Bonaventure

Secundo consideratur vanitas mutabilitatis rerum secundum esse, quod habent in intellectu humano, et haec probatur triplici ratione.

Cunctae res difficiles etc. Supra determinata est vanitas in rebus secundum esse, quod habent in universo; hic determinatur vanitas secundum esse, quod habent in intellectu humano; et ostenditur in eis vanitas tripliciter: primo, quia non patent; secundo, quia non implent, ibi: Non satiatur oculus visu; tertio, quia non permanent, ibi: Non est priorum memoria. Non patent ad interpretandum vel docendum; non implent ad discentem reficiendum et quietandum; non permanent ad memorandum. Et respiciunt isti tres actus triplicem vim in nobis: interpretativam, cognitivam et memorativam.

(Vers. 8.). Primo igitur notatur, quod non patent ad explicandum; ideo dicit: Cunctae res difficiles, scilicet ad inveniendam earum rationem; unde Sapientiae nono⁵: « Difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt; et quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore »; infra octavo: « Intellexi, quod operum Dei nullam possit homo invenire rationem » etc.; et ideo, quia difficiles sunt, non potest homo eas explicare sermone; Iob trigesimo octavo: « Quis enarrabit caelorum rationem »? Ecclesiastici quadragesimo tertio: « Multa dicemus, et deficiemus in verbis; consummatio sermonum ipse est ».

(Vers. 8. 9. 10.). Non saturatur etc. Hic secundo tangitur, quod non implent ad discentem reficiendum; et quia duobus sensibus maxime addiscimus, visu scilicet et auditu; ostendit, quod in neutro est satietas; et propterea dicit: Non saturatur oculus visu; Proverbiorum vigesimo septimo⁶: « Oculi enim hominum insatiabiles ». Nec auris impletur auditu, quoniam est ibi pruritus audiendi nova et curiosa; secundae ad Timotheum quarto: « Ad sua desideria coacervabunt sibi magistros prurientes auribus ». Et ratio huius est, quia illud, in quo est vera satietas, nec oculus vidit, nec auris percepit; primae ad Corinthios secundo: « Nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit » etc. p. 16 Et quod in his terrenis non possit refici, ostendit, quia oculus et auris vult nova percipere; sed nihil in novitate manet: ergo auris et oculus in nullo implentur. Maiorem supponit, et manifestatur Actuum decimo septimo¹: « Athenienses ad nihil aliud vacabant, nisi aut dicere, aut audire aliquid novi »; sed hic proponit minorem, quia nihil habet novitatem, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad fieri. — Propterea dicit: Quid est quod fuit? Quaerit et ipse respondet: Ipsum quod futurum est: ergo a simplici conversa: quod futurum est fuit. Similiter sequitur: Quid est quod factum est? Respondet: Ipsum quod faciendum est: ergo a simplici conversa: quod faciendum est factum est. — Et ex hoc concludit: Nihil sub sole novum, nec valet quisquam dicere: Ecce hoc recens est: ergo nec dicere nec audire aliquid novi. Et replicat probationem: Iam enim praecesserunt in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos; secundae Petri tertio²: « Ex quo patres nostri dormierunt, omnia sic perseverant ».

(Vers. 11.). Non est priorum memoria. Tertio hic tangitur, quod res non permanent ad memorandum, quia omnia traduntur oblivioni; unde dicit: Non est priorum memoria, scilicet apud nos posteriores; Sapientiae secundo³: « Nomen nostrum oblivionem accipiet per tempus, et nemo memoriam habebit operum nostrorum ». Et sic est in praeteritis et in futuris; unde subdit: Sed nec eorum quidem, quae post futura sunt, erit recordatio apud eos qui futuri sunt in novissimo, id est: posteriores non erunt memores priorum, et hoc propter tempus, quod inducit oblivionem; infra secundo: « Futura tempora oblivione cuncta operient ».

Quaestiones.

I. Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Cunctae res difficiles.

Contra: 1. Multa sunt, quorum cognitio est communis nobis et brutis: ergo non est difficile homini cognoscere quod cognoscit bestia.

2. Item, quaedam sunt, in quibus non contingit errare, sicut in cognitione sensibilium — quia sensus non fallitur circa proprium obiectum — et principiorum intelligibilium, sicut dignitatum⁴; et talia facile est cognoscere.

3. Item, quid est quod dicit: Non potest homo eas explicare sermone? Facilius est homini loqui, quam alicui creaturae facile operari: ergo si alicui creaturae facile est operari, ergo homini, eius operationem explicare.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod est cognoscere semiplene, ut quando cognoscitur secundum accidentia, vel secundum aliquam operationem. Est iterum cognoscere perfecte, et ille perfecte cognoscit, qui plene novit substantiam, virtutem et operationem et causas et rationes horum. Et quia virtus est occulta, et substantia remota⁵ a sensibus; ideo cunctae res nobis sunt difficiles.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod aliqua cognoscimus cum brutis, verum est aliqualiter, ut quod hoc est amarum; sed plene brutum nihil cognoscit.

2. Similiter patet secundum: quia, secundum quod sensibile est, manifestum est.

3. Per hoc etiam patet sequens: quia differt dicere aliquid et explicare; explicare enim est latentes rationes intus et involutas extra depromere; et hoc non potest facere, nisi qui intelligit; et hoc arduum est et paucorum.

II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non saturatur oculus visu etc.

1. Quaeritur, quare non inducit in aliis sensibus, cum similiter per eos contingat cognoscere?

2. Item, quid est quod dicit: Non saturatur? Dicitur enim tunc saturari, quando non vult amplius de eo quod desiderabat; sed contingit aliquando, quod homo non vult plus videre nec audire, immo quiescere: ergo etc.

3. Item, si non saturatur, ergo desiderium eorum nunquam quiescit: ergo cum desiderium, cuius non est quies, frustretur fine; et omne tale otiosum⁶: ergo desiderium visus est otiosum.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod ideo solum istos duos sensus commemorat, quia loquitur de sensibus, secundum quod sunt via in cognitionem et referuntur ad sensualem iucunditatem. Et duplex est verbum, quo recognoscimus omnia: verbum scilicet divinum et verbum humanum. Verbum divinum est omnis creatura, quia Deum loquitur; hoc verbum percipit oculus. Verbum humanum est vox prolata, et hoc percipit auris⁷. — Vel quia duplex est cognitio: per p. 17 inventionem et doctrinam; nam prima respicit visum, secunda vero respicit auditum.

1. 2. Quod obiicitur de saturitate; dico, quod loquitur de horum saturitate, secundum quod sunt organa cordis et voluntatis sive appetitus; et quia cor non saturatur, nec hi duo sensus. Unde Hugo¹: « Omnis pulcritudo, omnis iucunditas, omnis suavitas rerum conditarum afficere cor humanum potest, satiare non potest nisi illa dulcedo sola, ad quam factum est ».

3. Quod ergo obiicit²: frustrari, falsum, quia alibi terminatur.

2. Quod obiicit, quod non vult plus; hoc est, quia lassatur et fastidit, non quia saturatur.

III. Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nihil sub sole novum.

Contrarium videtur: 1. Ieremiae trigesimo primo³: Novum faciet Dominus super terram.

2. Item, Apocalypsis vigesimo primo⁴: Vidi caelum novum et terram novam.

3. Item, ex hoc verbo videtur error confirmari, quod in rebus sit circulatio secundum egressum, ut eadem sint quae fuerunt, et hoc per litteram sequentem: Iam praecessit in saeculis, quae fuerunt ante nos; et sic verificari videtur error ille, qui ponit, post magnum annum, qui continet quindecim millia annorum, omnia renovari⁵.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod est operatio conditionis, conservationis, reparationis, glorificationis; quaelibet istarum operationum est supra naturam, et ideo non erit sub sole sive sub tempore, sed supra, praeter propagationem; unde de hac tantum intelligit.

Et sic patent alia. — De hac⁶ notandum, quod ipse vocat novum, cuius simile non praecessit; et sic non est aliquid novum secundum propagationem, quia semper ibi simile ex simili; ipse autem obiicit, quasi dicat de eodem; et illud est sic impossibile intelligere, quia, si omnis forma corrupta et iterum generata differt numero, non potest intelligi de eodem numero⁷.

IV. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non est priorum memoria.

Contra: Dicitur in Psalmo⁸: Memor fui operum tuorum, Domine.

Respondeo: ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod illud intelligitur de malis, non de bonis. — Sed istud adhuc falsum, quia etiam multa mala sunt in memoria. — Et propterea dicendum, quod ista propositio non est intelligenda ut vera universaliter, sed ut in pluribus, quia plurium est oblivio quam memoria; plurima tamen eorum quae facta sunt, in nostra memoria sunt.

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Secondly the vanity of the mutability of things is considered according to the being which they have in the human understanding, and this is proved by a threefold reason.

All things are hard etc. Above there was determined the vanity in things according to the being which they have in the universe; here is determined the vanity according to the being which they have in the human understanding; and vanity is shown in them in three ways: first, because they do not lie open; secondly, because they do not fill, there: The eye is not filled with seeing; thirdly, because they do not remain, there: There is no remembrance of former things. They do not lie open for interpreting or for teaching; they do not fill so as to refresh and to give rest to the learner; they do not remain so as to be remembered. And these three acts look to a threefold power in us: the interpretative, the cognitive and the memorative.

(V. 8.). First, therefore, it is noted that they do not lie open to be explained; therefore he says: All things are hard, namely for finding out their reason; whence Wisdom the ninth chapter⁵: « Hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon earth; and with labour do we find the things that are before us »; below in the eighth chapter: « I understood that man can find no reason of the works of God » etc.; and therefore, because they are hard, man cannot explain them by word; Job the thirty-eighth chapter: « Who shall declare the reason of the heavens »? Ecclesiasticus the forty-third chapter: « We shall say many things, and shall fail in words; the consummation of our words is he himself ».

(V. 8, 9, 10.). The eye is not filled etc. Here, secondly, it is touched upon that they do not fill so as to refresh the learner; and because we learn most of all by two senses, namely by sight and by hearing; he shows that in neither is there satiety; and therefore he says: The eye is not filled with seeing; Proverbs the twenty-seventh chapter⁶: « For the eyes of men are insatiable ». Neither is the ear filled with hearing, since there is in it an itching to hear things new and curious; second to Timothy, the fourth chapter: « According to their own desires they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears ». And the reason of this is that that in which there is true satiety, neither hath eye seen nor ear perceived; first to the Corinthians, the second chapter: « Neither hath eye seen, nor ear heard » etc. p. 16 And that in these earthly things one cannot be refreshed, he shows, because eye and ear will perceive new things; but nothing remains in newness: therefore ear and eye are filled in nothing. He supposes the major, and it is made plain in Acts the seventeenth chapter¹: « The Athenians were free^tr. for nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing »; but here he proposes the minor, because nothing has newness, neither as to being nor as to becoming. — Therefore he says: What is it that hath been? He asks, and he himself answers: The same thing that shall be: therefore by a simple conversion: what shall be hath been. In like manner there follows: What is it that hath been done? He answers: The same that is to be done: therefore by a simple conversion: what is to be done hath been done. — And from this he concludes: Nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: therefore neither to tell nor to hear anything new. And he repeats the proof: For it hath already gone before in the ages that were before us; second of Peter, the third chapter²: « Since the time that our fathers slept, all things continue so ».

(V. 11.). There is no remembrance of former things. Here, thirdly, it is touched upon that things do not remain to be remembered, because all things are handed over to oblivion; whence he says: There is no remembrance of former things, namely among us who come after; Wisdom the second chapter³: « Our name shall be forgotten in time, and no man shall have any remembrance of our works ». And so it is in things past and in things to come; whence he adds: But neither indeed of those things which hereafter are to come shall there be any remembrance with them that shall be in the latter end, that is: those who come after will not be mindful of those who went before, and this on account of time, which brings in oblivion; below in the second chapter: « The times to come shall cover all things with oblivion ».

Questions.

I. It is asked concerning that which he says: All things are hard.

Contra: 1. There are many things the knowledge of which is common to us and to brutes: therefore it is not hard for a man to know what a beast knows.

2. Likewise, there are certain things in which it does not happen that one errs, as in the knowledge of sensible things — because sense is not deceived about its proper object — and of intelligible principles, such as the axioms⁴; and such things it is easy to know.

3. Likewise, what is it that he says: Man cannot explain them by word? It is easier for a man to speak than for any creature to work easily: therefore if it is easy for any creature to work, then it is easy for a man to explain its operation.

I respond: it must be said that there is a knowing half-fully, as when a thing is known according to its accidents, or according to some operation. There is again a knowing perfectly, and he knows perfectly who fully knows the substance, the power and the operation and the causes and the reasons of these. And because power is hidden, and substance remote⁵ from the senses; therefore all things are hard for us.

1. As to the objection, then, that we know some things along with the brutes, it is true in a certain way, as that this is bitter; but a brute knows nothing fully.

2. In like manner the second is clear: because, according as a thing is sensible, it is manifest.

3. Through this also the following is clear: because it is one thing to tell something and another to explain it; for to explain is to bring out the hidden and enfolded reasons that are within; and this no one can do save he who understands; and this is arduous and belongs to few.

II. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: The eye is not filled with seeing etc.

1. It is asked why he does not bring in the other senses, since it likewise happens that we know through them?

2. Likewise, what is it that he says: It is not filled? For a thing is then said to be filled when it wills no more of that which it was desiring; but it happens sometimes that a man wills not to see or to hear more, but rather to rest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it is not filled, then the desire of them never rests: therefore since a desire that has no rest is frustrated of its end; and every such thing is idle⁶: therefore the desire of sight is idle.

I respond: it must be said that he mentions these two senses alone for this reason, that he is speaking of the senses according as they are a way into knowledge and are referred to sensual pleasantness. And there is a twofold word by which we recognize all things: namely the divine word and the human word. The divine word is every creature, because it speaks God; this word the eye perceives. The human word is the voice uttered, and this the ear perceives⁷. — Or because knowledge is twofold: by p. 17 finding out and by teaching^tr.; for the first looks to sight, but the second looks to hearing.

1. 2. As to what is objected concerning satiety; I say that he is speaking of the satiety of these senses according as they are organs of the heart and of the will or appetite; and because the heart is not filled, neither are these two senses. Whence Hugh¹: « All the beauty, all the pleasantness, all the sweetness of created things can affect the human heart, but cannot satisfy it save that sweetness alone for which it was made ».

3. As to what he objects, then²: that it is frustrated, it is false, because it is terminated elsewhere.

2. As to what he objects, that a man wills no more; this is because he is wearied and is disgusted, not because he is filled.

III. It is asked concerning that which he says: Nothing under the sun is new.

The contrary seems true: 1. Jeremias the thirty-first chapter³: The Lord shall make a new thing upon the earth.

2. Likewise, the Apocalypse the twenty-first chapter⁴: I saw a new heaven and a new earth.

3. Likewise, from this word the error seems to be confirmed that there is in things a circulation according to their going forth, so that the same things are that once were, and this through the following text: It hath already gone before in the ages that were before us; and thus that error seems to be verified which holds that, after the great year, which contains fifteen thousand years, all things are renewed⁵.

I respond: it must be said that there is the operation of founding, of conserving, of repairing, of glorifying; any one of these operations is above nature, and therefore it will not be under the sun or under time, but above it, apart from propagation; whence he understands it of this alone.

And thus the others are clear. — Concerning this⁶ it is to be noted that he calls that new whose like has not gone before; and thus there is nothing new according to propagation, because there it is always like from like; but he objects as if he were speaking of the same thing; and that it is thus impossible to understand, because, if every form that is corrupted and again generated differs in number, it cannot be understood of the same in number⁷.

IV. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: There is no remembrance of former things.

Contra: It is said in the Psalm⁸: I remembered thy works, O Lord.

I respond: to this some say that that is understood of evil things, not of good. — But this is still false, because many evil things too are in the memory. — And therefore it must be said that this proposition is not to be understood as universally true, but as true in the greater number of cases, because oblivion belongs to more things than memory does; yet very many of the things that have been done are in our memory.

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