Bonaventure

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV.

Pars I.

De libero arbitrio secundum se et in generali.

Iam vero ad propositum redeamus etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad alias potentias; hic vero agit de libero arbitrio secundum se. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes. In prima determinat, quid sit liberum arbitrium in se sive in generali. In secunda vero determinat de libertate arbitrii secundum differentes eius status in speciali, ibi: Ex praedictis perspicuum est etc. Prima pars habet duas particulas. In quarum prima Magister ponit liberi arbitrii assignationem. In secunda ad praedictae assignationis explanationem quandam removet¹ dubitationem, ibi: Et quidem secundum praedictam assignationem etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quid sit liberum arbitrium. In secunda vero ex illa definitione elicit, quod liberum arbitrium non est praesentium nec praeteritorum, sed futurorum, et horum non quorumlibet, sed futurorum contingentium, ibi: Hoc autem sciendum est, quod liberum arbitrium etc. Similiter secunda pars habet duas, in quarum prima movet dubitationem, in secunda vero determinat, ibi: Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium etc.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem. Et quoniam eius quidditas et natura cognoscitur in assignando convenientiam et differentiam ipsius ad voluntatem et rationem, ideo de ipso quaerendum est in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem. Ad huius autem comparationis dilucidationem circa sex contingit dubitare et quaerere.

Primo enim quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem, an non.

Tertio, dato quod non, quaeritur, utrum complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.

Quarto, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum complectatur illas duas potentias per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus.

Quinto, dato quod per modum habitus, quaeritur, utrum habitus ille addat aliquid per essentiam rationi et voluntati.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, secundum quam illarum duarum potentiarum principalius insit animae libertas arbitrii, utrum videlicet secundum rationem, an secundum voluntatem.

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Commentary on Distinction XXV.

Part I.

On free choice considered in itself and in general.

Now let us return to our subject etc.

Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of free choice in comparison to the other powers; here, however, he treats of free choice in itself. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first he determines what free choice is in itself or in general. In the second he determines concerning the freedom of choice according to its different states in particular, there: From the foregoing it is clear etc. The first part has two subdivisions. In the first of these the Master sets down the definition of free choice. In the second he removes¹ a certain difficulty toward the explanation of the foregoing definition, there: And indeed, according to the aforesaid definition etc. The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he determines what free choice is. In the second, from that definition, he draws out that free choice is not of present nor of past things, but of future things, and of these not of any whatever, but of future contingent things, there: This too must be known, that free choice etc. Likewise the second part has two [divisions], in the first of which he raises a difficulty, and in the second he determines it, there: But free choice is taken otherwise etc.

Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question what free choice is in reality. And since its quiddity and nature is known in assigning its agreement with, and difference from, the will and reason, therefore inquiry must be made concerning it in comparison to reason and the will. Now for the clarification of this comparison there is occasion to raise doubt and inquiry concerning six [points].

For, first, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

Second, granting that it is, it is asked whether it is a power distinct from reason and will, or not.

Third, granting that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

Fourth, granting that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

Fifth, granting that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

Sixth and last, it is asked according to which of those two powers the freedom of choice more principally resides in the soul, namely whether according to reason, or according to the will.

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