Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXII.

Cap. I.

Quomodo originale peccatum dimittitur in baptismo.

Quoniam supra¹ dictum est, originale peccatum esse vitium concupiscentiae, assignatumque, quomodo a parentibus trahatur et originale dicatur; superest investigare, quomodo in baptismo dimittatur, cum etiam post baptismum remaneat concupiscentia, quae ante fuerat. Unde videtur, vel peccatum originale non esse concupiscentiam, vel non remitti in baptismo. « Manet quippe, ut ait Augustinus², in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius vitiosis desideriis non obedire praecipimur; quae tamen concupiscentia quotidie minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus ». Sed licet remaneat concupiscentia post baptismum, non tamen dominatur et regnat sicut ante; immo per gratiam baptismi mitigatur et minuitur, ut post dominari non valeat, nisi quis reddat vires hosti eundo post concupiscentias. Nec post baptismum remanet ad reatum, quia non imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum poena peccati est, ante baptismum vero poena est et culpa.

Duplici ergo ratione peccatum originale dicitur dimitti in baptismo: quia per gratiam baptismi vitium concupiscentiae debilitatur atque extenuatur, ita ut iam non regnet, nisi consensu reddantur ei vires; et quia reatus ipsius solvitur. Unde Augustinus in libro de Baptismo parvulorum³: « Gratia per baptismum id agitur, ut vetus homo crucifigatur, et corpus peccati destruatur, non ita, ut in ipsa vivente carne concupiscentia respersa et innata repente absumatur et non sit, sed ne obsit mortuo, quae inerat nato. Nam si post baptismum vixerit, in carne habet concupiscentiam, cum qua pugnet; eamque adiuvante Deo superet, si tamen non in vacuum gratiam eius suscepit. Non itaque hoc praestatur in baptismo, nisi forte miraculo ineffabili Creatoris, ut lex peccati, quae est in membris, prorsus exstinguatur et non sit, sed ut, quidquid mali ab homine factum dictum cogitatumque est, totum aboleatur, ac velut factum non fuerit, habeatur, ipsa vero concupiscentia, soluto reatus vinculo, quo per illam diabolus animam retinebat et a suo Creatore separabat, maneat in certamine ». — Ecce hic aperte ostendit, ea ratione dimitti in baptismo, non quia non maneat⁴ post baptismum, sed quia reatus in baptismo aboletur. Deinde idem ipse ostendit, eo modo etiam dimitti, quia baptismi gratia concupiscentia ipsa mitigatur et minuitur, in eodem libro⁵ ita dicens: « Lex carnis, quam Apostolus appellat peccatum, cum ait: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, non sic manet in membris eorum qui ex aqua et Spiritu renati sunt, tanquam non sit eius facta remissio, ubi omnino plena fit remissio peccatorum; sed manet in vetustate carnis tanquam superatum et peremptum, nisi illicito consensu quodam modo reviviscat et in regnum proprium dominationemque revocetur ». — Hic aperte insinuatur, in baptismo concupiscentiam debilitari, ex quo et dicitur dimitti, non solum ideo, quia reatus ibi solvitur⁶. Quem remissionis modum aliis etiam pluribus testimoniis Scriptura edocet. Ait enim Augustinus contra Iulianum⁷: « Lex, quae in membris est, vitium carnis est, quod ex poena peccati et ex traduce mortis provenit. Sed lex ista, quae est in membris, remissa est regeneratione spirituali et manet in carne mortali. Remissa est, quia reatus solutus est Sacramento, quo renascuntur fideles. Manet autem, quia tamen dominatur et regnat sicut ante; immo per gratiam baptismi mitigatur et minuitur, ut post dominari non valeat, nisi quis reddat vires hosti eundo post concupiscentias ». Idem in sermone⁸ quodam de concupiscentia carnis: « Per gratiam baptismatis et lavacrum regenerationis solutus est et ipse concupiscentiae reatus, cum quo eras natus, et quidquid antea consensisti malae concupiscentiae, sive cogitatione, sive locutione, sive actione ». Idem in libro de Nuptiis et concupiscentia⁹: « Concupiscentia carnis, licet in regeneratis iam non deputetur in peccatum, quaecumque tamen proles nascitur, obligata est originali peccato ». Item: « Dimittitur concupiscentia carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut non imputetur in peccatum ». « Hoc est enim non habere peccatum, non esse reum peccati ». « Quomodo ergo alia peccata praetereunt actu et remanent reatu, ut homicidium et similia; ita e converso fieri potest, ut concupiscentia praetereat reatu et remaneat actu ». — Ex praedictis evidenter monstratur, quomodo peccatum originale in baptismo remittatur.

Cap. II.

Utrum foeditas, quam ex libidine trahit, in baptismo diluatur.

Solet autem hic quaeri, utrum et ipsa caro in baptismo ab illa foeditate purgetur, quam in conceptione ex concupiscentia libidinosa contraxit. — Quibusdam¹⁰ videtur, quod sicut anima a reatu purificatur, ita et caro ab illa pollutione purgatur, ut, sicut duobus completur mysterium baptismi, scilicet aqua et spiritu, ita ibi duo purgentur, anima scilicet a reatu, et caro ab illa contagione; quod quidem probabile est. — Alii vero putant, tantum animam ibi mundari, carnem vero non ab illa foeditate purgari. — Si vero remanet illa foeditas usque ad procreationem filiorum, quae fit in concupiscentia carnis; videtur natura carnis magis ac magis corrumpi, et magis corrupta videtur caro prolis quam parentis, quia de carne pollutionem, quam habuit a conceptu, retinente trahitur polluta et in concupiscentia concipitur, unde et polluitur; et ita ex duplici causa contaminatur. Unde maior videtur pollutio carnis in prole, quam fuerit in parente. — Ad quod illi dicunt, quia licet caro prolis ex carne foeda seminetur et in concupiscentia concipiatur; non tamen foeditatem maiorem trahit, quam caro, unde seminatur, habuit¹¹. Quamvis, etiam si foedior atque immundior sit caro prolis, et ideo magis corrupta quam caro parentis, non tamen, ut aiunt, fit praeiudicium veritatis; quia nec absurdum esse dicunt, si carnis natura magis in posterioribus corrupta trahatur, neque ex ipsa magis corrupta anima amplius inficiatur.

Cap. III.

Utrum illius concupiscentiae Deus sit auctor.

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum concupiscentia, quae post baptismum remanet et tantum poenalitas est, ante baptismum vero poena erat et culpa, ex Deo auctore sit, vel ex alio. — Ad quod breviter respondentes dicimus, quia, in quantum poena est, Deum habet auctorem; in quantum vero culpa est, diabolum sive hominem habet auctorem.

Cap. IV.

Quare illud peccatum imputetur animae.

Solet etiam quaeri¹², qua iustitia teneatur illo peccato anima innocens a Deo creata, cum non sit in potestate sua illud vitare. Non enim per liberum arbitrium illud committitur, quia non prius est anima, quam illi peccato est obnoxia. — Ad hoc quidam dicunt, ideo animam ream esse illius peccati, licet munda a Deo sit creata, quia, cum infunditur corpori, condelectatur carni; ex quo peccatum contrahit. — Quod si esset, iam non originale, sed actuale diceretur. Potius ergo ideo recte potest dici imputari animae illud peccatum, quod ex corruptione corporis inevitabiliter trahit, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei¹³, « non fuit corruptio corporis, quae aggravat animam, causa primi peccati, sed poena, nec caro corruptibilis animam peccatricem fecit, sed peccatrix anima carnem corruptibilem fecit ».

Cap. V.

Utrum illud peccatum sit necessarium, vel voluntarium.

Illud etiam non immerito quaeri potest, utrum peccatum originale debeat dici voluntarium, vel necessarium. — Et necessarium potest dici, quia vitari non potest; unde et Propheta¹⁴ dicit: De necessitatibus meis erue me; et voluntarium non incongrue appellatur, quia ex voluntate primi hominis processit, ut Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum¹⁵ ostendit dicens: « Illud quod in parvulis dicitur originale peccatum, cum adhuc non utantur libero arbitrio voluntatis, non absurde vocatur voluntarium, quia, ex prima hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est quodam modo hereditarium ».

Cap. VI.

Quare Deus iungit animam corpori, sciens inde maculari.

Si vero quaeritur: cur Deus, qui fecit animam ipsam sine macula et scit, eam ex corporis coniunctione maculam peccati contrahere, et aliquando ante baptismum seiungi ab ipso corpore, et sic damnari, eam corpori coniungit¹⁶? respondemus, ex altitudine iudiciorum Dei id provenire, et nec iniuste id a Deo fieri. Ipse enim non incongrue humanae conditionis modum, quem a principio instituit, licet peccata hominum intercesserint, sine immutatione continue servat, corpora de materia a principio sine vitio facta fingens, animasque de nihilo creans, eorumque coniunctione hominem perficiens. Cum igitur utraque hominis natura a Deo sine vitio sit instituta, licet a se peccato sit vitiata, non ideo immutabilis Deus humanae conditionis primariam legem mutare debuit, sive a multiplicatione hominum desistere.

Cap. VII.

An anima sit talis, qualis a Deo creatur.

Hic a quibusdam quaeri solet, utrum anima talis sit ante baptismum, qualis a Deo creatur. — Quod non esse, probare conantur hoc modo: anima in corpore creatur, in cuius coniunctione peccato maculatur; quam cito igitur est, peccatum habet, nec prius fuit, quam peccatum habuit¹⁷: non est igitur talis, qualis a Deo creatur. Creatur enim a Deo innocens et sine vitio; et nunquam talis est. — Ad quod dici potest, quia non omnino talis est, qualem eam Deus fecit. Deus enim bonam eam fecit et bonitatem ei sine corruptione indidit. Et dicitur illa naturalis bonitas, quam in creatione a Conditore suscepit, quam bonitatem per peccatum penitus non amisit, sed vitiatam habuit, quam Deus tamen sine vitio fecit. Si enim res bona non esset anima, in ea malum esse nequiret, cum non possit malum esse nisi in bono, ut post¹⁸ dicetur. Non igitur omnino talis est anima, qualis est a Deo creata. Sicut quis, pollutas habens manus, non tale habuit pomum, quale ego dedi mundis manibus; ego enim dedi mundum.

Cap. VIII.

An animae ex creatione sint in donis naturalibus aequales.

Illud quoque non incongrue quaeri solet, utrum omnes animae ex creatione aequales sint, an aliae aliis excellentiores. — Pluribus non irrationabiliter videtur, quod ex ipsa creatione aliae aliis excellant in naturalibus donis, ut in essentia alia aliis sit subtilior et ad intelligendum memorandumque habilior, utpote acutiori ingenio et perspicaciori intellectu praedita. Quod non improbabiliter dicitur, cum in Angelis ita fuisse constet¹⁹. Et licet naturalibus donis aliae prae aliis polleant, tamen, ante baptismum a corpore discedentes, parem poenam, et post baptismum statim aequalem coronam sortiuntur, quia ingenii acumen vel tarditas praemium vel poenam in futuro non collocat.

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DISTINCTION XXXII.

Chapter I.

How original sin is remitted in baptism.

Since it has been said above¹ that original sin is the defect of concupiscence, and it has been assigned how it is drawn from the parents and is called "original," it remains to investigate how it is remitted in baptism, since even after baptism the concupiscence which was there before remains. Whence it seems that either original sin is not concupiscence, or it is not remitted in baptism. "For there remains, as Augustine² says, in the body of this death the carnal concupiscence, whose vicious desires we are commanded not to obey; which concupiscence, nevertheless, is daily diminished in those who advance and are continent." But although concupiscence remains after baptism, yet it does not dominate and reign as before; rather, through the grace of baptism it is mitigated and diminished, so that afterward it cannot dominate, unless one restores its strength to the enemy by going after concupiscences. Nor after baptism does it remain unto guilt, because it is not imputed as sin, but is only the penalty of sin, whereas before baptism it is both penalty and fault.

Chapter II.

For a twofold reason, therefore, original sin is said to be remitted in baptism: because through the grace of baptism the defect of concupiscence is weakened and attenuated, so that it no longer reigns unless its strength be restored to it by consent; and because its guilt is loosed. Hence Augustine in the book On the Baptism of Little Children³: "By grace it is brought about through baptism that the old man is crucified, and the body of sin is destroyed, not in such a way that in the living flesh itself the concupiscence diffused and inborn is suddenly consumed and ceases to be, but that it may not harm the dead man, which inhered in the one born. For if he lives after baptism, he has concupiscence in his flesh, with which he must fight; and let him, with God's help, overcome it, provided he has not received His grace in vain. This, therefore, is not granted in baptism, except perhaps by the ineffable miracle of the Creator, that the law of sin which is in the members should be wholly extinguished and cease to be, but rather that whatever of evil has been done, said, and thought by a man should be entirely abolished and held as though it had not been done, while concupiscence itself, the bond of guilt being loosed — by which the devil held the soul through it and separated it from its Creator — should remain in the contest." — Behold, here he plainly shows that for this reason it is remitted in baptism, not because it does not remain⁴ after baptism, but because its guilt is abolished in baptism. Then he himself shows that it is also remitted in this way, because by the grace of baptism the concupiscence itself is mitigated and diminished, in the same book⁵ thus saying: "The law of the flesh, which the Apostle calls sin, when he says: Let not sin reign in your mortal body, does not so remain in the members of those who are reborn of water and the Spirit, as though its remission had not been made, where the remission of sins is made altogether complete; but it remains in the oldness of the flesh as something overcome and slain, unless by unlawful consent it in some way revives and is recalled into its own kingdom and dominion." — Here it is plainly intimated that in baptism concupiscence is weakened, and from this it is also said to be remitted, not only because guilt is loosed there⁶. And Scripture teaches this manner of remission also by many other testimonies. For Augustine says against Julian⁷: "The law which is in the members is the defect of the flesh, which comes from the penalty of sin and from the traduction of death. But this law, which is in the members, is remitted by spiritual regeneration and remains in the mortal flesh. It is remitted, because the guilt is loosed by the Sacrament, by which the faithful are reborn. But it remains, because yet it does not dominate and reign as before; rather, through the grace of baptism it is mitigated and diminished, so that afterward it cannot dominate, unless one restores its strength to the enemy by going after concupiscences." The same, in a certain sermon⁸ on the concupiscence of the flesh: "Through the grace of baptism and the laver of regeneration even the guilt of concupiscence itself, with which you were born, has been loosed, and whatever you previously consented to of evil concupiscence, whether by thought, or by speech, or by deed." The same, in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence⁹: "The concupiscence of the flesh, although in the regenerate it is no longer reckoned as sin, yet whatever offspring is born is bound by original sin." Likewise: "The concupiscence of the flesh is remitted in baptism, not so that it is not, but so that it is not imputed as sin." "For this is to not have sin, to not be guilty of sin." "Just as, therefore, other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt, as homicide and the like; so conversely it can happen that concupiscence passes away in guilt and remains in act." — From the foregoing it is evidently shown how original sin is remitted in baptism.

Chapter II.

Whether the foulness which it draws from lust is washed away in baptism.

But here it is usually asked whether the flesh itself also is cleansed in baptism from that foulness which it contracted in conception from lustful concupiscence. — To some¹⁰ it seems that, just as the soul is purified from guilt, so also the flesh is purged from that pollution, so that, just as the mystery of baptism is completed by two things, namely water and spirit, so there two things are purged, namely the soul from guilt, and the flesh from that contagion; which indeed is probable. — But others think that only the soul is there cleansed, while the flesh is not purged from that foulness. — But if that foulness remains until the procreation of children, which takes place in the concupiscence of the flesh, the nature of the flesh seems to be more and more corrupted, and the flesh of the offspring seems more corrupted than that of the parent, because it is drawn polluted from the flesh which retains the pollution that it had from conception, and is conceived in concupiscence, whence it too is polluted; and thus from a twofold cause it is contaminated. Hence the pollution of the flesh seems greater in the offspring than it was in the parent. — To which those men say that, although the flesh of the offspring is sown foul from foul flesh and is conceived in concupiscence, yet it does not draw a greater foulness than the flesh from which it is sown had¹¹. And although the flesh of the offspring be fouler and more unclean, and therefore more corrupted than the flesh of the parent, yet, as they say, no prejudice is done to the truth; for they say it is not absurd if the nature of the flesh be drawn more corrupted in those that come later, nor that from the more corrupted flesh the soul is more infected.

Chapter III.

Whether God is the author of that concupiscence.

Moreover it is usually asked whether the concupiscence which remains after baptism and is only a penalty, but before baptism was both penalty and fault, has God as its author, or another. — To which, answering briefly, we say that, insofar as it is penalty, it has God as author; but insofar as it is fault, it has the devil or man as author.

Chapter IV.

Why that sin is imputed to the soul.

It is also usually asked¹² by what justice the soul, innocent and created by God, is held bound by that sin, since it is not in its power to avoid it. For it is not committed by free will, since the soul does not exist before it is liable to that sin. — To this some say that the soul is therefore guilty of that sin, although it was created clean by God, because, when it is infused into the body, it delights together with the flesh; from which it contracts sin. — But if this were so, it would now be called not original, but actual. Rather, therefore, that sin can rightly be said to be imputed to the soul which it inevitably draws from the corruption of the body, because, as Augustine says in the book On the City of God¹³, "the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, was not the cause of the first sin, but the penalty; nor did corruptible flesh make the soul a sinner, but the sinful soul made the flesh corruptible."

Chapter V.

Whether that sin is necessary, or voluntary.

It can also not undeservedly be asked whether original sin ought to be called voluntary or necessary. — And it can be called necessary, because it cannot be avoided; whence the Prophet¹⁴ too says: From my necessities deliver me; and it is not incongruously called voluntary, because it proceeded from the will of the first man, as Augustine in the first book of the Retractations¹⁵ shows, saying: "That which in little children is called original sin, although they do not yet make use of the free choice of the will, is not absurdly called voluntary, because, contracted from the first man's evil will, it has become in some way hereditary."

Chapter VI.

Why God joins the soul to the body, knowing that thereby it is stained.

But if it is asked: why God, who made the soul itself without stain and knows that it contracts the stain of sin from the conjunction of the body, and is sometimes separated from the body itself before baptism, and so is damned, joins it to the body¹⁶? we answer that this comes from the height of the judgments of God, and that this is not done unjustly by God. For He not incongruously continually preserves, without alteration, the mode of the human condition which He instituted from the beginning, although the sins of men have intervened, fashioning bodies from matter made from the beginning without defect, creating souls from nothing, and perfecting man by their conjunction. Since, therefore, each nature of man was instituted by God without defect, although it was vitiated by sin from itself, the immutable God did not on that account have to change the primary law of the human condition, or to desist from the multiplication of men.

Chapter VII.

Whether the soul is such as it is created by God.

Here it is usually asked by some whether the soul is, before baptism, such as it is created by God. — And that it is not, they try to prove in this way: the soul is created in the body, in whose conjunction it is stained with sin; therefore as soon as it is, it has sin, nor did it exist before it had sin¹⁷: it is not therefore such as it is created by God. For it is created by God innocent and without defect; and it is never such. — To which it can be said that it is not altogether such as God made it. For God made it good and endowed it with goodness without corruption. And that goodness is called natural which it received in creation from its Author, which goodness it did not utterly lose through sin, but had vitiated, which God nevertheless made without defect. For if the soul were not a good thing, there could be no evil in it, since there cannot be evil except in a good, as will be said hereafter¹⁸. Not, therefore, is the soul altogether such as it is created by God. Just as one who has polluted hands did not receive such an apple as I gave with clean hands; for I gave a clean one.

Chapter VIII.

Whether souls from creation are equal in their natural gifts.

It is also not incongruously usually asked whether all souls are equal from creation, or some more excellent than others. — To many it seems not irrationally that from creation itself some excel others in natural gifts, so that one is in essence subtler than others and more apt for understanding and remembering, as being endowed with sharper wit and more perspicacious intellect. Which is not improbably said, since it is established that it was so among the Angels¹⁹. And although some excel others in natural gifts, yet, departing from the body before baptism, they obtain an equal penalty, and after baptism at once an equal crown, because sharpness of wit or slowness does not place reward or penalty in the life to come.

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