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Cap. 1, Vers. 12-15

Commentarius in Ecclesiasten · Capitulum I

Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 17

Art. 2. Ex consideratione duplicis vanitatis rerum manifestat et reprehendit suam curiositatem.

Ego Ecclesiastes fui rex etc. Supra ostendit in rebus vanitatem; hic ex consideratione mutabilitatis rerum suam reprehendit curiositatem. Et habet haec pars duas, quia primo suam manifestat curiositatem; secundo reprehendit curiositatem ob vanitatem, secundo capitulo9: Cumque convertissem me ad universa opera.

Primo manifestat suam curiositatem, primo quidem in operibus prudentiae.

Prima habet duas partes, quia primo agitur de curiositate in operibus prudentiae sive philosophiae; secundo, de curiositate opulentiae sive artis mechanicae, ibi10: Magnificavi opera mea. — Prima habet duas: quia primo agit de curiositate quantum ad considerationem naturalium sive scientiae speculativae; secundo, quantum ad considerationem moralium sive scientiae practicae, ibi11: Locutus sum in corde meo etc.

Describitur curiositas philosophiae, primo quidem quoad considerationem rerum naturalium, et hoc quadruplici ratione.

Curiositatem igitur in operibus naturae sive in consideratione operum divinorum hoc ordine describit. Primo innuitur considerantis idoneitas, secundo vero ipsius curiositas, tertio divini iudicii severitas, quarto concluditur vanitas.

(Vers. 12.). Primo igitur notatur considerantis idoneitas, cum dicit: Ego Ecclesiastes; quia in eo fuit sapientia, ideo se dicit Ecclesiasten, id est concionatorem; fuit etiam potentia, unde dicit: fui rex; fuit etiam pax, unde subdit: in Ierusalem, quae interpretatur visio pacis; Ecclesiastici quadragesimo p. 18 septimo1: « Salomon imperavit in diebus pacis »; primi Paralipomenon vigesimo secundo: « Filius, qui nascetur tibi, erit pacificus »; et quia hoc habebat, ideo nihil a consideratione retrahebat.

(Vers. 13.). Et proposui in animo meo etc. Tangitur hic secundum, scilicet ipsius curiositas, quia omnia voluit scire et subtiliter indagare. Propterea dicit: Et proposui in animo meo quaerere, scilicet ab alio, et investigare sapienter, per me ipsum; et hoc est curiositas; ad Romanos duodecimo2: « Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem »; unde Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto: « Mel invenisti, comede quod sufficit tibi, ne forte satiatus evomas illud ». De omnibus, quae fiunt sub sole. Ecce, maior curiositas, quia de omnibus; Ecclesiastici tertio3: « In supervacuis rebus noli scrutari multipliciter, et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus; plurima enim super sensum hominum ostensa sunt tibi ».

Hanc occupationem pessimam etc. Tangitur hic tertium, scilicet divini iudicii severitas; quia divino iudicio propter peccatum primi parentis factum est, quod nostra vis rationalis ita libenter luxuriatur in cognitione terrenorum. Propter quod dicit: Hanc occupationem4 pessimam, quia non tantum est culpabilis, sed etiam poenalis; dedit Deus filiis hominum, id est dari permisit; vel ratione poenalitatis dedit iusto modo, ut occuparentur in ea, ac per hoc immemores essent suae salutis.

Unde notandum est, quod est occupatio mala, quae est ex infirmitate; de hac Ecclesiastici quadragesimo5: « Occupatio magna creata est omnibus hominibus, et iugum grave super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium ». — Est occupatio peior, quae est ex ignorantia, de qua Iob tertio: « Obscurent eum tenebrae et umbra mortis; occupet eum caligo et involvatur amaritudine ». — Tertia est ex curiositate, et haec est pessima, et de hac loquitur hic.

Et notandum, quod « occupatio, ut dicit Hugo6, est distractio mentis, quae avertit et distrahit et illaqueat animam, ut non possit cogitare ea quae salutis sunt ». Curiositas vero est intellectus humani libidinosa prostitutio, passim quamlibet veritatem amplexans et cum ea adulterans, quia sola prima veritas est sponsa.

(Vers. 14. 15.). Vidi cuncta, quae fiunt etc. Tangitur hic quarto inventa vanitas, quia nihil amplius profecit, nisi quod in sua consideratione vanitatem invenit. Et propterea dicit: Vidi cuncta, quae fiunt sub sole, id est, omnia consideravi. Et ecce, universa vanitas, id est, aperte apparet in eis vanitas, quia, secundum quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos octavo7, « vanitati subiecta est omnis creatura non volens »; nec tantum vanitas, immo et afflictio spiritus. — Sed quia non vident hoc omnes, et quia ita laborant inaniter et non sentiunt suam afflictionem; huic quaestioni tacitae respondet dicens: Perversi etc. Quia plures inveniuntur mali quam boni, plures stulti quam sapientes; propterea dicit: Perversi difficile corriguntur; unde Proverbiorum decimo octavo8: « Non recipit stultus verba prudentiae, nisi ea dixeris, quae versantur in corde suo ». Et stultorum infinitus est numerus, scilicet prae multitudine; et hoc non solum est vanitas considerare, immo etiam afflictio; unde dicitur in Psalmo: « Vidi praevaricantes, et tabescebam »; et rursus: « Tabescere me fecit zelus meus ».

Pervertitur homo per malam cogitationem; Sapientiae primo9: « Perversae cogitationes separant a Deo; probata autem virtus corripit insipientes ». Per malam affectionem; Proverbiorum decimo septimo: « Qui perversi cordis est non inveniet bonum, et qui vertit linguam incidet in malum ». Per malam locutionem; Proverbiorum decimo: « Labia iusti considerant placita, et os impiorum perversa »; Proverbiorum secundo: « Ut eruaris ab homine, qui perversa loquitur ». Per iniquam operationem; Proverbiorum secundo: « Laetantur, cum male fecerint, et exsultant in rebus pessimis »; Isaiae primo: « Quiescite agere perverse ».

Quaestiones.

I. Sed quaeritur hic primo de hoc quod dicit: Hanc occupationem pessimam etc.

Contra: Hoc est peccatum: ergo dedit Deus peccatum. — Si tu dicas: dedit, id est permisit dari; p. 19 sed similiter permisit furari: ergo esset recte dicendum, quod Deus furatur.

Respondeo: « peccata media inter primam apostasiam et ultimam poenam sunt poena et culpa1 »; quaedam autem plus dicunt rationem culpae, quaedam plus rationem poenae; illa quae plus dicunt rationem poenae, attribuuntur iusto Dei iudicio, et talis est occupatio et excaecatio huiusmodi.

II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Perversi difficile corriguntur: quia facile est, aliquem perverti; sed perversio est contra naturam2: ergo si facillimum est reverti ad naturam; cum vitium sit contra naturam, facillimum est corrigi.

Respondeo: ratio sumitur et ex parte operis mali, quia « bonum est uno modo, malum autem omnifarium3 »; et ex parte operantis potentiae, quae redditur infirma per culpam, et ideo non potest in opus strenuum; et a parte oppositionis boni ad malum secundum privationem, quia facillimum est recedere ab habitu ad privationem, sed difficile, vel omnino impossibile est redire.

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p. 17

Art. 2. From the consideration of the twofold vanity of things he manifests and reproves his own curiosity.

I Ecclesiastes was king etc. Above he showed the vanity in things; here, from the consideration of the mutability of things, he reproves his own curiosity. And this part has two members, because first he manifests his curiosity; secondly he reproves his curiosity on account of its vanity, in the second chapter9: And when I turned myself to all the works.

First he manifests his curiosity, and first indeed in the works of prudence.

The first has two parts, because first there is treated the curiosity in the works of prudence, that is, of philosophy; secondly, the curiosity of opulence, that is, of the mechanical art, there10: I made me great works. — The first has two: because first he treats of curiosity as to the consideration of natural things, that is, of speculative science; secondly, as to the consideration of moral things, that is, of practical science, there11: I have spoken in my heart etc.

The curiosity of philosophy is described, first indeed as to the consideration of natural things, and this by a fourfold reason.

The curiosity, therefore, in the works of nature, that is, in the consideration of the works of God, he describes in this order. First there is intimated the fitness of the one considering; secondly his curiosity; thirdly the severity of the divine judgement; fourthly the vanity is concluded.

(V. 12.). First, therefore, the fitness of the one considering is noted, when he says: I Ecclesiastes; because in him there was wisdom, therefore he calls himself Ecclesiastes, that is, a preacher; there was also power, whence he says: I was king; there was also peace, whence he adds: in Jerusalem, which is interpreted the vision of peace; Ecclesiasticus the p. 18 forty-seventh chapter1: « Solomon reigned in days of peace »; first of Paralipomenon, the twenty-second chapter: « The son that shall be born to thee shall be peaceable »; and because he had this, therefore nothing drew him back from consideration.

(V. 13.). And I proposed in my mind etc. Here the second is touched upon, namely his curiosity, because he wished to know all things and to search them out subtly. Therefore he says: And I proposed in my mind to seek, namely from another, and to search out wisely, by myself; and this is curiosity; to the Romans, the twelfth chapter2: « Not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety »; whence Proverbs the twenty-fifth chapter: « Thou hast found honey, eat what is sufficient for thee, lest being glutted therewith thou vomit it up ». Concerning all things that are done under the sun. Behold, a greater curiosity, because concerning all things; Ecclesiasticus the third chapter3: « In superfluous things seek not curiously in many ways, and in his many works be not curious; for very many things above the sense of men have been shewn to thee ».

This worst occupation etc. Here the third is touched upon, namely the severity of the divine judgement; because by the divine judgement, on account of the sin of the first parent, it has come about that our rational power so willingly runs riot in the knowledge of earthly things. Wherefore he says: This4 worst occupation, because it is not only culpable but also penal; God hath given to the sons of men, that is, he permitted it to be given; or by reason of penalty he gave it in a just manner, that they might be occupied therein, and through this be unmindful of their own salvation.

Whence it is to be noted that there is a bad occupation, which is from infirmity; of this Ecclesiasticus the fortieth chapter5: « A great occupation is created for all men, and a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their going out of their mother's womb until the day of their burial into the mother of all ». — There is a worse occupation, which is from ignorance, of which Job the third chapter: « Let darkness and the shadow of death obscure it; let a mist occupy it, and let it be wrapped in bitterness ». — The third is from curiosity, and this is the worst, and of this he speaks here.

And it is to be noted that « occupation, as Hugh says6, is a distraction of the mind, which turns away and draws apart and ensnares the soul, so that it cannot think upon the things that belong to salvation ». But curiosity is the lustful prostitution of the human understanding, embracing indiscriminately whatever truth and committing adultery with it, since the first truth alone is its spouse.

(V. 14, 15.). I have seen all things that are done etc. Here, fourthly, the vanity that was found is touched upon, because he profited nothing further, save that in his consideration he found vanity. And therefore he says: I have seen all things that are done under the sun, that is, I have considered all things. And behold all is vanity, that is, the vanity in them appears openly, because, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans, the eighth chapter7, « every creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly »; and not only vanity, but rather and affliction of spirit. — But because not all men see this, and because they so labour in vain and do not feel their own affliction, to this unspoken question he answers, saying: The perverse etc. Because more are found evil than good, more foolish than wise; therefore he says: The perverse are hard to be corrected; whence Proverbs the eighteenth chapter8: « A fool receiveth not the words of prudence, unless thou say those things which are in his heart ». And the number of fools is infinite, namely by reason of their multitude; and this is not only vanity to consider, but rather also affliction; whence it is said in the Psalm: « I beheld the transgressors, and I pined away »; and again: « My zeal hath made me pine away ».

A man is perverted by evil thought; Wisdom the first chapter9: « Perverse thoughts separate from God; but virtue, when it is tried, reproveth the unwise ». By evil affection; Proverbs the seventeenth chapter: « He that is of a perverse heart shall not find good, and he that perverteth his tongue shall fall into evil ». By evil speech; Proverbs the tenth chapter: « The lips of the just consider what is acceptable, and the mouth of the wicked uttereth perverse things »; Proverbs the second chapter: « That thou mayst be delivered from the man that speaketh perverse things ». By iniquitous work; Proverbs the second chapter: « They are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things »; Isaias the first chapter: « Cease to do perversely ».

Questions.

I. But it is asked here, first, concerning that which he says: This worst occupation etc.

Contra: This is a sin: therefore God gave a sin. — If thou sayest: he gave, that is, he permitted it to be given; p. 19 but in like manner he permitted stealing: therefore it would be rightly said that God steals.

I respond: « sins intermediate between the first apostasy and the last punishment are punishment and fault1 »; but some of them bespeak more the account of fault, some more the account of punishment; those which bespeak more the account of punishment are attributed to the just judgement of God, and such is occupation and blinding of this kind.

II. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: The perverse are hard to be corrected: because it is easy for someone to be perverted; but perversion is against nature2: therefore if it is most easy to return to nature, then, since vice is against nature, it is most easy to be corrected.

I respond: the reason is taken both on the part of the evil work, because « good is in one way, but evil in every way3 »; and on the part of the power of the one working, which is rendered infirm through fault, and therefore is not capable of a strenuous work; and on the part of the opposition of good to evil according to privation, because it is most easy to fall back from a habit into a privation, but difficult, or altogether impossible, to return.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 9
    Vers. 11.
    V. 11.
  2. 10
    Cap. 2, 4.
    Ch. 2:4.
  3. 11
    Cap. 1, 16.
    Ch. 1:16.
  4. 1
    Vers. 15. — Sequitur I. Paral. 22, 9, ubi Vulgata vir quietissimus pro pacificus. — Inferius post retrahebat Vat. addit: Solet defectus talium multos retrahere a consideratione rerum; non enim aptus est ad considerandum rerum naturas, qui habet harum ignorantiam; non potest etiam bene cogitare de huiusmodi, qui sustinet paupertatis inopiam, nec vacare etiam ad hoc potest qui non habet pacem et concordiam.
    V. 15. — There follows I Par. 22:9, where the Vulgate has vir quietissimus for pacificus. — Below, after retrahebat, the Vatican edition adds: The defect of such things is wont to draw many back from the consideration of things; for he is not fit to consider the natures of things who has ignorance of them; nor can he think well about such matters who endures the want of poverty, nor can he even be free for thistr. who has not peace and concord.
  5. 2
    Vers. 3. — Sequitur Prov. 25, 16.
    V. 3. — There follows Prov. 25:16.
  6. 3
    Vers. 24, et 25, ubi pro ne fueris Vulgata non eris.
    Vv. 24 and 25, where for ne fueris the Vulgate has non eris.
  7. 4
    Vat. addit id est curiositatem, et inferius post permisit subiungit in quantum est culpabilis.
    The Vatican edition adds id est curiositatem, and below, after permisit, subjoins in quantum est culpabilis.
  8. 5
    Vers. 1. — Sequitur Iob 3, 5.
    V. 1. — There follows Job 3:5.
  9. 6
    In Eccle. homil. 5. in fine: Occupatio enim est distractio et illigatio mentium, quae avertit et dissipat et illaqueat animas, ne cogitare pervaleant ea quae salutis sunt. Ibid. tangitur etiam curiositas, quae in lib. de Similitud. (inter opera Anselmi) definitur: Curiositas est studium perscrutandi ea quae scire nulla est utilitas. — Inferius post Curiositas vero Vat. addit secundum eundem, et voci prima cum E praefiximus sola.
    On Ecclesiastes, homily 5, at the end: For occupation is the distraction and entanglement of minds, which turns away and scatters and ensnares souls, so that they cannot prevail to think upon the things that belong to salvation. In the same place curiosity too is touched upon, which in the book On Likenesses (among the works of Anselm) is defined: Curiosity is the eagerness to search out the things which it is of no use to know. — Below, after Curiositas vero, the Vatican edition adds secundum eundem, and to the word prima we have, with E, prefixed sola.
  10. 7
    Vers. 20. — Inferius post spiritus exhibemus lectionem E. Ceteri codd. cum Vat. omittunt: Sed quia non usque respondet dicens: Perversi etc.
    V. 20. — Below, after spiritus, we give the reading of E. The remaining codices, with the Vatican edition, omit: Sed quia non as far as respondet dicens: Perversi etc.
  11. 8
    Vers. 2, ubi pro suo Vulgata eius. — Sequuntur Ps. 118, 158. et 139.
    V. 2, where for suo the Vulgate has eius. — There follow Ps. 118:158 and 139.
  12. 9
    Vers. 3. — Sequuntur Prov. 17, 20; 10, 32; 2, 12: Ut eruaris a via mala et ab homine etc., et 2, 14; denique Isai. 1, 16.
    V. 3. — There follow Prov. 17:20; 10:32; 2:12: That thou mayst be delivered from the evil way, and from the man etc., and 2:14; lastly Isai. 1:16.
  13. 1
    His verbis complectitur Magister in II. Sent. d. XXXVI. c. 1. sententiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 57, 9. n. 18.
    In these words the Master, in II Sentences d. XXXVI c. 1, comprises the opinion of Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 57:9 n. 18.
  14. 2
    Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 20: Peccatum est ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam aversio. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos., ubi eadem obiectio habetur.
    Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith IV c. 20: Sin is a turning away from that which is according to nature to that which is beside nature. Compare II Sentences d. 28 a. 1 q. 1 arg. 1 ad oppositum, where the same objection is found.
  15. 3
    Secundum Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 22. (c. 25.); VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 5.) et II. Ethic. c. 6. (cfr. tom. II. pag. 655, nota 3.). Idem, Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, ait: Ex habitu enim in privationem mutatio fit, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est. — Inferius post redire F supplet a privatione in habitum.
    According to Aristotle, Magna Moralia I c. 22 (c. 25); Eudemian Ethics VII c. 6 (c. 5) and Ethics II c. 6 (compare tom. II p. 655, note 3). The same, in the Categories, the chapter On Opposites, says: For a change takes place from a habit into a privation, but from a privation into a habit it is impossible. — Below, after redire, F supplies a privatione in habitum.
Translator’s Notes
  1. tr.
    Translator's note: the Latin vacare holds together several senses that English has to split: being at leisure, being free, being free for something and being free from something (with ab). Here it governs ad with the accusative (vacare ad hoc), so the English takes the side of being free for: the Vatican edition's addition is about what a man who lacks peace and concord cannot give himself to, not about what he is released from. No vaca- word is rendered "rest" in this translation, because quies and requies take that word.
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