Dist. 34
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
DISTINCTIO XXXIV.
Cap. I.
De peccato actuali.
Post praedicta de peccato actuali diligenti indagine quaedam consideranda sunt, scilicet quae fuerit origo et causa primi peccati, utrum res bona, an res mala; postea, in qua re sit peccatum; deinde, quid sit peccatum, et quot modis fiat, et de differentia ipsorum peccatorum.
Cap. II.
Quae fuit origo et causa peccati prima.
Causa et origo prima peccati res bona exstitit, quia ante primum peccatum non erat aliquid mali1, unde oriretur. Cum enim originem et causam habuerit, aut ex bono aut ex malo habuit. Sed malum ante non erat, ex bono igitur ortum est. Prius enim in angelo ortum est peccatum, et postea in homine. Et quid erat angelus nisi bona natura Dei? Non ex Deo ortum est malum, quod fuit in angelo, non ex alio quam ex angelo, ex bono igitur ortum fuit. Unde Augustinus2 in responsionibus contra Iulianum haereticum, qui dixerat: « Si ex natura peccatum est, tunc mala est natura; ait: Quaeso ut, si potest, respondeat. Manifestum est, ex voluntate mala, tanquam ex arbore mala, fieri omnia opera mala, tanquam fructus malos; sed ipsam malam voluntatem unde dicit exortam nisi ex bono? Si enim ex angelo; quid est angelus nisi bonum opus Dei? Si ex homine; quid erat ipse homo nisi bonum opus Dei? Immo quid erant haec duo, antequam in eis oriretur mala voluntas, nisi bonum opus Dei et bona et laudanda natura? Ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit unde oriri posset nisi ex bono. Dico ergo, quia voluntatem malam nullum malum praecessit, sed ex bono originem habuit ». — Hic aperte dicitur3, primam causam et originem mali bonam fuisse naturam. Et nihilominus ostenditur, cuius peccati fuerit causa, scilicet malae voluntatis.
Cap. III.
Quae fuerit secundaria causa malorum.
Mala autem voluntas illa angeli et hominis causa est etiam malorum subsequentium, scilicet malorum
operum et malarum voluntatum. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio4: « Nequaquam dubitare debemus, rerum bonarum, quae ad nos pertinent, causam non esse nisi bonitatem Dei. Malarum vero ab immutabili bono deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, postea hominis » : « hoc primum est creaturae rationalis malum, id est prima privatio boni ». — Ecce habes, primam voluntatem boni mutabilis, id est angeli vel hominis, deficientem ab immutabili bono, id est a Deo, causam esse malarum rerum ad nos pertinentium, quia causa est tam peccatorum quam poenarum, quibus premitur humana natura. Prima igitur origo et causa peccati bonum fuit, et secunda malum, quod ortum est ex bono.
Cap. IV.
Quod non nisi in re bona sit causa malorum.
Ostensa origine mali, superest videre, in qua re sit malum, scilicet an in re bona, an in re mala. — Qui recte acuteque sapit, non nisi in bono malum esse intelligit, id est in natura bona. Malum enim est corruptio vel privatio boni; ubi autem bonum non est, non potest esse corruptio vel privatio boni. Peccatum igitur non potest esse nisi in re bona. Sicut enim morbis ac vulneribus corrumpuntur corpora, quae, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio5, « sunt privationes eius boni, quod dicitur sanitas; ita et animorum quaecumque sunt vitia naturalium sunt privationes bonorum. Quid est enim aliud, quod malum dicitur, nisi privatio boni » ? « Bonum enim minui malum est; quamvis quantumcumque minuatur, necesse est, ut aliquid remaneat, si adhuc natura est. Non enim consumi potest bonum, quod est natura, nisi et ipsa consumatur. Cum vero corrumpitur, ideo malum est eius corruptio, quia eam qualicumque privat bono. Nam si nullo bono privat, non nocet; nocet autem: adimit igitur bonum. Quamdiu itaque natura corrumpitur, inest ei bonum, quo privetur ». « Ac per hoc nullum est, quod dicitur malum, si nullum sit bonum; sed bonum, omnino malo carens, integrum bonum est. Cui vero inest malum vitiatum vel vitiosum bonum est; nec malum unquam potest esse ullum, ubi est nullum bonum. Unde res mira conficitur, ut quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est, nihil aliud dici videtur, cum vitiosa natura mala natura esse dicitur, nisi malum esse quod bonum est, nec malum esse nisi quod bonum est ». Hac contextione6 evidenter insinuatur, malum non posse esse nisi in re bona; ubi etiam, licet absurdum videatur, manifeste dicitur, esse malum quod bonum est. Ex quo colligitur, nihil aliud significari, cum dicitur homo malus, nisi bonum malum. Unde Augustinus in eodem7 subdit: « Quid est malus homo nisi mala natura? quia homo natura est. Porro, si homo aliquod bonum est, quia natura est, quid aliud est malus homo nisi malum bonum? Tamen cum duo ista discernimus, invenimus nec ideo malum, quia homo est, nec ideo bonum, quia iniquus est; sed bonum, quia homo, malum, quia iniquus. Omnis itaque natura, etiam si vitiosa sit, in quantum natura est, bona est; in quantum vitiosa est, mala est ».
Cap. V.
Quod in his fallit dialecticorum regula de contrariis.
Ideoque « in his contrariis, quae mala et bona vocantur, illa dialecticorum regula deficit, qua dicunt, nulli rei duo simul inesse contraria. Nullus enim potus aut cibus simul dulcis est et amarus; nullum simul corpus ubi album, ibi et nigrum; et hoc in multis ac pene in omnibus reperitur contrariis, ut in una re simul esse non possint. Cum autem bona et mala nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt. Et haec duo contraria ita simul sunt, ut, si bonum non esset, in quo malum esset; prorsus nec malum esse potuisset, quia non modo ubi consisteret, sed unde oriretur, corruptio non haberet, nisi esset quod corrumperetur; quoniam nihil est aliud corruptio quam boni exterminatio. Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt, et nisi in bonis non sunt » ; « nec fuit prorsus, unde oriretur ulla mali natura, nisi ex angeli et hominis natura bona, unde primitus orta est voluntas mala ».
Ex his aperitur, quod primo et secundo supra diximus investigandum, scilicet quae fuerit origo mali, et in qua re sit. Ex bona enim re ortum et in re bona consistere, praemissis testimoniis comprobatur.
Ad hoc autem, quod dictum est, « malum esse quod bonum est », quidam sic opponunt: si bonum malum esse dicimus, incidimus in illam sententiam propheticam, ubi legitur: Vae his qui dicunt bonum malum, et malum bonum. Igitur si hanc maledictionem vitare volumus, nullatenus dicere debemus, bonum esse malum, et e converso. Hoc autem Augustinus in eodem libro7 determinat dicens: « Id quod dictum est in pro-
phetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus. Unde qui adulterium dicit bonum, in eum cadit illa prophetica detestatio », et in eum qui « dicit malum esse hominem, vel bonum esse iniquum. Qui enim dicit, hominem, in quantum homo est, malum esse, et bonitatem esse iniquitatem, opus Dei culpat, quod est homo, et vitium hominis laudat, quod est iniquitas ».
---
DISTINCTION XXXIV.
Chapter I.
On actual sin.
After the foregoing concerning actual sin, certain things must be considered with diligent inquiry, namely what was the origin and cause of the first sin, whether a good thing or an evil thing; afterward, in what thing sin is; then, what sin is, and in how many modes it comes about, and concerning the difference of these sins.
Chapter II.
What was the first origin and cause of sin.
The first cause and origin of sin was a good thing, because before the first sin there was not anything of evil1 from which it could arise. For since it had an origin and cause, it had it either from good or from evil. But evil did not exist before; therefore it arose from good. For sin first arose in the angel, and afterward in man. And what was the angel but a good nature of God? The evil which was in the angel did not arise from God, nor from any other than from the angel; therefore it arose from good. Whence Augustine2, in his responses against the heretic Julian, who had said: "If sin is from nature, then nature is evil"; he says: I ask that, if he can, he answer. It is manifest that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, all evil works are made, as evil fruits; but whence does he say that the evil will itself arose, except from good? For if from the angel — what is the angel but a good work of God? If from man — what was man himself but a good work of God? Nay, what were these two, before the evil will arose in them, but a good work of God and a good and praiseworthy nature? Therefore evil arises from good, nor was there anything from which it could arise except from good. I say, therefore, that no evil preceded the evil will, but it took its origin from good." — Here it is plainly said3 that the first cause and origin of evil was a good nature. And nonetheless it is shown of what sin it was the cause, namely of the evil will.
Chapter III.
What was the secondary cause of evils.
But that evil will of the angel and of man is also the cause of the subsequent evils, namely of evil
works and of evil wills. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion4: "We ought by no means to doubt that the cause of the good things which pertain to us is nothing but the goodness of God; but of evil things, the cause is the will of changeable good, falling away from the immutable good — first that of the angel, afterward that of man": "this is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good." — Behold, you have it that the first will of changeable good, that is, of the angel or of man, falling away from the immutable good, that is, from God, is the cause of the evil things that pertain to us, since it is the cause both of the sins and of the penalties by which human nature is oppressed. The first origin and cause of sin, therefore, was a good, and the second an evil, which arose from the good.
Chapter IV.
That the cause of evils is not save in a good thing.
The origin of evil having been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil is, namely whether in a good thing or in an evil thing. — He who rightly and keenly understands, understands evil to be not save in a good, that is, in a good nature. For evil is the corruption or privation of good; but where good is not, there cannot be corruption or privation of good. Sin, therefore, cannot be save in a good thing. For just as bodies are corrupted by diseases and wounds, which, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion5, "are privations of that good which is called health; so also whatever are the vices of the soul are privations of natural goods. For what else is that which is called evil, but the privation of good?" "For to diminish good is an evil; yet however much it be diminished, it is necessary that something remain, if it is still a nature. For the good which is a nature cannot be consumed, unless the nature itself also be consumed. But when it is corrupted, the corruption of it is therefore an evil, because it deprives it of good in whatever degree. For if it deprives of no good, it does not harm; but it does harm: therefore it takes away good. As long, therefore, as a nature is corrupted, there is in it a good of which it is deprived." "And through this there is nothing that is called evil, if there is no good; but a good, altogether lacking evil, is an entire good. But that in which there is evil is a vitiated or vicious good; nor can there ever be any evil where there is no good. Whence a wondrous thing comes about, that since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is a good, nothing else seems to be said, when a vicious nature is said to be an evil nature, except that the evil is that which is good, and that there is no evil save what is good." By this connection6 it is evidently intimated that evil cannot be save in a good thing; where also, although it may seem absurd, it is plainly said that there is an evil which is a good. From which it is gathered that nothing else is signified, when a man is called evil, but a good evil. Whence Augustine in the same place7 adds: "What is an evil man but an evil nature? for man is a nature. Moreover, if man is some good, because he is a nature, what else is an evil man but an evil good? Yet when we distinguish these two, we find that he is not evil because he is a man, nor good because he is iniquitous; but good because he is a man, evil because he is iniquitous. Every nature, therefore, even if it be vicious, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is vicious, it is evil."
Chapter V.
That in these things the dialecticians' rule concerning contraries fails.
And therefore "in these contraries, which are called evil and good, that rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two contraries cannot be in one thing at the same time. For no drink or food is at the same time sweet and bitter; no body is at the same time white where it is, and there black; and this is found in many and almost all contraries, that they cannot be at the same time in one thing. But since no one doubts that good and evil are contraries, not only can they be at the same time, but evils altogether cannot be without goods and save in goods. And these two contraries are so together that, if there were no good in which the evil could be, there could not possibly be any evil at all, since corruption would have not only no place where it might subsist, but nothing whence it might arise, unless there were something that could be corrupted; for corruption is nothing else than the extermination of good. From goods, therefore, evils arose, and they are not save in goods"; "nor was there at all anything whence any evil nature might arise, save from the good nature of the angel and of man, whence first arose the evil will."
From these things it is opened up what we said above must be investigated, first and second, namely what was the origin of evil, and in what thing it is. That it arose from a good thing and consists in a good thing is proved by the foregoing testimonies.
But against what has been said, "that there is an evil which is a good," some object thus: if we say that a good is an evil, we fall into that prophetic sentence where it is read: Woe to those who call good evil, and evil good. Therefore, if we wish to avoid this curse, we ought by no means to say that a good is an evil, and conversely. But Augustine determines this in the same book7, saying: "What was said in the pro-
phecy is to be understood of the very things by which men are evil, not of men. Whence he who calls adultery good, upon him falls that prophetic detestation," and upon him who "says that a man is evil, or that an iniquity is good. For he who says that a man, insofar as he is a man, is evil, and that goodness is iniquity, blames the work of God, which is man, and praises the vice of man, which is iniquity."
---
- Codd. BCDE et ed. 1. malum. Deinde pro habuerit Vat. cum edd. 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 habuit contra codd. — Maior huius dist. pars invenitur in Hugone, Sum. sent. tr. 3. c. 14.Codices BCDE and edition 1 read malum. Then, for habuerit, the Vatican edition with editions 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 reads habuit, against the codices. — The greater part of this distinction is found in Hugh, Sentences, tr. 3, c. 14.
- Libr. II. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 28. n. 48.Book II, On Marriage and Concupiscence, c. 28, n. 48.
- Edd. 1, 3 docetur.Editions 1, 3 read docetur.
- Cap. 23. n. 8; seq. locus ibid. c. 24. n. 8.Chapter 23, n. 8; the following passage in the same place, c. 24, n. 8.
- Cap. II. n. 3. — Praecedens definitio mali occurrit apud August., I. Contra Adversar. Legis et Prophetarum, c. 3. n. 7. — Deinde locus: Bonum enim minui etc, Enchirid. c. 12. n. 4, in quo textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. ante consumatur adiicit natura. Ultimus locus est ibid. c. 13. n. 4, in quo textu pro Cui vero, quod cum originali habet Vat., in aliis edd. et codd. minus bene legitur Cum vero.Chapter II, n. 3. — The preceding definition of evil occurs in Augustine, Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 3, n. 7. — Then the passage: For to diminish good etc., Enchiridion c. 12, n. 4, in which text the Vatican edition with several editions adds natura before consumatur. The last passage is in the same place, c. 13, n. 4, in which text, for Cui vero, which the Vatican edition has with the original, in the other editions and codices it is read less well as Cum vero.
- Ita codd. et edd., Vat. connexione. — Loc. cit. — Etiam textus seq. capitul. est ibid. c. 14. n. 4.Thus the codices and editions; the Vatican edition reads connexione. — Loc. cit. — The text of the following chapter is also in the same place, c. 14, n. 4.
- In codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 9 omittitur malum, quod etiam deest in textu Maurinorum, ubi ad marginem ponitur. Seq. locus ibid. c. 18. n. 4. — Isai. 5, 20. — Paulo superius post dicimus edd. 1, 8 addunt et malum bonum. — Cap. 19. n. 6. Sicut verba praecedentia, ita etiam ultimus locus c. 13. n. 4. Sed ultimus locus in Vat. et multis edd. corrupte legitur. In originali ita est: Quisquis ergo dicit: malum est, hominem esse; aut: bonum est, iniquum esse; ipse incidit in propheticam illam sententiam. Vae his, qui dicunt etc. Opus enim Dei culpat etc. Noster textus legitur in codd. et edd. 8, 9.In codices ABDE and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, 9 the word malum is omitted, which is also lacking in the text of the Maurists, where it is placed in the margin. The following passage is in the same place, c. 18, n. 4. — Isaiah 5, 20. — A little above, after dicimus, editions 1, 8 add et malum bonum. — Chapter 19, n. 6. As with the preceding words, so also the last passage is c. 13, n. 4. But the last passage in the Vatican edition and many editions is read corruptly. In the original it is thus: Whoever therefore says: it is evil, that a man exists; or: it is good, that an iniquitous man exists; he himself falls into that prophetic sentence. Woe to those who say etc. For he blames the work of God etc. Our text is read in codices and editions 8, 9. ---