Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 28
Quaestio II. Utrum consensus ad tempus faciat matrimonium.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum consensus ad tempus faciat matrimonium, ut cum dicitur: accipio te in meam usque ad decem annos. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia hic est consensus viri in uxorem et uxoris in virum, facta expressione per verbum: ergo etc.
2. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia, sicut se habet simpliciter ad simpliciter, sic secundum tempus ad secundum tempus; sed consensus simpliciter facit uxorem simpliciter et matrimonium simpliciter: ergo similiter consensus ad tempus facit matrimonium ad tempus.
3. Item, sicut aliquis fit servus simpliciter, se subdendo simpliciter1, ita etiam fit servus ad tempus, se subdendo ad tempus: ergo similiter videtur in coniugio, et sic videtur, quod ad certum tempus possit fieri matrimonium.
4. Item, qui aliquid potest dare simpliciter potest dare et ad tempus; sed vir potest dare simpliciter potestatem sui corporis: ergo et ad tempus. Sed non potest potestatem sui corporis dare nisi uxori: ergo potest habere uxorem ad tempus. Si tu dicas, quod Dominus instituit ad semper; contra: nihil debet Dominus instituere, quod possit vergere in diminutionem sui honoris, vel nostrae perfectionis; sed si matrimonium esset temporale, posset quis se totum ad Dei obsequium deputare, quando vellet: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. In quadam decretali2 Gregorii noni, de Conditionibus appositis in desponsationibus, dicitur: «Si quis dicat: contraham tecum, donec inveniam aliam honore, vel facultatibus digniorem; matrimonialis contractus, quantumcumque sit favorabilis, caret effectu».
2. Item, ad hoc est definitio Hugonis3, qui dicit, quod matrimonium «est consensus individuam vitae consuetudinem tenens».
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia de esse matrimonii, ut supra4 ostensum est, est indissolubilitas: ergo qui consentit in matrimonium ad omne tempus se obligat: ergo si exprimit, quod non obligatur nisi ad tempus, nullo modo est matrimonium.
4. Item, nulla anima unitur Deo per desponsationem, nisi simpliciter consentiat et proponat coniungi: ergo similiter in signo, si hoc est conveniens signum; sed matrimonium est conveniens signum5: ergo non fit matrimonium, nisi exprimatur simpliciter consensus.
Conclusio. Ut matrimonium sit validum, oportet simpliciter et ad omne tempus consentire et talem consensum simpliciter exprimere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod sit matrimonium, necesse est, consensum esse et exprimi simpliciter — unde dici debet: accipio te in meam — quodsi alio modo consentiat, non est consensus matrimonialis sive coniugalis, sed adulterinus6. Unde deficit matrimonium verum, sive deficiat in corde, sive in ore consensus simpliciter; sed quando in corde, tunc in conspectu Dei et secundum veritatem; quando in ore, tunc in facie Ecclesiae.
Ratio autem, quare oportet simpliciter consentire, et quod nihil valet consensus ad tempus, est, quia consensus non facit matrimonium nisi eatenus, quatenus praesupponit divinam institutionem; divina autem institutio respicit congruam significationem. Si ergo est significatio rei indivisibilis sive coniunctionis, ideo constituit7 Dominus coniunctionem talem ad perpetuitatem; et huic etiam competit dictamen iuris naturalis. Et ideo, si consensus consonat institutioni, necesse est, quod sit ad omne tempus, alioquin causa particularis non concordat universali; et ideo nihil fit, nec consentit in talem ut in uxorem, sed potius ut in concubinam. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, quia in forma verborum implicatur aliquid, quod est «contra matrimonii substantiam8».
Ad argumenta:
Ad 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet simpliciter etc.; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ubi contingit reperire secundum quid in utroque extremorum; sed matrimonium nullo modo est secundum tempus: et ideo non valet illud.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de servitute, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia servitutis vinculum potest esse temporale et perpetuum, sed matrimonium est perpetuum9.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas corporis potest dari ad tempus; dicendum, quod non potest dari ad tempus, nisi detur simpliciter; et est simile: quia Deus non acceptat bonam voluntatem vel servitium alicuius, nisi velit vel proponat semper sibi servire.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Dominus non debuit instituere; dicendum, quod in huius Sacramenti institutione magis congruitas in significando et necessitas quam aliud consideratur; et haec exigunt, ipsum esse perpetuum10.
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Question II. Whether consent for a fixed time makes a marriage.
Secondly it is asked, whether consent for a time makes a marriage, as when it is said: "I take you as mine up to ten years." And that it does, it seems:
1. Because here there is the consent of the husband toward the wife and of the wife toward the husband, the expression having been made through a word: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because, as the simple stands to the simple, so a determinate time stands to a determinate time; but consent given simply makes a wife simply and a marriage simply: therefore likewise consent for a time makes a marriage for a time.
3. Likewise, just as someone becomes a slave simply, by submitting himself simply1, so too he becomes a slave for a time, by submitting himself for a time: therefore it seems to be likewise in marriage, and so it seems that marriage can be contracted for a fixed time.
4. Likewise, whoever can give something simply can give it also for a time; but a man can give simply the power over his own body: therefore also for a time. But he cannot give the power over his own body except to a wife: therefore he can have a wife for a time. If you should say that the Lord instituted marriage to last forever; on the contrary: the Lord ought not to institute anything that could tend toward a diminishment of his own honor, or of our perfection; but if marriage were temporal, one could devote himself wholly to the service of God whenever he wished: therefore, etc.
On the contrary: 1. In a certain decretal2 of Gregory IX, On the Conditions Attached to Betrothals, it is said: "If someone should say: I will contract [marriage] with you until I find another more worthy in honor or in wealth — a matrimonial contract, however favorable it may be, lacks effect."
2. Likewise, to this end is the definition of Hugh3, who says that marriage "is a consent maintaining an undivided sharing of life."
3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because indissolubility belongs to the being of marriage, as was shown above4: therefore whoever consents to marriage obligates himself for all time: therefore if he expresses that he is obligated only for a time, it is in no way a marriage.
4. Likewise, no soul is united to God through betrothal unless it consents simply and purposes to be joined [to him]: therefore likewise in the sign, if this is a fitting sign; but marriage is a fitting sign5: therefore a marriage does not come about unless the consent is expressed simply.
Conclusion. In order for a marriage to be valid, it is necessary to consent simply and for all time, and to express such consent simply.
I respond: It must be said that, for there to be a marriage, it is necessary that the consent both be simply and be expressed simply — hence one ought to say: "I take you as mine" — but if one consents in some other way, it is not a marital or conjugal consent, but an adulterous one6. Hence the true marriage is lacking, whether the simple consent is lacking in the heart or in the mouth; but when it is lacking in the heart, then [the matter stands] in the sight of God and according to the truth; when in the mouth, then in the face of the Church.
The reason, moreover, why it is necessary to consent simply, and why consent for a time is worth nothing, is that consent does not make a marriage except insofar as it presupposes the divine institution; but the divine institution regards a fitting signification. If, then, it is the signification of an indivisible thing, or of a union, the Lord therefore established7 such a union with a view to perpetuity; and to this the dictate of natural law also corresponds. And therefore, if the consent accords with the institution, it is necessary that it be for all time; otherwise the particular cause does not agree with the universal; and therefore nothing comes about, nor does he consent to take her as a wife, but rather as a concubine. — And the arguments for this must be granted, because in the form of the words something is implied that is "against the substance of marriage8."
To the arguments:
To the 2nd. To that which is objected, that as the simple stands [to the simple, so a determinate time to a determinate time], etc.; it must be said that this is true where it happens that one finds "in a certain respect" in both extremes; but marriage is in no way "according to a time": and therefore that [argument] does not hold.
To the 3rd. To that which is objected concerning servitude, it must be said that it is not alike, because the bond of servitude can be temporal or perpetual, but marriage is perpetual9.
To the 4th. To that which is objected, that the power over the body can be given for a time; it must be said that it cannot be given for a time, unless it is given simply; and it is similar [to the case of servitude]: for God does not accept anyone's good will or service, unless he is willing or purposes to serve him forever.
To that which is objected, that the Lord ought not to have instituted [marriage as perpetual]; it must be said that in the institution of this Sacrament, fittingness in signifying and necessity are considered more than anything else; and these require that it be perpetual10.
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- 1Cod. K (l a secunda manu) supplet alicui.Codex K (in a second hand) supplies alicui ["to someone"].
- 2Quae incipit Si conditiones (7.), X. lib. IV. tit. 5.[The decretal] which begins Si conditiones (c. 7), Decretals (X.), book IV, title 5.
- 3Libr. II. de Sacrament. p. XI. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 679, nota 8. — Pro tenens codd. G K retinens.Book II, On the Sacraments, part XI, ch. 4. Cf. above, p. 679, note 8. — For tenens, codices G and K read retinens.
- 4Dist. 27. a. 3. q. 1. seq.Distinction 27, article 3, question 1 and following.
- 5Ut ostensum est supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1.As was shown above, distinction 26, article 2, question 1.
- 6Ita codd. E I K L, in aliis et edd. adulterium.So codices E, I, K, L; in the other [codices] and in the printed editions, adulterium ["adultery"].
- 7Codd. F K L aa (l a secunda manu) instituit. Inferius post naturalis Vat. addit: quia vir potest uxori dare simpliciter potestatem sui corporis, quae verba, mutato quia in sed, ed. l paulo inferius post tempus subnectit.Codices F, K, L, aa (in a second hand) read instituit ["he instituted"]. Further below, after naturalis, the Vatican [codex] adds: "because the husband can give his wife the power over his own body simply" — words which, with quia changed to sed, edition 1 appends a little further below, after tempus.
- 8Ut dicit Gregor. IX. in praeallegato C. Si conditiones contra substantiam coniugii inserantur etc.As Gregory IX says in the aforecited chapter Si conditiones: [conditions] inserted against the substance of marriage, etc.
- 9Codd. E M O U W Y addunt tantum.Codices E, M, O, U, W, Y add tantum ["only"].
- 10Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.