Dist. 10, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 10
Articulus III. Qualiter Angeli officium suum exsequantur.
Consequenter quaeritur de tertio articulo, scilicet qualiter iniunctum sibi officium exsequantur; et cum hoc faciant discurrendo et denuntiando, incideret hic quaestio de Angeli motu et de locutione. Sed quia de motu dictum est in primo libro distinctione trigesima septima1, nunc quaerendum est de locutione angelica. Et supposito, quod competat Angelis loqui absque assumto corpore, sicut dicunt plures auctoritates Scripturae, locutione spirituali, quae quidem est sine voce, circa modum loquendi duo quaeruntur.
Primum est, utrum locutio Angeli idem sit quod eius cogitatio. Secundum est, utrum eadem locutio possit esse a Deo et Angelo.
Quaestio I. Utrum Angeli locutio sit idem quod eius cogitatio.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod spiritualis Angeli locutio non est idem quod eius cogitatio:
Fundamenta. 1. Primo per illud quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio2: Si linguis hominum loquar etc.; ibi Glossa: « Angeli praepositi significant minoribus quod de Dei voluntate primi sentiunt, quod fit aliquibus nutibus aut signis »; si ergo nutus cogitationis aliud est quam cogitatio, ergo cogitatio aliud est quam locutio.
2. Item, differt in Angelo actus virtutis intellectivae et operativae: ergo pari ratione differt actus virtutis cogitativae3 et interpretativae; si ergo cogitare est actus virtutis intellectivae, et loqui actus virtutis interpretativae: ergo non sunt idem.
3. Item, non est eadem conversio, qua intellectus convertitur ad se, et qua convertitur ad alterum: si ergo cogitando intellectus convertitur ad se, et loquendo convertitur ad alterum: ergo cogitare et loqui in Angelo non est idem, sed diversum.
4. Item, per locutionem est manifestatio cogitatus angelici: ergo si idem esset loqui et cogitare, quidquid cogitaret, alteri manifestaret: ergo nihil, quod est in uno Angelo, lateret, quin4 esset in alio: ergo quidquid sciret Angelus superioris ordinis, sciret ille qui est inferioris; quod est plane falsum: ergo etc.
Contra: Ad oppositum. 1. Gregorius in Moralibus5 definiens vocem Angelorum dicit: « Vox Angelorum in laude Conditoris est admiratio intimae contemplationis »: si ergo admiratio sive contemplatio non est actus differens a cogitatione, ergo nec locutio sive vociferatio.
2. Item, Damascenus6: « Non lingua et auditu indigent Angeli, nam sine sermone voce prolato tradunt sibi suas illuminationes »: ergo videtur, quod aut locutio angelica nihil sit, aut si aliquid est, non sit aliud quam cogitare.
3. Item, locutio non est aliud quam conceptus manifestatio, Angelus autem, in quantum est substantia cognitiva, habet naturam luminis et speculi7; sed lux corporalis per hoc, quod lucet, se manifestat, et speculum per hoc, quod speciem recipit et retinet, speciem repraesentat: ergo videtur, quod Angelus hoc ipso, quod intelligit, cogitationes suas declarat: ergo cum cogitationis declaratio sit locutio, idem est in eo cogitatio et locutio.
4. Item, loqui non est aliud quam dicere, et dicere non est aliud quam verbum gignere sive formare; sed cogitatio nihil aliud est quam verbi formatio sive verbi conceptio, sicut vult Anselmus et Augustinus8: ergo cogitatio nihil aliud est quam interior locutio; sed locutio, quae convenit Angelo, secundum se est tantum interior: ergo idem est quod cogitatio.
5. Item, si locutio differt a cogitatione, cum praesupponat eam, quaero, quid addit supra ipsam? Si tu dicas mihi, quod addit manifestationem, quae fit per quandam speciei oblationem et transfusionem in alterum quasi in audientem; tunc videtur, cum Angelus superioris ordinis nihil recipiat ab Angelo inferioris, quod Angelus inferioris ordinis non possit loqui alicui Angelo superioris ordinis: quod plane falsum est. Si enim potest Angelus loqui Deo, multo magis potest loqui alteri Angelo.
6. Item, locutio, quae differt a cogitatione, addit aliquod signum exprimens: si ergo Angelus vult speciem intelligibilem, quam habet in se, alteri Angelo manifestare loquendo; et in ipso differt locutio et cogitatio: oportet ergo, quod differat species, qua intelligit, et signum, quo exprimit. Tunc igitur quaero de illo signo: aut est species, aut res. Si species: ergo pari ratione indiget alio signo, et similiter quaeretur de illo alio tertio; nec erit ibi status, sicut nec in primo. Si autem est res; aut sensibilis, aut intelligibilis. Sensibilis non, quia quidquid est in Angelo, est spirituale. Si intelligibilis; quaero, quare illam magis apprehendit Angelus, cui fit sermo, quam ipsam speciem, quae est in intellectu angelico? Et iterum, illa res, quae est in uno Angelo, non potest fieri in veritate in alio Angelo: ergo oportet, quod fiat secundum similitudinem; et tunc pari ratione species existens in intellectu unius Angeli potest generare sui similem in alio. Aut si non; quare non?
Quaestiones incidentes. Item9, quomodo potest illud intelligi? et quid est ibi medium deferens, et quae est ibi lux abstrahens, et quae est ibi vis vel virtus excitans et imprimens? Omnia enim haec videntur esse necessaria, si differt in Angelo locutio et cogitatio.
Conclusio
Angelorum locutio non est idem quod cogitatio, quia locutio addit cogitationi respectum ad alterum et actum novum, non autem signum.
Respondeo: Loqui dicitur dupliciter. Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod loqui dupliciter est: uno modo loqui actum in se sive intrinsecum; alio modo actum ad alterum sive quodam modo extrinsecum10. Primo modo loqui idem est quod verbum formare sive gignere; secundo modo idem est quod verbum formatum depromere sive exprimere. Primo modo locutio sive in Deo, sive in homine, sive in Angelo non est aliud quam cogitatio. Secundo modo plus dicit quam cogitationem, sed differenter in diversis.
Loqui in Deo addit effectum. In Deo enim loqui ad alterum supra intellectum notat11 effectum, videlicet revelationem. Non
enim dicitur Deus nobis loqui solum, quia intelligit, sed etiam quia revelando aliquam illustrationem in nobis efficit. Unde Gregorius in Moralibus12: « Dei locutio, ad nos intrinsecus facta, videtur potius, quam auditur: quia, dum semetipsum sine mora sermonis insinuat, repentina luce tenebras nostrae ignorantiae illustrat ».
In homine addit effectum, actum et signum. In homine vero non solum addit effectum in alterum, sed etiam actum et signum medium. Cum enim unus homo loquitur alteri, non solum cogitat, sed cogitationem suam, formando vocem sensibilem, alii interpretatur et explicat. — Ratio autem, quare locutio in hominibus non solum addit actum, sed etiam signum medium, haec est: quia in anima alius est actus conversionis supra se, et alius actus conversionis ad alterum; et in cogitatione13 convertitur anima supra id quod habet in se, in locutione vero offert alteri: et ita oportet, quod alius actus sit cogitare et loqui, et ita addit actum locutio supra cogitationem in homine. Addit etiam signum, quia anima, quamdiu est cum corpore, non est nata suscipere, nisi mediante vi sensitiva; unde « qui amittunt unum sensum, necesse habent amittere unam scientiam14 ». Ideo ad hoc, quod anima conceptum suum alteri exprimat, oportet, quod ipsum voci sensibili per organa formatae, mediante vi imaginaria, coniungat, et sic similitudo intelligibilis sive signatum intelligibile per illud suum signum sensibile, mediantibus virtutibus sensitivis, ad intellectum alterius animae ascendat. — Et hoc conveniens est, ut, sicut homo compositus est ex anima et corpore, ita eius locutio aliquid habeat spirituale, aliquid corporale.
Conclusio 1. In spiritualibus autem substantiis medio modo est; nam locutio supra cogitationem addit effectum sive respectum, sed non addit sensibile signum. Respectum quidem et effectum addit propter hoc, quod cogitatio, quantum est de sui natura, est secreta; et ideo nunquam fit manifesta, nisi ipse cogitans aliquid tanquam audienti offerat, et aperiendo se, quodam quasi nutu mediante, quod in se habet ad intellectum alterius quasi ad aurem pertingere faciat. Necessarius est etiam actus novus, quia non eadem conversione15 se supra se convertit et supra alterum vel ad alterum. — Sed tamen non est necessarium sensibile signum nec deferens medium, quia, cum ipse intellectus angelicus sine potentiis sensitivis natus sit suscipere, Angelus loquens sine sensibili medio natus est similiter offerre; Conclusio 2. et ideo ad loquendum sufficit ipsi Angelo ipsa species intelligibilis, quae ex virtute intellectiva ipsius Angeli ad imperium16 voluntatis potest ad alterum protendi. Et sicut illa species, dum eam sibi et in se contuebatur intellectus, erat verbum interius; sic, dum eam protendit ad alterum, efficitur quasi nutus et verbum exterius. Et quia tam illa species quam virtus protendens illam ad alterum et ipsa protensio spiritualis est; ideo non indiget corporali medio deferente. — Corollarium. Sed quia virtus illa finita est, necesse est ad hoc, quod unus Angelus intellectum alterius Angeli loquendo, hoc est illam speciem protendendo, excitet, quod finita distantia ad invicem distent.
Ex his igitur patet, quod etsi non tantum differat in Angelo locutio et cogitatio, quantum differt in homine, differt tamen aliquo modo. Ideo rationes inductae ad hanc partem concedendae sunt.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod Gregorius loquitur de locutione Angeli in comparatione ad Deum, apud quem loqui Angeli cogitare est, quia aurem17 eius nihil latet.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod quamvis locutio Angeli non differat a cogitatione propter hoc, quod ultra cogitationem dicat vocem sensibilem; Notandum. nihilominus tamen non est omnino indifferens, quia, etsi non addat ultra cogitationem aliquod signum, addit tamen ulteriorem actum atque respectum, ratione cuius concernit finitam distantiam, quamvis cogitatio et intellectus ab omni distantia abstrahat.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de manifestatione lucis et speculi, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lucis vel speculi manifestatio est naturalis. Unde nec lux potest lucere, nec speculum suscipere, quin etiam se manifestent; sed non sic est in angelica cogitatione, cuius manifestatio est voluntaria, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram18: « Dum ipsi Angeli cogitationes suas ad nutum voluntatis modo occultant, modo communicant, quibusdam spiritualibus obstaculis positis, vel remotis, sicut sensibiliter videmus circa corpora ».
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil aliud est loqui quam dicere; dicendum, quod sicut loqui est dupliciter: in se, et ad alterum, sic etiam et19 dicere; et quamvis dicere in se idem sit quod cogitare vel cogitando intelligere, tamen dicere ad alterum ulteriorem habet actum.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi locutio addit aliquid supra cogitationem, quod tunc non poterit Angelus inferioris ordinis loqui ad Angelum superioris; dicendum, quod verum est, si loqui adderet influentiam veram in alterum; sed actus locutionis, superadditus actui cogitationis, Notandum. non dicit nisi quandam speciei protensionem ad alterum, quae quidem protensio non est illius speciei impressiva, sed potius excitativa intellectus audientis, ut propria virtute suscipiat et in se ipso faciat20. Unde locutio ex parte loquentis non ponit nisi excitationem activam, ex parte audientis non nisi excitationem passivam. — Quid auditus Angeli. Et ex hoc patet, quid sit auditus Angeli, et quomodo differat audire et videre; nam tam audire quam videre est in Angelo intelligere21. Sed tunc videt, cum ex proprio motu intelligit aliquid; tunc audit, quando per oblationem speciei intelligibilis, ab alio intelligente excitatus, ipsum quod offertur intelligit. Et sic competit Angelo non solum respectu superioris, sed etiam respectu paris vel inferioris; quia sic audit supremus Angelus ab infimo, sicut magister audire potest a discipulo, non quia ab eo suscipiat doctrinam sive illuminationem, sed quia melius cognoscit eius defectus per sui ipsius detectionem.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi locutio differt a cogitatione, quod nutus differt a specie; dicendum, quod illud non oportet, quod differat re, sed sufficit, quod differat comparatione. Ad quaestiones incidentes. Eadem enim species est, quae consideratur in se, et quae potest protendi ad alterum, relatione differens. Sed actus considerandi eam in se, qui quidem est cogitatio, et actus protendendi ad alterum, qui est locutio, actus est alius et alius; nam his actibus intellectus angelicus eadem similitudine diversimode utitur, ita quod in uno illa similitudo et intelligibilis species dicitur species tantum et verbum; in altero vero non tantum species, sed etiam nutus. — Alia solutio. Verumtamen posset dici, quod sicut species, quae est in speculo, dum protendit se ad oculum, non est omnino eadem, sed se multiplicat; sic etiam potest intelligi spirituali modo de specie, quae est in intellectu angelico. — Non requiritur medium. Si autem quaeratur de medio, dicendum, quod nulla est quaestio, quia, cum sit actio spiritualis et intellectualis, non indiget medio corporali. — De virtute et luce. Si vero quaeratur de virtute, per quam fit22, sive de luce spirituali; dicendum, quod concurrit ibi lux intellectus angelici offerentis et lux etiam supernae veritatis, Notandum. ut, sicut in luce corporali ad immutandum visum videmus concurrere et lucem incorporatam et lucem insuper influentem et absolutam, utpote lucem solis; sic etiam in spirituali cognitione duplicem lucem concurrere intelligamus, secundum quod in pluribus locis innuit Augustinus23.
I. Locutio est interni conceptus expressio ad alterum (I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1.). Differt autem ab illuminatione, « quia illuminatio fit solum a superioribus, locutio ab omnibus; secundo, illuminatio est de re per se non cognoscibili, locutio vero etiam de re per se cognoscibili; tertio, illuminatio fit per aliquam formationem intellectus illuminati, sed locutio non » (ita Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. a. 4.). — Quod Angeli inter se loquantur, constat ex s. Scriptura (Is. 6, 3, Apoc. 7, 2.). Difficile autem homini est explicare modum, quo loquantur, sive determinare, quid locutio in Angelis addat super cogitationem (cfr. hic argg. ultima ad oppos.). Hinc S. Bonav., dum alii Scholastici eandem quaestionem inscribunt: « de modo, quo Angeli loquantur », totus est in determinanda hac additione. Variae sunt Scholasticorum de hac re sententiae; quae tamen in hoc conveniunt, quod praeter cognitionem requiratur actus voluntatis, quo Angelus vult manifestare alteri suum conceptum sive ordinare eum ad alterum. Durandus (II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2.), reiectis tribus aliis sententiis, affirmat, requiri etiam « signum, in quantum est signum », nec excludit etiam signum sensibile. Hoc ultimum autem communiter ab aliis reprobatur. — Aegid. R. (hic q. 3. a. 1. et dub. lit. 5.) improbat sententiam S. Thomae et vult, quod « possunt (Angeli) formare aliqua signa intellectualia, exprimentia, quid cogitent ». Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2.) putat, Angelum loquentem causare in audiente immediate conceptum obiecti, de quo loquitur; quae sententia diffuse declaratur a Lycheto (ad hunc locum) et Hier. de Montefortino (t. II. q. 107. a. 1.). — Ad eandem fere sententiam accedere videtur Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 9. a. 2. q. 1.), qui multum loquitur de « quibusdam radiis spiritualibus », a loquente Angelo ad audientem transmissis, quibus « educit de potentia ad actum sui conceptus similitudinem, quam mediante illo radio usque ad intellectum alterius Angeli protendit ». — Secundum Petrum a Tar. (loc. cit.) ad propositum manifestandi accedit « applicatio ad aliquod signum naturale, uni Angelo in altero cognoscibile naturaliter, in quo manifestatur ». — Sed S. Thom. nihil requirit, nisi « quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri per voluntatem ipsius Angeli » (S. I. q. 107. a. 1; cfr. II. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. a. 3.); unde audiens « nihil recipit a loquente, sed per speciem, quam penes se habet, et alium Angelum et locutionem eius cognoscit » (de Verit. q. 9. a. 6. ad 1.). Attamen (Sum. loc. cit. ad 3.) dicit: « Sicut per
signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum ».
II. S. Bonav. convenit cum S. Thoma, quod loqui « non addit influentiam veram in alterum », et quod « protensio (speciei) non est illius speciei impressiva, sed potius excitativa intellectus audientis, ut propria virtute suscipiat et in se ipso faciat » etc. (hic ad 5. et cfr. ad 6. et hic a. 2. q. 2. ad 3.). Pro meliore intelligentia huius doctrinae cfr. infra d. 21. dub. 1, ubi docetur, ad locutionis formationem tria requiri, et I. Sent. d. 9. dub. 4, ubi aptum exemplum ponitur: « Simile est de duobus speculis sibi oppositis, si voluntarie possent abscondere aliis et offerre quae in se relucent ». Qui loci si attente ponderantur, vix aliqua in doctrina differentia inter utrumque S. Doctorem deprehenditur. Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 27. m. 1. 2. et praecipue 6.), licet paulo aliter loquatur, fere eandem doctrinam profitetur. — Dissentiunt autem Ss. Bonav. et Thom. quoad illud corollarium (hic in fine corp.), quod finita distantia esse debeat inter Angelos colloquentes. Hoc S. Thom. secundum principia, quae habet de relatione Angelorum ad locum, non approbat, quia « nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci » (S. loc. cit. a. 4.). Ceterum opportune monet Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.), modum angelicae locutionis nobis pro maxima parte esse ignotum; nec sapientiae esse de talibus multum assertorie loqui, sed potius Deo et Angelis ipsorum secreta committere. — Citatis auctoribus addimus Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 16, satis obscure loquentem; nec non Biel, II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2.
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Article III. In what manner the Angels carry out their office.
Next there is inquiry concerning the third article, namely, in what manner [the Angels] carry out the office enjoined upon them; and since they do this by going about and by announcing, there would here arise a question concerning the Angel's motion and concerning [his] locution. But because of motion it has been treated in the first book, distinction thirty-seven1, now inquiry must be made concerning angelic locution. And, it being supposed that it belongs to the Angels to speak without an assumed body — as many authorities of Scripture say — by a spiritual locution, which indeed is without voice, two things are asked concerning the manner of speaking.
The first is whether the locution of an Angel is the same as his thought. The second is whether the same locution can be from God and from an Angel.
Question I. Whether the locution of an Angel is the same as his thought.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the spiritual locution of an Angel is not the same as his thought:
The grounds. 1. First, through that which is said in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen2: If I should speak with the tongues of men etc.; there the Gloss [says]: «The Angels set over [others] signify to the lesser ones what they themselves first perceive of God's will, which comes about by certain nods or signs»; if, then, the nod of a thought is something other than the thought, then the thought is something other than the locution.
2. Likewise, in an Angel the act of the intellective power and [the act] of the operative [power] differ: therefore, by parity of reasoning, the act of the cogitative power3 and [the act] of the interpretative [power] differ; if, then, to think is the act of the intellective power, and to speak the act of the interpretative power: therefore they are not the same.
3. Likewise, the conversion by which the intellect is turned toward itself and [the conversion] by which it is turned toward another are not the same: if, then, in thinking the intellect is turned toward itself, and in speaking is turned toward another: therefore to think and to speak in an Angel are not the same, but diverse.
4. Likewise, through locution there is the manifestation of an angelic thought: therefore, if to speak and to think were the same, whatever [an Angel] thought, he would manifest to another: therefore nothing that is in one Angel would lie hidden but that4 it would be in another: therefore whatever the Angel of a higher order knew, he who is of a lower [order] would know; which is plainly false: therefore etc.
On the contrary: To the opposite. 1. Gregory in the Morals5, defining the voice of the Angels, says: «The voice of the Angels in the praise of the Creator is the wonder of the inmost contemplation»: if, then, wonder or contemplation is not an act differing from thought, then neither [is] locution or vociferation.
2. Likewise, Damascene6: «The Angels do not need tongue and hearing, for without a word uttered by voice they hand over their illuminations to one another»: therefore it seems that either angelic locution is nothing, or, if it is something, it is nothing other than to think.
3. Likewise, locution is nothing other than the manifestation of a concept; but an Angel, inasmuch as he is a cognitive substance, has the nature of a light and of a mirror7; but corporeal light, by the fact that it shines, manifests itself, and a mirror, by the fact that it receives and retains a species, represents the species: therefore it seems that an Angel, by this very fact that he understands, declares his thoughts: therefore, since the declaration of a thought is locution, in him thought and locution are the same.
4. Likewise, to speak is nothing other than to say, and to say is nothing other than to beget or form a word; but thought is nothing other than the formation of a word or the conception of a word, as Anselm and Augustine hold8: therefore thought is nothing other than interior locution; but the locution which befits an Angel is, in itself, only interior: therefore it is the same as thought.
5. Likewise, if locution differs from thought — since it presupposes it — I ask, what does it add over it? If you say to me that it adds a manifestation, which comes about by a certain offering and transfusion of a species into another as into a hearer; then it seems — since an Angel of a higher order receives nothing from an Angel of a lower [order] — that an Angel of a lower order could not speak to any Angel of a higher order: which is plainly false. For if an Angel can speak to God, much more can he speak to another Angel.
6. Likewise, locution, which differs from thought, adds some expressing sign: if, then, an Angel wishes to manifest to another Angel, by speaking, an intelligible species which he has in himself, and in him locution and thought differ: it must be, then, that the species by which he understands and the sign by which he expresses differ. Then, therefore, I ask concerning that sign: it is either a species or a thing. If a species: then by parity of reasoning it needs another sign, and similarly inquiry will be made concerning that other third one; nor will there be a stopping-point there, just as neither in the first. But if it is a thing: [it is] either sensible or intelligible. Sensible [it is] not, because whatever is in an Angel is spiritual. If intelligible: I ask, why does the Angel to whom the discourse is made apprehend that [thing] rather than the very species which is in the angelic intellect? And again, that thing which is in one Angel cannot come to be in truth in another Angel: therefore it must be that it come to be according to a likeness; and then by parity of reasoning a species existing in the intellect of one Angel can generate its like in another. Or if not, why not?
Incidental questions. Likewise9, how can that be understood? and what is the conveying medium there, and what is the abstracting light there, and what is the stirring and impressing force or power there? For all these seem to be necessary, if in an Angel locution and thought differ.
Conclusion
The locution of the Angels is not the same as thought, because locution adds to thought a relation to another and a new act, but not a sign.
I respond: "To speak" is said in two ways. For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to speak is [taken] in two ways: in one way, to speak [as] an act in itself, or intrinsic; in another way, [as] an act toward another, or in a certain way extrinsic10. In the first way, to speak is the same as to form or beget a word; in the second way, it is the same as to bring forth or express a word [already] formed. In the first way, locution — whether in God, or in man, or in an Angel — is nothing other than thought. In the second way it says more than thought, but differently in different [cases].
"To speak" in God adds an effect. For in God, to speak to another, beyond [the act of] understanding, marks11 an effect, namely revelation. For
God is not said to speak to us merely because he understands, but also because by revealing he effects some illumination in us. Hence Gregory in the Morals12: «God's locution, made to us inwardly, is seen rather than heard: because, while he insinuates his very self without the delay of speech, he illumines the darkness of our ignorance with a sudden light».
In man it adds an effect, an act, and a sign. But in man it adds not only an effect upon another, but also an act and an intermediate sign. For when one man speaks to another, he not only thinks, but also, by forming a sensible voice, interprets and explains his thought to the other. — Now the reason why locution in men adds not only an act but also an intermediate sign is this: that in the soul the act of conversion upon itself is one thing, and the act of conversion toward another is another; and in thought13 the soul is turned upon what it has within itself, but in locution it offers [it] to another: and so it must be that to think and to speak are a different act, and so locution adds an act over thought in man. It also adds a sign, because the soul, so long as it is with the body, is not fitted by nature to receive [anything] except by the mediation of the sensitive power; whence «those who lose one sense necessarily lose one [branch of] knowledge14». Therefore, in order that the soul may express its concept to another, it must join it to a voice formed by sensible organs, by the mediation of the imaginative power, and so the intelligible likeness, or the intelligible thing signified, ascends, through that sensible sign of his, by the mediation of the sensitive powers, to the intellect of the other soul. — And this is fitting, that, as man is composed of soul and body, so his locution should have something spiritual, something corporeal.
Conclusion 1. But in spiritual substances it is in a middle way; for locution adds over thought an effect or relation, but does not add a sensible sign. It adds a relation and an effect for this reason: that thought, as far as is of its own nature, is secret; and therefore it never becomes manifest unless the one thinking offer something as it were to a hearer, and, by opening himself, by a certain quasi-nod as a medium, cause what he has within himself to reach, as it were to the ear, to the intellect of another. A new act also is necessary, because not by the same conversion15 does he turn himself upon himself and upon another or toward another. — But nevertheless a sensible sign is not necessary, nor a conveying medium, because, since the angelic intellect itself is fitted by nature to receive without sensitive powers, the speaking Angel is likewise fitted by nature to offer without a sensible medium; Conclusion 2. and therefore for speaking the intelligible species itself suffices for the Angel, [a species] which, from the intellective power of the Angel himself, at the command16 of the will, can be extended toward another. And just as that species, while the intellect beheld it for itself and in itself, was an interior word; so, while it extends it toward another, it becomes as it were a nod and an exterior word. And because both that species and the power extending it toward another, and the extension itself, are spiritual, therefore it does not need a corporeal conveying medium. — A corollary. But because that power is finite, it is necessary, for this — that one Angel by speaking, that is, by extending that species, should stir up the intellect of another Angel — that they be distant from one another by a finite distance.
From these things, then, it is plain that, although locution and thought do not differ in an Angel as much as they differ in man, they do nevertheless differ in some way. Therefore the arguments adduced for this side are to be conceded.
The solution of the opposing arguments. 1. To that which is objected from Gregory, it must be said that Gregory is speaking of the Angel's locution in comparison to God, with whom for an Angel to speak is to think, because nothing lies hidden from his ear17.
2. To that which is objected from Damascene, it must be said that, although the locution of an Angel does not differ from thought by the fact that it utters a sensible voice beyond the thought, Note. nevertheless it is not altogether without difference; because, even if it does not add any sign beyond the thought, it nevertheless adds a further act and relation, by reason of which it concerns a finite distance, although thought and intellect abstract from all distance.
3. To that which is objected concerning the manifestation of light and of a mirror, it must be said that the case is not alike, because the manifestation of light or of a mirror is natural. Whence light cannot shine, nor a mirror receive [a species], without also manifesting themselves; but it is not so in angelic thought, whose manifestation is voluntary, as Augustine says upon Genesis according to the letter18: «While the Angels themselves, at the nod of [their] will, now conceal, now communicate their thoughts — certain spiritual obstacles being set up or removed — as we see sensibly with regard to bodies».
4. To that which is objected — that to speak is nothing other than to say — it must be said that, just as to speak is [taken] in two ways, in itself and toward another, so also is to say19; and although to say in oneself is the same as to think, or by thinking to understand, nevertheless to say toward another has a further act.
5. To that which is objected — that if locution adds something over thought, then an Angel of a lower order will not be able to speak to an Angel of a higher [order] — it must be said that this is true if to speak were to add a true influence upon another; but the act of locution, superadded to the act of thought, Note. says nothing but a certain extension of a species toward another, which extension indeed is not impressive of that species, but rather is excitative of the intellect of the hearer, so that by its own power it may receive [it] and make [it] in itself20. Hence locution, on the part of the speaker, posits nothing but an active stirring-up; on the part of the hearer, nothing but a passive stirring-up. — What the hearing of an Angel is. And from this it is plain what the hearing of an Angel is, and how to hear and to see differ; for both to hear and to see is, in an Angel, to understand21. But he sees when by his own motion he understands something; he hears when, by the offering of an intelligible species, stirred up by another that understands, he understands the very [thing] which is offered. And so this befits an Angel not only with respect to a higher [Angel], but also with respect to an equal or a lower one; for thus the highest Angel hears from the lowest, as a master can hear from a disciple — not because he receives doctrine or illumination from him, but because he better knows his defects through the [disciple's] disclosure of himself.
6. To that which is objected — that if locution differs from thought, [then] a nod differs from a species — it must be said that this is not necessary, that it differ in [its] thing, but it suffices that it differ in relation. To the incidental questions. For the species is the same which is considered in itself and which can be extended toward another, differing [only] in relation. But the act of considering it in itself, which indeed is thought, and the act of extending [it] toward another, which is locution, are a different and different act; for by these acts the angelic intellect uses the same likeness in diverse ways, so that in the one [act] that likeness and intelligible species is called a species only, and a word; but in the other not only a species, but also a nod. — Another solution. Nevertheless it could be said that, just as the species which is in a mirror, while it extends itself to the eye, is not altogether the same, but multiplies itself, so too can it be understood, in a spiritual manner, of the species which is in the angelic intellect. — No medium is required. But if inquiry be made concerning a medium, it must be said that there is no question, because, since it is a spiritual and intellectual action, it does not need a corporeal medium. — On the power and the light. But if inquiry be made concerning the power by which it comes about22, or concerning the spiritual light, it must be said that there concur there the light of the offering Angel's intellect and also the light of the supernal truth, Note. so that — just as in corporeal light we see concur, for the altering of sight, both the incorporated light and, besides, the light flowing in and absolute, namely the light of the sun — so too in spiritual cognition we understand a twofold light to concur, according as Augustine intimates in many places23.
I. Locution is the expression of an interior concept to another (I Sent. d. 27, part II, q. 1). It differs from illumination, «because illumination comes about only from superiors, locution from all; secondly, illumination is of a thing not knowable through itself, but locution [is] also of a thing knowable through itself; thirdly, illumination comes about through a certain formation of the illuminated intellect, but locution [does] not» (so Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 11, q. 2, a. 4). — That the Angels speak among themselves is established from sacred Scripture (Is. 6, 3; Apoc. 7, 2). But it is difficult for a man to explain the manner in which they speak, or to determine what locution in the Angels adds over thought (cf. here the last arguments ad oppositum). Hence S. Bonaventure — while other Scholastics inscribe the same question: «on the manner in which the Angels speak» — is wholly [engaged] in determining this addition. The opinions of the Scholastics on this matter are various; which nonetheless agree in this, that besides cognition there is required an act of will, by which the Angel wills to manifest his concept to another, or to order it toward another. Durandus (II Sent. d. 11, q. 2), the three other opinions being rejected, affirms that there is also required «a sign, inasmuch as it is a sign», nor does he exclude even a sensible sign. But this last is commonly disapproved by the others. — Giles of Rome (here, q. 3, a. 1, and lettered doubt 5) disproves the opinion of S. Thomas and holds that «[the Angels] can form certain intellectual signs, expressing what they think». Scotus (in each Writing, here, q. 2) thinks that the speaking Angel causes in the hearer immediately the concept of the object of which he speaks; which opinion is set forth at length by Lychetus (on this place) and Hieronymus de Montefortino (vol. II, q. 107, a. 1). — To nearly the same opinion Richard of Middleton seems to come near (II Sent. d. 9, a. 2, q. 1), who speaks much of «certain spiritual rays» transmitted from the speaking Angel to the hearer, by which «he educes from potency into act a likeness of his concept, which by the mediation of that ray he extends as far as the intellect of the other Angel». — According to Peter of Tarentaise (in the place cited), to the purpose of manifesting there comes «an application to some natural sign, naturally knowable to one Angel in another, in which [the concept] is manifested». — But S. Thomas requires nothing except «that the concept of the angelic mind be ordered to manifesting [itself] to another through the will of the Angel himself» (Summa I, q. 107, a. 1; cf. II Sent. d. 11, q. 2, a. 3); whence the hearer «receives nothing from the speaker, but through the species which he has in his keeping, he knows both the other Angel and his locution» (On Truth q. 9, a. 6, ad 1). And yet (Summa, in the place cited, ad 3) he says: «Just as
by a sensible sign the sense is stirred up, so by some intelligible power the mind of an Angel can be stirred up to attend».
II. S. Bonaventure agrees with S. Thomas that to speak «does not add a true influence upon another», and that «the extension (of a species) is not impressive of that species, but rather excitative of the intellect of the hearer, so that by its own power it may receive [it] and make [it] in itself» etc. (here, ad 5, and cf. ad 6, and here, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3). For a better understanding of this doctrine cf. below, d. 21, doubt 1, where it is taught that for the formation of locution three things are required, and I Sent. d. 9, doubt 4, where an apt example is set down: «It is like two mirrors set opposite each other, if they could voluntarily hide from others, and offer [to them], the things that shine forth in themselves». If these places be carefully weighed, scarcely any difference in doctrine between the two holy Doctors is detected. Alexander of Hales also (Summa part II, q. 27, m. 1, 2, and especially 6), although he speaks a little otherwise, professes nearly the same doctrine. — But Ss. Bonaventure and Thomas disagree concerning that corollary (here, at the end of the body) — that there must be a finite distance between Angels conversing. This S. Thomas, according to the principles which he holds concerning the relation of Angels to place, does not approve, because «distance of place causes no impediment» (Summa, in the place cited, a. 4). For the rest, Dionysius the Carthusian (here, q. 2) opportunely warns that the manner of angelic locution is for the greatest part unknown to us; and that it is not [a part] of wisdom to speak too assertively of such things, but rather to commit their secrets to God and to the Angels themselves. — To the authors cited we add Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 16, speaking quite obscurely; and also Biel, II Sent. d. 9, q. 2.
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- Parte II. a. 2. — Aliquanto inferius codd. antiquiores auctoritates et Scripturae [codd. R U Scriptura] pro auctoritates Scripturae. Cfr. Zachar. 1, 9: Et dixit ad me Angelus, qui loquebatur in me.[I Sent. d. 37,] part II, a. 2. — A little below, the more ancient codices [read] auctoritates et Scripturae [codices R, U: Scriptura] for auctoritates Scripturae. Cf. Zechariah 1, 9: And the Angel who spoke in me said to me.
- Vers. 1. — In Glossa ordinaria, apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum super hunc locum, textus originalis cum multis nostrorum codd. habet primi [Petrus Lomb. primum] sentiunt pro praesentiunt, quod habent alii codd. cum Vat. — Plures codd. cum Vat. hic et deinde saepius minus bene substituunt nomen cognitio pro cogitatio.[1 Corinthians 13,] v. 1. — In the ordinary Gloss, in Peter Lombard and Lyra upon this place, the original text, with many of our codices, has primi [Peter Lombard: primum] sentiunt for praesentiunt, which other codices, with the Vatican edition, have. — Several codices, with the Vatican edition, here and thereafter often less rightly substitute the word cognitio for cogitatio.
- Multi codd. cum Vat. cognitivae, contra codd. B E F K P T bb ee.Many codices, with the Vatican edition, [read] cognitivae, against codices B, E, F, K, P, T, bb, ee.
- Ex cod. P substituimus quin pro quod.From codex P we have substituted quin for quod.
- Libr. II. c. 7. n. 10. Cfr. supra pag. 85, nota 2.[Morals,] book II, c. 7, n. 10. Cf. above, p. 85, note 2.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3. — Vat. intentiones pro illuminationes. Cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 4.[Damascene,] On the Orthodox Faith, book II, c. 3. — The Vatican edition [reads] intentiones for illuminationes. Cf. above, p. 84, note 4.
- Cfr. supra pag. 81, nota 3. — Cod. F K substantia cogitativa pro substantia cognitiva, et paulo superius post conceptus in cod. T additur mentis.Cf. above, p. 81, note 3. — Codices F, K [read] substantia cogitativa for substantia cognitiva, and a little above, after conceptus, in codex T is added mentis.
- Anselm., Monol. c. 10. — August., XIV. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8. seqq. et XV. c. 10. n. 17. seqq. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1.Anselm, Monologion c. 10. — Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 6, n. 8 ff., and XV, c. 10, n. 17 ff. Cf. also I Sent. d. 27, part II, q. 1.
- Cod. aa Item quaero.Codex aa [reads] Item quaero.
- Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 21.Cf. Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 21.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 addit.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] addit [for notat].
- Libr. XXVIII. c. 1. n. 2.[Morals,] book XXVIII, c. 1, n. 2.
- Cod. cc cum ed. 1 et in conversione prima.Codex cc, with edition 1, [reads] et in conversione prima.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.). — De formatione vocis eiusque relatione ad imaginativam vim cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 87-91. (c. 8.) et August., de Magistro, c. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius auctoritate codd. L W aa cc et ed. 1 posuimus mediante vi pro mediante via, quod habet Vat. cum aliis codd. et edd.Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 14 (c. 18). — On the formation of the voice and its relation to the imaginative power cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 87–91 (c. 8), and Augustine, On the Teacher, c. 1 ff. — A little below, on the authority of codices L, W, aa, cc and edition 1, we have set mediante vi for mediante via, which the Vatican edition has with other codices and editions.
- Cod. I supplet intellectus angelicus.Codex I supplies intellectus angelicus.
- Vat. per vim. Paulo inferius codd. K aa continebat pro contuebatur, cod. cc et ed. 1 vero legunt continet intellectus, dicitur verbum interius.The Vatican edition [reads] per vim. A little below, codices K, aa [read] continebat for contuebatur, but codex cc and edition 1 read continet intellectus, dicitur verbum interius.
- Cod. Y mentem.Codex Y [reads] mentem.
- Libr. XII. c. 22. n. 48: Verum hoc intersit, quod illi [Angeli] nostras [cogitationes] etiamsi nolimus, noverunt, nos autem ipsorum, nisi ostendantur, nosse non possumus; quia sic eas, ut opinor, habent in potestate occultare spiritualibus modis, quemadmodum nos, quibusdam interiectis obstaculis, nostra corpora, ne aliorum oculis videantur, abscondimus.[On Genesis according to the Letter,] book XII, c. 22, n. 48: But let this difference hold: that they [the Angels] know our [thoughts] even if we are unwilling, but we cannot know theirs unless they be shown; because thus, as I think, they have it in their power to conceal them by spiritual means, just as we, by certain interposed obstacles, hide our bodies, lest they be seen by the eyes of others.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 est.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] est.
- Cod. cc cum ed. 1 et se ipso faciat.Codex cc, with edition 1, [reads] et se ipso faciat.
- August., XV. de Trin. c. 10. n. 18: Foris enim, cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio; intus autem, cum cogitamus, utrumque unum est. Sicut auditio et visio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus corporis, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud videre et audire... Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re, quam scimus, verbum est, quod in corde dicimus, quod nec Graecum est, nec Latinum, nec linguae alicuius alterius; sed cum id opus est in eorum [...] quibus loquimur perferre notitiam, aliquod signum, quo significetur, assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, ille auribus, ille oculis exhibetur, ut per signa corporalia etiam corporis sensibus verbum, quod mente gerimus, innotescat. Nam et innuere quid est, nisi quodam modo visibiliter dicere?Augustine, On the Trinity XV, c. 10, n. 18: For outwardly, when these things come about through the body, locution is one thing, vision another; but inwardly, when we think, the two are one. Just as hearing and seeing are two things distant from each other in the senses of the body, but in the soul to see and to hear are not one thing and another... For a thought formed from the thing which we know is a word which we say in the heart, which is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other tongue; but when there is need to convey it to the knowledge of those with whom we speak, some sign is taken up by which it may be signified. And for the most part a sound, sometimes also a nod, the one is presented to the ears, the other to the eyes, so that by corporeal signs the word which we bear in the mind may become known also to the senses of the body. For to nod — what is it, but in a certain way to say [something] visibly?
- Vat. cum pluribus codd. sit.The Vatican edition, with several codices, [reads] sit.
- Cfr. Opusculum a nobis editum de Humanae Cognitionis ratione, in quo a S. Bonav. eiusque discipulis haec Augustini doctrina diffuse exponitur.Cf. the little work published by us, On the Manner of Human Knowledge, in which this doctrine of Augustine is set forth at length by S. Bonaventure and his disciples. ---