Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Quaestio II
Utrum concedenda sit locutio, quod Filius generetur de substantia Patris.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit concedendum, quod aliquis generetur de substantia Patris, ut Filius. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per multas auctoritates in littera1 et maxime per illam: Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura legitur: Pater de sua substantia genuisse Filium;
sed Scriptura non dicit nisi verum nec frequentat nisi proprium: ergo praedictus sermo est verus et proprius.
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: quicumque est ab aliquo2 et est ei consubstantialis, est de eius substantia; sed Filius est a Patre et est ei consubstantialis: ergo est de eius substantia.
3. Item, Pater generat Filium: aut ergo de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia tunc esset creatura: ergo de aliquo3; non de aliquo alio a se: ergo de sui substantia.
4. Item, in inferioribus filius, qui habet partem substantiae a patre, dicitur esse de substantia patris: ergo multo fortius, qui habet totam substantiam, dicitur esse de substantia generantis: ergo haec est vera: Filius est de substantia Patris.
Contra:
1. Propositiones sunt transitivae4, et ubi transitio, ibi est distinctio et diversitas: ergo cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris, haec praepositio de notat distinctionem inter substantiam Patris et Filium: ergo cum nulla sit distinctio, quia Filius est substantia Patris, propositio praedicta est falsa. Si dicas, quod haec praepositio de cadit a generali significato praepositionum, retinens speciale: ergo est ibi soloecismus5, sicut si dicatur sublime volat pro sublimiter, quod stultum est dicere.
2. Item, obiicitur de significato speciali. Haec praepositio de, prout accipitur specialiter, aliquando tenetur materialiter, ut cultellus de ferro; aliquando ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies, id est post mane; aliquando originaliter, ut si dicatur, radius de sole vel splendor de igne. Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiatur, falsa est locutio: si materialiter, est falsa, quia Filius caret materia; si ordinaliter, falsa, quia sensus est, quod Filius sit post Patrem sive post substantiam Patris; si originaliter, similiter falsa quia tunc est sensus, quod Filius habeat ortum a substantia Patris; sed ista non admittitur: substantia Patris generat Filium: ergo est omni modo6 falsa. Si dicas, quod nullo istorum modorum, sed tenetur quarto modo substantialiter; quaeritur, unde ortum habeat haec significatio et ubi consimiliter accipiatur7; et videtur quod hoc nihil sit, quia tunc haec esset vera: Pater est de substantia Filii, quam nemo concedit.
3. Item, hoc idem ostenditur sic: differt haec praepositio de et a: quia a proprie dicit habitudinem principii activi, sed haec praepositio de dicit habitudinem principii passivi; sed Deo et eius substantiae magis convenit ratio principii activi quam passivi: ergo haec est magis vera: Filius est a substantia Patris, quam de; sed haec non recipitur: ergo nec alia debet recipi.
4. Item, de aut dicit identitatem aut diversitatem; si identitatem: ergo cum summa identitas sit in essentia vel substantia, haec erit vera: substantia[^8] de substantia, quam negat Magister; si diversitatem: sed non distinguitur substantia Patris a Filio, quia Filius est ipsa substantia Patris: ergo omnino est falsa.
Conclusio
Concedendum est, Filium generari de substantia Patris.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio est concedenda.
Et ad intelligentiam praedictorum9 notandum, quod praeter praedictos tres modos, quibus haec praepositio de accipitur, quarto modo etiam potest accipi, scilicet substantialiter, ut dicat substantialem convenientiam inter extrema; sed hanc nunquam pure dicit, cum sit praepositio et importet aliquam habitudinem et respectum ad extrema. Si enim tantum substantialiter teneretur10; sicut dicitur: filius de substantia patris, ita diceretur: pater de substantia filii; quod absonum est.
Propterea notandum, quod substantialiter accipi consuevit tripliciter. Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et partialiter, ut cum dicitur, quod partes sunt de toto sive de substantia totius, ut urceus vini de dolio. Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et ordinaliter, ut cum dicitur: de pane fit corpus Christi; ibi enim est ordo, quia substantia panis non manet in corpore Christi, sicut nec mane in meridie; sed ulterius substantialiter, quia substantia panis transit in substantiam corporis Christi. Aliquando accipitur11 substantialiter et originaliter, ut cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris; ratione ablativi tenetur substantialiter, ratione genitivi originaliter: et ideo importat aliquam distinctionem Filii ad Patrem, non ad eius substantiam, et ita praepositio tenet ibi generale significatum et speciale.
1. 2. Et sic patet responsio ad primum argumentum et secundum. Tamen quod dicitur, quod praepositiones sunt transitivae, non intelligitur, quod notent ex hoc diversitatem necessario; sed sicut dicitur, quod obliqui12 sunt transitivi quantum ad modum; quia transitive construuntur cum verbis, ut, video me; similiter hoc de praepositionibus dicitur, quae13 cum obliquis construuntur.
3. Patet etiam tertium, quod de non tantum dicit habitudinem principii passivi nec tantum habitudinem principii activi, sed habitudinem consubstantialem cum habitudine originis; quod non facit haec praepositio a; et ideo non est simile.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio, quia de non dicit ibi penitus identitatem nec diversitatem, sed consubstantialitatem cum habitudine originis.
I. Pro intelligentia aliquorum terminorum in solut. ad 1 et alibi occurrentium haec ex antiquis grammaticis notamus.
1. Duplex distinguebatur constructio transitiva, scil. tum actuum tum personarum. In prima constructibile dependens per modum actus significat, ut in verbis transitivis, v. g. lego librum; secunda vero est, in qua constructibile dependens per modum substantiae significat. Haec fit vel per casus obliquos (v. g. filius Socratis; similis Ciceroni) vel etiam per praepositiones, quae inde vocantur transitivae. Vide Scotum, Grammatica speculativa c. 46 usque 51, de hoc subtiliter disputantem.
2. Constructio transitiva secundum antiquam definitionem est illa, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa; intransitiva vero est ea, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel saltem ad idem videntur pertinere.
3. Quomodo casus grammaticales sint transitivi quantum ad modum significandi, late Scot. explicat ibid. c. 49.
4. Ipse S. Bonav. infra d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 docet, quod praepositiones non notent necessario diversitatem.
Ampliorem expositionem et applicationem huius solutionis exhibent Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; et Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, ad 1.
II. In conclusione doctores conveniunt. Cfr. Alex. et Richard. locc. citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 3. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.
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Question II
Whether the expression should be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.
Secondly it is asked whether it should be conceded that anyone is begotten of the substance of the Father, as the Son is. And that it is so, it seems:
1. By many authorities in the text1 and especially by this: «It is also said, and frequently read in Scripture, that the Father begot the Son from His own substance»; but Scripture says nothing except what is true, and uses frequently nothing except what is proper: therefore the aforesaid expression is true and proper.
2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: whoever is from something2 and is consubstantial with it, is of its substance; but the Son is from the Father and is consubstantial with Him: therefore He is of His substance.
3. Likewise, the Father begets the Son: either, then, from something, or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature: therefore from something3; not from something other than Himself: therefore from His own substance.
4. Likewise, among inferior beings a son who has a part of his father's substance is said to be of the father's substance: therefore much more strongly, one who has the whole substance is said to be of the substance of the begetter: therefore this is true: the Son is of the substance of the Father.
On the contrary:
1. Propositions are transitive4, and where there is transition, there is distinction and diversity: therefore when it is said the Son of the substance of the Father, this preposition de (of/from) denotes a distinction between the substance of the Father and the Son: therefore, since there is no distinction — because the Son is the substance of the Father — the aforesaid proposition is false. If you say that this preposition de falls from the general signification of prepositions, retaining the special: then there is here a solecism5, just as if one were to say sublime volat for sublimiter ("it flies sublime" for "sublimely"), which it is foolish to say.
2. Likewise, an objection is made concerning the special signified meaning. This preposition de, as it is taken specially, is sometimes taken materially, as a knife of iron; sometimes ordinally, as from morning comes midday, that is, after morning; sometimes originally, as when it is said, a ray from the sun or splendor from fire. But in whatever of these modes it is taken, the expression is false: if materially, it is false because the Son lacks matter; if ordinally, false because the sense is that the Son is after the Father, or after the substance of the Father; if originally, similarly false because then the sense is that the Son has His origin from the substance of the Father — but this is not admitted: «the substance of the Father begets the Son»: therefore in every way6 it is false. If you say that it is taken in none of those modes, but is held in a fourth mode, substantially, it is asked whence this signification has its origin, and where it is similarly taken7; and it seems that this is nothing, because then this would be true: the Father is of the substance of the Son, which no one concedes.
3. Likewise, the same is shown thus: this preposition de differs from a (from): for a properly expresses the relation of an active principle, but this preposition de expresses the relation of a passive principle; but the account of an active principle belongs more to God and His substance than that of a passive: therefore this is more true: the Son is from (a) the substance of the Father, than of (de); but this is not received: therefore neither should the other be received.
4. Likewise, de expresses either identity or diversity; if identity — then since the highest identity is in the essence or substance, this will be true: substance[^8] of substance, which the Master denies; if diversity — but the substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the very substance of the Father: therefore it is altogether false.
Conclusion
It is to be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.
I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid expression is to be conceded.
And for the understanding of the foregoing9 it should be noted that besides the three aforementioned modes in which this preposition de is taken, it can also be taken in a fourth mode, namely substantially, so that it expresses a substantial agreement between the extremes. But it never says this purely, since it is a preposition and imports some relation and respect to the extremes. For if it were held only substantially10, as it is said son from the substance of the father, so it would be said father from the substance of the son; which is absurd.
Therefore it should be noted that to be taken substantially is customary in three ways. Sometimes it is taken substantially and partially, as when it is said that parts are of the whole or of the substance of the whole, as a jug of wine from the cask. Sometimes it is taken substantially and ordinally, as when it is said: from bread is made the body of Christ; for there is order there, because the substance of the bread does not remain in the body of Christ, just as morning does not remain at midday; but further substantially, because the substance of the bread passes into the substance of the body of Christ. Sometimes it is taken11 substantially and originally, as when it is said: the Son of the substance of the Father; by reason of the ablative it is held substantially, by reason of the genitive originally: and therefore it imports some distinction of the Son to the Father, not to His substance, and so the preposition there holds its general signified meaning together with its special one.
1. 2. And so the response to the first and second arguments is clear. Yet as to what is said, that prepositions are transitive — it is not understood that they thereby denote diversity necessarily; but just as it is said that oblique [cases]12 are transitive as to manner, because they are construed transitively with verbs, as I see myself; likewise this is said of prepositions, which13 are construed with oblique cases.
3. The third is also clear: that de expresses not only the relation of a passive principle, nor only the relation of an active principle, but a consubstantial relation together with the relation of origin — which this preposition a does not do; and therefore they are not alike.
4. To that which is last objected, the response is clear, because de there does not express identity at all, nor diversity, but consubstantiality with the relation of origin.
I. For the understanding of certain terms occurring in the reply to 1 and elsewhere, we note the following from the ancient grammarians.
1. A twofold transitive construction was distinguished, namely both of acts and of persons. In the first, the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of an act, as in transitive verbs, e.g. I read a book; the second is that in which the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of a substance. This occurs either by oblique cases (e.g. Socrates's son; similar to Cicero) or also by prepositions, which are therefore called transitive. See Scotus, Grammatica speculativa, cc. 46–51, who discusses this subtly.
2. A transitive construction, according to the ancient definition, is one in which the constructibles pertain to diverse things, or seem to pertain to diverse things; an intransitive is one in which the constructibles pertain to the same thing, or at least seem to pertain to the same.
3. In what manner grammatical cases are transitive as to mode of signifying, Scotus explains at length ibid. c. 49.
4. St. Bonaventure himself below at d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 teaches that prepositions do not necessarily denote diversity.
A fuller exposition and application of this solution is given by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and Richard of Middleton, here q. 3, ad 1.
II. On the conclusion the doctors agree. Cf. Alexander and Richard loc. cit. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 ff. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.
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- Hic c. 1 post medium.Here [in the Sentences text, distinction 5] c. 1, after the middle.
- Ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquo pro alio.From nearly all the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted aliquo ("from something") for alio ("from another").
- Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit et, pro quo cod. A melius habet sed.The Vatican ed., against most codd. and ed. 1, adds et; for which cod. A better reads sed.
- Cfr. Priscian., XIV Grammat. c. 1 seqq. — Mox post ibi Vat. habet etiam est loco et. Paulo infra ed. 1 verbo nulla praemittit satis bene in substantia.Cf. Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XIV, c. 1 ff. — Next, after ibi the Vatican ed. has etiam est in place of et. A little later, ed. 1 prefixes in substantia before the word nulla, suitably enough.
- Priscian., XV Grammat. c. 1: Nam si (ordinatio partium orationis) incongrua sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus.Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XV, c. 1: «For if [the ordering of the parts of speech] is incongruous, it will produce a solecism, as when the elements of speech come together inelegantly».
- Plures codd. ut A F H K T Y etc. cum ed. 4 omni modo, Vat. omnino. — Similia habet Aristot., V Metaph. text. 29 (IV, 24) de praepositione ex. — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut K V W X post modorum addunt tenetur.Several codd. (A F H K T Y etc.) with ed. 4 read omni modo ("in every way"), Vat. omnino ("altogether"). — Aristotle has similar things, Metaphysics V, text 29 (IV, 24), on the preposition ex ("out of"). — A little later, several codd. (K V W X) after modorum add tenetur.
- Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 similiter accipitur.The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads similiter accipitur ("is similarly taken").
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit est. Textum Magistri vide in lit. c. 1 et 2 circa finem.The Vatican ed., contrary to the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, adds est. For the Master's text see in littera c. 1 and 2 near the end.
- Aliqui codd. ut T V addunt est.Some codd. (T V) add est.
- Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene tenetur.The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, less well reads tenetur ("is held").
- Substituimus ex codd. et ed. 1 accipitur pro dicitur. Paulo infra post Filius cod. V addit est.From the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted accipitur ("is taken") for dicitur ("is said"). A little later, after Filius, cod. V adds est.
- Supple: casus. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 videt me pro video me, sed non bene.Supply: casus ("[oblique] cases"). — A little later, several codd. (A C F G H K L O R S V X etc.) with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read videt me ("he sees me") for video me ("I see myself"), but not well.
- Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungit etiam. Cod. H quia loco quae.The Vatican ed., contrary to the testimony of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds etiam. Cod. H reads quia in place of quae.