Bonaventure

p. 695 ### Articulus Unicus. Quaestio VI. An consensus debeat esse in carnalem copulam.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur¹, in quid debeat esse consensus; et quod in carnalem copulam, videtur:

1. Quia ita dicit Hieronymus², quod «voventibus virginitatem non solum nubere, sed etiam velle nubere damnabile est»; sed non esset damnabile, nisi esset contra votum; et non esset contra votum, nisi consentirent in opus carnis: ergo necesse erat in illud consentire.

2. Item, in omnia, in quae consentit vir et uxor, possunt consentire frater et soror licite, excepta copula carnali: ergo si inter fratrem et sororem non potest licite contrahi matrimonium, patet etc. Si tu dicas mihi, quod oportet consentire in copulam coniugalem; quaero, quid vocetur copula coniugalis; et tandem oportet ad hoc devenire, quod ibi includatur copula carnalis.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur infra distinctione trigesima³, et loquitur de purissima Virgine: «Committens virginitatem suam divinae dispositioni, consensit in carnalem copulam»: si ergo nullum matrimonium purius illo, nullum sanctius, in omni oportet consentire.

4. Item, si qua mulier dicat: consentio in te, ut tamen non cognoscas me, non est matrimonium: ergo si ista conditio est contra substantiam matrimonii⁴, ergo tenetur consentire in carnalem copulam.

5. Item, matrimonium ad hoc institutum est, ut sint duo in carne una⁵: ergo necesse est ad hoc, quod sit matrimonium, quod carnaliter uniantur vel in carne, vel in voluntate: ergo non est matrimonium sine carnali copula.

Contra: 1. Magister dicit in littera⁶, quod «consensus cohabitationis vel carnalis copulae non facit coniugium».

2. Item, in distinctione trigesima⁷ dicitur: «Consensit Maria in copulam maritalem, sed non in copulam carnalem».

3. Item, hoc ipsum expresse dicit Hugo in libro de Virginitate Mariae⁸; et tamen ex consensu suo matrimonium contraxit: ergo non oportet in carnalem copulam consentire.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia nullus consentiens in actum carnis est virgo perfecte; beatus Ioannes est virgo perfecte: ergo non consensit in actum carnis. Et consensit in matrimonium quia de nuptiis est a Domino vocatus⁹: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullus vovens continentiam virginalem potest sine peccato consentire in actum carnis; beata Virgo vovit, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁰, et ipsa innuit in responsione sua, quam dixit: ergo peccavit, si in actum sive in carnalem copulam consensit. Et constat, quod sine peccato nupsit: ergo etc.

6. Item, possibile est, inter duos esse plenum matrimonium et perfectum sine commixtione carnali: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis consentiat in matrimonium, non consentiendo in commixtionem carnalem; si hoc potest esse in re et effectu, potest esse in consensu et causa¹¹.

Conclusio. Consensus, qui matrimonium facit, est consensus in mutuam suorum corporum potestatem, quae tamen aliter datur in contractione, et aliter in consummatione matrimonii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quorundam opinio fuit, quod ad hoc, quod contrahatur matrimonium, necesse est absolute consentire in copulam carnalem. Et dicunt hi, quod beata Virgo et Ioannes consenserit, tamen sine peccato; quia Ioannes¹² nec voverat nec proposuerat virginitatem servare; beata Virgo, quia non voverat, sed tantum proposuerat. — Sed haec opinio iniuriam facit Virgini gloriosae, quia, quamvis excuset a culpa, minuit tamen

p. 696 virginitatis eius gloriam, ut iam non debeat Virgo super omnes virgines nuncupari; quod noster refugit animus pariter et auditus. Unde haec opinio satis convenienter a magistro Hugone reprobatur.

Aliorum opinio fuit, et istius fuit Antissiodorensis¹³, quod necesse est consentire in copulam carnalem non in particulari, sed in universali; non explicite, sed implicite. Oportet enim consentire in copulam coniugalem, quae continet in se quatuor, scilicet cohabitationem et mutuum obsequium et mutuam corporum potestatem et copulam carnalem. — Sed illud non videtur sufficiens, quia constat, quod beata Virgo bene sciebat legem coniugii et sciebat explicite et cogitabat de actu coniugum; aut ergo consentiebat, aut dissentiebat. Si consentiebat, redit primum inconveniens; si dissentiebat, ergo nec in generali nec in speciali consentiebat.

Tertia opinio est, quod oportet consentire in carnalem copulam vel absolute, vel sub conditione, videlicet nisi Deus aliter disponat, vel si placuerit Deo; et tali modo consensit Virgo beata, ut videtur dicere beatus Augustinus¹⁴, et hoc non repugnat virginitati. — Sed certe omnis, quicumque recte consentit, taliter consentit. Praeterea, non est consensus conditionatus, sed absolutus ille qui matrimonium facit, et maxime cum non stet conditio; Deus autem nolebat Virginem copulari carnaliter viro.

Et propterea dicendum, quod consensus, qui matrimonium facit, est consensus in mutuam suorum corporum potestatem; et hoc sonant verba, cum dicunt: accipio te in meum, vel in meam; et sic consensit beata Virgo et Ioseph. — Sed notandum, quod aliter datur potestas corporis in contractione matrimonii, aliter in consummatione. In contractione ita datur uni, ut non possit, illo vivente, dari alii; ita etiam datur illi, ut ius habeat petendi, et necesse sit reddere petenti, nisi moriatur mundo per votum castitatis solemne et ingressum in religionem¹⁵. Quoniam igitur beata Virgo divina inspiratione noverat, vel fortassis ipsius Ioseph relatione, quod nunquam vellet uti eius corporis potestate, sed eius custodire virginitatem; ideo potuit et debuit ei committere sive dare. Sciebat etiam, quod si vellet exigere, quod posset publicando votum contraire; et sic patet illud. — Si ergo volumus istam mutuam corporum potestatem vocare copulam coniugalem; sic beata Virgo consensit in copulam, ut omnes nubentes. In matrimonii autem consummatione omnino transfertur potestas, ita quod nec voto privato nec solemni possit petenti debitum adversari. Unde gloriosa Virgo matrimonium consensit contrahere, sed certa fuit, quod nunquam matrimonium consummaret, et hoc scivit Spiritus sancti revelatione, vel Ioseph relatione, vel quia considerabat de voti publicatione; quia in Lege praeceptum erat servare, sed nullus fuerat ausus hoc vovere. Et hoc tangitur in libello illo, quem transtulit Hieronymus de Nativitate Mariae¹⁶, qui quamvis sit apocryphus, continet tamen multa verissima.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod velle nubere damnabile est; dicendum, quod Hieronymus loquitur de illis qui volunt nubere ex carnis petulantia, et tales magis appetunt coniunctionem corporum quam animorum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omnia frater et soror praeterquam in copulam carnalem possunt consentire; dicendum, quod falsum est; non enim possunt sibi suorum corporum dare mutuam potestatem; unde alter potest alii nubere, altero contradicente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicit Augustinus, quod consensit in copulam carnalem; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, quia consensit in mutuam corporum potestatem, quae ad carnalem copulam ordinatur, non tamen de necessitate; et beata Virgo¹⁷ in illam mutuam corporum potestatem absolute consensit, residuum vero, scilicet ordinationem in actum, divinae dispositioni commisit, credens semper¹⁸, quod Dominus ipsam servaret sine macula. Exemplum est de beata Caecilia¹⁹.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conditio illa impedit; dicendum, quod verum est²⁰, contra collationem mutuae potestatis; in consensu enim in copulam coniugalem datur potestas petendi debitum, licet non teneatur ad statim, sed viam habet, per quam evadere possit; quae etsi non erat nota omnibus, erat tamen nota spiritualibus mentibus; sicut certum est nobis de gloriosa Virgine et probabilius praesumitur de Ioseph, quoniam hoc non est iuris positivi, sed magis est iuris divini.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est propter carnalem copulam; dicendum, quod verum est, quod prima et principalis institutio ad hoc fuit, et tamen hoc non est tota ratio sive causa matrimonii, sicut melius patebit infra²¹, immo etiam fidei et Sacramenti et mutuae educationis; et hoc supra determi-

p. 697 natum est, ubi agitur, utrum carnalis copula sit de integritate Sacramenti.

Haec autem sine praeiudicio dicta sint, maxime propter reverentiam Virginis; non enim possumus negare, quin inter Mariam et Ioseph fuerit verum coniugium, cum hoc dicat Scriptura evangelica²², et Sancti omnes in hoc consentiant. Rursus, pietas fidei et reverentia Virginis non patitur nos sentire, ipsius beatissimam et purissimam et integerrimam animam ad opus carnis fuisse aliquantulum inclinatam; nec credo, ipsam in dubio se super hoc posuisse. Si quis tamen aliter dicat, dum tamen Virgini non faciat iniuriam, non est magna vis facienda. Cavendum est enim diligenter, ut honor Dominae nostrae in nullo ab aliquo minuatur, qui etiam in periculo capitis debeat²³ integer custodiri.

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Article Unique. Question VI. Whether consent ought to be to carnal intercourse.

Sixth and last it is asked¹, in what the consent [that makes marriage] ought to consist; and that it is in carnal intercourse, it seems:

1. Because Jerome² thus says, that "for those who have vowed virginity, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry, is damnable"; but it would not be damnable, unless it were contrary to a vow; and it would not be contrary to a vow, unless they consented to the work of the flesh: therefore it was necessary to consent to that.

2. Likewise, in all the things to which husband and wife consent, brother and sister can licitly consent, except carnal intercourse: therefore if marriage cannot licitly be contracted between brother and sister, it is plain, etc. If you say to me that one must consent to conjugal intercourse, I ask what is called conjugal intercourse; and eventually one must come to this, that carnal intercourse is included there.

3. Likewise, Augustine says — and it is found below, in the thirtieth distinction³ — speaking of the most pure Virgin: "Committing her virginity to the divine disposition, she consented to carnal intercourse": if therefore no marriage is purer than that one, none holier, then in every case one ought to consent.

4. Likewise, if some woman should say: I consent to you, provided however that you do not know me, it is not marriage: therefore if that condition is contrary to the substance of marriage⁴, then one is bound to consent to carnal intercourse.

5. Likewise, marriage was instituted for this, that they be two in one flesh⁵: therefore it is necessary for this, that it be marriage, that they be united carnally either in the flesh or in the will: therefore there is no marriage without carnal intercourse.

On the contrary: 1. The Master says in the text⁶, that "consent to cohabitation or to carnal intercourse does not make marriage."

2. Likewise, in the thirtieth distinction⁷ it is said: "Mary consented to marital intercourse, but not to carnal intercourse."

3. Likewise, Hugh expressly says this very thing in the book On the Virginity of Mary⁸; and yet from her consent she contracted marriage: therefore it is not necessary to consent to carnal intercourse.

4. Likewise, it seems by reason: because no one who consents to the act of the flesh is a perfect virgin; blessed John was a perfect virgin: therefore he did not consent to the act of the flesh. And he consented to marriage because he was called by the Lord away from a wedding⁹: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, no one who has vowed virginal continence can, without sin, consent to the act of the flesh; the blessed Virgin vowed [continence], as Augustine says¹⁰, and she herself hinted at this in her response, which she gave: therefore she sinned, if she consented to the act, or to carnal intercourse. And it is certain that she married without sin: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, it is possible for there to be between two persons a full and perfect marriage without carnal commingling: therefore it is possible for someone to consent to marriage without consenting to carnal commingling; if this can be so in reality and in effect, it can be so in consent and in cause¹¹.

Conclusion. The consent that makes marriage is consent to the mutual power over one another's bodies, which, however, is given in one way in the contracting [of marriage], and in another way in the consummation of marriage.

I respond: It must be said that the opinion of certain persons was that, for marriage to be contracted, it is necessary to consent absolutely to carnal intercourse. And these say that the blessed Virgin and John consented, yet without sin; because John¹² had neither vowed nor purposed to keep virginity; the blessed Virgin, because she had not vowed, but only purposed. — But this opinion does harm to the glorious Virgin, because, although it excuses from fault, it nevertheless diminishes

the glory of her virginity, so that the Virgin ought no longer to be called above all virgins; which our mind and hearing alike shrink from. Hence this opinion is quite fittingly rejected by Master Hugh.

The opinion of others — and this was the opinion of the Bishop of Auxerre¹³ — was that it is necessary to consent to carnal intercourse not in particular, but in universal; not explicitly, but implicitly. For one must consent to conjugal intercourse, which contains in itself four things, namely cohabitation, and mutual service, and the mutual power over each other's bodies, and carnal intercourse. — But this does not seem sufficient, because it is certain that the blessed Virgin well knew the law of marriage, and knew it explicitly, and thought about the act of spouses; therefore she either consented or dissented. If she consented, the first inconsistency returns; if she dissented, then she consented neither in general nor in particular.

The third opinion is that one must consent to carnal intercourse either absolutely or under a condition, namely unless God should otherwise dispose, or if it should please God; and in this way the blessed Virgin consented, as blessed Augustine seems to say¹⁴, and this does not conflict with virginity. — But surely everyone who rightly consents, consents in this manner. Moreover, the consent that makes marriage is not conditional but absolute, especially since the condition does not hold; but God did not will the Virgin to be carnally joined to a man.

And therefore it must be said that the consent that makes marriage is consent to the mutual power over one another's bodies; and this is what the words mean when they say: I take you as mine [husband], or as mine [wife]; and thus the blessed Virgin and Joseph consented. — But it must be noted that the power over the body is given in one way in the contracting of marriage, and in another way in its consummation. In the contracting, it is given to one in such a way that it cannot, while that one lives, be given to another; it is likewise given to the other such that he has the right to ask [for the marital debt], and it is necessary to render it to the one asking, unless he should die to the world through the solemn vow of chastity and entrance into religious life¹⁵. Since, then, the blessed Virgin knew by divine inspiration — or perhaps by Joseph's own report — that he would never wish to use the power over her body, but rather to guard her virginity; therefore she was able and bound to entrust or give it to him. She knew, too, that if he wished to exact it, he could contravene the vow by making it public; and thus that [difficulty] is resolved. — If, then, we wish to call this mutual power over the body "conjugal intercourse," in this way the blessed Virgin consented to intercourse, as do all who marry. But in the consummation of marriage the power is transferred altogether otherwise, in such a way that neither by private vow nor by solemn vow can it be opposed to the one asking for the debt. Hence the glorious Virgin consented to contract marriage, but she was certain that she would never consummate the marriage, and this she knew by revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by Joseph's report, or because she considered the publication of the vow; because in the Law it had been commanded to keep [a vow], but no one had dared to make this particular vow. And this is touched upon in that little book which Jerome translated, On the Nativity of Mary¹⁶, which, although it is apocryphal, nevertheless contains many very true things.

1. To that, then, which is objected — that to wish to marry is said to be damnable — it must be said that Jerome speaks of those who wish to marry out of the wantonness of the flesh, and such people desire the union of bodies more than of souls.

2. To that which is objected — that in all things brother and sister, except carnal intercourse, can consent — it must be said that this is false; for they cannot give to one another the mutual power over their bodies; hence one can marry another, the other objecting.

3. To that which is objected — that Augustine says she consented to carnal intercourse — it must be said that this is understood in the sense that she consented to the mutual power over the bodies, which is ordered to carnal intercourse, but not of necessity; and the blessed Virgin¹⁷ consented absolutely to that mutual power over bodies, while the remainder — namely, the ordering to the act — she committed to the divine disposition, believing always¹⁸ that the Lord would keep her without stain. An example is the blessed Cecilia¹⁹.

4. To that which is objected — that that condition impedes [marriage] — it must be said that this is true²⁰ against the conferring of mutual power; for in consent to conjugal intercourse, power is given to ask for the debt, although one is not bound to render it at once, but has a way by which he may escape it; which, even though it was not known to all, was nevertheless known to spiritual minds; just as it is certain for us concerning the glorious Virgin, and it is more probably presumed concerning Joseph, since this is not a matter of positive law, but rather of divine law.

5. To that which is objected — that it is for the sake of carnal intercourse — it must be said that this is true, that the first and principal institution [of marriage] was for this, and yet this is not the whole reason or cause of marriage, as will be shown better below²¹; indeed, it is also for the sake of faith, and of the sacrament, and of mutual upbringing; and this has been determined above, where it is treated whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of the sacrament.

But let these things be said without prejudice, chiefly out of reverence for the Virgin; for we cannot deny that between Mary and Joseph there was a true marriage, since the Gospel Scripture says this²², and all the Saints agree in this. Again, the piety of faith and reverence for the Virgin does not allow us to think that her most blessed and most pure and most whole soul was ever inclined, even a little, toward the act of the flesh; nor do I believe that she ever set herself in doubt about this. If anyone should say otherwise, provided he does no injury to the Virgin, no great effort need be made [to refute him]. One must, however, be diligent to see that the honor of Our Lady is in no way diminished by anyone, since even at the peril of life it ought²³ to be kept whole.

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