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Dist. 17, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 375

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Reliquit affectum infirmitatis, quo nemo vult mori, qui adeo naturalis est etc. Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia multi occidunt semetipsos — sicut patet in desperatis — et desiderant mori: non ergo verum est quod dicit. — Item, Augustinus narrat de quodam in libro de Civitate Deip375-10, quod « lecto Platonis libro, ubi de immortalitate animae disputavit, se praecipitem dedit de muro, ut de hac vita migraret ad eam quam credidit meliorem ». Ex hoc ipso videtur, quod aliqui sunt, qui mori desiderant.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est affectus naturalis, et est affectus deliberativus. Affectu naturali p. 376 nemo vult mori, immo omnis homo refugit mortem. Affectu autem deliberativo potest quis appetere mortem et effugere vitam, non quia haec sit mors, et illa sit vitap376-1, sed ratione alicuius, quod est annexum, vel existimatur esse annexum; sicut desperati et vehementer in vita confusi propter confusionem annexam refugiunt vitam; sic est etiam de aliis incommodis. Per hunc modum etiam aliqui appetunt mortem, qui post mortem credunt quiescere et gaudere, sicut est in illis, de quibus opponit, in quibus non fertur instantia contra verbum Augustinip376-2. Augustinus enim loquitur per se, loquitur etiam de appetitu naturali, non deliberativo.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod pius mentis affectus appetit dissolvi et esse cum Christo, quia contrarium videtur, secundae ad Corinthios quintop376-3: Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri. Si tu dicas, quod voluntate naturali, sive sensualitatis nolebat exspoliari, sed voluntate rationis sive deliberativa cupiebat dissolvi; obiicitur contra hoc per hoc quod dicitur ad Philippenses primop376-4: Permanere autem in carne necessarium est propter vos; sed Apostolus voluntate deliberativa id magis appetebat et volebat, quod erat fratribus magis necessarium: ergo illa voluntate videtur quod non appeteret dissolvi, aut simul appetebat duo contrariap376-5.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in carne nostra est duo reperire, videlicet ipsam naturam et infirmitatem aggravantem animam, secundum quod dicit Augustinus decimo tertio de Civitate Deip376-6, quod corpus aggravat animam, non quia corpus, sed quia corruptibile. Cum ergo dicitur: Nolumus exspoliari etc., hoc dicitur quantum ad ipsam carnis naturam, de qua dicitur ad Ephesios quintop376-7: Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit. Quantum autem ad infirmitatem aggravantem dicitur: Cupio dissolvi etc. Et sic nulla est ibi contrarietas.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, quomodo petebat simul dissolvi et permanere in carne; dicendum, quod est voluntas absoluta et voluntas con- <!-- page 376 R --> ditionalis; et nihil impedit duo opposita velle, ita quod unum velit voluntate conditionali, alterum voluntate absoluta. Volebat igitur Apostolus in carne permanere propter utilitatem fratrum voluntate absoluta, volebat nihilominus dissolvi et esse cum Christo, sed hoc non absolute, sed quantum in se erat; et sic nulla erat repugnantia, erat tamen quaedam mentis angustia ex hoc duplici desiderio; propter quod dicit: Coarctor ex duobus: desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Ambrosii: Ut homo dubitat, ut homo locutus est. Videtur enim esse falsum: quia Christus habuit scientiam omnium futurorum sub certitudine: ergo videtur, quod de nullo potuerit dubitare. — Item, in quemcumque cadit dubitatio, cadere potest ignorantia et error; sed nullum istorum potuit in Christo cadere: ergo videtur, quod non potuerit dubitare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dubitatio proprie dicit indifferentiam iudicii rationis respectu utriusque partis contradictionis, ita quod neutrum praeeligat alteri; et hoc modo accipiendo dubitationem, in Christo non fuit dubitatio. Alio modo dicitur dubitatio indifferentia quaedam partis sensibilis ad sequendum affectum naturae inclinantem, vel rationem imperantem; et talis dubitatio potuit esse in Christo; et de hac intelligit Ambrosius, de alia vero currit obiectio.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Hilarii: Non sibi tristis fuit, nec sibi orat transire calicem, sed discipulis. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum per ipsam orationis seriem. Ait enim: Transeat a me calix iste; si petit, calicem transire a se: ergo videtur, quod pro se oravit. — Item, sic petebat, sicut volebat; sed Christus sentiebat, aliquid se velle, quod non vellet Pater, sicut ipse dicebat: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu: si ergo aliqua voluntate sua ca- p. 377 licem passionis fugiebat, videtur, quod cum petiit, calicem transire a se, pro se oraverit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod orare pro aliquo contingit dupliciter: aut secundum formam orationis, aut secundum intentionem orantis. Secundum formam orationis Christus orabat pro se, id est pro voluntate sua sensualip377-1; secundum autem intentionem orantis in illa petitione Christus non pro se oravit, sed magis pro nobis. Non enim credidit, se <!-- page 377 R --> in petitione illa aliquid obtenturum pro se, nec ratio voluisset obtinere sibi liberationem a passione, sed potius oravit ob triplicem nostram utilitatem, sicut in praecedentibusp377-2 factum est. Hilarius ergo loquitur isto secundo modo; unde sermones sui, qui ponuntur in littera, referendi sunt ad principalem intentionem Christi; omnes autem obiectiones currunt secundum viam priorem.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which is said: He left behind the affection of weakness, by which no one wishes to die, which is so very natural, etc. For this seems false, since many kill themselves — as is evident in the despairing — and desire to die: therefore what he says is not true. — Likewise, Augustine relates in the book On the City of Godp375-10 of a certain man who, "having read Plato's book in which he discoursed on the immortality of the soul, threw himself headlong from a wall, that he might pass from this life to that which he believed better." From this very thing it seems that there are some who desire to die.

I respond: It must be said that there is a natural affection, and there is a deliberative affection. By the natural affection no one wishes to die; rather, every man flees death. But by the deliberative affection one can desire death and flee life, not because the one is death and the other is lifep376-1, but by reason of something that is annexed, or is reckoned to be annexed; just as the despairing and those who are vehemently confounded in life, on account of the confusion annexed to it, flee life; and so it is also with other troubles. In this manner too some desire death who believe that after death they will rest and rejoice, as is the case with those of whom he raises the objection, against whom the instance is not brought to bear against Augustine's wordp376-2. For Augustine speaks of itself, and he speaks also of the natural appetite, not the deliberative.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that the pious affection of the mind desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ, since the contrary seems [true], in the second [letter] to the Corinthians, the fifth [chapter]p376-3: We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed over. If you say that by the natural will, or [the will] of sensuality, he did not wish to be unclothed, but by the will of reason or the deliberative [will] he desired to be dissolved; against this it is objected by what is said to the Philippians, the first [chapter]p376-4: But to remain in the flesh is necessary for your sake; but the Apostle by the deliberative will rather desired and willed that which was more necessary for the brethren: therefore by that will it seems that he would not desire to be dissolved, or that he desired two contraries at oncep376-5.

I respond: It must be said that in our flesh there are two things to be found, namely the nature itself and the weakness burdening the soul, according to what Augustine says in the thirteenth [book] On the City of Godp376-6, that the body burdens the soul, not because it is body, but because it is corruptible. When therefore it is said: We do not wish to be unclothed, etc., this is said with regard to the very nature of the flesh, of which it is said to the Ephesians, the fifth [chapter]p376-7: No one ever hated his own flesh. But with regard to the weakness that burdens, it is said: I desire to be dissolved, etc. And thus there is no contrariety there.

But as to that which is asked, how he desired at once to be dissolved and to remain in the flesh; it must be said that there is an absolute will and a con- ditional will; and nothing prevents one from willing two opposites, so that one wills one of them by the conditional will, the other by the absolute will. Therefore the Apostle willed to remain in the flesh for the benefit of the brethren by the absolute will, and he willed nonetheless to be dissolved and to be with Christ, but this not absolutely, but insofar as it lay in himself; and thus there was no repugnance, yet there was a certain anguish of mind arising from this twofold desire; on account of which he says: I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that word of Ambrose: As a man he doubts, as a man he spoke. For this seems to be false: because Christ had the knowledge of all future things under certainty: therefore it seems that he could doubt about nothing. — Likewise, into whomever doubt falls, ignorance and error can fall; but none of these could fall in Christ: therefore it seems that he could not doubt.

I respond: It must be said that doubt properly bespeaks an indifference of the judgment of reason with respect to each side of the contradiction, so that it prefers neither to the other; and taking doubt in this way, in Christ there was no doubt. In another way doubt is said [to be] a certain indifference of the sensible part toward following the affection of nature that inclines, or the reason that commands; and such a doubt could be in Christ; and of this Ambrose understands [it], but concerning the other the objection runs [its course].

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that word of Hilary: He was not sad for himself, nor does he pray for himself that the cup pass, but for the disciples. For this seems to be false by the very tenor of the prayer. For he says: Let this cup pass from me; if he asks that the cup pass from him: therefore it seems that he prayed for himself. — Likewise, he asked just as he willed; but Christ perceived that he willed something which the Father did not will, as he himself said: Not as I will, but as thou [wilt]: if therefore by some will of his own he fled the cup of the passion, it seems that, when he asked the cup to pass from him, he prayed for himself.

I respond: It must be said that to pray for someone happens in two ways: either according to the form of the prayer, or according to the intention of the one praying. According to the form of the prayer Christ was praying for himself, that is, for his sensual willp377-1; but according to the intention of the one praying, in that petition Christ did not pray for himself, but rather for us. For he did not believe that he would obtain anything for himself in that petition, nor would reason have willed to obtain deliverance from the passion for itself, but rather he prayed for our threefold benefitp377-2, as has been done in the preceding [matters]. Hilary therefore speaks in that second way; whence his discourses, which are set down in the text, are to be referred to the principal intention of Christ; but all the objections run their course according to the prior way.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. l. c. 22. n. 1. Nomen istius fuit Cleombrotus; a Cicerone, I. Tuscul. Disput. c. 34, cognomine appellatur Ambraciota.
    Book l[oc. cit.], c. 22, n. 1. The name of this man was Cleombrotus; by Cicero, in the first [book of the] Tusculan Disputations, c. 34, he is surnamed Ambraciota.
  2. Sententia est: potest quis mortem appetere, non in quantum mors est, et vitam effugere, non in quantum est vita. — Pro non quia haec edd. non quia illa. Mox pro existimatur codd. A F L aa existimant, codd. G H I N T V aestimant.
    The sense is: one can desire death, not insofar as it is death, and flee life, not insofar as it is life. — For not because the one (non quia haec) the editions [read] not because the other (non quia illa). Presently, for is reckoned (existimatur) codices A F L aa [read] they reckon (existimant), codices G H I N T V [read] they estimate (aestimant).
  3. Scil. contra ipsa verba dubii, quae ex August. sumta sunt. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 6.
    Namely, against the very words of the doubt, which are taken from Augustine. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 6.
  4. Vers. 4. — Mox ante voluntate naturali edd. cum aliquot codd. inserunt ex.
    Verse 4. — Presently, before by the natural will (voluntate naturali) the editions, with some codices, insert ex.
  5. Vers. 24. In hoc loco non pauci codd. perperam propter nos.
    Verse 24. In this place not a few codices wrongly [read] for our sake (propter nos).
  6. Quod est impossibile. Cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.).
    Which is impossible. Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14).
  7. Cap. 16 n. 1, ubi arguit contra philosophos, qui animae separationem a corpore non putant esse poenalem: Unde illud est quod de Scripturis nostris in superiori libro commemoravimus: Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap. 9, 15.). Addendo utique corruptibile non qualicumque corpore, sed quale factum est ex peccato, consequente vindicta, animam perhibuit aggravari. Quod etiamsi non addidisset, nihil aliud intelligere deberemus.
    Chapter 16, n. 1, where he argues against the philosophers who do not think the separation of the soul from the body is penal: "Whence that is which we recalled from our Scriptures in the preceding book: For the corruptible body burdens the soul (Wisdom 9, 15). For by adding corruptible he declared that the soul is burdened not by any body whatever, but by such a body as has been made [so] from sin, with vindication following. And even if he had not added [it], we ought to understand nothing else."
  8. Vers. 29. — Codd. Eph. ultimo. — Simili modo explicatur ab August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 6. n. 16. et Serm. 344. n. 3. (alias seq. 31. ex Sirmond.) de Amore Dei et amore saeculi.
    Verse 29. — Codices [read] Ephesians, last [chapter]. — It is explained in a similar manner by Augustine, Letter 140 (otherwise 120), c. 6, n. 16, and Sermon 344, n. 3 (otherwise the following 31, from Sirmond), On the Love of God and the Love of the World.
  9. Pauci codd. sensibili, quod etiam in aliis legi potest, cum propter nimiam abbreviaturam scriptura vocis dubia sit. Post pauca pro in illa petitione Christus non pro se edd. nulla petitione Christus pro se. Voculam non, quam multi codd. omittunt, ex codd. F M N O V restituimus.
    A few codices [read] sensible (sensibili), which can also be read in others, since on account of the excessive abbreviation the writing of the word is doubtful. Shortly after, for in that petition Christ not for himself (in illa petitione Christus non pro se) the editions [read] in no petition Christ for himself (nulla petitione Christus pro se). The little word non (not), which many codices omit, we have restored from codices F M N O V.
  10. Hic a. 2. q. 3. in fine corp. — Mox edd. omittunt secundo, et subinde post sermones sui codd. A K M O addunt omnes. — De hoc dubio vide B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. ad 5; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.
    Here a. 2, q. 3, at the end of the body [of the article]. — Presently the editions omit second (secundo), and thereupon after his discourses (sermones sui) codices A K M O add all (omnes). — On this doubt see Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3, ad 5; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2. ---
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