Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII.

Cap. I. — De triplici genere mendacii.

Sciendum est tamen, tria esse genera mendaciorum. Sunt enim mendacia quaedam pro salute vel commodo alicuius, non malitia, sed benignitate dicta, qualiter obstetrices mentitae sunt et Raab¹. — Est et aliud mendacii genus, quod fit ioco, quod non fallit. Scit enim cui dicitur, causa ioci dici. Et haec duo genera mendaciorum non sunt sine culpa, sed non cum magna. Perfectis vero non convenit mentiri, nec etiam pro

temporali vita alicuius, ne pro corpore alterius animam suam occultent. Licet autem eis verum tacere, sed non falsum dicere, ut si quis non vult hominem ad mortem prodere, verum taceat, sed non falsum dicat. — Tertium vero genus mendacii est, quod ex malignitate et duplicitate procedit², cunctis valde cavendum. — His innui videtur, mendacia illa, quae fiunt ioco, vel pro salute alicuius, imperfectis esse venialia peccata, perfectis vero illud quod pro commodo alterius dicitur, esse damnabile; quod etiam de mendacio iocoso putari potest, praecipue si iteretur. — De mendacio autem obstetricum et Raab, quod fuerit veniale, Augustinus³ tradit dicens: « Forsitan, sicut obstetrices non remuneratae sunt, quia mentitae sunt, sed quia infantes liberaverunt, et propter hanc misericordiam veniale fuit peccatum, non tamen nullum; sic Raab liberata est propter liberationem exploratorum, pro qua fuit veniale peccatum. Sed ne putet quisque, in ceteris peccatis, si propter liberationem hominum fiant, ita posse concedi veniam. Multa enim mala detestanda talem sequuntur errorem ». « Possumus enim et furando alicui prodesse, si pauper, cui datur, sentit commodum, et dives, cui tollitur, non sentit incommodum; ita et adulterando possumus, si aliqua, nisi ad hoc ei consentiatur, appareat amando moritura, et si vixerit, poenitendo purganda. Nec ideo peccatum grave negabitur tale adulterium ». — « In his autem tanto minus peccat quisque, cum mentitur, quanto magis a primo recedit. Quisquis vero aliquod genus esse mendacii, quod peccatum non sit, putaverit, decipiet se ipsum turpiter, cum honestum esse deceptorem aliorum arbitretur⁵ ». — Omne ergo genus mendacii summopere fuge, quia omne mendacium non est a Deo.

Cap. II. — De octo speciebus mendacii.

Sciendum est etiam, octo esse genera mendacii, ut Augustinus in libro de Mendacio⁴ tradit, quae diligenter notanda sunt, ut appareat, quod mendacium sit veniale, et quod damnabile. « Primum capitale est mendacium longeque fugiendum, quod fit in doctrina religionis, ad quod nulla causa quisquam debet adduci. — Secundum, quod tale est, ut nulli prosit et obsit alicui. — Tertium, quod ita prodest alicui, ut obsit alteri. — Quartum, sola mentiendi fallendique libidine, quod merum mendacium est. — Quintum, quod fit placendi cupiditate de suaviloquio. — His omnibus evitatis, sequitur sextum genus, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, ut si quis pecuniam alicuius iniuste tollendam sciens, ubi sit, nescire se mentiatur. — Septimum, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, ut si quis, nolens hominem ad mortem quaesitum prodere, mentiatur. — Octavum, quod nulli obest et ad hoc prodest, ut ab immunditia corporali aliquem tueatur ».

Cap. III. — Quid sit mendacium.

Hic videndum est, quid sit mendacium, et quid sit mentiri; deinde, utrum omne mendacium sit peccatum, et quare. — « Mendacium est, ut ait Augustinus⁶, falsa significatio vocis cum intentione fallendi ». Ut ergo mendacium sit, necesse est, ut falsum proferatur et cum intentione fallendi. « Hoc enim malum est proprium mentientis, aliud habere clausum in pectore, aliud promptum in lingua ».

Cap. IV. — Quid sit mentiri.

Mentiri vero est loqui contra hoc quod animo sentit quis, sive illud verum sit, sive non. Omnis ergo, qui loquitur mendacium, mentitur, quia loquitur contra hoc quod animo sentit, id est voluntate fallendi; sed non omnis qui mentitur, mendacium dicit, quia quod verum est loquitur aliquando mentiendo, sicut e converso falsum dicendo aliquando verax est. Unde ait Augustinus⁷: « Nemo sane mentiens iudicandus est, qui dicit falsum, quod putat verum, quia, quantum in ipso est, non fallit ipse, sed fallitur. Non igitur mendacii arguendus est qui falsa incautius credit ac pro veris habet; potiusque e contrario ille mentitur, qui dicit verum, quod putat falsum. Quantum enim ad animum eius attinet, non verum dicit, quia non quod sentit dicit, quamvis verum inveniatur esse quod dicit. Nec ille liber est a mendacio, qui ore nesciens loquitur verum, sciens autem voluntate mentitur ».

Hic quaeri solet, si Iudaeus dicat, Christum esse Deum, cum non ita sentiat animo, utrum loquatur mendacium. Non est mendacium quod dicit, quia, licet aliter teneat animo, verum est tamen quod dicit; et ideo non est mendacium; mentitur tamen, illud quod verum est dicens. — Quod vero omne mendacium sit peccatum, Augustinus⁸ insinuat. « Mihi, inquit, videtur omne mendacium esse peccatum. Sed multum

interest, quo animo, et de quibus rebus quisque mentiatur. Non enim sic peccat qui consulendi, ut qui nocendi voluntate mentitur; nec tantum nocet qui viatorem mentiendo in diverso itinere mittit, quantum qui viam vitae mendacio depravat ».

Cap. V. — Quod omne mendacium peccatum sit, sive prosit, sive non, et quare.

« Porro omne mendacium ideo dicendum est esse peccatum, quia hoc debet loqui homo, quod animo gerit, sive illud verum sit, sive putetur, et non sit. Verba enim ideo sunt instituta, non ut per ea homines invicem fallant, sed ut per ea in alterius notitiam suas cogitationes ferant. Verbis ergo uti ad fallaciam, non ad quod sunt instituta, peccatum est. — Nec etiam ideo ullum mendacium putandum est non esse peccatum, quia possumus alicui aliquando prodesse mentiendo. Possumus enim, ut praedictum est, et furando et adulterando prodesse ». « Mendacium quoque non tunc tantum esse, possumus dicere, quando aliquis laeditur. Cum enim a sciente dicitur falsum, mendacium est, sive quis sive nemo laedatur⁹ ». — Ecce ex his constat, omne mendacium esse peccatum. Non tamen de omni mendacio accipiendum est illud: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium; nec illud: Os, quod mentitur, occidit animam; nec omne mendacium isto praecepto prohiberi videtur, nec praemissa descriptione mendacium ioci includi.

Cap. VI. — In quibus rebus cum periculo erratur, vel non.

Illud etiam sciendum est, quod « in quibusdam rebus magno malo, in quibusdam parvo, in quibusdam nullo fallimur¹⁰ ». « In quibus rebus nihil interest ad capessendum Dei regnum, utrum credantur, an non, vel utrum vera putentur, an falsa, sive sint, sive non; in his errare, id est aliud pro alio putare, non arbitrandum est esse peccatum; vel si est, minimum atque levissimum ». « Et sunt vera, quamvis non videantur, quae nisi credantur, ad vitam aeternam non potest perveniri ». « Et licet error maxima cura cavendus sit non modo in maioribus, sed etiam in minoribus rebus, nec nisi rerum ignorantia possit errari; non est tamen consequens, ut continuo erret, quisquis aliquid nescit, sed quisquis se existimat scire quod nescit. Pro vero enim approbat falsum, quod est erroris proprium. Verumtamen, in qua re quisquis erret, interest plurimum. Sunt enim quae nescire sit melius quam scire. Item, nonnullis errare profuit aliquando, sed in via pedum, non in via morum ».

Solet quaeri de Iacob, qui se dixit esse Esau, aliter animo sentiens, utrum mentitus sit. De hoc Augustinus¹¹ ait: « Iacob quod matre fecit auctore, ut falleret patrem, si diligenter attendatur, videtur non esse mendacium, sed mysterium ». Intendebat enim matri obedire, quae per Spiritum noverat mysterium. Et ideo propter familiare consilium Spiritus sancti, quod mater acceperat, a mendacio excusatur Iacob.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. They are the editors' NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM (the apparatus on the Master's text), numbered continuously here though the printed edition restarts the numbering on each page.

DISTINCTION XXXVIII.

Chap. I. — On the threefold kind of lying.

It must be known, nevertheless, that there are three kinds of lie. For there are certain lies told for the welfare or advantage of someone, spoken not from malice but from kindness, in the manner in which the midwives lied, and Rahab¹. — And there is another kind of lie, which is done in jest, which does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it is said for the sake of a jest. And these two kinds of lie are not without fault, but not with a great one. But to the perfect it is not fitting to lie, not even for

the temporal life of someone, lest for the sake of another's body they should conceal their own soul. Yet it is permitted to them to be silent about the truth, but not to speak a falsehood, so that if someone does not wish to betray a man to death, he may keep silent about the truth, but not speak a falsehood. — But the third kind of lie is that which proceeds² from malice and duplicity, greatly to be avoided by all. — By this it seems to be intimated that those lies which are done in jest, or for the welfare of someone, are venial sins for the imperfect, but that for the perfect that lie which is told for the advantage of another is damnable; which can also be thought of the jesting lie, especially if it is repeated. — But concerning the lie of the midwives and of Rahab, that it was venial, Augustine³ hands down, saying: « Perhaps, just as the midwives were not rewarded because they lied, but because they delivered the infants, and on account of this mercy the sin was venial, yet not nothing; so Rahab was delivered on account of the deliverance of the spies, for which it was a venial sin. But let no one suppose, in the other sins, that if they are done for the deliverance of men, pardon can thus be granted. For many detestable evils follow such an error ». « For we can also by stealing benefit someone, if the poor man to whom it is given perceives the advantage, and the rich man from whom it is taken does not perceive the disadvantage; so also by committing adultery we can, if some woman, unless this be consented to her, appears about to die from love, and, if she lives, to be purged by repenting. Nor on that account will so grave a sin as such adultery be denied ». — « But in these matters each one sins so much the less, when he lies, the more he withdraws from the first. But whoever shall have supposed that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin will deceive himself basely, since he reckons it honorable to be a deceiver of others⁵ ». — Therefore flee with all your might every kind of lie, because every lie is not from God.

Chap. II. — On the eight species of lying.

It must also be known that there are eight kinds of lie, as Augustine hands down in the book On Lying⁴, which are to be diligently noted, so that it may appear which lie is venial and which damnable. « The first is the capital lie, far to be fled, which is done in the teaching of religion, to which no cause ought anyone to be led. — The second, which is such that it profits no one and harms someone. — The third, which so profits someone that it harms another. — The fourth, by the mere lust of lying and deceiving, which is a pure lie. — The fifth, which is done from a desire of pleasing by smooth speech. — When all these have been avoided, there follows the sixth kind, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, knowing where the money of another unjustly to be taken away is, should lie that he does not know. — The seventh, which both harms no one and profits someone, as if someone, unwilling to betray a man sought for death, should lie. — The eighth, which harms no one and is for this profitable, that it may protect someone from bodily defilement ».

Chap. III. — What a lie is.

Here it must be seen what a lie is, and what it is to lie; then, whether every lie is a sin, and why. — « A lie is, as Augustine⁶ says, a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving ». In order, therefore, that there be a lie, it is necessary that a falsehood be uttered and with the intention of deceiving. « For this is the evil proper to the one lying: to have one thing closed up in the breast, another ready on the tongue ».

Chap. IV. — What it is to lie.

But to lie is to speak against that which one feels in the mind, whether that be true or not. Everyone, therefore, who speaks a lie, lies, because he speaks against that which he feels in the mind, that is, with the will of deceiving; but not everyone who lies speaks a lie, because he sometimes speaks what is true while lying, just as conversely he is sometimes truthful by speaking what is false. Whence Augustine⁷ says: « No one indeed is to be judged a liar who says what is false which he thinks true, because, as far as in him lies, he himself does not deceive, but is deceived. He is not therefore to be accused of a lie who too incautiously believes what is false and holds it for true; and rather, on the contrary, that man lies who speaks what is true which he thinks false. For as far as concerns his mind, he does not speak the truth, because he does not say what he feels, although what he says is found to be true. Nor is that man free from a lie who unknowingly speaks the truth with his mouth, but knowingly lies in his will ».

Here it is wont to be asked, if a Jew should say that Christ is God, while he does not so feel in his mind, whether he speaks a lie. What he says is not a lie, because, although he holds otherwise in his mind, yet what he says is true; and therefore it is not a lie; yet he lies, in saying that which is true. — But that every lie is a sin, Augustine⁸ suggests. « To me, he says, every lie seems to be a sin. But it matters much

with what mind, and concerning what matters, each one lies. For he does not sin in the same way who lies with the will of counseling as he who lies with the will of harming; nor does he harm as much who by lying sends a traveler onto a different road, as he who depraves the way of life by a lie ».

Chap. V. — That every lie is a sin, whether it profits or not, and why.

« Furthermore, every lie is for this reason to be said to be a sin, because a man ought to speak that which he bears in his mind, whether that be true, or be thought true, and is not. For words were instituted for this, not that by them men should deceive one another, but that by them they should carry their thoughts into the knowledge of another. To use words, therefore, for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin. — Nor for this reason is any lie to be thought not to be a sin, because we can sometimes profit someone by lying. For we can, as has been said before, profit also by stealing and by committing adultery ». « We can also say that a lie is not only then [a lie] when someone is harmed. For when a falsehood is spoken by one who knows, it is a lie, whether anyone or no one be harmed⁹ ». — Behold, from these things it is established that every lie is a sin. Yet not of every lie is that to be understood: Thou shalt destroy all that speak a lie; nor that: The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul; nor does every lie seem to be prohibited by that precept, nor, by the description set forth above, is the lie of jest included.

Chap. VI. — In what matters one errs with danger, or not.

This too must be known, that « in some matters we are deceived with great evil, in some with small, in some with none¹⁰ ». « In which matters it makes no difference for the attaining of the kingdom of God, whether they be believed or not, or whether they be thought true or false, whether they be so or not; to err in these, that is, to suppose one thing for another, is not to be reckoned a sin; or if it is, the least and lightest. — And there are things true, although they do not appear so, which unless they be believed, one cannot attain to eternal life ». « And although error is to be avoided with the greatest care, not only in greater but also in lesser matters, nor can one err except through ignorance of things; nevertheless it is not consequent that he should at once err, whoever does not know something, but whoever supposes himself to know what he does not know. For he approves the false for the true, which is proper to error. Yet, in what matter each one may err, it matters very much. For there are things which it is better not to know than to know. Likewise, to some it has at some time profited to err, but in the way of the feet, not in the way of morals ».

It is wont to be asked concerning Jacob, who said that he was Esau, while feeling otherwise in his mind, whether he lied. Concerning this Augustine¹¹ says: « Jacob, in what he did with his mother as the prompter, that he might deceive his father, if it be diligently attended to, seems not to be a lie, but a mystery ». For he intended to obey his mother, who through the Spirit knew the mystery. And therefore, on account of the intimate counsel of the Holy Spirit, which his mother had received, Jacob is excused from a lie.