Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 28
Articulus Unicus.
Quaestio IV. Utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum consensus tacitus faciat matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per decretalem quarti libri, de Sponsalibus1: «Tuae fraternitati» etc. Matrimonium in veritate contrahitur per legitimum viri et mulieris consensum; sed necessaria sunt verba quantum ad Ecclesiam ad consensum exprimendum de praesenti»: ergo videtur, quod quantum ad Deum sit matrimonium sine verbo.
2. Item, ratione alia videtur: quia peccatum adulterii sive fornicationis solo interiori consensu iudicatur consummatum, etiam sine signo exteriori2: ergo si plus potest consensus castus quam incestus, patet etc.
3. Item, consensus verborum exteriorum non unit nisi per consensum interiorem; sed «ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum3»: ergo videtur, quod si adsit unus consensus interior, idem omnino faciet.
4. Item, aliquae duae personae consentiunt aeque intense et plene ante expressionem et post4: ergo si post expressionem est matrimonium, et ante similiter.
5. Item, si aliquis voveat interius tantum, nihilominus vovet et obligatur ad votum: ergo similiter, si consentit interius tantum. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia votum fit Deo, qui videt corda, matrimonium vero respectu hominis, qui corda nescit; obiicitur tunc, quod saltem in conspectu Dei debet esse matrimonium.
6. Item, hoc ostenditur per simile: quia qui vere contritus est interius, in conspectu Dei vere poenitens iudicatur, etiam si non adsit confessio oris: ergo similiter est in matrimonio.
Contra: 1. Matrimonium est Sacramentum; sed omne Sacramentum est signum, et signum est quod offert se sensui5: ergo etc.
2. Item, si consensus interius faceret matrimonium; ergo cum nesciat homo occulta alterius, nesciret, utrum esset vir illius, an non: ergo si illi coniungeretur exterius, nesciret, utrum esset matrimonium, et ita in periculo se poneret.
3. Item, quantumcumque velim voluntate plena alteri aliquid dare, nullum ius acquiritur illi ex mea voluntate, si non promittam exterius per signum; sed in matrimonio ius acquirunt coniuges inter se invicem: ergo etc.
4. Item, ratione videtur: quia quantumcumque credat aliquis et innuat, nisi sermone exprimat: ego te baptizo, non baptizat6: ergo a simili videtur, quod non contrahat, quantumcumque consentiat, nisi sermone exprimat. — Et ex hoc videtur, quod mutus non possit contrahere.
Conclusio. Matrimonium non contrahitur, nisi interior consensus exterius exprimatur vel verbis, vel nutibus, vel scripto.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad omnis Sacramenti esse necessario requiritur significatio sive expressio. p. 693 Omne enim Sacramentum signum est et ut signum administratur; et ideo istud est necessarium7. Sed in aliquibus est materia determinata et forma verborum praescripta, quae vim habent sibi ad hoc datam; et talia Sacramenta nunquam fiunt, nisi illa verba pronuntientur. In aliquibus autem non venit vis a verbo exteriori, sed ab intrinseco, ut in poenitentia quantum ad confessionem et in matrimonio; et in talibus sufficit, qualiscumque fiat expressio, sive verbo, sive scripto, sive etiam quocumque nutu8 alio. — Concedendum est igitur, quod matrimonium non contrahitur, nisi consensus exterius exprimatur, vel per verba convenientia, vel per nutus idem importantes.
1. Et per hoc patet primum ad primam partem, scilicet quod de decretali obiiciebatur. Patet etiam, quod inter mutos potest contrahi, non tamen sine aliquo signo9. — Similiter ultimum ad oppositum, quod non est simile de baptismo.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de adulterio, vel peccato, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia peccatum est in interiori deordinatione, sed Sacramentum consistit in exteriori significatione.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi unum propter alterum, ergo utrobique tantum unum; dicendum, quod differt dicere unum propter alterum, et unum per alterum: quia ubi est dicere unum per alterum, ibi est ponere duo, quorum alterum est sicut efficiens, alterum sicut instrumentum; et non est verum, quod efficiens possit tantum per se, quantum potest cum instrumento. Quod autem dicitur, ubi unum propter alterum etc., loquitur de unitate obiecti, ubi propter quod dicit causam formalem, ut: video colorem, quia lucidum, et amo vinum, quia dulce10, et sic in similibus.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voto, dicendum, quod non est simile propter duas rationes: una, quia votum non est Sacramentum; alia, quia obligat se homo Deo, ad quem cogitare est loqui11; matrimonium autem est Sacramentum, per quod obligatur homo homini.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vere contritus dicitur poenitens; dicendum, quod verum est de poenitentia-virtute, sed non Sacramento12; matrimonium autem est Sacramentum, non virtus; et praeterea est ad alterum semper, non ad se, sicut contritio: et ideo non est simile, ut patet.
I. Quaestionem 4, in qua solvenda omnes consentiunt, plerique commentatores Lombardi tractant supra d. 27. Cfr. Scot., hic q. unica n. 2. — S. Thom., d. 27. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 43. a. 2. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., d. 27. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., d. 27. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.
II. Circa 5. quaestionem plura sunt notanda. 1. Secundum novum ius, a Concilio Trident. (Sess. XXIV. c. 1. de Reform.) promulgatum, matrimonia clandestina (id est, quae «aliter, quam praesente parocho vel alio sacerdote de ipsius parochi seu ordinarii licentia, et duobus, vel tribus testibus, contrahuntur») in omnibus locis, ubi hoc decretum promulgatum est, non tantum sunt illicita, sed etiam prorsus irrita et invalida. — 2. Sed ante hoc Concilium «clandestina matrimonia, libero contrahentium consensu facta, rata et vera matrimonia [erant], quamdiu Ecclesia ea irrita non fecit» (ibid.). — 3. Eadem, cum essent rata et vera, habebant etiam rationem Sacramenti, cum «inter fideles matrimonium dari non possit, quin uno eodemque tempore sit Sacramentum... ac proinde a coniugali foedere Sacramentum separari nunquam possit» (Pius IX. Allocut. 27. Sept. 1852). — 4. Hinc falsa est opinio et a doctrina Scholasticorum aliena, quam saec. XVI. introduxerunt aliqui praeclari theologi (Canus, Estius, Sylvius), quae asserit, non consensum contrahentium legitime manifestatum esse materiam et formam huius Sacramenti, sed verba a sacerdote pronuntiata: Ego vos coniungo etc.; ac proinde ministrum huius Sacramenti esse sacerdotem. Contrarium nunc constat ex damnata in Syllabo Pii IX. thesi 66: «Matrimonii Sacramentum non est nisi quid contractui accessorium ab eoque separabile; ipsum Sacramentum in una tantum nuptiali benedictione situm est». Veram doctrinam docet S. Bonav. etiam infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, d. 35. q. 4, d. 42. a. 3. q. 2.
De hac 5. quaestione: Scot., supra d. 26. q. unica n. 14–15. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; Suppl. q. 45. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.
III. De 6. quaestione cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. et de matrimonio B. Virginis infra d. 30. q. 2. et dub. 4. 5; in qua distinctione etiam alii commentatores Lombardi de eodem agunt, cum quadam differentia circa votum virginitatis, ut ibi (q. 2.) in scholio exponitur. p. 694 Cum purissimum matrimonium B. Virginis cum S. Iosepho sit verum matrimonium (ut fere omnes certum esse putant); supponitur quidem, ipsam consensisse in ea quae essentialia sunt matrimonio; ast non usus potestatis traditae, sed tantum vinculum est ei essentiale, ut loc. cit. probatum est; hinc consensus debet habere hoc vinculum cum traditione potestatis pro obiecto, non vero expresse actum coniugalem. Hinc I. opinio repudianda est. — S. Thom. (hic a. 4; Suppl. q. 48. a. 1.) favet 2. et 3. opinioni his verbis: «Patet, quod dixerunt illi qui dixerunt, quod consentire in matrimonium est consentire in carnalem copulam implicite, non explicite. Non enim debet intelligi, nisi sicut implicite continetur effectus in sua causa, quia potestas carnalis copulae, in quam consentitur, est causa carnalis copulae, sicut potestas utendi re sua est causa usus». Idem in Sum. (III. q. 29. a. 2.) dicit: «Non expresse in copulam carnalem (consensit) nisi sub conditione, si Deo placeret».
De 6. quaestione: B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., infra d. 30. q. 2.
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Article Unicus.
Question IV. Whether a tacit consent brings about marriage.
Fourth, the question is asked whether a tacit consent brings about marriage. And it seems that it does:
1. By the decretal of the fourth book, On Betrothals1: "To your fraternity," etc.: "A marriage is truly contracted through the lawful consent of a man and a woman; but words are necessary, as far as the Church is concerned, for expressing consent as to the present." Therefore it seems that, as far as God is concerned, there can be marriage without a word.
2. Likewise, it seems so for another reason: because the sin of adultery or of fornication is judged to be consummated by interior consent alone, even without an external sign2; therefore, if a chaste consent can do more than an incestuous one, the point is clear, etc.
3. Likewise, the consent of exterior words does not unite except through interior consent; but "where one thing exists on account of another, in both cases there is only one thing3": therefore it seems that if a single interior consent is present, that alone will accomplish everything.
4. Likewise, some two persons consent equally intensely and fully both before the expression and after4: therefore, if there is marriage after the expression, likewise there is marriage before it as well.
5. Likewise, if someone makes a vow interiorly only, he nonetheless vows and is bound to the vow: therefore likewise, if he consents interiorly only [to marriage, the same should hold]. If you say that it is not similar, because the vow is made to God, who sees hearts, whereas marriage concerns man, who does not know hearts — it is then objected that at least in the sight of God there ought to be marriage.
6. Likewise, this is shown by a similar case: because one who is truly contrite interiorly is judged, in the sight of God, to be truly a penitent, even if there is no confession by mouth: therefore likewise it is so in marriage.
On the contrary: 1. Marriage is a Sacrament; but every Sacrament is a sign, and a sign is that which offers itself to the senses5: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, if interior consent alone made marriage, then, since a man cannot know another's hidden acts, he would not know whether he was that woman's husband, or not: therefore if he were joined to her outwardly, he would not know whether it was marriage, and thus he would place himself in danger.
3. Likewise, however much I may wish, with a full will, to give something to another, no right is acquired by that other from my will alone, unless I promise it outwardly by some sign; but in marriage the spouses acquire rights over one another: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because however much someone may believe and nod assent, unless he expresses it in speech — "I baptize you" — he does not baptize6: therefore, by a similar argument, it seems that one does not contract marriage, however much he consents, unless he expresses it in speech. — And from this it seems to follow that a mute person could not contract marriage.
Conclusion. Marriage is not contracted unless the interior consent is expressed outwardly, either by words, or by gestures, or in writing.
I respond: It must be said that for the being of every Sacrament, some signification or expression is necessarily required. For every Sacrament is a sign, and as a sign it is administered; and therefore this is necessary7. But in some Sacraments the matter is determinate and the form of words prescribed, which have a force given to them for this purpose; and such Sacraments never come to be unless those words are pronounced. In others, however, the force does not come from an exterior word, but from within, as in penance as regards confession, and in marriage; and in such cases whatever expression is made suffices, whether by word, or in writing, or even by any other gesture8. — It must therefore be granted that marriage is not contracted unless the consent is expressed outwardly, either through fitting words, or through gestures conveying the same thing.
1. And by this the first point as to the first part is clear, namely what was objected concerning the decretal. It is also clear that marriage can be contracted between mutes, though not without some sign9. — Likewise for the last objection to the contrary, that it is not similar in the case of baptism.
2. To what is objected concerning adultery, or sin, it must be said that it is not similar: because sin consists in an interior disorder, whereas a Sacrament consists in an exterior signification.
3. and 4. To what is objected, that in that case one thing exists on account of another, therefore in both cases there is only one thing; it must be said that it is one thing to say "one on account of the other," and another to say "one through the other": because where one says "one through the other," there one posits two things, of which the one is like the efficient cause and the other like the instrument; and it is not true that the efficient cause by itself alone can do as much as it can with the instrument. But when it is said "where one exists on account of the other," etc., this speaks of the unity of the object, where "on account of" designates the formal cause, as: I see the color, because it is bright, and I love the wine, because it is sweet10, and so in similar cases.
5. To what is objected concerning a vow, it must be said that it is not similar, for two reasons: one, because a vow is not a Sacrament; the other, because a man binds himself to God, for whom to think is to speak11; whereas marriage is a Sacrament, by which a man is bound to another man.
6. To what is objected, that one who is truly contrite is called a penitent — it must be said that this is true of penance as a virtue, but not of it as a Sacrament12; marriage, however, is a Sacrament, not a virtue; and moreover it always relates to another, not to oneself, as contrition does: and therefore it is not similar, as is evident.
I. Question 4, in resolving which all agree, most of Lombard's commentators treat above at d. 27. Cf. Scotus, here q. unica, n. 2. — St. Thomas, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 43, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — Durandus, d. 27, q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica.
II. Concerning the 5th question several things are to be noted. 1. According to the new law promulgated by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIV, c. 1, De Reform.), clandestine marriages — that is, those contracted "otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest, or another priest with the license of that parish priest or of the ordinary, and of two or three witnesses" — are, in all places where this decree has been promulgated, not only unlawful, but altogether null and invalid. — 2. But before this Council, "clandestine marriages, made by the free consent of the contracting parties, were valid and true marriages, so long as the Church had not made them null" (ibid.). — 3. These same marriages, since they were valid and true, also had the character of a Sacrament, since "among the faithful a marriage cannot be given without at one and the same time being a Sacrament... and accordingly the Sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal bond" (Pius IX, Allocution of 27 Sept. 1852). — 4. Hence the opinion is false and foreign to the doctrine of the Scholastics which certain distinguished theologians of the sixteenth century (Canus, Estius, Sylvius) introduced, asserting that the matter and form of this Sacrament is not the lawfully manifested consent of the contracting parties, but the words pronounced by the priest — "I join you" etc. — and that accordingly the minister of this Sacrament is the priest. The contrary is now established from the thesis condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, no. 66: "The Sacrament of Matrimony is nothing but an accessory of the contract, separable from it; the Sacrament itself consists solely in the nuptial blessing." St. Bonaventure teaches the true doctrine also below, at d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; d. 35, q. 4; d. 42, a. 3, q. 2.
On this 5th question: Scotus, above d. 26, q. unica, n. 14–15. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 3; Suppl. q. 45, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 3.
III. On the 6th question, cf. above d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, and on the marriage of the Blessed Virgin, below d. 30, q. 2 and dub. 4, 5; in which distinction other commentators of Lombard also treat the same matter, with a certain difference concerning the vow of virginity, as is set forth there (q. 2) in the scholion. Since the most pure marriage of the Blessed Virgin with St. Joseph is a true marriage (as almost all hold to be certain), it is supposed indeed that she consented to those things that are essential to marriage; but it is not the use of the power handed over [in marriage], but only the bond, that is essential to it, as has been proven in the place cited; hence her consent must have had this bond, together with the handing-over of the power, as its object, but not expressly the conjugal act itself. Hence the first opinion is to be rejected. — St. Thomas (here a. 4; Suppl. q. 48, a. 1) favors the 2nd and 3rd opinion in these words: "It is clear what those meant who said that to consent to marriage is to consent implicitly, not explicitly, to carnal intercourse. For this should be understood only as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, since the power of carnal intercourse, to which consent is given, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power of using one's own property is the cause of its use." The same author, in the Summa (III, q. 29, a. 2), says: "She did not consent expressly to carnal intercourse, except under the condition, should it please God."
On the 6th question: Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 4. — Denis the Carthusian, below d. 30, q. 2.
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- 1Tit. 1. c. 25. Finem textus originalis exhibet sic: sed necessaria sunt quantum ad Ecclesiam verba consentientia [cod. aa habet exprimentia] de praesenti.Tit. 1, c. 25. The original text's ending reads thus: "but words expressing consent [codex aa has 'exprimentia'] are necessary as regards the Church, as to the present."
- 2Cfr. Matth. 5, 28, quem locum allegant etiam codd. N aa. — Inferius pro incestus edd. incastus.Cf. Matthew 5:28, which passage codices N aa also cite. — Below, for "incestus" the editions read "incastus."
- 3Secundum Aristot., vide supra pag. 197, nota 5. — Inferius pro unus codd. EWY solus, et pro interior, quod habent codd. ENW aa, alii codd. et edd. perperam exterior.According to Aristotle, see above p. 197, note 5. — Below, for "unus" codices EWY read "solus" [alone], and for "interior," which codices ENW aa have, other codices and editions wrongly read "exterior."
- 4Cod. E ut post.Codex E reads "ut post."
- 5Ut docet August. supra in lit. Magistri, d. 1. c. 3.As Augustine teaches above, in the Master's text, d. 1, c. 3.
- 6Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. Pro sermone permulti codd. et edd. bis sermonem, codd. N X per sermonem. Edd. omittunt innuat.Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2. For "sermone," very many codices and editions read "sermonem" twice; codices N X read "per sermonem." The editions omit "innuat."
- 7Vide supra d. 1. p. I. q. 2.See above d. 1, p. I, q. 2.
- 8Codd. A aa modo, cod. L medio, codd. GH motu. Pro qualiscumque codd. E L qualitercumque.Codices A aa read "modo," codex L "medio," codices GH "motu." For "qualiscumque" codices E L read "qualitercumque."
- 9Cfr. C. Cum apud sedem (23.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).Cf. c. "Cum apud sedem" (23), X, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis (Bk. IV, tit. 1).
- 10Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.): In vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est; nam per se dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens; si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderabat. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. ad 4, ubi exemplum de colore lucido explicatur. Vide etiam supra d. 9. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.Aristotle, Topics II, c. 2 (c. 3): "In wine, what is loved is the sweetness, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for what one desires per se is the sweet thing, whereas the wine is desired only per accidens — for if it turns sour, one no longer desires it; therefore it was desired only per accidens." Cf. III Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, ad 4, where the example of a bright color is explained. See also above d. 9, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.
- 11Cfr. Gregor., XXXV. Moral. c. 3. n. 4. — Superius post Sacramentum Vat. addit: per quod obligatur homo homini.Cf. Gregory, Moralia XXXV, c. 3, n. 4. — Above, after "Sacramentum" the Vatican [codex] adds: "by which man is bound to man."
- 12Vide supra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 4. et a. 2. q. 4.See above d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 4, and a. 2, q. 4.