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Dist. 41

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XLI.

Cap. I. An omnis intentio vel actio infidelium sit mala.

Cumque intentio, ut supra1 dictum est, bonum opus faciat, et fides intentionem dirigat; non immerito quaeri potest, utrum omnis intentio omneque illorum opus malum sit, qui fidem non habent. Si enim fides intentionem dirigit, et intentio bonum opus facit; ubi non est fides, nec intentio bona nec bonum opus esse videtur. — Quod a quibusdam non irrationabiliter astruitur, qui dicunt, omnes actiones et voluntates hominis sine fide malas esse, quae, fide habita, bonae existunt. Unde Apostolus2 ait: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Quod Augustinus exponens ait: «Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil bonum est sine summo bono; ubi deest agnitio aeternae veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus». Et Iacobus in Epistola canonica ait: Qui offenderit in uno, scilicet in caritate, factus est omnium reus. Qui ergo fidem et caritatem non habet, omnis eius actio peccatum est, quia ad caritatem non refertur. Quod enim ad caritatem non refertur, ut supra3 meminit Augustinus, non fit, quemadmodum fieri oportet, ideoque malum

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est. Non igitur mandata custodit qui caritate caret, quia sine caritate nullum mandatorum custoditur. Unde Augustinus super Epistolam ad Galatas ait4: «Custoditionem legis dicit Apostolus non inebriari, non occidere, non moechari, et alia huiusmodi ad bonos mores pertinentia, quae nisi caritate, fide et spe impleri non possunt». Nullum ergo mandatum implet, nullum bonum opus facit, qui fidem caritatemque non habet. Impossibile est enim, ut ait Apostolus5, sine fide aliquid placere Deo. Quae ergo sine fide fiunt, bona non sunt, quia omne bonum placet Deo.

His autem obiicitur quod supra6 dixit Augustinus, scilicet quod in servili timore, etsi bonum fiat, non tamen bene. «Nemo enim invitus bene facit, etiamsi bonum est quod facit». Hic enim bonum dicit fieri, sed non bene, ab illo qui caritatem non habet. Qui enim serviliter timet caritate vacuus est; de quo tamen hic dicit, quia bonum facit, sed non bene. Qui etiam super illum locum Psalmi7: Turtur invenit sibi nidum, ubi reponat pullos suos; dicit, quod «Iudaei, haeretici et pagani opera bona faciunt, quia vestiunt nudos et pascunt pauperes, et huiusmodi: sed non in nido Ecclesiae, id est in fide; et ideo conculcantur pulli eorum». — Quibus illi respondent dicentes, bona opera appellari huiusmodi, quae sine caritate fiunt, non quia bona sint, quando sic fiunt, quod supra evidenter docuit Augustinus, sed quia bona essent, si aliter fierent; quae etiam8 suo genere sunt bona, sed ex affectu fiunt mala.

Alii vero, qui trifariam distinctionem actuum faciunt, opera cuncta, quae ad naturae subsidium fiunt, semper bona esse astruunt. Sed quod Augustinus mala esse dicit, si malas habeant causas, non ita accipiendum est, quasi ipsa mala sint, sed quia peccant et mali sunt qui ea malo fine agunt. Item, et illud aliud, scilicet, «bonum opus intentio facit, et intentionem fides dirigit9»; determinant dicentes, ibi bonum vocatum quod remunerabile est ad vitam, non quod illud sit solum bonum opus, immo et alia plura, licet non ea ratione, qua illud fit, sint bona.

Cap. II. Quibus modis dicatur bonum.

Bonum enim multipliciter accipitur, scilicet pro utili, pro remunerabili, pro signo boni, pro specie boni, pro licito, et aliis forte modis; solaque illa intentio remunerabilis est ad vitam, quam fides dirigit; sed non illa sola bona est, ut aiunt. Nam si quis Iudaeus vel malus Christianus necessitatem proximi relevaverit, naturali pietate ductus, bonum fecit, et bona fuit voluntas, qua illud fecit.

Cap. III. Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Peccatum adeo est voluntarium, et illud: Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est, et item: Non nisi voluntate peccatur.

Post haec investigari oportet, qualiter intelligendum sit quod ait Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione10: «Usque adeo, inquit, peccatum voluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium». Huius dicti rationem Augustinus aperiens, in libro Retractationum dicit: «Potest videri falsa haec definitio; sed si diligenter discutiatur, invenietur esse verissima. Peccatum quippe illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati», scilicet peccatum primum hominis, quod fuit peccatum et causa peccati, sed non poena; «quamvis et illa, quae non voluntaria peccata non immerito dicuntur, quia vel a nescientibus, vel a coactis perpetrantur, non omni modo possunt sine voluntate committi; quoniam et ille qui peccat ignorans, voluntate utique facit quod, cum faciendum non sit, putat esse faciendum; et ille qui, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, non ea quae vult facit, concupiscit quidem nolens, et in eo non facit quod vult; sed si vincitur, concupiscentiae consentit volens, et in eo non facit nisi quod vult; et illud quod in parvulis est originale peccatum, ex prima hominis voluntate mala contractum est. Non itaque falsum est quod dixi: Usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est» etc. — Ecce qualiter illud accipiendum sit, scilicet vel de primo peccato hominis, vel de omnibus generaliter peccatis mortiferis, quorum licet quaedam dicantur non voluntaria, quae scilicet per ignorantiam, vel per infirmitatem fiunt, eadem tamen ratione ea possunt dici voluntaria, quia sine voluntate non committuntur.

Illius etiam intelligentia perquirenda est, quod in libro de Duabus Animabus11 edidit inquiens: «Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est». Quod etiam in libro Retractationum plane determinat dicens: «Potest putari falsa esse ista sententia, qua diximus, nusquam nisi in voluntate esse peccatum, cum Apostolus dicat: Quod nolo, hoc facio» etc. «Sed peccatum, quod nusquam est nisi in voluntate, illud praecipue intelligendum est, quod iusta damnatio consecuta est», id est primum hominis peccatum. In eodem quoque libro de Duabus Animabus12 aliud tradidit consideratione dignum; ait enim: «Non nisi voluntate peccatur», ipsamque voluntatem definit dicens: «Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum». Huius dicti causam aperiens et intelligentiam pandens, in libro Retractationum ait:

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«Hoc propterea dictum est, ut hac definitione volens a nolente discerneretur, et sic ad illos referretur intentio, qui in paradiso fecerunt originem mali, nullo cogente, peccando, id est libera voluntate, quia et scientes contra praeceptum fecerunt; et ille tentator suasit, ut hoc fieret, non coegit. Nam qui nesciens peccavit non incongruenter nolens peccasse dici potest; quamvis et ipse quod nesciens fecit volens tamen fecit». «Ita nec tale peccatum sine voluntate esse potuit, sed voluntas facti ibi fuit, non voluntas peccati; quod tamen factum fuit peccatum; hoc enim factum est quod fieri non debuit. Quisquis autem sciens peccat, si potest cogenti ad peccatum sine peccato resistere, nec tamen facit, utique volens peccat; quia qui potest resistere non cogitur cedere». «Quapropter peccatum sine voluntate esse non posse, verissimum est». — Ex his liquet, qualiter superiora accipienda sint.

Cap. IV. Quod mala voluntas est voluntarium peccatum.

Si autem omne peccatum mortale voluntarium est, cum voluntas mala peccatum sit mortale, constat, ipsam esse voluntarium peccatum. «Quid enim, ut ait Augustinus13, tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est»? Voluntas itaque mala recte voluntarium dicitur peccatum, quod in voluntate consistit. «Voluntas quippe, ut ait Augustinus in eodem, est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima causa peccandi, nec est cui recte imputetur peccatum nisi peccanti. Non ergo est cui recte imputetur nisi voluntati». — Hoc autem de peccato actuali et mortali intelligendum est. Neque his verbis aliud voluit ostendere Augustinus, ut ipse ait in Retractationibus, nisi quia «voluntas est, qua peccatur et qua recte vivitur».

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XLI.

Chapter I. Whether every intention or action of unbelievers is evil.

And since intention, as was said above1, makes a work good, and faith directs intention, it can not undeservedly be asked whether every intention and every work of those who do not have faith is evil. For if faith directs intention, and intention makes a work good, where there is no faith, neither intention nor work seems to be good. — Which is asserted not unreasonably by certain men, who say that all the actions and wills of a man without faith are evil, which, faith being had, become good. Hence the Apostle2 says: Everything that is not from faith is sin. Which Augustine, expounding, says: «The whole life of unbelievers is sin, and nothing is good without the highest good; where the knowledge of eternal truth is lacking, virtue is false, even amid the best morals». And James in his canonical Epistle says: Whoever shall offend in one, namely in charity, is made guilty of all. Whoever, therefore, does not have faith and charity, his every action is sin, because it is not referred to charity. For what is not referred to charity, as Augustine recalled above3, is not done as it ought to be done, and therefore is evil.

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Not therefore does he keep the commandments who lacks charity, because without charity none of the commandments is kept. Hence Augustine on the Epistle to the Galatians says4: «The Apostle calls keeping the law: not to be drunken, not to kill, not to commit adultery, and other such things pertaining to good morals, which cannot be fulfilled except by charity, faith, and hope». No one therefore fulfills any commandment, no one does any good work, who does not have faith and charity. For it is impossible, as the Apostle says5, for anything to please God without faith. Therefore the things that are done without faith are not good, because everything good pleases God.

But against this is objected what Augustine said above6, namely that in servile fear, even if a good thing be done, it is nevertheless not done well. «For no one does well unwillingly, even though what he does is good». For here he says a good thing is done, but not well, by him who does not have charity. For he who fears in a servile way is void of charity; of whom nevertheless he here says that he does a good thing, but not well. He who also, on that place of the Psalm7: The turtledove has found for herself a nest, where she may lay her young; says that «Jews, heretics, and pagans do good works, because they clothe the naked and feed the poor, and such things: but not in the nest of the Church, that is, in faith; and therefore their young are trampled». — To whom those men respond, saying that such works as are done without charity are called good, not because they are good when they are so done — which Augustine plainly taught above — but because they would be good if they were done otherwise; which also8 in their own kind are good, but from affection become evil.

But others, who make a threefold distinction of acts, assert that all works which are done for the support of nature are always good. But that Augustine says they are evil, if they have evil causes, is not so to be taken as if they themselves were evil, but because those who do them with an evil end sin and are evil. Likewise, that other saying, namely «intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention9»; they determine, saying that there is called good that which is rewardable unto life, not that this alone is a good work, but rather also many others, although they are not good by that reason by which it is done.

Chapter II. In how many ways the good is spoken of.

For the good is taken in many ways, namely for the useful, for the rewardable, for the sign of the good, for the appearance of the good, for the lawful, and perhaps in other ways; and only that intention is rewardable unto life which faith directs; but that alone is not good, as they say. For if some Jew or evil Christian should relieve the need of his neighbor, led by natural piety, he did a good thing, and good was the will by which he did it.

Chapter III. How that saying is to be understood: Sin is so far voluntary; and that one: Nowhere except in the will is there sin; and likewise: One sins only by the will.

After these things it must be investigated how that is to be understood which Augustine says in the book On True Religion10: «So far, he says, is sin a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin, if it be not voluntary». Augustine, disclosing the reason of this saying, says in the book of Retractations: «This definition can seem false; but if it be carefully examined, it will be found to be most true. For that is to be reckoned sin which is only sin, not what is also the penalty of sin», namely the first sin of man, which was sin and the cause of sin, but not penalty; «although even those things which are not undeservedly called non-voluntary sins, because they are perpetrated either by the unknowing or by the coerced, cannot in every way be committed without the will; since even he who sins unknowingly does by the will indeed what, although it ought not to be done, he thinks ought to be done; and he who, while the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do the things that he wills, lusts indeed unwillingly, and in this does not do what he wills; but if he is conquered, he consents willingly to concupiscence, and in this does nothing but what he wills; and that which in little ones is original sin was contracted from the first evil will of man. Therefore it is not false that I said: So far is sin voluntary» etc. — Behold how that is to be taken, namely either of the first sin of man, or of all deadly sins generally, of which, although certain ones be called non-voluntary, namely those which are done through ignorance or through infirmity, by the same reasoning they can be called voluntary, because they are not committed without the will.

The understanding also of that is to be sought which he set forth in the book On the Two Souls11, saying: «Nowhere except in the will is there sin». Which also in the book of Retractations he plainly determines, saying: «It can be thought that this sentence is false, by which we said that nowhere except in the will is there sin, since the Apostle says: What I will not, that I do» etc. «But the sin which is nowhere except in the will is principally to be understood as that which a just damnation has followed», that is, the first sin of man. In the same book On the Two Souls also12 he handed down another thing worthy of consideration; for he says: «One sins only by the will», and he defines the will itself, saying: «The will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something». Disclosing the cause of this saying and unfolding its understanding, he says in the book of Retractations:

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«This was said for this reason, that by this definition the willing might be distinguished from the unwilling, and so the intention might be referred to those who in paradise made the origin of evil, with nothing compelling, by sinning, that is, by free will, because they also knowingly acted against the precept; and that tempter persuaded that this should be done, he did not compel. For he who sinned unknowingly can not incongruously be said to have sinned unwillingly; although he too did willingly what he did unknowingly». «Thus neither could such a sin be without the will, but there was there the will of the deed, not the will of the sin; which deed nevertheless was sin; for this was done which ought not to have been done. But whoever knowingly sins, if he can resist without sin the one compelling him to sin, and nevertheless does not, certainly sins willingly; because he who can resist is not compelled to yield». «Wherefore it is most true that sin cannot be without the will». — From these things it is clear how the foregoing things are to be taken.

Chapter IV. That an evil will is voluntary sin.

But if every mortal sin is voluntary, since an evil will is a mortal sin, it is established that it itself is voluntary sin. «For what, as Augustine says13, is as much in the will as the will itself»? An evil will, therefore, is rightly called voluntary sin, which consists in the will. «For the will, as Augustine says in the same place, is the first cause of sinning; or no sin is the first cause of sinning, nor is there one to whom sin is rightly imputed except the one sinning. There is not, therefore, one to whom it is rightly imputed except the will». — But this is to be understood of actual and mortal sin. Nor by these words did Augustine wish to show anything else, as he himself says in the Retractations, except that «it is the will by which one sins and by which one lives rightly».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. praeced. c. 1.
    The preceding distinction, c. 1.
  2. Rom. 14, 23, ubi in Glossa seq. locus Augustini refertur, qui verbotenus legitur apud S. Prosperum, Libr. Sent. n. 106, sed secundum sententiam saepissime invenitur in S. August. v. g. IV. contra Iulian. c. 3. n. 32; de Gestis Pelag. c. 14. n. 34; XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 25; in Ps. 31. Enarrat. 2. n. 4; in Ps. 70. Serm. 2. n. 3; in Ps. 118. Serm. 7. n. 1. — Secundus locus Scripturae est Iac. 2, 10, ubi Vulgata: offendat pro offenderit, Vat. cum codd. CD offendit. Verba addita in caritate sunt in Glossa ad hunc locum.
    Romans 14:23, where in the Gloss the following passage of Augustine is referred to, which is read word for word in St. Prosper, Book of Sentences n. 106, but according to the sense is found very often in St. Augustine, e.g. Against Julian IV, c. 3, n. 32; On the Deeds of Pelagius c. 14, n. 34; On the City of God XIX, c. 25; Enarrations on Psalm 31, 2, n. 4; on Psalm 70, Serm. 2, n. 3; on Psalm 118, Serm. 7, n. 1. — The second Scriptural passage is James 2:10, where the Vulgate has offendat for offenderit; the Vatican edition with codices CD reads offendit. The words added, in caritate, are in the Gloss on this place.
  3. Dist. XXXVIII. c. 1.
    Distinction XXXVIII, c. 1.
  4. Num. 62. (ad 6, 13). — Pro nisi, quod habent codd. et originale, edd. sine.
    N. 62 (on 6:13). — For nisi, which the codices and the original have, the editions read sine.
  5. Hebr. 11, 6.
    Hebrews 11:6.
  6. Dist. praeced. c. 1. Seq. locus est etiam in August., 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19.
    The preceding distinction, c. 1. The following passage is also in Augustine, Confessions I, c. 12, n. 19.
  7. Enarrat. n. 7. super Ps. 83, 3, et ad verbum in Glossa.
    Enarration n. 7 on Psalm 83:3, and word for word in the Gloss.
  8. Vat. quae in suo, et infra sunt pro fiunt, edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 et codd. A B C E quae etiam sui genere.
    The Vatican edition reads quae in suo, and below sunt for fiunt; editions 1, 2, 3, 7 and codices A B C E read quae etiam sui genere.
  9. August., Enarrat. II. in Ps. 31. serm. ad plebem, n. 4; cfr. supra d. XL. c. I.
    Augustine, Enarration II on Psalm 31, sermon to the people, n. 4; cf. above, Dist. XL, c. I.
  10. Cap. 14. n. 27. Seq. locus est 1. Retract. c. 13. n. 5, ubi etiam tertius locus est. In hoc ultimo textu Vat. cum paucis edd. et originali post originale peccatum contra codd. et ceteras edd. addit: Cum adhuc non utantur voluntatis libero arbitrio [originale: arbitrio voluntatis], non absurde vocatur voluntarium, quia.
    Chapter 14, n. 27. The following passage is Retractations I, c. 13, n. 5, where the third passage also is. In this last text the Vatican edition with a few editions and the original, after original sin, against the codices and the other editions adds: Since they do not yet use the free choice of the will [the original: the choice of the will], it is not absurdly called voluntary, because.
  11. Cap. 10. n. 12. Seq. locus est 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 2, ubi et tertius locus. Textus Apostoli est Rom. 7, 16.
    Chapter 10, n. 12. The following passage is Retractations I, c. 15, n. 2, where the third passage also is. The text of the Apostle is Romans 7:16.
  12. Cap. 10. n. 14; secundus locus ibid. parum inferius, ad quos referuntur tres loci in 1. Retract. c. 15. n. 3.
    Chapter 10, n. 14; the second passage is in the same place a little below, to which are referred the three passages in Retractations I, c. 15, n. 3.
  13. Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 26. et ibid. III. c. 17. n. 49. Locus est I. c. 9. n. 4. — Supra pro sita est Vat. cum cod. D sita; in fine codd. omittunt qua ante recte vivitur.
    Book I On Free Choice c. 12, n. 26, and in the same work III, c. 17, n. 49. The passage is I, c. 9, n. 4. — Above, for sita est the Vatican edition with codex D reads sita; at the end the codices omit qua before recte vivitur. ---
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