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Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 115

Articulus II

De comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini.

Consequenter circa secundum articulum huius quaestionis, qui est per comparationem generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini, duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.

Secundo, utrum per generationem communicetur.

Quaestio I

Utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.

Quod autem substantia generetur, sic obiicitur1:

1. Generatio in inferioribus est motus ad substantiam5; quod motus est, hoc est imperfectionis, quod ad substantiam est, hoc est perfectionis; si ergo quod est perfectionis est transferendum ad divina: ergo et generatio terminatur ad essentiam.

2. Item, generatio in divinis terminatur: aut ergo ad substantiam, aut ad accidens, quia omne ens est substantia, vel accidens26; sed in divinis non terminatur ad accidens, cum non sit ibi: ergo ad substantiam. Si dicas, quod in divinis, quamvis non sit accidens, est tamen relatio, quae distinguitur a substantia; tunc arguitur sic: aut generatio terminabitur ad substantiam, aut ad relationem; sed non ad relationem, quia in ad aliquid per se non est origo, nec terminatur productio7: ergo terminatur ad substantiam: ergo substantia generatur.

3. Item, sicut dicit Philosophus8: «Motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt, et corruptis nobis, corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt»; et hoc est34, quia universale habet idem esse cum singulari: ergo cum multo magis sit eadem substantia cum persona, et substantia sit in persona, si persona generatur, et substantia.

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4. Item, generare tam in divinis quam in creaturis est simile sibi producere9; sed non est similitudo in persona, sed in substantia et in natura: ergo cum terminetur ad simile, in quantum est simile, ergo ad substantiam, secundum quam attenditur similitudo.

Contra:

1. Omne quod generatur ab alio generatur, quia nihil se ipsum gignit10; sed substantia divina non habet alium, nec aliud est in divinis: ergo non generatur.

2. Item, omne quod generatur habet principium a quo11; sed omne quod habet principium, est principiatum; sed principium et principiatum distinguuntur: si ergo substantia generatur, distinguitur: aut ergo a substantia, aut a persona; sed utrumque est impossibile: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod generatur est de substantia generantis12; si ergo substantia generatur, substantia vel essentia est de substantia generantis; sed non est nisi una omnino substantia: ergo idem est de se ipso, quod est impossibile.

4. Item, generatio est productio13; sed productio est quaedam actio, et omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad singularia14: ergo cum generatio sit quaedam actio, in divinis terminabitur ad singulare sive suppositum; sed tale non est substantia: ergo non terminabitur ad ipsam.

Conclusio

Cum in divinis generatio terminetur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, non ad substantiam secundam sive essentiam, minime recipitur, quod substantia generetur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio de sua communi ratione ad substantiam terminatur. Sed attendendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter15: prima, quae est individuum et hypostasis sive persona, et secunda, quae est commune. Dico ergo, quod est loqui de termino generationis dupliciter: aut quantum ad productionem, aut quantum ad intentionem. Quantum ad productionem, cum sit circa singulare, terminatur ad substantiam primam, et16 quantum ad intentionem ad naturam communem, quia natura producens hunc hominem intendit formam communem dare ei.

Sed quoniam in creaturis forma communis numeratur in suppositis, ideo in illis forma communis producitur et corrumpitur; et ideo in creaturis generatio non tantum secundum intentionem, sed etiam secundum productionem ad substantiam communem terminatur; et ideo universale in singulari generatur, quia numeratur17. Sed quoniam in divinis substantia non numeratur nec advenit ei novum esse: ideo generatio secundum productionem terminatur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, quia persona secundum Boethium18 «est rationalis naturae individua substantia». Et quoniam illud solum dicitur proprie generari, ad quod terminatur generatio secundum rationem producendi: ideo persona generatur, non substantia vel essentia. Et ideo haec non recipitur: essentia generatur.

Et sic patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem; procedunt enim19 diversis viis.

Patet etiam, quare in divinis non sequitur, quod, generata persona, generetur substantia, sicut in creaturis. Posset tamen aliter dici, quod non generetur commune nisi in hoc20; et non tantum in creaturis hoc verum est, sed etiam in divinis. Commune autem ut in hoc non significatur in abstractione, sed in concretione; et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat substantiam in concretione21, Deus generatur et Deus generat Deum. Quia vero substantia vel essentia significat in abstractione, ideo nec generat nec generatur; et ita procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas.

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Scholion

I. Haec conclusio est iterum contra abbatem Ioachim (cfr. Schol. hic a. 1, q. 1). Ut recte intelligatur conclusio, notandum, quod non est sermo de subiecto generationis, quod in generatione creaturarum est materia prima, quae praesupponitur generationi, sed de termino generationis, qui incipit esse.

Perfecta generatio terminatur ad substantiam, non ad accidens; sed S. Doctor cum communi sententia distinguit duplicem substantiam: altera dicitur substantia prima, quae est omne individuum in genere substantiae; altera vero secunda, quae est aliquid «commune» in genere substantiae. Substantia prima est terminus totalis generationis quantum ad productionem; substantia vero secunda est terminus formalis (at partialis) quantum ad intentionem. In creaturis uterque terminus incipit esse de novo, non vero in Deo. «Unde generatio divina terminatur ad primam substantiam, non ad essentiam, neque ad relationem, in quantum est relatio, sed in quantum est persona subsistens». Ita hic Richard. a Med.

II. In conclusione et principalibus argumentis doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 2 secundae quaest. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article II

On the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term.

Next, concerning the second article of this question — which is by the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term — two questions are asked.

First: whether substance or essence is begotten.

Second: whether through generation it is communicated.

Question I

Whether substance or essence is begotten.

That substance is begotten is objected1 thus:

1. Generation in inferior beings is a motion to substance5; what is motion, this belongs to imperfection; what is toward substance, this belongs to perfection; if therefore what belongs to perfection is to be transferred to the divine: therefore generation also is terminated at essence.

2. Likewise, generation in God is terminated: either, therefore, at substance, or at accident, since every being is substance or accident26; but in God it is not terminated at an accident, since none is there: therefore at substance. If you say that in God, although there is no accident, there is nevertheless relation, which is distinguished from substance, then it is argued thus: either generation will be terminated at substance, or at relation; but not at relation, since in ad aliquid (in relation to something) there is no origin per se, nor is production terminated7: therefore it is terminated at substance: therefore substance is begotten.

3. Likewise, as the Philosopher says8: «When we are moved, the things in us are moved, and when we are corrupted, the things in us are corrupted»; and this is so34, because the universal has the same being as the singular: therefore, since substance is much more the same as the person — and substance is in the person — if the person is begotten, so also the substance.

4. Likewise, to beget, both in God and in creatures, is to produce a likeness of itself9; but the likeness is not in the person, but in the substance and in the nature: therefore, since generation is terminated at the like insofar as it is like, therefore at the substance, according to which the likeness is observed.

On the contrary:

1. Whatever is begotten is begotten by another, since nothing begets itself10; but the divine substance does not have another, nor is there another in God: therefore it is not begotten.

2. Likewise, whatever is begotten has a principle from which11; but everything that has a principle is principled; and principle and principled are distinguished: if therefore substance is begotten, it is distinguished — either from substance or from a person; but both are impossible: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, whatever is begotten is from the substance of the begetter12; if therefore substance is begotten, the substance or essence is from the substance of the begetter; but there is altogether only one substance: therefore the same thing is from itself, which is impossible.

4. Likewise, generation is production13; but production is a kind of action, and every action of a creature is terminated at singulars14: therefore, since generation is a kind of action, in God it will be terminated at the singular or supposit; but such is not substance: therefore it will not be terminated at it.

Conclusion

Since in God generation is terminated only at the first substance, which is a person, not at second substance or essence, it is by no means received that substance is begotten.

I respond: It must be said that generation, by its common account, is terminated at substance. But it should be noted that substance is said in two ways15: first, that which is the individual and hypostasis or person; and second, that which is the common. I say therefore that one can speak of the term of generation in two ways: either as to production, or as to intention. As to production, since it concerns the singular, it is terminated at first substance, and16 as to intention at the common nature, because the nature producing this man intends to give him the common form.

But since in creatures the common form is numbered in supposits, therefore in them the common form is produced and corrupted; and therefore in creatures generation, not only according to intention but also according to production, is terminated at common substance; and so the universal is begotten in the singular, because it is numbered17. But since in God substance is not numbered, nor does a new being come to it, therefore generation according to production is terminated only at first substance, which is the person, because a person, according to Boethius18, «is the individual substance of a rational nature». And since that alone is properly said to be begotten at which generation is terminated according to the account of producing, therefore the person is begotten, not the substance or essence. And therefore this is not received: essence is begotten.

And thus all the objections on either side are clear; for they proceed19 by different ways.

It is also clear why in God it does not follow that, when the person is begotten, the substance is begotten, as in creatures. Yet it could be put another way: that the common is not begotten except in this (i.e. in the singular)20; and this is true not only in creatures, but also in God. The common, however, as in this is signified not in abstraction, but in concretion; and therefore, since this name God signifies substance in concretion21, God is begotten and God begets God. But because substance or essence signifies in abstraction, therefore it neither begets nor is begotten; and thus the arguments proceed to the opposite parts.

Scholion

I. This conclusion is again against Abbot Joachim (cf. the Scholion here a. 1, q. 1). For the conclusion to be rightly understood, it should be noted that we are not speaking of the subject of generation, which in the generation of creatures is prime matter (which is presupposed to generation), but of the term of generation, which begins to be.

Perfect generation is terminated at substance, not at accident; but the Holy Doctor, with the common opinion, distinguishes a twofold substance: one is called first substance, which is every individual in the genus of substance; and the other second, which is something «common» in the genus of substance. First substance is the total term of generation as to production; second substance is the formal (but partial) term as to intention. In creatures both terms begin to be anew; in God, however, this is not so. «Hence divine generation is terminated at first substance, not at the essence, nor at the relation insofar as it is a relation, but insofar as it is a subsisting person». So Richard of Middleton here.

II. On the conclusion and the principal arguments the doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 3; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 2 of the second question. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Supple: casus. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 videt me pro video me, sed non bene.
    Supply: casus (a case [is fallen]). — A little below, several codd. (A C F G H K L O R S V X etc.) with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read videt me in place of video me, but not well.
  2. Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungit etiam. Cod. H quia loco quae.
    The Vatican edition, against the witness of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds etiam. Cod. H reads quia in place of quae.
  3. Vat. ponit quod loco quia et omittit de, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition puts quod in place of quia and omits de, but against the mss. and ed. 1.
  4. Cod. H ostenditur.
    Cod. H reads ostenditur.
  5. Propositio haec quoad sensum invenitur in Aristot., V Phys. text. 7 (c. 1): Quae (mutatio) vero ex non esse simpliciter in substantiam est, generatio simpliciter est. Cfr. etiam I de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 11–18 (c. 3).
    This proposition, as to its sense, is found in Aristotle, Physics V, text 7 (c. 1): «Change which is from non-being absolutely into substance is generation absolutely». Cf. also On Generation and Corruption I, text 11–18 (c. 3).
  6. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Complexis et de Substantia; I Phys. text. 26–30 (c. 3); V Metaph. text. 13 seqq. (IV, c. 7).
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories c. On Complex Terms and On Substance; Physics I, text 26–30 (c. 3); Metaphysics V, text 13 ff. (IV, c. 7).
  7. Aristot., V Phys. text. 10 (c. 2): Neque etiam in ad aliquid (est motus). — Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut A I T bb arguetur loco arguitur. In fine argumenti post substantiam cod. I addit sed illud, ad quod terminatur generatio, illud generatur.
    Aristotle, Physics V, text 10 (c. 2): «Nor again is there [motion] in ad aliquid (in relation)». — A little before, some codd. (A I T bb) read arguetur in place of arguitur. At the end of the argument, after substantiam, cod. I adds: but that at which generation is terminated, that is generated.
  8. Aristot., II Topic. c. 3 (c. 7), in quo textu mss. cum sex primis edd. moventibus pro motis (κινουμένων); idem recurrit infra d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 et d. 37, p. II, a. 1, obiect. 3. Alteram propositionis partem invenies in Aristot., de Longit. et Brevit. Vitae c. 2 his verbis: Corruptis (φθειρομένων) enim animalibus, corrumpuntur et scientia et sanitas, quae in animalibus. — Rationem huic propositioni additam innuit Arist., II Topic. loc. cit. et fusius probat VII Metaph. text. 35 et 45 seqq. (VI, 10 et 13). Post corrumpuntur codd. V X addunt omnia et cod. K post idem esse adiungit et eandem essentiam.
    Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7), where the text of the mss. with the first six editions reads moventibus in place of motis (κινουμένων); the same recurs below at d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3, and d. 37, p. II, a. 1, obj. 3. The other part of the proposition you will find in Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life c. 2, with these words: «For when animals are corrupted (φθειρομένων), the knowledge and the health that are in animals are also corrupted». — The reason added to this proposition Aristotle hints at in Topics II, loc. cit., and more fully proves in Metaphysics VII, text 35 and 45 ff. (VI, 10 and 13). After corrumpuntur, codd. V X add omnia, and cod. K after idem esse appends et eandem essentiam.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., II de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4), ubi dicit, quod naturalissimum operum viventium est facere quale ipsum, id est generare; et text. 49: Finis est generare quale ipsum, id est simile. — Mox plerique codd. ut A C F G H I T etc. cum ed. 1 ad similem loco ad simile ac dein similis pro simile.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4), where he says that the most natural of the works of living things is to make what is like itself — that is, to generate; and text 49: «The end is to generate what is like itself» — that is, the like. — Shortly after, most codd. (A C F G H I T etc.) with ed. 1 read ad similem in place of ad simile, and then similis for simile.
  10. Aristot., II de Anima, text. 47 (c. 4): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. — Paulo infra post aliud aliqui codd. ut A T V Z cc omittunt est, cuius loco cod. X ponit a quo generetur.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4): «But nothing generates its very self». — A little below, after aliud, some codd. (A T V Z cc) omit est; in its place cod. X puts a quo generetur.
  11. Aristot., IV Metaph. text. 22 (ed. Venet. 1489), ubi secundum translationem arabico-latinam sic habetur: Et si generetur, necesse est, ut habeat esse illud ex quo generatur, illud quod ex eo generatur, et illud per quod generatur. Iuxta ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: Si fit, necesse est esse, ex quo fit, et a quo generatur.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 22 (Venice ed. 1489), where according to the Arabic-Latin translation it reads thus: «And if it is generated, it is necessary that there be that from which it is generated, that which is generated from it, and that through which it is generated». According to the Paris edition (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: «If it comes to be, it is necessary that there be that from which it comes to be and that by which it is generated».
  12. Cfr. Aristot., II de Anima, text. 34–50 (c. 4), ubi de nutritione et generatione agit. — Circa finem argumenti post una Vat. minus bene omittit omnino et post idem omittit est, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34–50 (c. 4), where he treats of nutrition and generation. — Near the end of the argument, after una the Vatican edition less well omits omnino, and after idem omits est, but against the mss. and ed. 1.
  13. Sub hoc respectu Aristot., II de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4) actum generandi viventis definiens ait: est facere quale ipsum.
    In this respect Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4), defining the act of generating of the living, says: «it is to make what is like itself».
  14. De termino actionis ait Aristot., I Metaph. c. 1: Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt. — In fine argumenti aliqui codd. ut A I T cum ed. 1 terminatur loco terminabitur.
    On the term of an action Aristotle says, Metaphysics I, c. 1: «But all actions and generations are concerned with the singular». — At the end of the argument, some codd. (A I T) with ed. 1 read terminatur in place of terminabitur.
  15. Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.
    See Aristotle, Categories, c. On Substance.
  16. Codd. omittunt vero a Vat. post quantum additum, cuius loco voci quantum praemittunt plures codd. ut A F G I K S T V X Z, quos sequimur, particulam et, alii ut H P Q Y sed. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 post quia expunximus haec.
    The codices omit vero (added by the Vatican edition after quantum); in its place, several codd. (A F G I K S T V X Z), which we follow, prefix the particle et to quantum, others (H P Q Y) prefix sed. A little below, on the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, after quia we have expunged haec.
  17. Cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 28 (VI, c. 8).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8).
  18. Libr. de Persona et duabus naturis c. 3 in initio (ed. Migne). — Immediate post Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 Sed quia loco Et quoniam. — De termino generationis cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 26 seqq. (VI, c. 8).
    Book On the Person and the Two Natures c. 3 at the beginning (Migne edition). — Immediately after, the Vatican edition against the mss. and ed. 1 reads Sed quia in place of Et quoniam. — On the term of generation, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 26 ff. (VI, c. 8).
  19. Fide mss. expunximus hic a Vat. additum de.
    On the witness of the mss. we have here expunged de, which had been added by the Vatican edition.
  20. Hoc est, in individuo sive supposito. De quo cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. loc. cit. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. ut in hoc.
    That is, in the individual or supposit. On which cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, loc. cit. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the mss., reads ut in hoc.
  21. Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit ideo in concretione.
    The Vatican edition, incongruously and against the older codd. and ed. 1, adds ideo in concretione.
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