Dist. 7, Part 2, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de illa divisione, quam ponit Isidorus in tria membra, cum dicit, quod daemones triplici scientiae acumine vigent. Videtur enim diminute procedere, quia Augustinus super Genesim secundo quatuor modos ponit, quos etiam Magister adducit in littera1. — Item, videtur superflua; Philosophus2 enim non ponit nisi duos modos; dicit enim, quod omne quod quis novit, discens vel inveniens novit.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod divisio Isidori sufficiens est et consona verbis Augustini. Sufficientia autem patet sic. Omne enim quod daemones sciunt, aut sciunt cognitione innata, et sic dicuntur scire acumine sensus; aut cognitione acquisita. Sed cognitio acquisita potest esse dupliciter: aut de rebus, quae subsunt rationi, et haec per experientiam addiscuntur; aut de rebus, quae sunt supra, et sic est per revelationem superiorum spirituum.
Quod ergo obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum, quod duo modi reducuntur ad unum. Et iterum, Augustinus magis assignat modos praedicendi futura quam cognoscendi. Philosophus autem loquitur de cognitione acquisita; vel si generaliter de omni, tunc sub inventione comprehendit sensus acumen et experientiam temporum3.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod daemones aliqua cognoscunt a sanctis Angelis, quae ab omnipotenti Deo discunt, iussu eius sibi revelantibus. Contra: Daemones sunt inimici Dei et Angelorum; si ergo ab inimicis abscondenda sunt secreta consilia, ergo videtur, quod Deus eis nunquam revelari faciat. — Item, ipsi sunt in tenebris damnationis: ergo cum non sint idonei ad gratiam, et revelatio sit cognitio gratiae, non naturae, videtur, quod nullo modo fiat ipsis daemonibus.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod pro vero habendum est quod dicit Isidorus et Augustinus4, quod aliqua praesciunt revelatione supernorum spirituum, cuius revelationis attendendus est finis et modus. Revelationis huius finis: Finis, quia mirabilis Sapientia per inimicantes implet voluntatem suam; unde sicut revelatio somnii de exaltatione Iosephi5, facta insidiantibus, secundum mirabilem Dei dispositionem fecit ad eius impletionem, licet secundum intentiones illorum esset ad impedimentum: sic Deus aliqua ostendit per Angelos suos daemonibus, ut, dum illi obviant, aliquid valde decens et competens ordinatissime impleat et eliciat. — Et ex hoc patet primum, quia non est simile. Humanum enim consilium potest irritari, non tamen divinum.
Attendendus est etiam modus. Revelationis modus duplex: Duplici enim modo fit revelatio: aliquando mentis illustratione, sicut fiebat sanctis Prophetis, et haec est gratiae; aliquando vero sola praedictione6, sicut homo revelat aliquando voluntatem suam. Et haec non est gratiae aliquo modo perficientis vel elevantis naturam, sed potest esse opus misericordiae, si illud ordinetur ad bonum eius cui praedicitur, vel iustitiae, si ordinetur ad punitionem alicuius mali, utpote si ad fallendum fallaces; vel utriusque, si simul ad utrumque. Et ita est quasi semper, quia huiusmodi futura praedicuntur daemonibus, et permittuntur miracula fieri ab eis, ut boni talia parvipendant, in quibus se vident a damnatis et miseris superari, et mali et fallaces proficiant in peius7, errantes et in errorem mittentes occulto Dei iudicio, tamen iudicio iusto. Notandum: Unde valde stultum est desiderare facere miracula vel praescire futura et quasi magna haec reputare, cum inimicos Dei in his videamus abundare8.
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Angeli non sunt creatores, quia non operantur nisi exterius. Sed contra: haec non videtur ratio, quia si solus Creator operatur interius, tunc ergo natura nihil producit. — Item, creare est producere aliquid de nihilo; sed si daemon propria virtute extraheret semen de potentia in actum, non de nihilo faceret: ergo non esset creator.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod quaedam est virtus, quae in productione rerum solum operatur exterius; quaedam quae perfecte operatur interius; quaedam partim interius, partim exterius. Triplex operatio virtutis: Virtus artificis solum exterius operatur, amovendo sive iungendo et applicando unam naturam cum alia. Virtus Dei operatur perfecte interius, quia ipsa primordialia semina, quae sunt intima, producit. Virtus vero, quae est partim interius, partim exterius, est virtus naturae, quae exterius est respectu rationum seminalium, sed interius respectu producendorum ex p. 207ipsis. Natura enim, dum operatur, immittit virtutem suam usque ad intima passi; et in illa immissione ipsam essentiam formae, quae erat in potentia incompleta, non producit, sed productam a Deo supponit: ipsam tamen adiuvando ad actum perfectum adducit. Solus igitur ille potest seminales illas rationes facere, qui potest creare; quoniam ipsae non sunt ex aliis, sed ex nihilo, et ex ipsis fiunt omnia, quae naturaliter producuntur. Igitur nec pater est creator filii, nec agricola segetum; quia licet pater operetur interius, sicut natura, tamen operatur exterius et circa aliquid et ex aliquo, non ex nihilo, licet non operetur adeo exterius, sicut agricola. Operatio autem daemonum magis est similis operationi agricolae quam paternae9.
DUB. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sicut mentem nostram non potest formare nisi Deus etc. Si ergo hoc verum est; tunc, sicut gratia est a Deo, nullo modo a natura vel potentia creata, videtur, quod similiter omnis alia forma sit a solo Deo: ergo agens creatum nullam formam inducit.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod beatus Augustinus valde subtiliter loquitur et veraciter, si quis verba eius sane intelligat. Vult ergo dicere, quod sicut mentem nostram iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, quia gratia non est ex aliquo, sed potius ex Notandum nihilo10; sic formarum seminales rationes sive formarum primas essentias solus Deus potest producere. Illas enim aut necesse est esse ex nihilo, aut in infinitum abire. Non ergo intelligit Augustinus quoad eductionem formae de potentia in actum, quam vocat actionem quodammodo exteriorem, sed potius quoad productionem illius seminalis rationis, quae est essentia rei, aliter se habens, cum est in potentia, et in actu11.
DUB. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod daemones quaedam possunt per naturae subtilitatem, quae non possunt propter Dei prohibitionem. Contra hoc est, quod Deus sic dedit virtutes rebus et «sic administrat eas, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat», sicut dicit Augustinus septimo de Civitate12; unde peccare volentes non cohibet, sed sinit prout volunt peccare: ergo pari ratione non debet angelorum potentiam cohibere.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Deus voluntates non cohibet propter legem libertatis, quam eis statuit, sed iusto iudicio de malo in peius ruere permittit; sed virtutem restringit iudicio aeque iusto, quia operatio potentiae, ut frequenter in his qui potentia abutuntur, est ad aliorum afflictionem et punitionem. Quoniam igitur omnis poena debet esse iusta; si habens potentiam iniuste affligit vel vult affligere, debet potentia compesci, non ratione eius qui agit, sed ratione eius qui patitur, nisi altissima Dei iudicia aliud requirant13. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod res agere proprios motus sinit; non intelligitur, quod non compescat virtutem per contrarias potestates, sed quia tantum sinit agere, quantum suam iustitiam decet permittere.
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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
DOUBT I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that division which Isidore lays down in three members, when he says that demons flourish by a threefold sharpness of knowledge. For it seems to proceed deficiently, since Augustine, on Genesis book two, lays down four modes, which the Master also adduces in the text1. — Likewise, it seems superfluous; for the Philosopher2 lays down only two modes; for he says that everything which anyone knows, he knows by learning or by discovering.
I RESPOND: It must be said that Isidore's division is sufficient and consonant with the words of Augustine. Its sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that demons know, either they know by innate cognition, and thus are said to know by the sharpness of sense; or by acquired cognition. But acquired cognition can be in two ways: either of things which fall under reason, and these are learned by experience; or of things which are above, and this is by the revelation of higher spirits.
To the objection from Augustine, then, it must be said that the two modes are reduced to one. And again, Augustine assigns modes of foretelling future things rather than of knowing them. The Philosopher, however, is speaking of acquired cognition; or if generally of every [cognition], then under invention he includes the sharpness of sense and the experience of times3.
DOUBT II.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that demons know certain things from the holy Angels, which they learn from almighty God, by his command revealing [them] to them. On the contrary: Demons are enemies of God and of the Angels; if therefore secret counsels are to be hidden from enemies, then it seems that God would never have [anything] revealed to them. — Likewise, they are in the darkness of damnation: therefore, since they are not fit for grace, and revelation is a cognition of grace, not of nature, it seems that in no way is it made to demons themselves.
I RESPOND: It must be said that as true is to be held what Isidore and Augustine say4, that they foreknow certain things by the revelation of higher spirits, of which revelation the end and mode must be attended to. The end of this revelation: The End, because the wondrous Wisdom through hostile beings fulfills its own will; whence, just as the revelation of the dream concerning the exaltation of Joseph5, made to those plotting [against him], according to the wondrous disposition of God served toward its fulfillment, although according to their intentions it was [meant] toward its impediment: so God shows certain things through his Angels to the demons, so that, while they oppose, he may most orderly fulfill and bring forth something very fitting and proper. — And from this the first [objection] is clear, since it is not similar. For human counsel can be thwarted, but not the divine.
The mode also must be attended to. The mode of revelation is twofold: For in two ways revelation is made: sometimes by illumination of the mind, as was done to the holy Prophets, and this is of grace; but sometimes by bare prediction6, as a man sometimes reveals his own will. And this is not of grace in any way perfecting or elevating nature, but it can be a work of mercy, if it be ordered to the good of him to whom it is foretold, or of justice, if it be ordered to the punishment of some evil, as for instance to the deceiving of deceivers; or of both, if at the same time toward both. And so it is almost always, because such future things are foretold to demons, and miracles are permitted to be done by them, that the good may make light of such things, in which they see themselves surpassed by the damned and miserable, and the evil and deceitful may progress into worse7, erring and sending [others] into error by the hidden judgment of God, yet by a just judgment. Note: Hence it is very foolish to desire to perform miracles or to foreknow future things and to reckon these as great, since we see the enemies of God to abound in such things8.
DOUBT III.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that Angels are not creators, because they do not operate except outwardly. But on the contrary: this does not seem a [good] reason, since if only the Creator operates inwardly, then nature produces nothing. — Likewise, to create is to produce something from nothing; but if a demon by his own power were to draw forth seed from potency into act, he would not make it from nothing: therefore he would not be a creator.
I RESPOND: It must be said that there is a certain power which in the production of things operates only outwardly; a certain [power] which operates inwardly in a complete way; a certain [power] partly inwardly, partly outwardly. The threefold operation of power: The power of the artisan operates only outwardly, by removing or joining and applying one nature with another. The power of God operates completely inwardly, since it produces the very primordial seeds, which are innermost. But the power which is partly inwardly, partly outwardly, is the power of nature, which is outward with respect to seminal accounts, but inward with respect to the things to be produced from p. 207them. For nature, when it operates, sends in its power even to the innermost parts of the patient; and in that sending in, [it does] not produce the very essence of the form, which was in incomplete potency, but presupposes it as produced by God: it yet, by aiding it, brings it forth to perfect act. Therefore he alone can make those seminal accounts, who can create; since they are not from others, but from nothing, and from them all things are made which are produced naturally. Therefore neither is the father a creator of the son, nor the farmer of the crops; since although the father operates inwardly, like nature, yet he operates outwardly and about something and from something, not from nothing, although he does not operate so outwardly as the farmer. But the operation of demons is more similar to the operation of the farmer than to that of the father9.
DOUBT IV.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: As none can form our mind except God etc. If therefore this is true; then, just as grace is from God, in no way from nature or created power, it seems that likewise every other form is from God alone: therefore a created agent induces no form.
I RESPOND: It must be said that blessed Augustine speaks very subtly and truly, if anyone soundly understands his words. He wishes therefore to say that, just as none can form our mind by justifying it except God, since grace is not from anything, but rather from Note nothing10; so the seminal accounts of forms or the first essences of forms only God can produce. For these must either be from nothing, or go on to infinity. Augustine therefore does not understand [this] as regards the educing of form from potency into act, which he calls in some way an outward action, but rather as regards the production of that seminal account, which is the essence of the thing, otherwise disposed when it is in potency and [when] in act11.
DOUBT V.
Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that demons can do certain things by the subtlety of nature, which they cannot do because of God's prohibition. Against this is, that God so gave powers to things and «so administers them, that he lets them perform their proper motions», as Augustine says in the seventh [book] On the City [of God]12; whence he does not restrain those wishing to sin, but lets them sin as they will: therefore by parity of reason he ought not to restrain the power of the angels.
I RESPOND: It must be said that God does not restrain wills on account of the law of liberty which he established for them, but by a just judgment permits [them] to rush from evil into worse; yet he restrains [their] power by an equally just judgment, since the operation of power, as frequently in those who abuse power, is for the affliction and punishment of others. Since therefore every penalty must be just; if one having power unjustly afflicts or wills to afflict, the power must be checked, not on account of him who acts, but on account of him who suffers, unless the most high judgments of God require otherwise13. — As to the objection, then, that he lets things perform their proper motions; it is not understood [to mean] that he does not check power by contrary powers, but that he only lets [them] act as much as it is fitting for his justice to permit.
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- Cap. 5.Chapter 5 [of the littera Magistri of this distinction, where Augustine's four modes are quoted].
- Lib. III. de Anima, text. 8. (c. 4.). Cfr. I. Poster. c. 1, ubi contra Platonem ostenditur, novam cognitionem nos posse habere; et c. 14. (c. 18.); I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et II. Ethic. c. 1.Book III On the Soul, text 8 (c. 4). Cf. Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 1, where it is shown against Plato that we can have new cognition; and c. 14 (c. 18); Metaphysics I, c. 1 seqq. and Ethics II, c. 1.
- Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 4.B. Albert solves the same doubt here, a. 4.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.Cf. here the littera Magistri, c. 5.
- Gen. 37, 6. seqq.Genesis 37, 6 ff.
- Plures codd. ut F T Z aa bb praedicatione, qui etiam dein ponunt cum pluribus aliis Et hoc pro Et haec.Several codices such as F T Z aa bb read praedicatione ['by preaching']; the same then, with several others, put Et hoc ['And this (masc./neut.)'] for Et haec ['And these (n. pl.)'].
- Vat. poenis.The Vatican edition reads poenis ['penalties'] [for peius].
- Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4; Ægid. R., hic dub. lit. 2, S. c. Gent. III. c. 103. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3.Cf. B. Albert here a. 4; Ægidius Romanus here in the dubia circa litteram 2; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 103 ff. — B. Albert here a. 12. — Petrus a Tarantasia here q. 3, a. 3.
- Vide supra a. 2. q. 2.See above, a. 2, q. 2.
- Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. addit vel esset abire in infinitum, quae etiam paulo inferius pro Illas enim substituit Alias enim.The Vatican edition with one or another codex adds vel esset abire in infinitum ['or [it] would be to go on to infinity'], which also a little below substitutes Alias enim ['for otherwise'] for Illas enim ['for those'].
- Simili modo dubium hoc solvitur ab Ægidio R., hic dub. lit. 4.In a similar way this doubt is solved by Ægidius Romanus here in the dubia circa litteram 4.
- Cap. 30.Chapter 30.
- Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18, n. 51.Cf. Augustine, III On Free Will, c. 18, n. 51. ---