Dist. 42
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42
## DISTINCTIO XLII.
Cap. I.
An voluntas et actio mala in eodem et circa idem sint unum peccatum, vel plura.
Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio sint peccatum, quaeri solet, utrum in eodem homine et circa eandem rem haec duo unum sint peccatum, vel diversa; ut si quis voluntate furatur, voluntatem habuit malam, quae peccatum est, et actum malum, qui item peccatum est. Haec autem duo diversa sunt, scilicet voluntas et actio; sed nunquid diversa sunt et peccata, an unum? — Quidam1 dicunt, unum esse peccatum; alii vero diversa esse peccata dicunt; quia, cum constet, haec duo esse diversa, aut diversa duo peccata dicuntur, aut duo diversa, non peccata. — Quibus alii respondent, haec duo diversa esse, non peccata2. Non enim plura peccata sunt, sed peccatum unum, quia una praevaricatio vel inobedientia in utroque admittitur, sive quando vult, sive quando agit; et unus est ibi contemptus, sed minor, cum in voluntate solum peccatum continetur, maior vero, cum voluntati etiam operatio additur; et ideo maius fit peccatum, sed non plura, cum voluntas operi mancipatur.
Sed adhuc eisdem obiicitur. Si unum tantum peccatum illa duo sunt, cum quis, voluntate mali prius concepta, deinde opus patraverit, non pro aliquo reus est, nisi pro quo ante opus reus erat, cum adhuc in sola voluntate peccatum consistebat. Nullus enim reus est aeternae mortis nisi pro peccato; sed peccatum aliud non est admissum actione, quam prius admissum erat voluntate. Non igitur pro aliquo alio iste fit damnabilis actu peccando, quam ante fuerat, cum sola voluntate delinquebat. — Ad hoc etiam illi respondent dicentes3, propter peccatum quidem tantum illum furem reum constitui; et quamvis eius voluntas et actio unum sint peccatum, pro alio tamen reus factus est actu peccando, quam prius erat sola voluntate delinquendo, quia pro actu, qui est aliud quam voluntas, licet non aliud peccatum.
Item et adhuc quaestioni instant dicentes, ideo haec duo diversa esse peccata, quia diversorum legis mandatorum praevaricationes sunt. Alio enim mandato legis prohibetur actio furti, scilicet: Non furaberis4, alio voluntas furandi, scilicet: Non concupisces rem proximi tui. Cum autem haec duo diversa mandata sint, quibus illa duo prohibentur; patet, illa duo diversas esse praevaricationes, diversa igitur peccata. — Ad quod etiam illi dicunt, diversa quidem esse mandata, quibus illa duo distinctim prohibentur, ut Augustinus docet super Exodum5, verumtamen in illis non observatis una praevaricatio tantum incurritur, unumque peccatum contrahitur, licet duo diversa illis prohibeantur; sicut e converso duo sunt mandata caritatis, quibus duo praecipiuntur diligi, una tamen in eis nobis commendatur caritas.
Cap. II.
Si peccatum ab aliquo commissum in eo sit, usquequo poeniteat.
Praeterea quaeri solet, cum ab aliquo peccato voluntate perpetrato voluntas id agendi et actio transierit, nondum tamen vera habita poenitentia, utrum illud peccatum, usquequo poeniteat, sit in eo. Quod non esse videtur, quia voluntas illa, quae prius fuit, non est, neque actio, quia non illud vult vel agit, quod ante voluit et egit. — Sed non est ignorandum, peccatum duobus modis dici esse in aliquo et transire, scilicet actu et reatu6. Actu est in aliquo, dum ipsum quod peccatum est, ut actio vel voluntas, in peccante est; reatu vero, cum pro eo, sive transierit sive adsit, mens hominis polluta est et corrupta, totusque homo suppliciis obligatur perpetuis. Nec unquam est in aliquo peccatum actu, praeter originale, quin sit etiam reatu, sed est reatu interdum, postquam transit actu.
Cap. III.
Quibus modis accipitur reatus.
Reatus autem in Scriptura multipliciter accipitur, scilicet pro culpa, pro poena, pro obligatione poenae temporalis, vel aeternae. Si enim mortale est, obligat nos poenae aeternae; si veniale, obligat nos poenae temporali; duo enim sunt peccatorum genera, mortalium scilicet et venialium.
Mortale est per quod homo mortem aeternam meretur — « crimen enim, ut ait Augustinus7, est quod est dignum accusatione et damnatione » — veniale autem, quod hominem usque in reatum perpetuae mortis non gravat, verumtamen poenam meretur, sed facile indulgetur.
Cap. IV.
De modis peccatorum.
Modi autem peccatorum varias in Scriptura habent distinctiones, in qua dicitur duobus modis peccatum committi, scilicet « cupiditate et timore », ut Augustinus tradit super illum locum Psalmi8: Incensa igni et suffossa. His enim duobus modis dicit omnia peccata mortalia includi. Et incensa ea dicit, quae ex cupiditate male incendente oriuntur; suffossa vero, quae ex timore male humiliante proveniunt; quod est, quando quis cupit non cupienda, vel timet non timenda. — Alibi vero dicitur, peccatum fieri tribus modis, scilicet cogitatu, verbo et opere; unde Hieronymus super Ezechielem9: « Tria generalia delicta sunt, quibus humanum subiacet genus: aut enim cogitatione, aut sermone, aut opere peccamus ». His aliquando etiam additur quartus modus, scilicet consuetudinis, quod in quatriduano Lazaro significatum est. Dicitur quoque homo peccare in Deum, in se et in proximum. In Deum, cum de Deo male sentit, ut haereticus, vel quae Dei sunt usurpare praesumit, indigne participando Sacramentis, vel quando nomen Dei peierando contemptibile facit; in proximum peccat, cum proximum iniuste laedit; in se vero, cum sibi, non alii, nocet.
Cap. V.
Quod differant delictum et peccatum.
Variam quoque appellationem habet: dicitur enim peccatum et delictum. Et « delictum fortasse est, ut ait Augustinus in Quaestionibus Levitici10, declinare a bono, peccatum est facere malum. Aliud est enim declinare a bono, aliud est facere malum. Peccatum ergo est perpetratio mali, delictum desertio boni; quod et ipsum nomen ostendit. Quid enim aliud sonat delictum nisi derelictum, et qui delinquit, quid derelinquit nisi bonum? » « Vel delictum est quod ignoranter fit, peccatum quod scienter committitur. Indifferenter tamen et peccatum nomine delicti, et delictum nomine peccati appellatur ».
Cap. VI.
De septem principalibus vitiis.
Praeterea sciendum est, septem esse vitia principalia vel capitalia, ut Gregorius super Exodum11 ait, « scilicet inanem gloriam, iram, invidiam, acidiam vel tristitiam, avaritiam, gastrimargiam, luxuriam »: quae, ut ait Ioannes Chrysostomus12, significata sunt in septem populis, qui terram promissionis Israeli promissam tenebant. De his quasi septem fontibus cunctae animarum mortiferae corruptelae emanant. Et dicuntur haec capitalia, quia ex eis oriuntur omnia mala. Nullum enim malum est, quod non ab aliquo horum originem trahat.
Cap. VII.
De superbia.
Ex superbia tamen omnia mala oriuntur, et haec et alia; quia, ut ait Gregorius13, « radix cuncti mali est superbia »; de qua dicitur: Initium omnis peccati est superbia, « quae est amor propriae excellentiae ». Cuius quatuor sunt species, ut Gregorius14 ait: « Prima est, cum bonum, quod habet quis, sibi attribuit. Secunda, cum credit, a Deo esse datum, sed tamen pro suis meritis. Tertia, cum se iactat habere quod non habet. Quarta, cum, ceteris despectis, singulariter vult videri ». Merito ergo radix omnis mali dicitur superbia. Huic autem videtur obviare quod ait Apostolus15: Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas; quia, si radix omnium malorum cupiditas est, ergo superbiae. Quomodo ergo superbia radix est et initium omnis peccati?
Cap. VIII.
Quomodo superbia dicatur radix omnium malorum et cupiditas, cum superbia non sit cupiditas.
Sed « utrumque recte dictum esse intelligitur, si genera peccatorum singulorum, non singula generum utraque locutione intelligantur includi; nullum quippe genus peccati est, quod interdum ex superbia non proveniat; nullum etiam est, quod ex cupiditate aliquando non descendat. Sunt enim nonnulli hominum, qui ex cupiditate fiunt superbi; et aliqui ex superbia fiunt cupidi. Est enim, ut ait Augustinus16, homo, qui non esset amator pecuniae, nisi per hoc putaret, se excellentiorem esse, ideoque, ut excellat, divitias cupit; tali ex superbia oboritur cupiditas. Et est aliquis, qui non amaret excellere, nisi putaret, per hoc maiores divitias habere ». Ideo ergo excellere laborat, quia divitias habere amat. Huic innascitur superbia, id est amor excellentiae, ex cupiditate. Patet ergo, quod ex superbia aliquando cupiditas, et ex cupiditate aliquando superbia oritur; et ideo de utraque recte dicitur, quod sit radix omnis mali.
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## DISTINCTION XLII.
Chapter I.
Whether an evil will and an evil action in the same person and concerning the same thing are one sin, or many.
Now since an evil will and an operation are sin, it is wont to be asked whether in the same man and concerning the same thing these two are one sin, or diverse; as, for example, if someone steals by his will, he had an evil will, which is a sin, and an evil act, which is likewise a sin. Now these two are diverse, namely the will and the action; but are they also diverse sins, or one? — Some1 say there is one sin; but others say they are diverse sins; for since it is agreed that these two are diverse, either they are called diverse two sins, or two diverse things, not sins. — To whom others reply that these two are diverse, but not sins2. For they are not many sins, but one sin, because one transgression or disobedience is committed in both, whether when one wills or when one acts; and there is one contempt there, but a lesser one when the sin is contained in the will alone, and a greater one when an operation is also added to the will; and so the sin becomes greater, but not more, when the will is given over to the deed.
But the same men are further objected to. If those two are only one sin, then when someone, having first conceived the will to evil, afterwards perpetrates the deed, he is not liable for anything except that for which he was liable before the deed, when the sin still consisted in the will alone. For no one is liable to eternal death except on account of sin; but no other sin has been committed by the action than what had previously been committed by the will. Therefore this man is not made damnable on account of any other thing by sinning in act than he had been before, when he was offending by the will alone. — To this also those men reply, saying3 that the thief is indeed made liable only on account of the sin; and although his will and action are one sin, yet he is made liable for another thing by sinning in act than he was before by offending by the will alone, because for the act, which is other than the will, although not another sin.
Moreover, they further press the question, saying that these two are diverse sins for this reason, that they are transgressions of diverse commandments of the law. For by one commandment of the law the action of theft is forbidden, namely: Thou shalt not steal4; by another, the will to steal, namely: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property. Now since these are two diverse commandments by which those two are forbidden, it is plain that those two are diverse transgressions, and therefore diverse sins. — To which also those men say that the commandments are indeed diverse, by which those two are distinctly forbidden, as Augustine teaches on Exodus5; yet, when they are not observed, only one transgression is incurred, and one sin is contracted, although two diverse things are forbidden by them; just as, conversely, there are two commandments of charity, by which two things are commanded to be loved, yet one charity is commended to us in them.
Chapter II.
Whether a sin committed by someone remains in him until he repents.
Furthermore it is wont to be asked, when, after a sin has been perpetrated by someone through the will, the will to do it and the action have passed away, but true repentance has not yet been had, whether that sin remains in him until he repents. And it seems that it does not, because that will which existed before does not exist, nor does the action, since he does not will or do that which he willed and did before. — But it must not be unknown that sin is said to be in someone and to pass away in two modes, namely in act and by liability6. It is in someone in act while that which is the sin itself, such as the action or the will, is in the one sinning; but by liability, when on account of it — whether it has passed away or is present — the man's mind is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is bound to perpetual punishments. And sin is never in anyone in act, except original sin, without also being there by liability; but it is there by liability sometimes after it passes away in act.
Chapter III.
In what ways "liability" is taken.
Now "liability" is taken in many ways in Scripture, namely for fault, for punishment, for the obligation to temporal punishment, or to eternal. For if it is mortal, it binds us to eternal punishment; if venial, it binds us to temporal punishment; for there are two kinds of sins, namely of mortal and of venial.
A sin is mortal by which a man merits eternal death — for « a crime, as Augustine says7, is that which is worthy of accusation and condemnation » — but venial is that which does not burden a man unto liability to perpetual death, yet nevertheless merits punishment, but is easily pardoned.
Chapter IV.
On the modes of sins.
Now the modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture, in which it is said that sin is committed in two modes, namely « by desire and by fear », as Augustine relates on that passage of the Psalm8: Burned with fire and dug under. For in these two modes he says that all mortal sins are included. And he calls those things burned which arise from desire that evilly inflames; but dug under those which come from fear that evilly abases; which is, when someone desires what is not to be desired, or fears what is not to be feared. — But elsewhere it is said that sin is committed in three modes, namely by thought, by word, and by deed; whence Jerome on Ezekiel9: « There are three general offenses to which the human race is subject: for we sin either by thought, or by speech, or by deed ». To these is sometimes also added a fourth mode, namely of habit, which was signified in the four-days-dead Lazarus. A man is also said to sin against God, against himself, and against his neighbor. Against God, when he thinks ill of God, like a heretic, or presumes to usurp the things that are God's, by participating unworthily in the Sacraments, or when by perjury he makes the name of God contemptible; he sins against his neighbor when he unjustly harms his neighbor; but against himself, when he harms himself, not another.
Chapter V.
That "offense" and "sin" differ.
It also has a varied appellation: for it is called sin and offense. And « an offense is perhaps, as Augustine says in the Questions on Leviticus10, to turn aside from good, while sin is to do evil. For it is one thing to turn aside from good, another to do evil. Therefore sin is the perpetration of evil, offense the desertion of good; which the very name shows. For what else does offense (delictum) sound but forsaken (derelictum), and he who offends (delinquit), what does he forsake (derelinquit) but the good? » « Or offense is what is done in ignorance, sin what is committed knowingly. Yet indifferently both sin is called by the name of offense, and offense by the name of sin ».
Chapter VI.
On the seven principal vices.
Furthermore it must be known that there are seven principal or capital vices, as Gregory on Exodus says11, « namely vainglory, anger, envy, sloth or sadness, avarice, gluttony, lust »: which, as John Chrysostom says12, were signified in the seven peoples who held the land of promise that was promised to Israel. From these, as from seven fountains, all the deadly corruptions of souls flow forth. And these are called capital, because from them all evils arise. For there is no evil which does not draw its origin from one of these.
Chapter VII.
On pride.
Yet from pride all evils arise, both these and others; for, as Gregory says13, « the root of all evil is pride »; of which it is said: The beginning of all sin is pride, « which is the love of one's own excellence ». Of it there are four species, as Gregory says14: « The first is when one attributes to oneself the good which one has. The second, when one believes it to be given by God, but yet on account of one's own merits. The third, when one boasts of having what one does not have. The fourth, when, despising the rest, one wishes to be seen as singular ». Rightly, therefore, pride is called the root of all evil. But to this there seems to be opposed what the Apostle says15: The root of all evils is covetousness; for if covetousness is the root of all evils, then it is the root of pride. How, then, is pride the root and beginning of all sin?
Chapter VIII.
How pride is called the root of all evils, and also covetousness, although pride is not covetousness.
But « both are understood to be rightly said, if both expressions are understood to include the kinds of individual sins, not the individual kinds; for there is no kind of sin which does not sometimes arise from pride; there is also none which does not at some time descend from covetousness. For there are some men who become proud from covetousness; and some who become covetous from pride. For there is, as Augustine says16, a man who would not be a lover of money, unless he thought through this to be more excellent, and therefore, in order to excel, desires riches; in such a one covetousness arises from pride. And there is another who would not love to excel, unless he thought to have greater riches through it ». Therefore he labors to excel because he loves to have riches. In this man pride is born, that is, the love of excellence, from covetousness. It is plain, therefore, that from pride covetousness sometimes arises, and from covetousness pride sometimes arises; and so of each it is rightly said that it is the root of all evil.
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- Inter quos est Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 13.Among whom is Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 13.
- Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 falso diversa esse peccata, non plura.The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 wrongly read that they are diverse sins, not many.
- Edd. 1, 8 respondentes dicunt.Editions 1, 8 read they say in reply.
- Exod. 20, 15. 17. et Deut. 5, 19. 21.Exodus 20:15, 17 and Deuteronomy 5:19, 21.
- Libr. II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 71.Questions on the Pentateuch, Book II, q. 71.
- Ex August., l. de Nupt. et concupisc. c. 26. n. 29, et VI. contra Iulian. c. 19. n. 60. — In fine capituli pro interdum Vat. et edd. 4, 9 male intelligendum.From Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, c. 26, n. 29, and Book VI Against Julian, c. 19, n. 60. — At the end of the chapter, for interdum (sometimes) the Vatican edition and editions 4, 9 wrongly read intelligendum.
- In Evang. Ioan. tract. 41. n. 9.On the Gospel of John, tract. 41, n. 9.
- Enarrat. n. 13. in Ps. 79. 17. — Codd. ABCE paulo inferius post duobus omittunt modis.Enarration n. 13 on Psalm 79:17. — Codices ABCE, a little further on, after duobus omit modis.
- Cap. 43, 23. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 64. n. 17. De quarto modo malae consuetudinis sub figura Lazari loquitur August., in Evang. Ioan. tract. 49. n. 3: Est genus mortis immane, mala consuetudo appellatur. — Quae sequuntur usque ad c. 8. excerpta sunt ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 16.Ch. 43:23. Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 64, n. 17. Of the fourth mode, that of evil habit, under the figure of Lazarus, Augustine speaks in On the Gospel of John, tract. 49, n. 3: There is a monstrous kind of death, which is called evil habit. — What follows down to c. 8 is excerpted from Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 16.
- Libr. III. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 20. Seq. locus est ibid. parum inferius.Questions on the Pentateuch, Book III, q. 20. The following passage is in the same place, a little further on.
- Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87, et in Glossa ad Exod. 23, 22.Moralia, Book XXXI, c. 45, n. 87, and in the Gloss on Exodus 23:22.
- Est in Glossa apud Lyranum, Deut. 23. 23. In libris Chrysostomi locum istum non invenimus, sed in Ioan. Cassiano Collat. 5. c. 16, et Isidor. Quaest. in Deut. c. 16. — In fine ante non ab aliquo Vat. cum cod. D et multis edd. addit etiam.It is in the Gloss at Lyranus, Deuteronomy 23:23. We did not find this passage in the books of Chrysostom, but in John Cassian, Conferences 5, c. 16, and Isidore, Questions on Deuteronomy, c. 16. — At the end, before non ab aliquo, the Vatican edition with codex D and many editions adds etiam.
- Loc. cit.; locus Scripturae est Eccli. 10, 13. Definitio superbiae est ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18.Loc. cit.; the passage of Scripture is Sirach 10:13. The definition of pride is from Augustine, On Genesis Literally, Book XI, c. 14, n. 18.
- Libr. XXIII. Moral. c. 6. n. 13.Moralia, Book XXIII, c. 6, n. 13.
- Epist. I. ad Tim. 6, 10. — Inferius pro quia edd. 1, 8 sed.First Letter to Timothy 6:10. — Further on, for quia editions 1, 8 read sed.
- Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 19. Sed totus locus a verbis: utrumque recte usque Ideo ergo occurrit in Glossa ad I. Tim. 6, 10. — Pro Ideo ergo edd. 1, 8 Ideoque.On Genesis Literally, Book XI, c. 15, n. 19. But the whole passage, from the words utrumque recte down to Ideo ergo, occurs in the Gloss on 1 Timothy 6:10. — For Ideo ergo editions 1, 8 read Ideoque. ---