some codd. (T V Y) with ed. 1 read duplex; and a little later, many codd. (A C G K L R S T V X etc.) after et add per, though less aptly. Then — with no change of sense — codd. D T read nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater. Cf. on this d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X after eodem reads by way of gloss: «for the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; therefore one is not predicated of another, as the Father is the Son».
  16. Plures codd. ut A B C L R S U X bb cum ed. 1 falso praedicatio loco praedicatum, et paulo infra post praedicatione omittunt multi codd. ut A F G I K T aa etc. cum ed. 1 non bene secundum substantiam.
    Several codd. (A B C L R S U X bb) with ed. 1 wrongly read praedicatio for praedicatum; and a little later, after praedicatione, many codd. (A F G I K T aa etc.) with ed. 1 not well omit secundum substantiam.
  17. Vat. et codd. cc contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 non bene haec; cod. X ibi.
    The Vatican edition and codd. cc, against the older codd. and ed. 1, not well read haec; cod. X reads ibi.
  18. Cod. Y relatio. Ratio hic stat pro relatio; cfr. supra p. 58.
    Cod. Y reads relatio. Ratio here stands for relatio; cf. above, p. 58.
  19. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit Et.
    The Vatican edition, against the mss. and ed. 1, omits Et.
  20. Codd. I X addunt sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat. — De duplici ratione praedicandi vide infra d. 34, q. 2.
    Codd. I X add sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat. — On the twofold mode of predicating, see below d. 34, q. 2.
  21. Cod. W hic addit illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris; codd. aa bb vero superioris de inferiore est; cod. H tandem in creaturis.
    Cod. W here adds illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris; codd. aa bb read superioris de inferiore est; cod. H finally in creaturis.
  22. Codd. L O addunt communis. Paulo infra post pro illa cod. T continuat constructionem sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem. Quoad doctrinae explicationem cfr. supra d. 4, qq. 2 et 4.
    Codd. L O add communis. A little further on, after pro illa, cod. T continues the construction sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem. For the explication of the doctrine cf. above d. 4, qq. 2 and 4.
  23. Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A E Q V X post omnino omittunt in, in qua lectione adiacentia adiective sumitur.
    The Vatican edition, beyond the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, omits sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta. A little earlier, several codd. (A E Q V X) after omnino omit in — in which reading adiacentia is taken adjectivally.
  24. Cod. R infertur; cod. W proceditur.
    Cod. R reads infertur; cod. W reads proceditur.
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