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Dist. 6, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
p. 164

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, Sacrificium Ecclesiae duobus constare, visibili elementorum specie et invisibili Domini Iesu Christi carne et sanguine. In hoc enim verbo1 primo videtur esse insufficientia, quia ad constitutionem Sacramenti altaris non solum concurrunt duo, immo tria, videlicet, elementum exterius, corpus Christi verum et corpus Christi mysticum. — Item, videtur in verbo suo esse repugnantia, cum dicit invisibili carne et sanguine; caro enim et sanguis vere sunt corpora: ergo et vere visibilia. Si ergo caro Christi vera fuit, restat igitur, quod fuit visibilis. — Item, tertio videtur, quod illa similitudo sit inepta, quoniam Sacramentum et res Sacramenti in unitatem personae non concurrunt, secundum quod Deus et homo: ergo non videtur ibi fieri recta assimilatio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in Sacramento altaris duplex est res, videlicet signata et contenta, et signata tantum. Et Augustinus2 in parte ista non loquitur de re signata tantum, cuiusmodi est corpus Christi mysticum, sed de re signata et contenta, cuiusmodi est corpus Christi verum. Haec enim sola est, quae facit ad propositum, videlicet ad intelligendum unionis et incarnationis mysterium, et hoc propter similitudinem utrobique repertam. (Notandum.)

Reperitur autem ibi similitudo triplex, videlicet quantum ad extremorum unitatem, quantum ad distinctionem sive diversitatem, et quantum ad finem sive utilitatem. (Similitudo triplex.) Sicut enim in Sacramento altaris est species visibilis et caro Christi invisibilis, prout est sub illo Sacramento; sic in Christo est humana natura vera sensibilis, et divina, quae solum est intelligibilis. — Similitudo etiam est quantum ad distinctionem, quoniam exterior species visibilis et res interior non concurrunt ad constituendum unum per naturam, sed concurrunt ad unum Sacramentum, quod est unum per ordinem et respectum signi ad signatum. Sic et in Christo divina natura et humana non constituunt aliquid tertium, sed uniuntur in unam hypostasim, quae utriusque naturae est suppositum, et in qua utraque natura suo modo substantificatur. Et quantum ad hoc non est omnimoda similitudo, sed partim similitudo, et partim dissimilitudo. — Tertio similitudo est, quia, sicut res Sacramenti unitur exteriori signo, ut mediante illo cognoscatur et ad utilitatem veram convertatur; sic divina natura unitur humanae, ut in ea cognosceretur; et inde est etiam, quod talis unitas3 similis est illi unioni, qua copulatur verbum ipsi voci, ut ab aliis possit cognosci.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Non enim valet quod obiicit de insufficientia, quoniam ad propositum sufficiunt illa duo membra. — Nec valet quod obiicit de repugnantia, quia non dicit haec duo, videlicet carnem et sanguinem, invisibilia simpliciter4, sed prout sunt sub Sacramento contenta. — Nec illud quod obiicit de illarum unionum disconvenientia, quia non vult dicere, quod illa sint omnino similia, sed quod similitudinem habent quantum ad tria praedicta5.

Dub. II.

Item circa tertiam opinionem, quae ibi ponitur: Sunt et alii, qui in incarnatione Verbi etc., notandum, quod tria insinuantur in littera illius opinionis, quae valde sunt improbabilia. (In 3. opinione tria improbabilia.)

Primum vero, cum dicit: Ex carne et anima aliquam substantiam compositam diffitentur. (Primum.) Et illud convincitur esse6 improbabile, quoniam ex forma et materia resultat unum compositum. Si ergo anima habet naturalem inclinationem ad corpus sicut ad propriam materiam, quam perficit; necessarium erat, ex anima et carne in Christo aliquod tertium constitui. Illud autem aut est substantia, aut accidens; accidens non; constat, quia substantia non est pars accidentis7: necesse est igitur, quod fiat inde substantia.

Aliud improbabile est in hoc quod dicit: Illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur, ut mortalium oculis congruenter appareret. (Secundum.) Si enim hoc verum esset, cum anima non appareat oculis, non assumsisset animam. Et iterum, si Christus apparebat esse homo, et non erat verus homo, alius apparebat, quam esset: ergo aliqua falsitas et aliqua deceptio fuit in Christo, quod omnino absurdissimum est. Veritas enim nec falli potest nec fallere8. p. 165

Item, tertium improbabile est in hoc quod dicit, illa duo in singularitatem personae Verbum Dei assumsisse, quia illis duobus accidentibus non est personarum numerus auctus. (Tertium.) Si enim hoc verum esset, cum columba, in qua Spiritus sanctus apparuit, non auxerit numerum personarum in divinis; assumta est1b in unitatem personae, quod nefarium est dicere. Et iterum, cum aliqua anima unitur Deo per voluntatis conformitatem, et nullo modo ex hoc crescat in Trinitate numerus personarum; quaelibet anima sancta assumeretur a Verbo in unitatem personae: ergo quilibet Sanctus esset Deus, quod quidem dicere est omnino perversum.

Et propterea iste modus dicendi, sicut ex littera2b colligitur, repudiatus est tanquam erroneus; (Reprobatur opinio.) nec credendum est, Magistrum fuisse de opinione ista, nec dicere hoc asserendo vel approbando, sed aliorum opinionem recitando. (Excusatur Magister.) Hanc autem opinionem, sicut et alias, nec omnino reprobat nec omnino approbat. Nondum enim claruerat eius falsitas, maxime cum videatur super verba Sanctorum esse fundata3b.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Multis modis habitum dicimus etc. Primo enim distinguit habitum in tria membra; secundo vero distinguit alia distinctione per quatuor membra: igitur vel una est superflua, vel altera diminuta. — Item, videntur aliqua membra secundae divisionis esse impossibilia. Dicit enim, quod quaedam accedunt4b, quae mutant, sed non mutantur, sicut sapientia. Hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia, si ex aliquo accidente adveniente mutatur subiectum, videtur, quod ipsum multo magis debeat dici mutatum, quia de ente in potentia fit ens in actu. — Item, aliud membrum similiter, quod dicit, quod quaedam accedunt, quae nec mutant nec mutantur, videtur impossibile. Nihil enim novum acquiri potest sine aliqua mutatione acquirentis, vel acquisiti: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua differentia habitus introducatur in esse, qua5b non fiat mutatio in habito, vel habente.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus6b distinguit habitum dupliciter: uno modo in se per differentias proprias, quae respiciunt habitum quantum ad esse. (Primus modus distinguendi tripliciter.) Et istae sunt tres. Omne enim quod habetur, aut habetur interius, aut exterius, aut partim interius, partim exterius. Si omnino interius; sic dicimus habitum animae, ut scientiam et disciplinam. Si omnino exterius; sic dicimus habitum eorum quae exterius corpori accommodantur, sicut esse vestitum et calceatum. Si quodam modo interius, et quodam modo exterius; sic dicimus alium alio validiorem vel fortiorem. Et hoc quasi tenet medium inter differentias duas prius positas. (Notandum.) Et ad istas tres differentias reduci possunt septem illi modi habendi, quos assignat Philosophus in Postpraedicamentis7b.

Sed quia iste modus distinguendi parum valet ad propositum, ideo sumit Augustinus alium modum distinguendi per quatuor membra, qui respicit ipsum habitum quantum ad fieri. (Secundus modus distinguendi quadrupliciter.) Et haec divisio est quadrimembris secundum quatuor combinationes8b sufficientes et immediatas. Omne enim quod accedit alicui, aut mutat tantum et non mutatur, sicut sapientia; aut mutat et mutatur, ut cibus; aut nec mutat nec mutatur, ut anulus; aut mutatur, sed non mutat, ut vestimentum. — Et illud quartum membrum valet ad propositum, et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum. (Ad 1. obiectionem.) Istae enim quatuor differentiae reducuntur ad illas tres; ideo nec istae sunt superfluae, nec illae diminutae.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia mutat, sed non mutatur; (Ad 2. obi.) dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod quis fiat sapiens, concurrit sapientia creata et increata, sicut ad hoc, quod fiat gratus, concurrit caritas creata et increata. Cum autem Augustinus dicit, quod « sapientia non mutatur »; non intelligit de sapientia creata, quae est accidens animae, sed de sapientia increata. — Et hoc frequenter advertendum est in verbis Augustini, cum loquitur de sapientia et gratia, quia modo loquitur de increata, modo de creata. (Notandum de August.) — Potest etiam hoc verbum intelligi de sapientia creata. (Aliter.) Sed tunc non loquitur Augustinus de quocumque genere mutationis, sed de illa mutatione, quae est de una dispositione ad alteram, utpote de mutatione, quae est secundum formam; et tunc non habet instantiam in sapientia, quia sapientia accidens non alteratur, quamvis sapiens secundum illam alteretur9b. p. 166

Et per hoc patet tertium obiectum: (Ad 3. obi.) non enim excludit omnem motum Augustinus, sed illum motum alterationis, qui est secundum qualitatem absolutam. Haec autem non est in coniunctione anuli ad digitum, sed solum quae est mutatio secundum locum vel situm1c.

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English Translation
p. 164

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry about what he says, that the Sacrifice of the Church consists of two things, the visible species of the elements and the invisible flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. For in this statement1 there seems, first, to be an insufficiency, because to the constitution of the Sacrament of the altar not only two things concur, but rather three, namely, the exterior element, the true body of Christ, and the mystical body of Christ. — Likewise, there seems to be a repugnance in his statement, when he says the invisible flesh and blood; for flesh and blood are truly bodies: therefore they are also truly visible. If, then, the flesh of Christ was true, it remains, therefore, that it was visible. — Likewise, third, it seems that this likeness is unfitting, since the Sacrament and the reality of the Sacrament do not concur into the unity of a person, in the way that God and man do: therefore a right assimilation does not seem to be made there.

I respond: It must be said that in the Sacrament of the altar there is a twofold reality, namely, that which is both signified and contained, and that which is signified only. And Augustine2 in this passage does not speak of the reality that is signified only, of which kind is the mystical body of Christ, but of the reality both signified and contained, of which kind is the true body of Christ. For this alone is what bears on the matter, namely, on understanding the mystery of the union and incarnation, and this on account of the likeness found on both sides. (Note.)

Now there is found there a threefold likeness, namely, with respect to the unity of the extremes, with respect to the distinction or diversity, and with respect to the end or usefulness. (Threefold likeness.) For just as in the Sacrament of the altar there is a visible species and the invisible flesh of Christ, insofar as it is under that Sacrament; so in Christ there is a true sensible human nature, and the divine, which is only intelligible. — There is a likeness also with respect to the distinction, since the exterior visible species and the interior reality do not concur to constitute one thing by nature, but they concur into one Sacrament, which is one by the order and relation of sign to signified. So too in Christ the divine nature and the human do not constitute some third thing, but are united into one hypostasis, which is the supposit of both natures, and in which each nature is substantiated in its own way. And with respect to this there is not an entire likeness, but partly likeness and partly unlikeness. — Third, there is a likeness, because, just as the reality of the Sacrament is united to the exterior sign, so that through it it may be known and turned to true usefulness; so the divine nature is united to the human, so that it might be known in it; and hence it is also that such a unity3 is like that union by which the word is joined to the voice itself, so that it can be known by others.

And through this the response to the objections is clear. For what he objects about insufficiency does not hold, since for the matter at hand those two members suffice. — Nor does what he objects about repugnance hold, because he does not call these two, namely the flesh and blood, invisible simply4, but insofar as they are contained under the Sacrament. — Nor does that which he objects about the disconvenience of those unions, because he does not mean to say that they are entirely alike, but that they have a likeness with respect to the three things aforesaid5.

Doubt II.

Likewise, concerning the third opinion, which is set down there: There are also others who, in the incarnation of the Word, etc., it is to be noted that three things are insinuated in the text of that opinion which are very much improbable. (In the third opinion three improbable things.)

The first indeed, when he says: They acknowledge from the flesh and the soul some composite substance. (The first.) And that is shown to be6 improbable, since from form and matter there results one composite. If, then, the soul has a natural inclination toward the body as toward its proper matter, which it perfects; it was necessary that from the soul and the flesh in Christ some third thing be constituted. But that is either a substance or an accident; an accident it is not; this is established, because a substance is not a part of an accident7: it is necessary, therefore, that thence a substance be made.

Another improbable thing is in what he says: That by those two, as by a garment, the Word of God was clothed, so that he might appear fittingly to mortal eyes. (The second.) For if this were true, since the soul does not appear to the eyes, he would not have assumed a soul. And again, if Christ appeared to be a man, and was not a true man, another appeared than he was: therefore there was some falsity and some deception in Christ, which is altogether most absurd. For Truth can neither be deceived nor deceive8. p. 165

Likewise, the third improbable thing is in what he says, that the two were assumed into the singularity of the person of the Word of God, because by those two accidents the number of persons was not increased. (The third.) For if this were true, since the dove, in which the Holy Spirit appeared, did not increase the number of persons in the divine; [yet] it was assumed1b into the unity of the person, which it is nefarious to say. And again, since some soul is united to God by conformity of will, and in no way does the number of persons in the Trinity thereby increase; any holy soul would be assumed by the Word into the unity of the person: therefore any saint would be God, which indeed to say is altogether perverse.

And therefore this manner of speaking, as is gathered from the text2b, has been repudiated as erroneous; (The opinion is reproved.) nor is it to be believed that the Master was of this opinion, nor that he says this asserting or approving it, but rehearsing the opinion of others. (The Master is excused.) But this opinion, like the others also, he neither wholly reproves nor wholly approves. For its falsity had not yet become clear, especially since it seemed to be founded upon the words of the Saints3b.

Doubt III.

Likewise, there is inquiry about what he says: In many ways we speak of "habit," etc. For first he distinguishes habit into three members; but second he distinguishes by another division into four members: therefore either the one is superfluous, or the other deficient. — Likewise, some members of the second division seem to be impossible. For he says that certain things accrue4b, which change but are not changed, as wisdom. This seems to be impossible, because, if by some accruing accident a subject is changed, it seems that the subject itself much more ought to be called changed, because from being in potency it becomes being in act. — Likewise, another member similarly, where he says that certain things accrue, which neither change nor are changed, seems impossible. For nothing new can be acquired without some change of the acquirer or of the acquired: therefore it is impossible that some difference of habit be introduced into being, by which5b there be made no change in the thing had, or in the haver.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine6b distinguishes habit in two ways: in one way in itself, through proper differences which regard the habit with respect to being. (The first way of distinguishing, threefold.) And these are three. For everything that is had is had either interiorly, or exteriorly, or partly interiorly, partly exteriorly. If wholly interiorly; thus we speak of a habit of the soul, as knowledge and discipline. If wholly exteriorly; thus we speak of a habit of those things which are accommodated to the body exteriorly, as being clothed and shod. If in a certain way interiorly, and in a certain way exteriorly; thus we speak of one [as] stronger or mightier than another. And this holds, as it were, the mean between the two differences set down before. (Note.) And to these three differences can be reduced those seven modes of having which the Philosopher assigns in the Postpredicaments7b.

But because this way of distinguishing avails little for the matter at hand, therefore Augustine takes another way of distinguishing through four members, which regards the habit itself with respect to its coming-to-be. (The second way of distinguishing, fourfold.) And this division is four-membered according to four sufficient and immediate combinations8b. For everything that accrues to something either changes only and is not changed, as wisdom; or changes and is changed, as food; or neither changes nor is changed, as a ring; or is changed, but does not change, as clothing. — And that fourth member avails for the matter at hand, and through this the response to the first objection is clear. (To the first objection.) For these four differences are reduced to those three; therefore neither are these superfluous, nor those deficient.

To that which is objected, that wisdom changes but is not changed; (To the second objection.) it must be said that for this, that someone become wise, created and uncreated wisdom concur, just as for this, that he become pleasing [to God], created and uncreated charity concur. But when Augustine says that « wisdom is not changed »; he does not understand it of created wisdom, which is an accident of the soul, but of uncreated wisdom. — And this is frequently to be noted in the words of Augustine, when he speaks of wisdom and grace, because now he speaks of the uncreated, now of the created. (Note concerning Augustine.) — This statement can also be understood of created wisdom. (Otherwise.) But then Augustine is not speaking of any kind of change whatsoever, but of that change which is from one disposition to another, as for example of the change which is according to form; and then it has no instance in wisdom, because wisdom, an accident, is not altered, although the wise person is altered according to it9b. p. 166

And through this the third objection is clear: (To the third objection.) for Augustine does not exclude every motion, but that motion of alteration which is according to absolute quality. But this is not in the conjoining of a ring to a finger, but only that which is a change according to place or situation1c.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Pro suo edd. secundo.
    Instead of suo (his), the editions read secundo (second).
  2. Ex cuius verbis textus huius dubii sumtus est; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    From whose words the text of this doubt is taken; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  3. Codd. K Z bb unio. Paulo inferius pro primo obiicit codd. A B F G I L X ostendit, codd. C M O ostenditur, cod. bb dicit.
    Codices K, Z, bb read unio (union). A little below, instead of primo obiicit (he first objects) codices A B F G I L X read ostendit, codices C M O ostenditur, codex bb dicit.
  4. Codd. A E G I L N T X aa minus congrue non simpliciter.
    Codices A E G I L N T X aa, less fittingly, non simpliciter (not simply).
  5. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 2. q. I.
    Cf. Sentences, Book IV, dist. 8, part II, art. 2, q. 1.
  6. Edd. et illud communiter est.
    The editions read et illud communiter est (and that commonly is).
  7. Cfr. supra pag. 154, nota 8.
    Cf. above, p. 154, note 8.
  8. Vide supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
    See above, dist. 2, art. 2, q. 1 and following.
  9. Cfr. supra d. I. dub. 1. — Pro assumta est Vat. assumta esset.
    Cf. above, dist. 1, doubt 1. — Instead of assumta est (it was assumed) the Vatican edition reads assumta esset (it would have been assumed).
  10. Hic c. 4. seq. et d. VII. c. 2. seq. — Mox pro repudiatus cod. U repudiandus.
    Here, c. 4 and following, and dist. VII, c. 2 and following. — Soon, instead of repudiatus (repudiated) codex U reads repudiandus (to be repudiated).
  11. Vide supra a. 1. q. 3. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    See above, art. 1, q. 3. — On this doubt cf. Blessed Albert, here, art. 8; St. Thomas, here, on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the text.
  12. Codd. U Z bb et alii hic et paulo inferius accidunt pro accedunt. Mox pro quia si plurimi codd. vitiose quia etsi.
    Codices U Z bb and others here and a little below read accidunt (befall) instead of accedunt (accrue). Soon, instead of quia si (because if) very many codices read corruptly quia etsi (because even if).
  13. Pro qua edd. quod et subinde in habitu pro in habito.
    Instead of qua (by which) the editions read quod, and thereupon in habitu instead of in habito (in the thing had).
  14. Libr. 83 Qq. q. 73. n. 1., unde sumtus est textus huius dubii.
    Book of 83 Questions, q. 73, n. 1, whence the text of this doubt is taken.
  15. Cap. de Habere. De Postpraedicamentis Aristoteles tractat in tertia parte sui libri, qui inscribitur de Praedicamentis. Postquam in prima istius libri parte egit de Antepraedicamentis i. e. de quibusdam suppositis ad Praedicamentorum doctrinam conferentibus v. gr. de definitione aequivocorum, univocorum etc., et in secunda de Praedicamentis i. e. substantia, quantitate, relatione, actione et passione; in tertia, ut diximus, agit de Postpraedicamentis i. e. de quibusdam consequentibus ad ipsa praedicamenta v. gr. de oppositione, de priori, simul, habere etc. Octo qui in cap. de Habere assignantur modi habendi a Petro Hispano hoc disticho exprimuntur: Affectum [qualitatem v. gr. virtutem] quantum, vestitum, dic velut aurum [anulum in digito], Membrum, contentum [in vase], possessum, vir mulierem. De octavo horum modorum Aristot. profitetur, quod « modus alienissimus est eius quod est habere; nihil enim aliud uxorem habere significamur, quam quod cohabitant ». — Codd. A F I L N aa in Praedicamentis.
    Chapter "On Having." Aristotle treats of the Postpredicaments in the third part of his book entitled On the Predicaments [Categories]. After, in the first part of that book, he treated of the Antepredicaments, i.e. of certain things presupposed and conducing to the doctrine of the Predicaments, e.g. on the definition of equivocals, univocals, etc., and in the second part of the Predicaments themselves, i.e. substance, quantity, relation, action, and passion; in the third, as we said, he treats of the Postpredicaments, i.e. of certain things consequent upon the predicaments themselves, e.g. on opposition, on the prior, the simultaneous, having, etc. The eight modes of having which are assigned in the chapter "On Having" are expressed by Peter of Spain in this distich: Disposition [quality, e.g. virtue], quantity, the clothed — say [it] as gold [a ring on the finger], member, content [in a vessel], the possessed, a man a woman. Concerning the eighth of these modes Aristotle declares that « it is the most alien mode of that which is having; for by 'having a wife' we are signified nothing else than that they cohabit ». — Codices A F I L N aa read in Praedicamentis (in the Predicaments).
  16. Codd. M O conditiones. Mox pro Omne codd. A B C D E M O Z cc Esse, edd. Hoc. Subinde pro accedit codd. N U accidit.
    Codices M O read conditiones (conditions). Soon, instead of Omne (everything) codices A B C D E M O Z cc read Esse (being), the editions Hoc (this). Thereupon, instead of accedit (accrues) codices N U read accidit (befalls).
  17. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. dub. 2. et 1. — Codd. A G I L N T U aa secundum illum, cod. P secundum illud. Aliquanto inferius pro Haec [alteratio] autem plurimi codd. Hoc autem.
    Cf. Sentences, Book I, dist. 37, part II, doubts 2 and 1. — Codices A G I L N T U aa read secundum illum (according to him), codex P secundum illud (according to it). Somewhat below, instead of Haec [alteratio] autem (but this [alteration]) very many codices read Hoc autem (but this).
  18. Cfr. de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.
    Cf. on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 5. ---
← Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 3