Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 28
Quaestio III. Utrum consensus conditionatus faciat matrimonium.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum consensus conditionatus faciat matrimonium, ut: accipio te in meam, si dederis mihi centum libras. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per simile: quia votum conditionatum votum est: ergo similiter videtur, quod consensus conditionatus matrimonium faciat1.
2. Item, aliquis consentiens in aliquam spe pecuniae habendae matrimonium contrahit: ergo si consensus talis competit matrimonio, ergo ipsius expressio non repugnat: ergo si dicat: consentio, si dederis, patet etc.
3. Item, quando aliquis promittit aliquid sub conditione; si stet conditio, stat obligatio et promissio; sed possibile est, stare conditionem: ergo et consensum et obligationem et matrimonium.
Contra:
1. Plus se obligat qui simpliciter de futuro promittit, quam qui sub conditione — nam prima est obligatio simpliciter, secunda vero non — sed consensus per verba de futuro expressus non facit matrimonium2: ergo etc.
2. Item, post consensum istum aut est uxor aut non. Si uxor; sed possibile est, conditionem non stare, et non consenserat nisi sub conditione: ergo est uxor sine consensu. Sed non est uxor3: ergo talis consensus non efficit matrimonium.
3. Item, matrimonium est vinculum nullo modo solubile; sed omnis obligatio vel pactio sub conditione facta est solubilis: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Consensus conditionatus expressus per verba de futuro non facit nisi sponsalia, ast omnino non valet, si conditio fit per modum poenae, sive ut determinatio contractus inhonesta et contra substantiam matrimonii; si autem fit per verba de praesenti, etiam tunc non facit matrimonium, si conditio est de futuro contingenti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consensus conditionatus, si fiat per verba de futuro, iudicari4 habet, sicut et consensus de futuro non facit matrimonium, sed desponsationem sive sponsalia; sic nec talis consensus sub conditione.
Attendendum tamen, quod conditio aut apponitur per modum poenae, aut ut determinatio contractus. Si per modum poenae, nullius est vigoris, pro eo quod matrimonia debent esse libera. Unde si quis proponat: promitto tecum sub contrahere poena centum marcarum, vel si non contraxero, dabo tibi centum: etiam si non contrahat, non debet nec tenetur ad illam poenam5. — Si autem apponitur ut determinatio contractus sive consensus, distinguendum est: aut enim est conditio honesta, aut inhonesta. Si est honesta, stante conditione, stant sponsalia; non stante, non stant, ut si quis dicat: contraham tecum, si placuerit patri meo, vel si tu volueris converti ad fidem. — Si autem est inhonesta, duplex est: aut est contra substantiam matrimonii, aut non. Si contra substantiam matrimonii, tunc nulla est obligatio, ut si dicat: contraham tecum, si procuraveris venena sterilitatis, vel aliquod huiusmodi. Si autem est inhonesta et non contra substantiam matrimonii, ut si dicatur: contraham tecum si furatus fueris, vel si Deum offenderis, talis conditio pro non adiecta habenda est. Et hoc totum probatur per illa quae dicuntur Extra, in quarto libro de Conditionibus appositis in desponsatione6.
Si autem consensus fiat per verba de praesenti; aut conditio est praeterita, aut praesens, aut futura. Si conditio est praeterita, ut: accipio te in meam, si mortuus est pater tuus; vel de praesenti, ut: accipio te in meam, si es virgo; stante conditione, stat matrimonium. Si autem conditio est de futuro; aut futuri necessarii, aut futuri contingentis. Si futuri necessarii, ut: accipio te in meam si sol oriatur cras; tunc est matrimonium. Si autem conditio est contingens, dico, quod non est matrimonium, eo quod consensus pendet de futuro, sicut et conditio; et ideo iudicandum est tunc, sicut
de futuro, nec est matrimonium, nisi carnalis copula subsequatur, quia tunc intelligitur a conditione apposita recessisse7.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur ad secundam partem, quod non stat matrimonium per consensum conditionatum; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi8 est conditio de futuro contingenti, quia tunc consensus pendet ex futuro.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simpliciter stat, per simile in voto; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia votum est pura obligatio, matrimonium autem est coniunctio; et non est coniunctio nisi per praesens, sed obligatio est bene per futurum.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consensus ex spe pecuniae facit matrimonium; verum9 est, quia simplex potest esse et absolutus; sed cum exprimitur sub conditione, non exprimitur ut simpliciter nec ut absolutus nec ut praesens; et ideo non est simile.
Ad 3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod matrimonium plus dicit quam obligationem. Unde dico, quod non sequitur: iste est obligatus isti mulieri, ut eam accipiat in uxorem: ergo est eius vir; sicut non sequitur: obligavit se ad persolvendum: ergo solvit. Unde matrimonium non tantum est obligatio, immo ipsius vinculi indissolubilis unio10.
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Question III. Whether conditioned consent makes a marriage.
Thirdly it is asked, whether conditioned consent makes a marriage, as: "I take you as mine, if you shall have given me a hundred pounds." And that it does, it seems:
1. By a like case: because a conditioned vow is [still] a vow: therefore it seems likewise that conditioned consent makes a marriage1.
2. Likewise, someone consenting in the hope of having some money contracts a marriage: therefore if such a consent is competent to marriage, then its expression is not repugnant [to marriage]: therefore if he should say: "I consent, if you shall have given [it]," it is plain, etc.
3. Likewise, when someone promises something under a condition; if the condition stands, the obligation and the promise stand; but it is possible for the condition to stand: therefore also the consent and the obligation and the marriage [stand].
On the contrary:
1. He who promises simply for the future obligates himself more than he who [promises] under a condition — for the first is an obligation simply, but the second is not — but consent expressed by words of the future does not make marriage2: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, after this consent, either she is his wife or not. If she is his wife; but it is possible for the condition not to stand, and he had not consented except under the condition: therefore she is his wife without consent. But she is not his wife3: therefore such a consent does not effect a marriage.
3. Likewise, marriage is a bond in no way dissoluble; but every obligation or pact made under a condition is dissoluble: therefore, etc.
Conclusion. Conditioned consent expressed by words of the future produces only a betrothal, but it is of no force at all if the condition is by way of a penalty, or is a stipulation of the contract that is dishonorable and against the substance of marriage; but if it is expressed by words of the present, even then it does not make marriage, if the condition is of a future contingent thing.
I respond: It must be said that conditioned consent, if it is made by words of the future, is to be judged4 to hold in the same way as consent for the future [simply]: it does not make marriage, but a betrothal or espousal; so too neither does such a consent under a condition.
It must be noted, however, that a condition is attached either by way of a penalty, or as a stipulation of the contract. If it is by way of a penalty, it is of no force, on the ground that marriages ought to be free. Hence if someone should propose: "I promise to contract with you under penalty of a hundred marks, or if I do not contract, I will give you a hundred [marks]"; even if he does not contract, he neither owes nor is bound to that penalty5. — But if it is attached as a stipulation of the contract or of the consent, a distinction must be made: for either the condition is honorable, or dishonorable. If it is honorable, while the condition stands the betrothal stands; when it does not stand, [the betrothal] does not stand, as if someone should say: "I will contract with you, if it should please my father," or "if you should be willing to convert to the faith." — But if it is dishonorable, it is twofold: either it is against the substance of marriage, or not. If it is against the substance of marriage, then there is no obligation at all, as if he should say: "I will contract with you, if you procure poisons of sterility," or something of this kind. But if it is dishonorable and not against the substance of marriage, as if it should be said: "I will contract with you if you shall have committed theft, or if you shall have offended God," such a condition is to be held as not attached [at all]. And all this is proved through those things which are said in the Decretals, in the fourth book, On Conditions Attached in a Betrothal6.
But if the consent is made by words of the present; either the condition is past, or present, or future. If the condition is past, as: "I take you as mine, if your father is dead"; or present, as: "I take you as mine, if you are a virgin"; while the condition stands, the marriage stands. But if the condition is of the future; either of a necessary future, or of a contingent future. If of a necessary future, as: "I take you as mine if the sun shall rise tomorrow," then it is marriage. But if the condition is contingent, I say that it is not marriage, because the consent hangs upon the future, just as the condition does; and therefore it must be judged then, just as
concerning the future, it is not marriage either, unless carnal intercourse should follow, because then it is understood that [the marriage] has receded from the condition attached7.
To that, then, which is objected as to the second part, that marriage does not stand through conditioned consent; it must be said that this is true where8 the condition is of a future contingent thing, because then the consent hangs upon the future.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1. To that which is objected, that it holds simply, by the like case of the vow; it must be said that it is not alike: because a vow is a pure obligation, but marriage is a conjoining; and there is no conjoining except through the present, whereas an obligation may well be through the future.
To 2. To that which is objected, that consent from the hope of money makes marriage; this is true9, because a simple [consent] can be both actual and unconditional; but when it is expressed under a condition, it is not expressed as simple, nor as unconditional, nor as present; and therefore it is not alike.
To 3. To the other it must be said that marriage says more than an obligation. Hence I say that it does not follow: "this man is obligated to this woman, to take her [in marriage]: therefore he is her husband"; just as it does not follow: "he obligated himself to paying: therefore he has paid." Hence marriage is not only an obligation, but rather the union of an indissoluble bond itself10.
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- 1Multi codd. matrimonium sit, cod. K (l a secunda manu) et ed. l sit consensus, cui Vat. addit: et per consequens matrimonium efficit.Many codices [read] that it is a marriage; codex K (in a second hand) and edition 1, that it is consent, to which the Vatican [codex] adds: and consequently it effects a marriage.
- 2Ut ostensum est supra q. I.As was shown above, question I.
- 3Cod. aa supplet sine consensu, cod. T substituit ergo non pro sed non.Cod. aa supplies without consent; cod. T substitutes therefore not for but not.
- 4Non pauci codd. et ed. l iudicium.Not a few codices, and edition 1, [read] iudicium ["judgment," for iudicari].
- 5Cfr. C. Gemma (29.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. I.); Iustinian., C. V. de Sponsalibus etc. (tit. I.), lex Mulier iuris sui (5.), in fine, et VIII. de Inutilibus Stipulationibus (tit. 39.), lex Libera matrimonia (2.).Cf. c. Gemma (29), Decretals, bk. IV, tit. I, On Betrothals and Marriage; Justinian, Code V, On Betrothals etc. (tit. I), law Mulier iuris sui (5), at the end, and [Code] VIII, On Void Stipulations (tit. 39), law Libera matrimonia (2).
- 6Tit. 5. c. 1-7. — Mox post aut conditio cod. T addit apposita.Tit. 5, cc. 1–7. — Shortly after aut conditio, cod. T adds apposita ["attached"].
- 7Vide supra q. 1. ad 3. et 4.See above, question 1, replies to 3 and 4.
- 8Cod. I quando.Cod. I [reads] quando ["when," for ubi].
- 9Cod. K dicendum, quod verum. Pro quia simplex potest esse edd. quando simplex est.Cod. K [reads] dicendum, quod verum ["it must be said, that it is true"]. For quia simplex potest esse, the printed editions [read] quando simplex est.
- 10Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Edd. cum pluribus codd. indivisibilis unio. — Vide scholion ad [?] articuli quaest.Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the body [of the response]. — The printed editions, with several codices, [read] indivisibilis unio ["an indivisible union"]. — See the scholion for [this][?] question of the article.