Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 28
Quaestio I. Utrum consensus de futuro faciat matrimonium.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod consensus de futuro faciat matrimonium.
1. Hac ratione: sicut se habet praesens ad praesens, ita futurum ad futurum; sed consensus de praesenti facit matrimonium in praesenti: ergo consensus de futuro facit matrimonium de futuro.
2. Item, per simile videtur: sicut qui promittit aliquid in praesenti obligatur in praesenti, sic qui promittit aliquid de futuro obligatur pro illo tempore1; sed sicut promissio est causa obligationis, ita consensus est causa matrimonii: ergo videtur.
3. Item, consensus de futuro facit matrimonium, si carnalis copula subsequatur2; sed carnalis copula non est causa matrimonii, sed ipsum sequitur: ergo prius fuit matrimonium, quam coirent: ergo etc.
4. Item, si consentiat de futuro, et sequatur stuprum, ita ut non cognoscat affectu maritali, sed fornicario, facit matrimonium; sed magis obligat iuramentum quam stuprum: ergo si consentiat cum iuramento, est ei uxor.
Contra:
1. Iura3 dicunt, quod si quis in aliquam consentiat per verba de futuro et in alteram per verba de praesenti, secunda est uxor: si ergo unius est una uxor, prima non fuit uxor.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia quod futurum est non est4: ergo cum consentit de futuro, nondum consentit: ergo modo non est matrimonium. Quod autem nec in illo futuro, patet: simus in illo futuro et ponatur, quod tunc non consentiat; non est consensus tunc nec prius fuit: ergo non est matrimonium nec fuit.
3. Item, qui semel consentit in aliquam non debet iterum consentire ad hoc, quod fiat matrimonium; sed consensus de futuro, cum dicitur: accipiam te in meam, obligat iterum consentire5: ergo per verba de futuro non est consensus matrimonialis. Quod se obliget, patet, quia se obligat ad accipiendum in uxorem, et non aliter accipit quam per consensum.
Conclusio. Consensus non facit matrimonium, nisi exprimatur per verba de praesenti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consensus non facit matrimonium, nisi exprimatur per verba de praesenti. Si enim exprimatur per verba de futuro, in veritate non est consensus tunc, sed promissio de consentiendo. Unde si dicat quis: ego consentiam in te; tunc quidem non consentit, sed se consensurum promittit. Et quia non est ibi consensus, ideo non est matrimonii contractio; quia vero est promissio, et ideo obligatio; propterea non matrimonium, sed sponsalia debent dici; et haec quidem sponsalia firmata sunt, quando simplici promissioni additur iuramentum. Secundum enim iura6 cogendus est vir, ut mulierem accipiat in uxorem, nisi aliquis casus interveniat, qui solvat sponsalia.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sicut praesens se habet ad praesens etc.; dicendum quod verum est. Unde sicut, si consentit hodie, fit hodie matrimonium; sic, si consentit cras, fit cras. Sed cum nunc dicit de futuro, non consentit, sed consentire promittit; et ideo non fit matrimonium, nec de praesenti nec de futuro, sed solum sponsalia contrahuntur7.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui de futuro promittit obligatur ad futurum; dicendum, quod verum est, quia promissio est praesens; unde cum dicit: ego faciam hoc, actu promittit, et ideo8 obligatur. Similiter et iste obligatur spondendo; sed non propter hoc fit matrimonium, sicut nec promissio est solutio.
Ad 3 et 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de carnali copula, dicendum, quod iura9 praesumunt, quod ipse consentit, et hoc per signum expressum exterius, quia tanquam uxorem cognoscit; et praesumunt etiam, quod tanquam uxorem cognoscat, «ne reportet commodum de malitia». Unde in veritate si non consentit, sed solum tanquam meretricem cognoscit, matrimonium secundum veritatem non est. Quia tamen coitus ille cum praecedenti sponsione signum est probabile consensus matrimonialis; ideo matrimonium est secundum iudicium Ecclesiae, et consulendum est tali, quod consentiat, si non consensit interius in animo.
I. Circa 1. quaestionem manifestum est, quod sicut differunt promissio et solutio, sic consensus de futuro et de praesenti, nec non sponsalia et matrimonium. Cfr. supra d. 27. dub. 3, de promissione iurata infra dub. 1. 2. — Plura de sponsalibus habet cum aliis S. Thom. supra d. 27. q. 2. a. 1-3.
De ipsa 1. quaestione: Scot., hic q. unica. — S. Thom., supra d. 27. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3, et de promissione iurata, hic a. 1; Suppl. q. 45. a. 3, q. 46. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1-4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
II. Circa 2. quaestionem patet, quod cum indissolubilitas matrimonio sit essentialis, consensus ad tempus non est verus nec sufficiens consensus.
De hac 2. quaestione: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1.
III. Solutio 3. quaestionis quoad principia est communis; in applicatione ad plures casus oriuntur varia dubia, de quibus agitur in libris scientiae moralis et canonum.
S. Thom., infra d. 29. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 47. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Question I. Whether consent for the future makes marriage.
Concerning the first it is proceeded thus, and it is shown that consent for the future makes marriage.
1. By this reasoning: as the present is related to the present, so the future to the future; but consent for the present makes marriage in the present: therefore consent for the future makes marriage for the future.
2. Likewise, it seems by a like case: as one who promises something in the present is obligated in the present, so one who promises something for the future is obligated for that time1; but as a promise is the cause of an obligation, so consent is the cause of marriage: therefore it seems [so].
3. Likewise, consent for the future makes marriage, if carnal intercourse should follow2; but carnal intercourse is not the cause of marriage, but follows upon it: therefore the marriage existed before they came together: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if one should consent for the future, and fornication should follow, such that one does not know [the other] with marital affection but with a fornicator's affection, [this still] makes marriage; but an oath obligates more than fornication [does]: therefore if one should consent together with an oath, she is his wife.
On the contrary:
1. The laws3 say that if someone consents to one woman by words of the future and to another by words of the present, the second is his wife: if therefore one man has one wife, the first was not his wife.
2. Likewise, it seems by reasoning: because what is future is not [yet]4: therefore when he consents for the future, he does not yet consent: therefore there is not now a marriage. But that there is not one in that future [moment] either is plain: let us be in that future [moment], and let it be supposed that then he does not consent; there is no consent then, nor was there before: therefore there is no marriage, nor was there.
3. Likewise, one who has once consented to a certain woman ought not to consent again for this, that marriage may come about; but consent for the future, when it is said: I shall take you as mine, obligates one to consent again5: therefore by words of the future there is no marital consent. That he does obligate himself is plain, because he obligates himself to taking [her] as wife, and he takes her in no other way than through consent.
Conclusion. Consent does not make marriage, unless it is expressed by words of the present.
I respond: It must be said that consent does not make marriage unless it is expressed by words of the present. For if it is expressed by words of the future, in truth it is not consent then, but a promise of consenting. Hence if someone should say: I shall consent to you; then indeed he does not consent, but promises that he will consent. And because there is no consent there, therefore there is no contracting of marriage; but because there is a promise, therefore there is an obligation; on that account it is to be called not marriage, but betrothal; and this betrothal indeed is confirmed when an oath is added to the simple promise. For according to the laws6 the man is to be compelled to take the woman as wife, unless some circumstance intervenes that dissolves the betrothal.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that as the present is related to the present etc.; it must be said that this is true. Hence just as, if one consents today, marriage comes about today; so, if one consents tomorrow, it comes about tomorrow. But when he now speaks of the future, he does not consent, but promises to consent; and therefore marriage does not come about, neither for the present nor for the future, but only a betrothal is contracted7.
To 2. To that which is objected, that one who promises for the future is obligated for the future; it must be said that this is true, because a promise is present; hence when he says: I shall do this, he actually promises, and therefore8 he is obligated. Likewise this one too is obligated by pledging; but marriage does not thereby come about, just as a promise is not the discharge [of the obligation].
To 3 and 4. To that which is objected concerning carnal intercourse, it must be said that the laws9 presume that he himself consents, and this through an outward express sign, because he acknowledges her as his wife; and they presume further that he acknowledges her as his wife, "lest he should reap advantage from his own wrongdoing." Hence in truth, if he does not consent, but acknowledges her only as a prostitute, there is no marriage according to the truth. Because, however, that intercourse, together with the preceding pledge, is a probable sign of marital consent; therefore there is marriage according to the judgment of the Church, and such a one is to be counselled to consent, if he did not consent inwardly in his mind.
I. Concerning the first question it is manifest that, just as a promise and its discharge differ, so do consent for the future and for the present, and likewise betrothal and marriage. Cf. above, d. 27, dub. 3; on a sworn promise, below, dub. 1, 2. — St. Thomas has more on betrothals, along with others, above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1–3.
On this first question itself: Scotus, here, the only question. — St. Thomas, above, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3, and on the sworn promise, here, a. 1; Supplement, q. 45, a. 3, q. 46, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarantaise, here, q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 1, q. 1–4. — Durandus, here, q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here, the only question.
II. Concerning the second question it is plain that, since indissolubility is essential to marriage, consent for a fixed time is not a true nor a sufficient consent.
On this second question: Peter of Tarantaise, here, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 1.
III. The solution of the third question, as to its principles, is common [to all]; in its application to several cases various doubts arise, which are treated in the books of moral science and of the canons.
St. Thomas, below, d. 29, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3; Supplement, q. 47, a. 5. — Peter of Tarantaise, loc. cit., quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit., q. 2. — Durandus, here, q. 2.
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- 1In codd. S T additur scilicet tempore, vel testimonio, vel termino.In codd. S T there is added namely of time, or of testimony, or of a set term.
- 2Vide C. Is qui fidem (30.) et C. Adolescens (32.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. I.).See c. Is qui fidem (30) and c. Adolescens (32), Decretals, bk. IV, tit. I, On Betrothals and Marriage.
- 3In C. Sicut ex litteris (22.) et C. Si inter virum (31.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. I.).In c. Sicut ex litteris (22) and c. Si inter virum (31), Decretals, bk. IV, tit. I, On Betrothals and Marriage.
- 4August., XI. Confess. c. 14. n. 17. et 18: Futurum nondum est. — Inferius pro simus in illo futuro et edd. quia.Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 14, n. 17 and 18: The future does not yet exist. — Below, for let us be in that future the editions [read] because.
- 5Cod. F addit: ergo per verba de futuro non est consentire.Cod. F adds: therefore by words of the future there is no consenting.
- 6Ut C. Ex litteris Silvani (10.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.). Cfr. ibid. C. Praeterea hi (2.) et C. Requisivit a nobis (17).As c. Ex litteris Silvani (10), Decretals, bk. IV, tit. I, On Betrothals and Marriage. Cf. ibid. c. Praeterea hi (2) and c. Requisivit a nobis (17).
- 7Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Superius verbis Sed cum codd. I K interserunt tamen. Subinde pro sed cod. Z substituit eo quod.See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Above, to the words But when, codd. I K insert however. Further on, for but cod. Z substitutes because.
- 8Cod. T addit actu.Cod. T adds actually.
- 9Ut in ipsis decretalibus supra pag. 688, nota 2, allegatis et in Glossis super ipsas insinuatur. Cfr. ibid. C. Ad id quod (21.). — De seq. axiomate (ne reportet commodum etc.) cfr. supra pag. 103, nota 11.As is suggested in the very decretals cited above, p. 688, note 2, and in the Glosses upon them. Cf. ibid. c. Ad id quod (21). — On the following axiom (lest he reap advantage etc.) cf. above, p. 103, note 11.