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Dist. 7

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 132

Distinctio VII

Cap. I

Utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit gignere Filium.

Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit generare Filium. Si enim, inquiunt, potuit et1 voluit generare Filium: ergo potuit aliquid et voluit, quod nec potuit nec voluit Filius; nam Filius nec potuit nec voluit generare Filium. Cui versutiae facile respondemus dicentes: posse vel velle generare Filium non est aliquid posse vel velle subiectum2 voluntati vel potentiae. Est tamen aliqua potentia vel voluntas, scilicet posse vel velle gignere Filium; et ideo distinguenda est intelligentia propositi3 verbi: posse vel velle gignere Filium est posse vel velle aliquid. Neque enim generatio Filii aliquid eorum est, quae subiecta sunt divinae potentiae et voluntati, nec est aliquid inter omnia vel de omnibus, sed super omnia et ante omnia. Non enim ante voluit vel potuit, quam genuit; sicut nec ante fuit, quam genuit, quia4 ab aeterno fuit et ab aeterno genuit. Ex simili quoque hoc videre possumus. Pater enim potest esse Pater et vult esse Pater; Filius autem nec5 potest nec vult esse Pater: ergo Pater potest vel vult esse aliquid, quod non potest vel vult esse Filius. Non sequitur, quia esse Patrem non est esse aliquid, sed est esse ad aliquid, ut in sequenti ostendetur6.

Sed vehementer nos movet quod ait Augustinus in secundo libro contra Maximinum7, qui asserebat Patrem potentiorem Filio, eo quod Filium genuit Deum creatorem, Filius autem non; dicebatque Patrem potuisse gignere non Filium; et ideo potentiorem esse Filio. Ad quod respondens Augustinus dicere videtur, quod Filius etiam potuit8 gignere, volens ostendere, Patrem non esse potentiorem Filio, his verbis: «Absit, ut ideo potentior sit Pater Filio, sicut putas, quia Creatorem genuit Pater, Filius autem non genuit Creatorem; neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit». Vide et diligenter attende haec verba: non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit. Videtur enim dicere, quod Filius potuit gignere, sed non oportuit; et ita potuit quod non oportuit. Quare autem non oportuit, subdit dicens: «Immoderata enim esset divina generatio, si genitus Filius nepotem gigneret Patri, quia et ipse nepos, nisi avo suo pronepotem gigneret, secundum vestram mirabilem sapientiam impotens diceretur. Similiter etiam ille, si nepotem non gigneret avo suo et pronepotem proavo suo, non a vobis appellaretur omnipotens; nec impleretur generationis series, si semper alter ex altero nasceretur; nec eam perficeret ullus, si non sufficeret unus omnipotens. Itaque omnipotentem genuit Filium Patris natura, non fecit».

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Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam posse stare, scilicet quod Filius potuerit gignere. Si enim Filius potuit gignere, potuit esse pater; et si potuit esse pater, ergo potuit esse pater vel sui, vel Patris, vel Spiritus sancti, vel alicuius9 alius. Sed alius non, quia nullus alius semper fuit; nec Patris, quia Pater est ingenitus et innascibilis; nec sui, «quia nulla res se ipsam gignere potest»; nec Spiritus sancti, quia nasci non potuit. Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse filius, et ita mutabilis esse potuit.

Quomodo ergo accipietur10 quod supra dictum est: non enim non potuit gignere, sed non oportuit, quasi potuit, sed non oportuit? Non est nobis perspicuum aperire, quomodo sit hoc verum, et ideo sub silentio potius esset praetereundum, nisi me super hoc aliquid loqui cogeret instantia quaerentium.

Potest ergo11 sic intelligi: non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit, id est, non ex impotentia sui fuit, quod Filius non genuit, sed ei non conveniebat, sicut Deus Filius non est Deus Pater; nec tamen hoc ex impotentia sui est. Nam et Pater similiter non est Filius, nec hoc est ex impotentia Patris. Sed quaerit Maximinus, Arianorum Episcopus: unde ergo est, quod Pater non potest esse Filius, vel Filius Pater? Non utique ex impotentia, sed Pater12 proprietate generationis Pater est, qua oportet eum non esse Filium, et Filius proprietate nativitatis Filius est, qua oportet eum non esse Patrem. De quibus proprietatibus postea plenius tractabitur13.

Cap. II

An posse gignere Filium sit aliqua potentia in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.

Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit natura gignere Filium, et an haec14 sit aliqua potentia, quae non15 sit in Filio. Ad quod dicimus, quod Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia natura est vel essentia. At inquiunt illi, si potens est gignere, habet ergo potentiam gignendi; Filius autem non habet potentiam gignendi, si non potest gignere: habet ergo Pater aliquam potentiam, quam non habet Filius. Non sequitur. Eandem enim potentiam penitus habet Filius quam et Pater, qua Pater potuit gignere, et Filius potuit gigni. Eadem enim potentia est in Filio, qua potuit gigni, quae est in Patre, qua potuit gignere. Sed contra hoc opponitur: aliud est posse gignere, aliud est posse gigni; quia aliud est gignere, aliud gigni. Hic distinguendum est. Si enim, cum dicitur: aliud est posse gignere, aliud posse gigni, aliam significes16 potentiam, qua Pater potens est gignere, et aliam, qua Filius potens est gigni, falsus est intellectus. Si autem dicas, Patrem posse habere aliam proprietatem sive notionem, qua genitor est; et Filium aliam, qua genitus est, verus est intellectus. Aliam enim habet Pater proprietatem, qua Pater est, aliam Filius, qua Filius est. Ita etiam, cum dicitur: Filius non habet potentiam generandi, quam habet Pater, dupliciter intelligi potest. Si enim dicatur: Filius non habet potentiam generandi quam et Pater, id est17, qua potens sit ad generandum, id est, ut genuerit, vel ut generet sicut Pater, verum est. Si vero intelligatur sic: non habet potentiam, qua possit gigni vel genitus esse, qua eadem Pater potens est, ut genuerit vel ut generet, falsum est; sicut dicitur: Pater habet potentiam, qua potest esse Pater; Filius vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Pater; et e converso, Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius, Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius18: habet ergo aliquam Pater, quam non habet Filius, et e converso. Absit; quia eadem est potentia Patris, qua potest esse Pater, et Filii, qua potest esse Filius. Ita etiam eadem est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater, non Filius, et Filius vult esse Filius, non Pater: et eadem est voluntas Filii, qua vult esse genitus, et Patrem genuisse; et Patris, qua vult esse genitor, et Filium genitum esse19.

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English Translation
p. 132

Distinction VII

Chapter I

Whether the Father could or willed to beget the Son.

Here it is wont to be asked by some, whether the Father could or willed to beget the Son. For if, they say, he could and1 willed to beget the Son: therefore he could and willed something which the Son neither could nor willed; for the Son neither could nor willed to beget a Son. To which subtlety we easily reply, saying: to be able or to will to beget the Son is not to be able or to will something subject2 to will or to power. There is, however, some power or will, namely, to be able or to will to beget the Son; and therefore the meaning of the proposed3 phrase is to be distinguished: to be able or to will to beget the Son is to be able or to will something. For neither is the generation of the Son any of those things which are subject to the divine power and will, nor is it any thing among all things or of all things, but above all and before all. For he did not will or have power before he begot; just as he did not exist before he begot, since4 from eternity he was and from eternity he begot. We can also see this from a similar case. For the Father can be Father and wills to be Father; the Son, however, neither5 can nor wills to be Father: therefore the Father can or wills to be something which the Son cannot or does not will to be. It does not follow, because to be Father is not to be something, but is to be in relation to something, as will be shown in what follows6.

But what Augustine says in the second book Against Maximinus7 greatly moves us — Maximinus, who asserted that the Father is more powerful than the Son, in that the Father begot the Son a Creator God, but the Son did not; and he said the Father could have begotten one not a Son; and therefore was more powerful than the Son. Replying to which, Augustine seems to say that the Son also could8 have begotten, wishing to show that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, in these words: «Far be it that the Father be therefore more powerful than the Son, as you suppose, because the Father begot a Creator, but the Son did not beget a Creator; for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not». See and diligently attend to these words: for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not. For he seems to say that the Son could have begotten, but ought not to have; and so could what he ought not. Why he ought not, Augustine adds, saying: «For the divine generation would be immoderate, if the begotten Son were to beget a grandson for the Father, since that grandson too, unless he were to beget a great-grandson for his grandfather, would, according to your wondrous wisdom, be called impotent. Likewise also that one, if he were not to beget a grandson for his grandfather and a great-grandson for his great-grandfather, would not be called by you omnipotent; nor would the series of generation be fulfilled, if always one were born from another; nor would any complete it, unless one omnipotent suffice. Therefore the Father's nature begot the Son omnipotent, it did not make him».

p. 133

This, however, does not seem to some able to stand, namely that the Son could have begotten. For if the Son could have begotten, he could have been a father; and if he could have been a father, then he could have been father either of himself, or of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit, or of some other9. But not of another, because no other always was; nor of the Father, because the Father is unbegotten and innascible; nor of himself, «because no thing can beget itself»; nor of the Holy Spirit, because he could not be born. For if he could be born, he could be a son, and so could be mutable.

How then is to be taken10 what was said above: for it is not that he could not beget, but that he ought not, as if he could, but ought not? It is not clear to us how to explain how this is true, and so it should rather be passed over in silence, were not the importunity of those who ask compelling me to say something on it.

It can therefore11 be understood thus: for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not, that is, it was not from any impotence of his that the Son did not beget, but it did not befit him, just as God the Son is not God the Father; nor yet is this from any impotence of his. For likewise the Father is not the Son, nor is this from any impotence of the Father. But Maximinus, the Bishop of the Arians, asks: whence then is it, that the Father cannot be Son, or the Son Father? Surely not from impotence, but the Father12 is Father by the property of generation, by which it is fitting that he not be the Son, and the Son is Son by the property of nativity, by which it is fitting that he not be the Father. Of which properties more fully will be treated hereafter13.

Chapter II

Whether to be able to beget the Son is some power in the Father which is not in the Son.

Likewise it is asked by some, whether the Father is able by nature to beget the Son, and whether this14 is some power which is not15 in the Son. To which we say, that the Father is not able save by nature; for his power is nature or essence. But they say: if he is able to beget, therefore he has the power of begetting; the Son, however, does not have the power of begetting, if he cannot beget: therefore the Father has some power which the Son does not have. It does not follow. For the Son has wholly the same power as the Father, that by which the Father could beget, and the Son could be begotten. For the same power is in the Son, by which he could be begotten, which is in the Father, by which he could beget. But against this it is objected: to be able to beget is one thing, to be able to be begotten is another; for to beget is one thing, to be begotten another. Here a distinction must be made. For if, when it is said: to be able to beget is one thing, to be able to be begotten another, you signify16 one power, by which the Father is able to beget, and another, by which the Son is able to be begotten, the understanding is false. But if you say that the Father can have one property or notion, by which he is begetter; and the Son another, by which he is begotten, the understanding is true. For the Father has one property, by which he is Father, the Son another, by which he is Son. So also, when it is said: the Son does not have the power of begetting which the Father has, it can be understood in two ways. For if it be said: the Son does not have the power of begetting which the Father has, that is17, by which he is able to generation, that is, that he should have begotten, or that he should beget as the Father, it is true. But if it be understood thus: he does not have the power by which he could be begotten or be one begotten, by which same the Father is able, that he should have begotten or that he should beget, it is false; just as it is said: the Father has the power by which he can be Father; the Son, however, does not have the power by which he could be Father; and conversely, the Son has the power by which he can be Son, but the Father does not have the power by which he could be Son18: therefore the Father has some which the Son does not have, and conversely. Far be it; for the same is the power of the Father, by which he can be Father, and of the Son, by which he can be Son. So too the same is the will, by which the Father wills to be Father, not Son, and the Son wills to be Son, not Father: and the same is the will of the Son, by which he wills to be begotten, and that the Father has begotten; and of the Father, by which he wills to be begetter, and that the Son is begotten19.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. vet, sed contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.
    The Vatican edition reads vet, but against the codices and editions 1, 6, 8.
  2. Supple cum cod. A divinae.
    Supply with codex A divinae ("of the divine [will or power]").
  3. Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 et. Paulo ante codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 3, 7 praepositi loco propositi.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, reads et. A little before, codices A B C E with editions 1, 3, 7 read praepositi in place of propositi.
  4. Edd. 1, 2, 8 addunt et.
    Editions 1, 2, 8 add et.
  5. Vat. cum edd. 1, 6 non.
    The Vatican edition with editions 1, 6 reads non.
  6. Dist. XXVIII, c. 5. — Paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem sed est esse ad aliquid, quam edd. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 sic exhibent: sed potest esse ad aliquid.
    Distinction XXVIII, c. 5. — A little before, codices A B C E and edition 1 omit the clause sed est esse ad aliquid ("but it is to be in relation to something"), which editions 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 give thus: sed potest esse ad aliquid ("but it can be in relation to something").
  7. Cap. 12, n. 2. — Mox Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, post potentiorem addit esse. Dein cod. C bene genuerit loco genuit.
    Chapter 12, no. 2. — Next the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, adds esse after potentiorem. Then codex C rightly reads genuerit in place of genuit.
  8. Edd. 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 potuerit.
    Editions 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 read potuerit.
  9. Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 hic repetit alicuius.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, here repeats alicuius.
  10. Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6 accipiatur.
    The Vatican edition with editions 4, 5, 6 reads accipiatur.
  11. Mendum Vat. omittentis non; castigatur ex codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. Paulo ante cod. D Potest autem loco Potest ergo.
    A blunder of the Vatican edition omitting non; it is corrected from the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. A little before, codex D reads Potest autem in place of Potest ergo.
  12. Codd. hic repetunt ex.
    The codices here repeat ex.
  13. Dist. XXVI.
    Distinction XXVI.
  14. Vat. contra codd. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 hoc. Mox post quae fide codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 expunximus in Vat. additum non. Paulo infra post dicimus quod codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt Pater.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, reads hoc. Next, after quae, on the witness of the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, we have expunged the non added in the Vatican edition. A little below, after dicimus quod, the codices and editions 1, 8 omit Pater.
  15. Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 9, 10, addit et.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 9, 10, adds et.
  16. Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 significas. Paulo supra post posse gignere codd. A D E addunt et.
    The Vatican edition with editions 4, 6, 8 reads significas. A little above, after posse gignere, codices A D E add et.
  17. Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 scilicet.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, reads scilicet.
  18. Vat. cum ed. 4 indebite omittit Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius.
    The Vatican edition with edition 4 unduly omits Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius ("but the Father does not have the power by which he could be the Son").
  19. In codd. B D E et ed. 1 deest esse.
    In codices B D E and edition 1 esse is missing.
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