Dist. 25, Part 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
DISTINCTIO XXV.
Pars II.
Cap. V.
De differentia libertatis arbitrii secundum diversa tempora.
Ex praedictis perspicuum fit, quod maior fuit libertas arbitrii prima quam secunda, et tertia multo maior quam secunda vel prima. Prima enim libertas arbitrii fuit, in qua poterat peccare et non peccare; ultima vero erit, in qua poterit non peccare et non poterit peccare; media vero, in qua potest peccare et non potest non peccare, ante reparationem etiam mortaliter, post reparationem vero saltem venialiter.
Cap. VI.
De quatuor statibus liberi arbitrii.
Et possunt notari in homine quatuor status liberi arbitrii. Ante peccatum enim ad bonum nil impediebat, ad malum nil impellebat. Non habuit infirmitatem ad malum et habuit adiutorium ad bonum. Tunc sine errore ratio iudicare, et voluntas sine difficultate bonum appetere poterat. Post peccatum vero, ante reparationem gratiae, premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur et habet infirmitatem in malo, sed non habet gratiam in bono; et ideo potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam damnabiliter. Post reparationem vero, ante confirmationem, premitur a concupiscentia, sed non vincitur, et habet quidem infirmitatem in malo, sed gratiam in bono, ut possit peccare propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et possit non peccare ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem; nondum tamen habet posse omnino non peccare, vel non posse peccare, propter infirmitatem nondum perfecte absorptam et propter gratiam nondum perfecte1 consummatam. Post confirmationem vero, infirmitate penitus consumta et gratia consummata, nec vinci poterit nec premi, et tunc habebit non posse peccare.
Cap. VII.
De corruptione liberi arbitrii per peccatum.
Unde manifestum est, quod praeter alias poenalitates pro peccato illo incurrit homo poenam in corruptione et depressione liberi arbitrii. Per illud namque peccatum naturalia bona in homine corrupta sunt et gratuita detracta. Hic est enim ille qui a latronibus vulneratus et spoliatus2: vulneratus quidem in naturalibus bonis, quibus non est privatus, alioquin non posset fieri reparatio; spoliatus vero gratuitis, quae naturalibus addita fuerant. Haec sunt data optima, et dona perfecta, quorum alia sunt corrupta per peccatum, id est naturalia, ut ingenium, memoria, intellectus; alia subtracta, id est gratuita, quamquam et naturalia ex gratia sint; ad generalem quippe genus refertur. Corrupta est ergo libertas arbitrii per peccatum et ex parte perdita. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio3: « Libero arbitrio male utens, homo et se perdidit et ipsum. Cum enim libero arbitrio peccaretur, victore peccato amissum est et liberum arbitrium. A quo enim quis devictus est, huic servus addictus est ». — Ecce liberum arbitrium dicit hominem amisisse, non quia post peccatum non habuerit liberum arbitrium, sed quia libertatem arbitrii perdidit, non quidem omnem, sed libertatem a miseria et a peccato.
Cap. VIII.
De tribus modis libertatis liberi arbitrii: a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria.
Est namque libertas triplex, scilicet a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria4. — A necessitate et ante peccatum et post aeque liberum est arbitrium. Sicut enim tunc cogi non poterat, ita nec modo. Ideoque voluntas merito apud Deum iudicatur, quae semper a necessitate libera est et nunquam cogi potest. Ubi necessitas, ibi non est libertas, ubi non est libertas5, nec voluntas, et ideo nec meritum. Haec libertas in omnibus est, tam in malis quam in bonis. — Est et alia libertas, a peccato scilicet, de qua dicit Apostolus6: Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas; et Veritas in Evangelio: Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. Haec libertas a servitute peccati liberat et servos iustitiae facit, sicut e converso servitus peccati liberos iustitiae facit. Unde Apostolus: Liberati a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiae. Et item: Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae. Hanc libertatem homo peccando amisit; ideoque Augustinus7 dicit, quod homo, male utens libero arbitrio, et se perdidit et ipsum, quia perdita est per peccatum libertas, non a necessitate, sed a peccato. Qui enim facit peccatum servus est peccati.
Istam libertatem, quae est a peccato, illi soli nunc habent, quos Filius per gratiam liberat et reparat, non ita, quod penitus sint sine peccato in hac mortali carne, sed ut in eis peccatum non dominetur neque regnet. Et haec est vera et bona libertas, quae bonam parit servitutem, scilicet iustitiae. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio8 ait: « Ad iustitiam faciendam non erit aliquis liber, nisi, a peccato liberatus, esse iustitiae coeperit servus, et ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti obedientiam ». — Est alia libertas non vera, malae servituti adiuncta, quae est ad malum faciendum, ubi ratio dissentit a voluntate, iudicans, non esse faciendum quod voluntas appetit; ad bonum vero faciendum concordat ratio voluntati, et ideo vera libertas est et pia. De libertate autem ad malum et servitute mala ait Augustinus in Enchiridio9: « Servi addicti peccato quae potest esse libertas, nisi quando eum peccare delectat? Liberaliter enim servit, qui sui Domini voluntatem libenter facit; ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est qui peccati servus est ».
Hic quaeri potest, utrum haec libertas, qua quis liber est ad malum, sit libertas arbitrii. Si enim libertas arbitrii est, bonum quidem est, quia libertas arbitrii bonum naturale est. — Quibusdam videtur, quod sit ipsa libertas arbitrii, quae semper bona est, sed propter peccati servitutem ad malum sit liberior et pronior; et ideo dicitur non vera esse libertas, quia ad malum est. — Aliis autem videtur, quod haec libertas10 ad malum, quam supra commemoravit Augustinus, non sit ipsa libertas arbitrii, sed sit quaedam pronitas peccandi et curvitas, quae ex peccato est et mala est.
Similiter etiam quaeri solet, utrum illa libertas vera, quae est ad iustitiam faciendam, sit ipsa libertas arbitrii. — Quidam dicunt, illam eandem esse, sed reparatam per gratiam, qua iuvante libera est ad bonum, sine gratia vero non est libera ad bonum. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio11: « Ista libertas ad bene faciendum unde erit homini addicto et vendito, nisi eum redimat ille qui dicit: Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis? Quod antequam fieri in homine incipiat, quomodo quisquam de libero arbitrio gloriatur, qui nondum est liber ad operandum bene »? — Ecce aperte ostendit, liberum arbitrium per gratiam liberari, ut per illud bene operetur quis. Ideoque dicunt, illam libertatem veram, quae est ad bene faciendum, cuius supra meminit Augustinus, esse libertatem ipsam arbitrii, gratia Dei liberatam et adiutam. — Alii vero putant, non esse ipsam arbitrii libertatem, sed aliam quandam, quae ex gratia et libero arbitrio in mente hominis, Deo operante, incipit esse, cum reparatur12.
Verum nobis magis placet, ut ipsa libertas arbitrii sit et illa qua quis liber est ad malum, et illa qua quis liber est ad bonum faciendum. Ex causis enim variis sortitur diversa vocabula. Dicitur enim libertas ad malum faciendum, antequam per gratiam sit reparata; sed cum per gratiam fuerit reparata, dicitur libertas ad bonum faciendum, quia ante gratiam libera est voluntas ad malum, per gratiam vero libera fit ad bonum. Semper igitur voluntas hominis aliquo modo libera est, sed non semper bona est. Non enim est bona nisi a peccato liberata, est tamen a necessitate libera. Unde Augustinus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio13: « Semper in nobis voluntas libera est, sed non semper bona est. Aut enim libera est iustitiae, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona ».
Est iterum libertas a miseria, de qua Apostolus14 ait: Et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei. Hanc libertatem habuit homo ante peccatum, quia omni carebat miseria et nulla tangebatur molestia, et plenius habebit in futura beatitudine, ubi miser esse non poterit. Sed in hac vita, quae est inter primum peccatum et ultimam confirmationem, nemo a miseria liber est, quia poena peccati non caret.
Ex praedictis iam apparet, in quo per peccatum sit imminutum et corruptum liberum arbitrium, quia ante peccatum nulla erat homini difficultas nullumque impedimentum de lege membrorum ad bonum, nulla impulsio vel instigatio ad malum. Nunc autem per legem carnis ad bonum impeditur et ad malum instigatur, ut non possit velle et perficere bonum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adiuvetur, quia, ut ait Apostolus15, peccatum habitat in carne. Liberum ergo arbitrium, cum semper et in singulis sit liberum, non est tamen pariter liberum in bonis et in malis, et ad bona et ad mala. Liberius est enim in bonis, ubi liberatum est, quam in malis, ubi liberatum non est. Et liberius est ad malum, quod per se potest, quam ad bonum, quod, nisi gratia liberetur et adiuvetur, non potest.
Cap. IX.
De libertate, quae est ex gratia, et quae ex natura.
Libertas ergo a peccato et a miseria per gratiam est, libertas vero a necessitate per naturam. Utramque libertatem, naturae scilicet et gratiae, notat Apostolus16, cum ex persona hominis non redempti ait: Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio; ac si diceret: habeo libertatem naturae, sed non habeo libertatem gratiae; ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis, quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adiuvetur: liberetur quidem, ut velit, et adiuvetur, ut perficiat; quia, ut ait Apostolus, non est volentis velle, neque currentis currere, id est operari, sed miserentis Dei; qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum, cuius gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praevenit praeparando, ut velit bonum, et praeparatam adiuvat, ut perficiat.
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DISTINCTION XXV.
Part II.
Chapter V.
On the difference of the freedom of choice according to different times.
From the aforesaid it becomes clear that the first freedom of choice was greater than the second, and the third much greater than the second or the first. For the first freedom of choice was that in which one was able to sin and not to sin; the last will be that in which one will be able not to sin and unable to sin; but the middle one is that in which one is able to sin and unable not to sin — before reparation even mortally, but after reparation at least venially.
Chapter VI.
On the four states of free choice.
And four states of free choice can be noted in man. For before sin nothing impeded toward the good, nothing impelled toward evil. He had no infirmity toward evil and had help toward the good. Then reason could judge without error, and the will could seek the good without difficulty. But after sin, before the reparation of grace, [the will] is pressed by concupiscence and overcome, and has infirmity in evil but does not have grace in good; and therefore it can sin and cannot not sin, even damnably. But after reparation, before confirmation, it is pressed by concupiscence but is not overcome, and has indeed infirmity in evil, but grace in good, so that it can sin through liberty and infirmity, and can not-sin unto death through liberty and assisting grace; yet it does not yet have to be wholly able not to sin, or to be unable to sin, because the infirmity is not yet perfectly absorbed and because grace is not yet perfectly1 consummated. But after confirmation, the infirmity being wholly consumed and grace consummated, it will be neither able to be overcome nor pressed, and then it will have to be unable to sin.
Chapter VII.
On the corruption of free choice through sin.
Whence it is manifest that, besides the other penalties, for that sin man incurred a penalty in the corruption and depression of free choice. For through that sin the natural goods in man were corrupted and the gratuitous ones taken away. For this is he who was wounded and despoiled by robbers2: wounded indeed in his natural goods, of which he was not deprived, otherwise reparation could not be made; but despoiled of the gratuitous goods which had been added to the natural ones. These are the best gifts and perfect endowments, of which some are corrupted through sin, that is, the natural ones, such as talent, memory, intellect; others are taken away, that is, the gratuitous ones, although the natural ones too are from grace; for the genus is referred to the general. The freedom of choice, therefore, was corrupted through sin and in part lost. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion3: « By misusing free choice, man destroyed both himself and it. For when one sinned by free choice, with sin victorious, free choice too was lost. For by whatever a man is overcome, to this is he assigned as a slave ». — Behold, he says that man lost free choice, not because after sin he did not have free choice, but because he lost the freedom of choice — not indeed all of it, but the freedom from misery and from sin.
Chapter VIII.
On the three modes of the freedom of free choice: from necessity, from sin, from misery.
For freedom is threefold, namely from necessity, from sin, from misery4. — From necessity, choice is equally free both before sin and after. For just as then it could not be coerced, so neither now. And therefore the will is deservedly judged before God, which is always free from necessity and can never be coerced. Where there is necessity, there is no freedom; where there is no freedom5, there is no will, and therefore no merit. This freedom is in all, as much in the evil as in the good. — There is also another freedom, namely from sin, of which the Apostle says6: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom; and Truth in the Gospel: If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. This freedom frees from the servitude of sin and makes [men] servants of justice, just as conversely the servitude of sin makes [men] free from justice. Whence the Apostle: Being made free from sin, you became servants of justice. And again: When you were servants of sin, you were free from justice. This freedom man lost by sinning; and therefore Augustine7 says that man, by misusing free choice, destroyed both himself and it, because the freedom was lost through sin — not from necessity, but from sin. For he who commits sin is the servant of sin.
This freedom, which is from sin, only those now have whom the Son frees and repairs through grace — not so that they are entirely without sin in this mortal flesh, but so that in them sin does not dominate nor reign. And this is the true and good freedom, which gives birth to a good servitude, namely of justice. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion8 says: « No one will be free for doing justice unless, being freed from sin, he begins to be a servant of justice; and this is the true freedom for the joy of right action, together with a pious servitude for obedience to the precept ». — There is another non-true freedom, joined to an evil servitude, which is for doing evil, where reason dissents from the will, judging that what the will desires ought not to be done; but toward doing the good reason agrees with the will, and therefore the freedom is true and pious. But concerning the freedom toward evil and the evil servitude, Augustine says in the Enchiridion9: « What freedom can there be for one assigned as a servant to sin, except when it delights him to sin? For he serves freely who willingly does the will of his Lord; and through this he is free for sinning who is the servant of sin ».
Here it can be asked whether this freedom, by which one is free toward evil, is the freedom of choice. For if it is the freedom of choice, it is indeed something good, because the freedom of choice is a natural good. — To some it seems that it is the very freedom of choice, which is always good, but which on account of the servitude of sin is freer and more prone toward evil; and therefore it is said not to be true freedom, because it is toward evil. — But to others it seems that this freedom10 toward evil, which Augustine mentioned above, is not the freedom of choice itself, but is a certain proneness to sinning and a crookedness which is from sin and is evil.
Likewise it is also wont to be asked whether that true freedom, which is for doing justice, is the freedom of choice itself. — Some say that it is the same one, but repaired through grace, by whose help it is free toward the good, while without grace it is not free toward the good. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion11: « Whence will this freedom for doing well belong to a man assigned and sold [into bondage], unless he redeem him who says: If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed? And before this begins to come to pass in man, how does anyone glory in free choice, who is not yet free for working well »? — Behold, he plainly shows that free choice is freed through grace, so that through it one may work well. And therefore they say that the true freedom, which is for doing well, of which Augustine made mention above, is the freedom of choice itself, freed and assisted by the grace of God. — But others think that it is not the freedom of choice itself, but a certain other [freedom], which from grace and free choice begins to be in the mind of man, God working, when it is repaired12.
But it pleases us more that the freedom of choice itself be both that by which one is free toward evil, and that by which one is free toward doing good. For from various causes it obtains diverse names. For it is called the freedom for doing evil before it is repaired through grace; but when it has been repaired through grace, it is called the freedom for doing good, because before grace the will is free toward evil, but through grace it becomes free toward the good. Always therefore the will of man is in some way free, but it is not always good. For it is not good unless freed from sin, yet it is free from necessity. Whence Augustine in the book On Grace and Free Choice13: « The will in us is always free, but it is not always good. For either it is free from justice when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves justice, and then it is good ».
Again, there is a freedom from misery, of which the Apostle14 says: And the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God. This freedom man had before sin, because he lacked all misery and was touched by no trouble, and he will have it more fully in future beatitude, where he will be unable to be wretched. But in this life, which is between the first sin and the final confirmation, no one is free from misery, because one is not without the penalty of sin.
From the aforesaid it now appears in what way free choice has been diminished and corrupted through sin, since before sin there was for man no difficulty and no impediment from the law of the members toward the good, no impulse or instigation toward evil. But now through the law of the flesh he is impeded toward the good and instigated toward evil, so that he cannot will and accomplish the good unless he is freed and assisted by grace, because, as the Apostle says15, sin dwells in the flesh. Free choice, therefore, although it is always and in each one free, is nevertheless not equally free in good things and in evil, and toward good things and toward evil. For it is freer in good things, where it is freed, than in evil things, where it is not freed. And it is freer toward evil, which it can do of itself, than toward the good, which it cannot do unless it be freed and assisted by grace.
Chapter IX.
On the freedom which is from grace, and that which is from nature.
The freedom, therefore, from sin and from misery is through grace, but the freedom from necessity is through nature. Both freedoms, namely of nature and of grace, the Apostle notes16, when from the person of unredeemed man he says: To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not; as if he said: I have the freedom of nature, but I do not have the freedom of grace; therefore the perfection of the good is not with me. For the will of man, which he has naturally, is not able to be raised toward the good for willing it effectively or fulfilling it in deed, unless through grace it be freed and assisted: freed indeed, that it may will, and assisted, that it may accomplish; because, as the Apostle says, it is not of him that wills to will, nor of him that runs to run, that is, to work, but of God that shows mercy; who works in us to will and to accomplish the good, whose grace the will or working of man does not summon, but grace itself prevents the will by preparing it, that it may will the good, and assists it once prepared, that it may accomplish.
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- Ita in codd. et ed. 1; in aliis plene.Thus in the codices and edition 1; in the others, plene (fully).
- Luc. 10, 30; cfr. Ambr. et Beda in hunc locum.Luke 10:30; compare Ambrose and Bede on this passage.
- Enchirid. c. 30. n. 9. — Locus Scripturae est II. Petr. 2, 19.Enchiridion, chapter 30, n. 9. — The scriptural passage is 2 Pet. 2:19.
- Bernard., de Gratia et lib. arbitrio c. 3. n. 7. — Superius edd. 1, 2, 3, 8 post libertas addunt arbitrii.Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 3, n. 7. — Above, editions 1, 2, 3, 8 add arbitrii (of choice) after libertas.
- In Vat. desunt verba ubi non est libertas.In the Vatican edition the words ubi non est libertas (where there is no freedom) are lacking.
- Epist. II. Cor. 3, 17. Seq. locus Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 36; tertius et quartus Rom. 6, 18 et 20.Epistle, 2 Cor. 3:17. The following scriptural passage is John 8:36; the third and fourth, Rom. 6:18 and 20.
- Enchirid. c. 30. n. 9. Vide supra c. 7.Enchiridion, chapter 30, n. 9. See above, chapter 7.
- Cap. 30. n. 9.Chapter 30, n. 9.
- Ibid., in quo textu edd. 1-9 post peccato addunt scilicet; codd., excepto A, omittunt etiam peccato.Ibid., in which text editions 1–9 add scilicet (namely) after peccato; the codices, except A, also omit peccato.
- Edd. 1, 8 addunt arbitrii.Editions 1, 8 add arbitrii (of choice).
- Ibid. — Textus Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 36. — In verbis Augustini Vat. cum edd. 8, 9 post faciendum ponit nunquam pro unde et cum pluribus edd. post vendito addit sub peccato et omittit ille ante qui.Ibid. — The scriptural passage is John 8:36. — In Augustine's words the Vatican edition, with editions 8, 9, places nunquam (never) after faciendum instead of unde, and with several editions adds sub peccato (under sin) after vendito and omits ille before qui.
- Vat. cum ceteris edd., exceptis 1, 6, reparatus est, refragantibus codd.The Vatican edition, with the other editions except 1 and 6, [reads] reparatus est, the codices being opposed.
- Cap. 13. n. 31.Chapter 13, n. 31.
- Rom. 8, 21. — Paulo inferius pro quia omni edd. 1, 8 qui omni.Rom. 8:21. — A little below, for quia omni editions 1, 8 [read] qui omni.
- Rom. 7, 17.Rom. 7:17.
- Rom. 7, 18. Seqq. duo textus sunt Rom. 9, 16, et Phil. 2, 13.Rom. 7:18. The following two texts are Rom. 9:16 and Phil. 2:13.