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Dist. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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Pars I.

Cap. I. Quod unum est principium, non plura.

« Creationem rerum insinuans Scriptura, Deum esse creatorem initiumque temporis atque omnium visibilium vel invisibilium creaturarum, in primordio sui ostendit » dicens1: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. « His etenim verbis Moyses, Spiritu Dei afflatus, in uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert », elidens errorem quorundam, plura sine principio fuisse principia opinantium. « Plato namque tria initia existimavit, Deum scilicet et exemplar et materiam, et ipsam increatam sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem ». Creator enim est qui de nihilo aliquid facit.

Cap. II. Quid sit creare, quid facere.

Et creare proprie est de nihilo aliquid facere, facere vero non modo de nihilo aliquid operari, sed etiam de materia. Unde et homo vel Angelus dicitur aliqua facere, sed non creare, vocaturque factor sive artifex, sed non creator. Hoc enim nomen soli Deo proprie congruit, qui et de nihilo quaedam et de aliquo aliqua facit. Ipse est ergo creator et opifex et factor, sed creatoris2 nomen sibi proprie retinuit, alia vero etiam creaturis communicavit. In Scriptura3 tamen saepe creator accipitur tanquam factor, et e contra sicut facere, sine distinctione significationis.

Cap. III. Secundum quam rationem dicuntur de Deo huiusmodi verba: agere, facere.

Verumtamen sciendum est, haec verba, scilicet creare, facere, agere, et alia huiusmodi de Deo non ita posse dici secundum eam rationem, qua dicuntur de creaturis4. Quippe cum dicimus, eum aliquid facere, non aliquem in operando motum illi intelligimus inesse, vel aliquam in laborando passionem,

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sicut nobis solet accidere, sed eius sempiternae voluntatis novum aliquem significamus effectum, id est aeterna eius voluntate aliquid noviter existere. Cum ergo dicitur aliquid facere, tale est, ac si dicatur, iuxta eius voluntatem vel per eius voluntatem aliquid noviter contingere vel esse, ut in ipso nihil novi contingat, sed novum aliquid, sicut in eius aeterna voluntate fuerat, fiat sine aliqua motione vel sui mutatione. Nos vero operando mutari dicimur, quia movemur; non enim sine motu aliquid facimus. Deus ergo agere vel facere aliquid dicitur, quia causa est rerum noviter existentium, dum eius voluntate res novae esse incipiunt, quae ante non erant, absque ipsius agitatione; ut actus proprie dici non queat, cum videlicet actus omnis in motu consistat, in Deo autem motus nullus est. Sicut ergo ex calore solis aliqua fieri contingit, nulla tamen in ipso vel in eius calore facta motione vel mutatione, ita ex Dei voluntate nova habent esse sine mutatione auctoris, qui est unum et solum principium omnium. Aristoteles vero duo5 principia dixit, scilicet materiam et speciem, et tertium operatorium dictum; mundum quoque semper esse et fuisse.

Horum ergo et similium errorem Spiritus sanctus evacuans veritatisque disciplinam tradens, Deum in principio temporum mundum creasse et ante tempora aeternaliter exstitisse significat6, ipsius aeternitatem et omnipotentiam commendans; cui voluisse facere est, quia, ut praediximus, ex eius voluntate et bonitate res novae existunt. « Credamus7 igitur, rerum creatarum caelestium vel terrestrium, visibilium vel invisibilium causam non esse nisi bonitatem Creatoris, qui est Deus unus et verus. Cuius tanta est bonitas, ut summe bonus beatitudinis suae, qua aeternaliter beatus est, alios velit esse participes; quam videt8 et communicari posse et minui omnino non posse. Illud igitur bonum, quod ipse erat et quo beatus erat, sola bonitate, non necessitate aliis communicari voluit, quia summe boni erat prodesse velle, et omnipotentissimi facere non posse9 ».

Pars II.

Cap. IV.10 Quare rationalis creatura facta sit, id est homo vel Angelus.

« Et quia non valet eius beatitudinis particeps existere aliquis, nisi per intelligentiam, quae quanto magis intelligitur, tanto plenius habetur; fecit Deus rationalem creaturam, quae summum bonum intelligeret et intelligendo amaret et amando possideret ac possidendo frueretur. Eamque hoc modo distinxit, ut pars in sui puritate permaneret nec corpori uniretur, scilicet Angeli, pars corpori iungeretur, scilicet animae. Distincta est itaque rationalis creatura in incorpoream et corpoream; et incorporea quidem Angelus, corporea vero homo vocatur, ex anima rationali et carne subsistens. Conditio ergo rationalis creaturae primam causam habuit Dei bonitatem11 ».

« Ideoque, si quaeratur, quare creatus sit homo vel Angelus, brevi sermone responderi potest: propter bonitatem eius. Unde Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana: Quia bonus est Deus, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus ».

« Et si quaeritur, ad quid creata sit rationalis creatura, respondetur: ad laudandum Deum, ad serviendum ei, ad fruendum eo; in quibus proficit ipsa, non Deus. Deus enim perfectus et summa bonitate plenus nec augeri potest nec minui. Quod ergo rationalis creatura facta est a Deo, referendum est ad Creatoris bonitatem et ad creaturae utilitatem ». « Cum ergo quaeritur, quare vel ad quid facta sit rationalis creatura, brevissime responderi potest: propter Dei bonitatem, et suam utilitatem. Utile nempe ipsi est servire Deo et frui eo ». « Factus ergo Angelus sive homo propter Deum dicitur esse, non quia creator Deus et summe beatus alterutrius indiguerit officio, qui bonorum nostrorum non eget12, sed ut serviret ei ac frueretur eo, cui servire regnare est. In hoc enim proficit serviens, non ille cui servitur ». « Et sicut factus est homo propter Deum, id est, ut ei serviret, ita mundus factus est propter hominem, scilicet ut ei serviret. Positus est ergo homo in medio, ut et ei serviretur et ipse serviret, ut acciperet utrinque13, et reflueret totum ad bonum hominis, et quod accepit obsequium, et quod impendit. Ita enim voluit Deus sibi ab homine serviri, ut ea servitute non Deus, sed homo serviens iuvaretur; et voluit, ut mundus serviret homini, et exinde similiter iuvaretur homo. Totum igitur bonum hominis erat, et quod factum est propter ipsum, et propter quod factus est ipse. Omnia enim, ut ait Apostolus14, nostra sunt, scilicet superiora et aequalia et inferiora. Superiora quidem nostra sunt ad perfruendum, ut Deus-Trinitas, aequalia ad convivendum, scilicet Angeli, qui, etsi modo nobis superiores sint, in futuro erunt aequales; qui et modo nostri sunt, quia ad usum nobis sunt, sicut res dominorum dicuntur esse famulorum, non dominio, sed quia sunt ad usum eorum. Ipsique Angeli in quibusdam Scripturae locis15 nobis servire dicuntur, dum propter nos in ministerium mittuntur ».

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Cap. V. Quomodo dicitur homo factus propter reparationem angelici casus.

« De homine quoque in scriptura interdum reperitur16, quod factus sit propter reparationem angelicae ruinae. Quod non ita est intelligendum, quasi non fuisset homo factus, si non peccasset Angelus; sed quia inter alias causas, scilicet praecipuas, haec etiam nonnulla causa exstitit ». Nostra igitur sunt superiora et aequalia; nostra etiam sunt inferiora, quia ad serviendum nobis facta.

Cap. VI. Quare ita homo sit institutus, ut unita sit anima corpori.

Solet etiam quaeri, cum maioris dignitatis videretur17 esse anima, si absque corpore permansisset, cur unita sit corpori. — Ad quod primo dici potest: quia Deus voluit, et voluntatis eius causa quaerenda non est. Secundo autem potest dici, quod ideo Deus voluit, eam corpori uniri, ut in humana conditione ostenderet novum exemplum beatae unionis, quae est inter Deum et spiritum, in qua diligitur ex toto corde et videtur facie ad faciem18. Putaret enim creatura, se non posse uniri Creatori suo tanta propinquitate, ut eum tota mente diligeret et cognosceret, nisi videret spiritum, qui est excellentissima creatura, tam infimae, id est carni, quae de terra est, in tanta dilectione uniri, ut non valeat arctari ad hoc, ut velit eam relinquere, sicut Apostolus ostendit dicens: Nolumus corpore exspoliari, sed supervestiri19; per quod ostenditur, spiritum creatum Spiritui increato ineffabili amore uniri. « Pro exemplo ergo futurae societatis, quae inter Deum et spiritum rationalem in glorificatione eiusdem perficienda erat, animam corporeis indumentis et terrenis mansionibus copulavit, luteamque materiam fecit ad vitae sensum vegetare, ut sciret homo, quia, si potuit Deus tam disparem naturam corporis et animae in foederationem unam et in amicitiam tantam coniungere, nequaquam ei impossibile futurum, rationalis creaturae humilitatem, licet longe inferiorem, ad suae gloriae participationem sublimare. Quia ergo pro exemplo rationalis spiritus in parte usque ad consortium terreni corporis humiliatus est, ne forte in hoc nimis depressus videretur, addidit Dei providentia, ut postmodum cum eodem corpore glorificato ad consortium illorum qui in sua permanserint20 puritate, sublimaretur, ut quod minus ex dispensatione Creatoris sui acceperat conditus, postmodum per gratiam eiusdem acciperet glorificatus. Sic ergo conditor noster Deus rationales spiritus varia sorte pro arbitrio voluntatis suae disponens21, illis, quos in sua puritate reliquerat, sursum in caelo mansionem; illis vero, quos corporibus terrenis sociaverat, deorsum in terra habitationem constituit; utrisque regulam imponens obedientiae, qualenus et illi ab eo ubi erant, non caderent, et isti ab eo ubi erant, ad id ubi non erant, ascenderent. Fecit itaque Deus hominem ex duplici substantia, corpus de terra fingens, animam vero de nihilo faciens22 ». Ideo etiam unitae sunt animae corporibus, ut in eis Deo famulantes maiorem mereantur coronam.

Epilogus.

Ex praemissis apparet, rationalem creaturam in angelicam et humanam fuisse distinctam, quarum altera tota est spiritualis, id est angelica; altera ex parte spiritualis et ex parte corporalis, id est humana. Cum itaque de his tractandum sit, scilicet de spirituali et corporali creatura et de rationali et non rationali23, primo de rationali et spirituali, id est de Angelis agendum videtur, ut a contuitu Creatoris ad cognitionem creaturae dignioris ratio nostra intendat; deinde ad considerationem corporeae tam illius quae est rationalis, quam illius quae non est rationalis, descendat, ut Trinitatis increatae sacramentum tripartitae creaturae eique concretorum atque contingentium sequatur documentum.

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English Translation

Part I.

Chapter I. That there is one principle, not many.

"Scripture, in introducing the creation of things, shows from its very outset that God is the creator and the beginning of time and of all visible or invisible creatures," saying1: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. "By these words Moses, inspired by the Spirit of God, reports that the world was made by God the creator in one principle," refuting the error of certain men who held that there were many principles without beginning. "For Plato proposed three beginnings — namely God and the exemplar and matter, and held this matter to be uncreated and without beginning, and God to be as it were an artificer, not a creator." For a creator is one who makes something out of nothing.

Chapter II. What it is to create, what to make.

And to create properly is to make something out of nothing, while to make is not only to work something out of nothing, but also out of matter. Hence even man or an angel is said to make some things, but not to create, and is called a maker or artificer, but not a creator. For this name belongs properly to God alone, who both makes certain things out of nothing and certain things out of something. He, then, is creator and worker and maker; but the name "creator"2 he reserved properly for himself, while he communicated the others also to his creatures. In Scripture3, however, "creator" is often taken in the sense of "maker," and conversely "to make" in the same sense [as "to create"], without distinction of meaning.

Chapter III. In what sense the verbs "to act," "to make," and the like are predicated of God.

Nevertheless it must be known that these words — namely to create, to make, to act, and others of this kind — cannot be predicated of God according to the same account by which they are predicated of creatures4. For when we say that he makes something, we do not understand any motion to be in him while operating, nor any passion in laboring, such as is wont to befall us;

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but we signify some new effect of his eternal will — that is, that something newly exists by his eternal will. When therefore he is said to make something, it amounts to saying that according to his will, or through his will, something newly comes to be or to exist, in such a way that nothing new comes to be in him, but something new — just as it had been in his eternal will — comes to be without any motion or change of himself. We, on the other hand, are said to be changed in operating, because we are moved; for we do not make anything without motion. God therefore is said to act or to make something because he is the cause of things newly existing, when by his will new things begin to be which were not before, without any agitation of himself; so that the word "act" cannot properly be said of him, since clearly every act consists in motion, and in God there is no motion. As, therefore, from the heat of the sun certain things come to be without any motion or change wrought in itself or in its heat, so by God's will new things have being without any change of the author, who is the one and only principle of all things. Aristotle, however, held two5 principles, namely matter and species (form), and a third called operatorium; and he held also that the world always was and always has been.

Refuting therefore the error of these and similar men, and handing down the discipline of truth, the Holy Spirit signifies6 that God created the world in the beginning of times and existed eternally before times, commending his eternity and omnipotence; for whom to have willed is to make, since, as we have said, by his will and goodness new things come into being. "Let us believe,7 then, that the cause of created things, heavenly or earthly, visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who is one and true God. So great is his goodness that, supremely good as he is, he wills others to be partakers of that blessedness wherein he is eternally blessed; which goodness he sees8 both can be communicated and can in no way be diminished. That good, then, which he himself was and by which he was blessed, he willed to communicate to others not from necessity but by goodness alone — because it belonged to one supremely good to will to do good, and to one most omnipotent not to be unable to do9 [it]."

Part II.

Chapter IV.10 Why a rational creature was made, that is, man or angel.

"And because no one can be a partaker of his blessedness except through understanding — which, the more it is understood, the more fully is possessed — God made a rational creature which should understand the supreme good, and understanding should love, and loving should possess, and possessing should enjoy. And he distinguished her in this manner: that one part should remain in its own purity and not be united to body — namely the angels; the other part should be joined to body — namely souls. The rational creature is therefore distinguished into incorporeal and corporeal; and the incorporeal is called angel, while the corporeal is called man, subsisting from a rational soul and flesh. The condition therefore of the rational creature had as its first cause the goodness of God.11"

"Hence if it be asked why man or angel was created, the answer can be given in a brief word: because of his goodness. Whence Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine: Because God is good, we are; and inasmuch as we are, we are good."

"And if it be asked for what the rational creature was created, the answer is: for praising God, for serving him, for enjoying him; in which things the creature itself profits, not God. For God, being perfect and full of supreme goodness, can neither be increased nor diminished. That a rational creature was therefore made by God must be referred to the goodness of the Creator and to the utility of the creature." "When, therefore, it is asked why or for what end the rational creature was made, it can be answered most briefly: for the goodness of God, and her own utility. For it is useful to her to serve God and to enjoy him." "Angel therefore, or man, is said to have been made for God's sake — not because the creator God, supremely blessed, had need of the service of either, since he does not need our goods12, but that the creature might serve him and enjoy him, for whom to serve is to reign. For in this the servant profits, not the one served." "And as man was made for God's sake — that is, that he might serve him — so the world was made for man's sake, namely, that it might serve him. Man therefore was placed in the middle, so that he might both be served and serve, that he might receive from both sides13, and that the whole should flow back to the good of man — both the service which he received and the service which he performed. For God so willed himself to be served by man that, by that servitude, God should not, but man serving should, be helped; and he willed that the world should serve man, and that from this man should likewise be helped. The whole good was therefore man's, both what was made for his sake and that for which he himself was made. For all things, as the Apostle says14, are ours — namely those above, those equal, and those below. Those above are ours for full enjoyment, namely God the Trinity; those equal for fellowship, namely the angels, who, even though for the present they are above us, in the future shall be our equals; and they are even now ours, because they are for our use, just as the master's things are said to be the servants' — not by dominion, but because they are for the servants' use. And in certain passages of Scripture15 the angels themselves are said to serve us, when they are sent into ministry on our account."

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Chapter V. In what sense man is said to have been made for the repair of the angelic fall.

"Of man also it is occasionally found in Scripture16 that he was made for the repair of the angelic ruin. This is not to be understood as if man would not have been made had the angel not sinned; rather, it is that among the other causes — namely the principal ones — this also stood as some sort of cause." Therefore those things above are ours, and those equal; ours too are those below, because they were made to serve us.

Chapter VI. Why man was so instituted that the soul is united to the body.

It is also customarily asked: since the soul would seem to be17 of greater dignity if it had remained without body, why is it united to body? — To which it can first be said: because God so willed, and the cause of his will is not to be sought. Secondly, it can be said that for this reason God willed it united to a body — that in the human condition he might display a new example of that blessed union which is between God and spirit, in which [God] is loved with the whole heart and seen face to face18. For the creature would have supposed that it could not be united to its Creator with such closeness — that it should love and know him with the whole mind — unless it saw a spirit (which is the most excellent creature) united in such great love to a thing so lowly — namely to the flesh, which is of the earth — that it cannot be constrained even to wish to leave it, as the Apostle shows when he says: We would not be unclothed [from the body], but clothed over19; by which it is shown that a created spirit is united to the uncreated Spirit with ineffable love. "As an example, therefore, of the future society which was to be perfected between God and the rational spirit in his glorification, [God] coupled the soul to bodily garments and to earthly habitations, and made the clayey matter quicken to the sense of life — that man might know that, if God could join into one federation and into so great a friendship natures so unlike as body and soul, it would in no way be impossible for him to raise the humility of the rational creature, however far lower, to the participation of his own glory. Because, then, for the sake of [this] example the rational spirit was for a part [of itself] humbled to the society of the earthly body, lest perhaps in this it should seem too greatly depressed, God's providence added that afterward — together with that same body, now glorified — it should be raised to the company of those who remained in their20 purity, so that what the creature had received less in [his] creation by the Creator's dispensation, he might afterward receive [in fuller measure] by the same Creator's grace, when glorified. So therefore our maker God, disposing the rational spirits by varied lot at the choice of his own will,21 gave the ones whom he had left in their own purity a dwelling above in heaven; and to those whom he had joined to earthly bodies he gave a dwelling below on earth; imposing on both the rule of obedience, in such a way that the former should not fall from him there where they were, and the latter should ascend from him where they were to that where they were not. So therefore God made man from a twofold substance, fashioning his body from earth and making the soul from nothing22." For this reason also souls are united to bodies — that, while serving God in them, they may merit the greater crown.

Epilogue.

From the foregoing it appears that the rational creature was divided into the angelic and the human, of which the former is wholly spiritual, that is angelic; the latter is partly spiritual and partly corporeal, that is human. Since therefore we must treat of these — namely of the spiritual and the corporeal creature, and of the rational and the non-rational23 — it seems that we ought first to treat of the rational and spiritual, that is, of the angels, so that our reason may stretch out from the contemplation of the Creator to the cognition of the worthier creature; then descend to the consideration of the corporeal — both that which is rational and that which is not rational — so that the sacrament of the uncreated Trinity may be followed by the document of the tripartite creature and of the things concreted and contingent that belong to it.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Genesis 1, 1. — Paulo ante cod. D omittit sui. — Hanc primam propositionem, nonnullis mutatis, Magister sumsit ex Beda, I. Hexaem. init., sed sequentem usque ad elidens, et deinde a Plato namque usque ad creatorem ex Strabone, Prothem. in Gloss., Patrolog. lat. tom. 113, col. 64. a. Tum Beda, tum Strabo has sententias mutuarunt ex S. Ambros., I. Hexaem. c. 1. et 2, n. 1-7.
    Genesis 1:1. — Shortly before, codex D omits sui. — This first proposition, with some modifications, the Master took from Bede, Hexaemeron I (opening); but the next [passage] up to elidens, and then from Plato namque up to creatorem, [he took] from Strabo, Prothemata in Glossam, Patrologia Latina vol. 113, col. 64a. Both Bede and Strabo borrowed these sentences from St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, cc. 1 and 2, nn. 1–7.
  2. Codd. B C E convenit, et mox pro creatoris codd. cum edd., exc. 1, 8, incongrue creationis. Deinde pro sicut facere Vat. et edd. 2-7 tanquam facere.
    Codices B, C, and E [read] convenit, and shortly afterward, in place of creatoris, the codices with the editions (except 1 and 8) incongruously [read] creationis. Then, in place of sicut facere, the Vatican [edition] and editions 2–7 [read] tanquam facere.
  3. Cfr. Genes. I, 27. et Eccli. 17, 1.
    Cf. Genesis 1:27 and Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:1.
  4. Cfr. August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 36.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter I, c. 18, n. 36.
  5. Vat. omittit duo, terrogantibus codd. nec non edd., et pro dixit exhibet posuit contra codd. et edd. 1, 8. — Hanc sententiam Magister sumsit ex Ambros., I. Hexaem. c. 1. n. 1: « ... alii quoque, ut Aristoteles cum suis, disputandum putavit, duo principia ponerent, materiam et speciem, et tertium cum iis, quod operatorium dicitur ». De hac sententia, quae Aristoteli istam opinionem attribuit, cfr. Comment. S. Bonav., hic dub. 3.
    The Vatican [edition] omits duo, against the witness of the codices and editions; and in place of dixit it gives posuit, against the codices and editions 1 and 8. — The Master took this sentence from Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 1, n. 1: "... others also, such as Aristotle with his followers, thought it should be argued that they were positing two principles, matter and species (form), and a third together with these, which is called operatorium." Concerning this sentence — which attributes that opinion to Aristotle — cf. the Commentary of St. Bonaventure, here, dubium 3.
  6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. XLV-XLVII.
    Cf. Sentences, Book I, distinctions 45–47.
  7. Codd. B C T et edd. 1, S vidit, et paulo inferius pro aliis edd. alii.
    Codices B, C, T and editions 1 and S [read] vidit; and a little below, in place of aliis, the editions [read] alii.
  8. Hug. de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. II. c. 4. Cfr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. (inter opera S. August.).
    Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Book I, part II, c. 4. Cf. On Loving God, c. 2 (among the works [attributed to] St. Augustine).
  9. De Diligendo Deo loc. cit., et Hugo loc. cit.
    On Loving God, at the cited place, and Hugh, at the cited place.
  10. Lib. I. c. 32. n. 3-5. Cfr. Magister, I. Sent. d. I. c. 3.
    [On Christian Doctrine] Book I, c. 32, nn. 3–5. Cf. the Master [of the Sentences], Sentences Book I, distinction 1, c. 3.
  11. Verba praecedentia et quae sequuntur usque ad finem capituli sumta sunt ex libro de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. et 3., et ex Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. II. c. 1.
    The preceding words and those that follow up to the end of the chapter are taken from the book On Loving God, cc. 2 and 3, and from Hugh, in the book On the Sacraments, part II, c. 1.
  12. Psalm. 13, 2.
    Psalm 13:2 [Vulgate; cf. Psalm 16:2 in the Hebrew/modern numbering].
  13. Val. cum codd. A D V. et nonnullis edd. perperam utramque.
    The Vatican [edition] with codices A, D, V and some editions wrongly [reads] utramque.
  14. I. Cor. 3, 22. Cfr. Rom. 8, 32, ubi in Glossa, quae sumta est ex August., II. Quaest. evang. c. 33, 35, inveniuntur verba quae sequuntur.
    1 Corinthians 3:22. Cf. Romans 8:32, where in the Gloss — which is taken from Augustine, Quaestiones Evangeliorum II, cc. 33 and 35 — the words that follow are found.
  15. Hebr. I, 14.
    Hebrews 1:14.
  16. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 29; XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1.
    Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 29; City of God XXII, c. 1.
  17. Vat. cum nonnullis edd. videatur.
    The Vatican [edition] with some editions [reads] videatur ["it should seem"].
  18. Cfr. I. Sent. d. XL. c. 4. Infra respicitur Matth. 22, 37; et I. Cor. 13, 12.
    Cf. Sentences Book I, distinction 40, c. 4. Below, reference is made to Matthew 22:37 and to 1 Corinthians 13:12.
  19. II. Cor. 5, 4.
    2 Corinthians 5:4.
  20. Cod. C perstiterunt, codd. A D cum edd. 1, 8 perstiterunt; subinde Vat. perperam sublimetur, omnibus codd. et edd. refragantibus.
    Codex C [reads] perstiterunt; codices A and D with editions 1 and 8 [read] perstiterunt; thereafter the Vatican [edition] wrongly [reads] sublimetur, with all codices and editions disagreeing.
  21. Vat. cum nonnullis edd. componens.
    The Vatican [edition] with some editions [reads] componens ["composing"] [in place of disponens, "disposing"].
  22. Libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 14. (inter opera August.), et iterum Hugo a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 1.
    The book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 14 (among the works [attributed to] Augustine), and again Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Book I, part VI, c. 1.
  23. Sola Vat. omittit verba et de rationali et non rationali, primo.
    The Vatican alone omits the words et de rationali et non rationali, in the first position.
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