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Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 374

Quaestio III. Utrum oratio, qua Christus oravit in passione, ut calix transferretur, fuerit a ratione, an a sensualitate.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, ut calix transferretur a sep374-4, fuerit a ratione, an a sensualitate. Et quod a sensualitate, videtur:

Argg. pro 1. parte.

1. Auctoritate Magistri in litterap374-5: «Secundum affectum sensualitatis Christus mori noluit, nec obtinuit quod secundum istum affectum petiit»: ergo videtur, quod petitio illa ex voluntate sensualitatis processerit.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex ordine verborum, cum dicit: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tup374-6; aut hoc dicit ratione voluntatis sensualitatis, aut rationis. Quantum ad voluntatem rationis non dicit, quia illa erat per omnia divinae voluntati conformis: ergo hoc dicit quantum ad voluntatem sensualitatis: ex illa ergo voluntate procedebat postulatio orationis propositae.

3. Item, nullus sapiens petit vel orat contrarium eius quod vultp374-7; sed ratio volebat mori: ergo petitio de evasione mortis non erat petitio rationis; et erat rationis, vel sensualitatis: ergo sensualitatis.

4. Item, peccatum est alicui petere quod est peccatum appeterep374-8; sed appetere non mori peccatum esset ipsi voluntati rationali: ergo si illud petivisset, peccasset. Sed non peccavit: ergo non petiit: ergo petitio illa fuit a voluntate sensuali.

Sed contra:

Pro 2. parte.

1. Oratio sic definiturp374-9: «Oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum»; sed sensualitatis non est ascendere in Deum: ergo sensualitatis non est orare: ergo praedicta oratio non potuit esse sensualitatis.

2. Item, alio modo definitur oratiop374-10: «Oratio est pius mentis affectus in Deum directus»; sed p. 375 sensualitas non habet ferri in Deum: ergo quantum ad actum sensualitatis non consistit usus orationis.

3. Item, solius rationis est conferrep375-1; sed praedicta oratio fuit cum collatione quadam, sicut patet, cum dicitur: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu: ergo non processit a sensualitate, sed a ratione.

4. Item, solius rationis est futura praecognoscerep375-2; sed oratio illa, qua petebatur calix futurus transferri, erat ex futurorum praecognitione: ergo non erat sensualitatis, sed rationis.

Conclusio.

Christi oratio in horto ad Patrem quoad materiam fuit sensualitatis, sed quoad formam fuit rationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de praedicta oratione est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad materiam, aut quantum ad formam. Si loquamur de ipsa quantum ad materiam; cum materia orationis respiciat desiderium petentis, talis petitio fuit petitio sensualitatisp375-3, cuius desiderium erat ad non moriendum. Si autem loquamur de praedicta oratione quantum ad formam; sic, cum forma petitionis respiciat discretionem proponentis, et talis modus proponendi sit ad discretionem rationis, concedendum est, quod talis oratio fuerit voluntatis rationalis.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta; ad quaestionem propositam, quia non est simpliciter concedendum, quod talis oratio fuerit simpliciter rationis, vel simpliciter sensualitatis, sed quodam modo huius, quodam modo illius: sensualitatis quantum ad materiam, sed rationis quantum ad formam; item, sensualitatis ut moventis, sed rationis ut proponentis; item, sensualitatis ut pro quo, sed rationis ut a quo. Unde bene et recte consuevit dici, quod ratio fuerit advocatus sensualitatisp375-4. — Secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes ad utramque partem, quoniam procedunt his duabus viis, sicut patet aspicienti.

Quaest. incidens. Sed tunc restat quaestio: cum ratio sciret, sensualitatem in hac petitione nec exaudiendam necp375-5 dignam exaudiri, utpote quia petebat contrarium divini propositi; quomodo hanc petitionem proposuit et pro ea allegavit? — Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod Ratio triplex. ratio triplexp375-6 fuit. Prima, ad manifestationem veritatis naturae assumtae, quae naturaliter refutabat passionem; et in hoc erudivit nostram fidem. — Secunda vero, ad confirmandam nostram imbecillitatem, ut non diffidamus, si passionum pericula exhorremus; et in hoc erexit nostram spem. — Tertio, ut ostenderet, voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati esse per omnia subiiciendam, quod ostendit in conditione apposita, non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu; et in hoc ordinavit in nobis caritatemp375-7, quae affectum nostrum divinae voluntati per omnia conatur subiicere. Unde magis oravit pro nobis in illa oratione, quam oraret pro se. — Notabilis observatio. Et attendendum est, quod ratiop375-8 in petitione illa servavit formam prudentis et fidelis advocati, qui desiderium sensualitatis proponit, servata tamen forma iuris. Dictat enim ius divinum, quod omnis appetitus debet esse Deo subiectus. — Et per hoc patet determinatio obiectorum, patet etiam praedictae orationis finis et utilitasp375-9.

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English Translation
p. 374

Question III. Whether the prayer by which Christ prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed, was from the reason or from the sensuality.

Thirdly it is asked, whether that prayer by which he prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed from himp374-4, was from the reason or from the sensuality. And that it was from the sensuality seems so:

Arguments for the first part.

1. By the authority of the Master in the textp374-5: «According to the affect of the sensuality Christ did not wish to die, nor did he obtain what he asked according to that affect»: therefore it seems that that petition proceeded from the will of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the order of the words, when he says: Not as I will, but as thou wiltp374-6; either he says this by reason of the sensual will, or of the will of reason. As to the will of reason he does not say it, because that was in all things conformed to the divine will: therefore he says this as to the will of the sensuality: from that will, therefore, proceeded the request of the prayer proposed.

3. Likewise, no wise man asks or prays for the contrary of what he willsp374-7; but reason willed to die: therefore the petition about escaping death was not a petition of reason; and it was either of reason or of the sensuality: therefore of the sensuality.

4. Likewise, it is a sin for someone to ask what it is a sin to desirep374-8; but to desire not to die would be a sin for the rational will itself: therefore if he had asked that, he would have sinned. But he did not sin: therefore he did not ask: therefore that petition was from the sensual will.

On the contrary:

For the second part.

1. Prayer is defined thusp374-9: «Prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God»; but it does not belong to the sensuality to ascend into God: therefore it does not belong to the sensuality to pray: therefore the aforesaid prayer could not be of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, prayer is defined in another wayp374-10: «Prayer is a pious affect of the mind directed into God»; but p. 375 the sensuality cannot be borne into God: therefore as to the act of the sensuality the use of prayer does not consist.

3. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to deliberatep375-1; but the aforesaid prayer was with a certain deliberation, as is clear, when it is said: Not as I will, but as thou wilt: therefore it did not proceed from the sensuality, but from the reason.

4. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to foreknow future thingsp375-2; but that prayer, by which it was asked that the coming cup be removed, was from a foreknowledge of future things: therefore it was not of the sensuality, but of the reason.

Conclusion.

Christ's prayer in the garden to the Father, as to its matter, was of the sensuality, but as to its form was of the reason.

I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid prayer is to be spoken of in two ways: either as to its matter, or as to its form. If we speak of it as to its matter; since the matter of prayer regards the desire of the one petitioning, such a petition was a petition of the sensualityp375-3, whose desire was for not dying. But if we speak of the aforesaid prayer as to its form; thus, since the form of the petition regards the discretion of the one proposing, and such a manner of proposing belongs to the discretion of the reason, it must be granted that such a prayer was of the rational will.

And by this is clear the response to the proposed question and also to the objections; to the proposed question, because it is not to be granted absolutely that such a prayer was absolutely of the reason, or absolutely of the sensuality, but in one manner of this, in another manner of that: of the sensuality as to its matter, but of the reason as to its form; likewise, of the sensuality as moving, but of the reason as proposing; likewise, of the sensuality as that-for-which, but of the reason as that-from-which. Hence it has rightly and well been wont to be said that reason was the advocate of the sensualityp375-4. — According to this, the reasons on either side can be resolved, since they proceed by these two ways, as is clear to one looking [at it].

Incidental question. But then a question remains: since reason knew that the sensuality in this petition was neither to be heard norp375-5 worthy to be heard, inasmuch as it asked the contrary of the divine plan; how did it propose this petition and plead for it? — And it must be said to this that A threefold reason. the reason was threefoldp375-6. The first, for the manifestation of the truth of the assumed nature, which naturally refused the passion; and in this he instructed our faith. — But the second, for the confirming of our weakness, that we should not despair if we shrink from the perils of sufferings; and in this he raised up our hope. — Thirdly, that he might show that our will is to be subjected in all things to the divine will, which he showed in the condition added, not as I will, but as thou wilt; and in this he ordered charity in usp375-7, which strives to subject our affect in all things to the divine will. Hence he prayed more for us in that prayer than he would pray for himself. — A noteworthy observation. And it must be noted that the reasonp375-8 in that petition kept the form of a prudent and faithful advocate, who proposes the desire of the sensuality, yet keeping the form of the law. For the divine law dictates that every appetite ought to be subject to God. — And by this is clear the determination of the objections, and also clear is the end and usefulness of the aforesaid prayerp375-9.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Matth. 26, 39.
    Matthew 26:39.
  2. Hic c. 2. — Pro nec obtinuit non pauci codd., discrepantes cum verbis Magistri, nec optavit. Deinde pro ex voluntate sensualitatis cod. W ex sensualitate.
    Here, c. 2. — For nor did he obtain not a few codices, departing from the words of the Master, [read] nor did he wish. Then for from the will of the sensuality codex W [reads] from the sensuality.
  3. Matth. 26, 39.
    Matthew 26:39.
  4. Cod. F addit et quod debet velle.
    Codex F adds and what he ought to will.
  5. Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 appetere. In fine arg. pro sensuali codd. GIZ sensibili, codd. L aa sensualitatis.
    Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] to desire. At the end of the argument, for sensual codices GIZ [read] sensible, codices L aa [read] of the sensuality.
  6. A Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24. Cfr. supra pag. 201, nota 7.
    From [John] Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 24. Cf. above, p. 201, note 7.
  7. In libro de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 50: Devotio est pius et humilis affectus in Deum: humilis ex conscientia infirmitatis propriae, pius ex consideratione divinae clementiae. Oratio est mentis devotio i. e. conversio in Deum per pium et humilem affectum. — In fine arg. pro orationis plurimi codd. vitiose rationis.
    In the book On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine), c. 50: Devotion is a pious and humble affect toward God: humble from the consciousness of one's own weakness, pious from the consideration of the divine clemency. Prayer is a devotion of the mind, that is, a turning into God through a pious and humble affect. — At the end of the argument, for of prayer very many codices faultily [read] of reason.
  8. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57. (c. 11.): Deliberativa autem in rationalibus [est]; utrum enim aget hoc, an hoc, iam rationis est opus, et necesse est mensurare; maius enim persequitur.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 57 (c. 11): But the deliberative [faculty] is in rational beings; for whether he shall do this or that, that is now the work of reason, and it is necessary to measure; for he pursues the greater.
  9. Ut insinuat Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 10.), et de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1.
    As Aristotle suggests, On the Soul III, text 53 (c. 10), and On Memory and Recollection c. 1.
  10. Codd. N U subiungunt tantummodo, pauci codd. et edd. addunt tantum. Paulo inferius pro ad discretionem edd. cum nonnullis codd. a discretione.
    Codices N U add only, a few codices and editions add only. A little below, for to the discretion the editions with some codices [read] from the discretion.
  11. Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 3: «Dicimus, quod illa petitio fuit rationis et fuit etiam sensualitatis, sed aliter et aliter. Rationis fuit tanquam illa [illam?] proponens; sensualitatis fuit, quia vice sensualitatis proposita fuit a ratione. Ratio enim inclinata a sensualitate ad hoc proposuit illam tanquam advocatus sensualitatis». Et inferius, «Haec dictio: si possibile est, non est de petitione, in quantum proponitur pro sensualitate, sed est addita ab ipsa ratione; ratio enim ex parte una illud proponit, sicut advocatus multa proponit quandoque, quae nescit ille cuius est advocatus».
    William of Auxerre, Summa, part III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 3: «We say that that petition was of reason and was also of the sensuality, but in one way and another. Of reason it was as proposing it; of the sensuality it was, because in place of the sensuality it was proposed by reason. For reason, inclined by the sensuality, proposed it for this [purpose] as the advocate of the sensuality». And below, «This phrase, if it be possible, is not part of the petition insofar as it is proposed for the sensuality, but is added by reason itself; for reason on the one part proposes it, just as an advocate sometimes proposes many things which the one whose advocate he is does not know».
  12. Cod. K inserit esse, cod. A esset (!).
    Codex K inserts to be, codex A [reads] would be (!).
  13. De hac triplici ratione vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et supra d. XV. c. 1.
    On this threefold reason see here the text of the Master, c. 2, and above, d. XV, c. 1.
  14. Respicitur illud Cant. 2, 4: Ordinavit in me caritatem. — Paulo ante pro Tertio cod. K Tertia vero.
    Reference is made to that of Canticles 2:4: He ordered charity in me. — A little before, for Thirdly codex K [reads] But the third.
  15. Ita recte codd. A K bb, in aliis et edd. oratio; paulo inferius pro qui plurimi codd. quae.
    Thus rightly codices A K bb; in others and the editions [read] prayer; a little below, for who very many codices [read] which.
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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