Dist. 25, Part 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
DISTINCTIO XXV.
Pars I.
Cap. I.
Definitio liberi arbitrii secundum philosophos.
Iam vero ad propositum redeamus, scilicet ad liberi arbitrii tractatum; quod philosophi1 definientes dixerunt liberum de voluntate iudicium, quia potestas ipsa et habilitas voluntatis et rationis, quam supra2 diximus esse liberum arbitrium, libera est ad utrumlibet, quia libere potest moveri ad hoc, vel ad illud. Liberum ergo dicitur arbitrium quantum ad voluntatem, quia voluntarie moveri et spontaneo appetitu ferri potest ad ea quae bona vel mala iudicat, vel iudicare valet.
Hoc autem sciendum est, quod liberum arbitrium ad praesens, vel ad praeteritum non refertur, sed ad futura contingentia. Quod enim in praesenti est determinatum est nec in potestate nostra est, ut tunc sit, vel non sit, quando est. Potest enim non esse, vel aliud esse postea; sed non potest non esse, dum est, vel aliud esse, dum id est, quod est; sed in futuro an hoc sit, vel illud, ad potestatem liberi arbitrii spectat. Nec tamen omnia futura sub potestate liberi arbitrii veniunt, sed ea tantum, quae per liberum arbitrium possunt fieri, vel non fieri. Si quis enim tale quid velit ac disponat facere, quod in eius nullatenus sit potestate, vel quod sine ipsius dispositione aeque fieret, in hoc ipse liberum non habet arbitrium.
Et quidem, secundum praedictam assignationem, in his tantum videtur esse liberum arbitrium, qui voluntatem mutare et in contraria possunt deflectere, in quorum videlicet potestate est eligere bonum, vel malum, et utrumlibet secundum electionem facere, vel dimittere; secundum quod nec in Deo nec in his omnibus, qui tanta beatitudinis gratia sunt roborati, ut iam peccare nequeant, liberum arbitrium esse nequit. — Sed quod Deus liberum arbitrium habeat, Augustinus docet in libro vigesimo secundo de Civitate Dei3, ita inquiens: « Certe Deus ipse nunquid, quoniam peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est »? Ambrosius quoque in libro de Trinitate ait: « Paulus dicit: Quia omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult, id est, pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio ».
Cap. II.
Qualiter in Deo accipitur liberum arbitrium.
Sed aliter accipitur liberum arbitrium in Creatore quam in creaturis. Dei etenim liberum arbitrium dicitur eius sapientissima et omnipotens voluntas, quae non necessitate, sed libera bonitate4 omnia facit, prout vult. Ideoque Hieronymus attendens, non ita esse liberum arbitrium in Deo, sicut est in creaturis, ab ipso videtur liberum arbitrium excludere, in homilia quadam de filio prodigo5 dicens: « Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt ». Dum ait cetera, indicat liberum arbitrium, sicut est in ceteris, non esse in Deo.
Cap. III.
Quod Angeli et Sancti habent liberum arbitrium.
Angeli vero et Sancti, qui iam cum Domino feliciter vivunt, atque ita gratia beatitudinis confirmati sunt, ut ad malum flecti nec velint nec possint, libero arbitrio non carent; unde Augustinus in libro vigesimo secundo de Civitate Dei6 ait: « Sicut prima immortalitas fuit, quam peccando Adam perdidit, posse non mori; ita primum liberum arbitrium posse non peccare, novissimum non posse peccare ». Idem in Enchiridio: « Sic oportebat prius hominem fieri, ut bene velle posset et male; postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit, nec ideo carebit libero arbitrio ».
Cap. IV.
Quod liberius erit liberum arbitrium, quando peccare non poterit.
« Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium, quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati sic esse volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus. Sicut ergo anima nostra nunc habet nolle infelicitatem, ita nolle iniquitatem semper habitura est. Sed ordo servandus fuit, quo Deus voluit ostendere, quam bonum sit animal rationale, quod etiam peccare possit, quamvis sit melius, quod peccare non possit ». — Ecce his verbis evidenter astruitur, quod post beatitudinis confirmationem erit in homine liberum arbitrium, quo peccare non poterit; et nunc in Angelis est et in Sanctis, qui cum Domino sunt, et tanto utique liberius, quanto a peccato immunius et ad bonum pronius. Quo enim quisque ab illa peccati servitute, de qua scriptum est: Qui facit peccatum servus est peccati7, longius absistit, tanto in eligendo bonum liberius habet iudicium. Unde si diligenter inspiciatur, liberum videtur dici arbitrium, quia sine coactione et necessitate valet appetere vel eligere quod ex ratione decreverit.
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DISTINCTION XXV.
Part I.
Chapter I.
The definition of free choice according to the philosophers.
Now let us return to our purpose, namely to the treatise on free choice; which the philosophers1, defining it, called a judgment of the will concerning the free, because that power and aptitude of will and reason, which we said above2 to be free choice, is free with respect to either alternative, because it can freely be moved to this or to that. Choice is therefore called free with respect to the will, because it can be moved voluntarily and borne by spontaneous appetite to those things which it judges, or is able to judge, to be good or evil.
But this must be known, that free choice is not referred to the present or to the past, but to future contingents. For what is in the present is determined, nor is it in our power that it should then be, or not be, when it is. For it can later not be, or be otherwise; but it cannot not-be, while it is, or be otherwise, while that is which is; but in the future, whether this be, or that, pertains to the power of free choice. Yet not all future things come under the power of free choice, but only those which through free choice can be done, or not done. For if anyone should will and dispose to do such a thing as is in no way in his power, or which would equally come to pass without his disposing of it, in this he himself does not have free choice.
And indeed, according to the aforesaid assignment, free choice seems to be only in those who can change the will and bend it to contrary things, in whose power, namely, it is to choose good or evil, and to do or to forgo either according to election; according to which there can be no free choice either in God or in all those who are so strengthened by the grace of beatitude that they can no longer sin. — But that God has free choice, Augustine teaches in the twenty-second book On the City of God3, saying thus: « Surely is God himself, because he cannot sin, on that account to be denied to have free choice »? Ambrose also in the book On the Trinity says: « Paul says: Because one and the same Spirit works all things, dividing to each as he wills, that is, according to the choice of free will, not according to the obedience of necessity ».
Chapter II.
How free choice is taken in God.
But free choice is taken otherwise in the Creator than in creatures. For God's free choice is said to be his most wise and omnipotent will, which not by necessity, but by free goodness4, does all things as it wills. And therefore Jerome, attending to the fact that free choice is not in God as it is in creatures, seems to exclude free choice from him, saying in a certain homily on the prodigal son5: « God alone is the one into whom sin does not fall nor can fall; the rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent to either side ». When he says the rest, he indicates that free choice, as it is in the rest, is not in God.
Chapter III.
That the Angels and the Saints have free choice.
But the Angels and the Saints, who now live happily with the Lord, and are so confirmed by the grace of beatitude that they neither will nor are able to be bent to evil, do not lack free choice; whence Augustine in the twenty-second book On the City of God6 says: « Just as the first immortality was to be able not to die, which Adam lost by sinning; so the first free choice was to be able not to sin, the last to be unable to sin ». The same in the Enchiridion: « Thus it was fitting that man should first be made, so that he could will both well and ill; but afterward it will be so, that he cannot will ill, nor on that account will he lack free choice ».
Chapter IV.
That free choice will be more free, when it will be unable to sin.
« For much more free will the choice be that will not at all be able to serve sin. Nor is it either that the will does not exist, or that it is not to be called free, by which we so will to be blessed that we not only will not to be wretched, but are utterly unable to will it. Just as therefore our soul now has to be unwilling for unhappiness, so it will always be about to be unwilling for iniquity. But an order had to be kept, by which God willed to show how good is a rational creature, which can even sin, although it is better that it cannot sin ». — Behold, by these words it is evidently established that after the confirmation of beatitude there will be in man a free choice by which he will be unable to sin; and it is now in the Angels and in the Saints who are with the Lord, and so much the more free indeed, the more it is immune from sin and prone to good. For the further anyone stands from that servitude of sin, of which it is written: He who commits sin is the servant of sin7, the more freely he has judgment in choosing the good. Hence, if it be diligently examined, choice seems to be called free because without coercion and necessity it is able to seek or to choose what it has decreed by reason.
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- Boeth., III. super libr. Periherm. (ed. 2.) — De hac distinctione, teste cod. Erf., conferendus est Gandolph., II. Sent. c. 193. Praecipue autem Magister usus est Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. V. c. 20, et Sent. tr. 3. c. 9.Boethius, on Book III of the Peri Hermeneias (2nd edition). — On this distinction, according to codex Erfurt, Gandulph is to be compared, Sentences II, c. 193. But the Master chiefly made use of Hugh, On the Sacraments, part V, chapter 20, and Sentences, treatise 3, chapter 9.
- Dist. praeced. c. 3.The preceding distinction, chapter 3.
- Cap. 30. n. 3. — Locus Ambrosii est II. de Fide, c. 6. n. 48; et locus Scripturae I. Cor. 12, 11.Chapter 30, n. 3. — The passage of Ambrose is in On the Faith II, chapter 6, n. 48; and the scriptural passage is 1 Cor. 12:11.
- Ita codd. B C E et edd. 2, 3, 7, 9 et originale Hugonis; in aliis edd. et codd. voluntate.Thus codices B, C, E and editions 2, 3, 7, 9 and the original of Hugh; in other editions and codices, voluntate (by will).
- Est in Epist. 21. ad Damasum n. 40. — In fine capituli ante esse in Deo Vat. ceteraeque edd., excepta 1, non apte addunt ita.It is in Letter 21 to Damasus, n. 40. — At the end of the chapter, before esse in Deo, the Vatican edition and the other editions, except 1, unsuitably add ita.
- Cap. 30. n. 3. Textus Enchiridii est c. 105. n. 28, qui excurrit usque in c. 4.Chapter 30, n. 3. The text of the Enchiridion is chapter 105, n. 28, which runs on into chapter 4.
- Ioan. 8, 34. — Quod sequitur est ex Hugone, Sent. tr. III. c. 8; sed seq. capitulum ex eodem, l. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 16. Deinde alia iterum ex Sent. tr. III. c. 9. 8.John 8:34. — What follows is from Hugh, Sentences, treatise III, chapter 8; but the following chapter [is] from the same, On the Sacraments, part VI, chapter 16. Then again other things from Sentences, treatise III, chapters 9 and 8.