Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 32
Articulus I. De obligatione coniugum per comparationem ad votum continentiae.
Quaestio I. Utrum post carnalem copulam possit vir continere, uxore nolente.
Quantum ad primum ostenditur, quod non:
1. Quia post carnalem copulam vir non habet potestatem sui corporis1: si non habet, ergo non potest de ipso facere sacrificium continentiae, uxore nolente.
2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera2: « Non modo non hortamur, sed etiam quod vovisti prohibemus implere, si forte coniux tua hoc tecum suscipere animi vel carnis infirmitate recusat ».
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia mulier non tenetur continere, nec vir potest eam ad continentiam cogere; sed cogit eam, si, ipsa invita, vult3 continentiam servare: ergo cum non possit cogere, non potest continere.
4. Item, sicut servus tenetur domino obsequi, sic vir uxori debitum reddere, et fortius, quia est a Domino confirmatum4; sed servus, prohibente domino, non potest religionem intrare, vel a servitio eius se auferre: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Licitum est viro, uxore etiam prohibente, accipere crucem in subsidium Terrae sanctae5; sed votum continentiae adhuc melius est: ergo etc.
2. Item, uxore prohibente, potest quis corpus suum ad martyrium et mortem exponere; et tunc constat, quod se reddit impossibilem ad solvendum debitum: ergo etc.
3. Item, quantumcumque quis iuret, vel voveat, vel se obliget, ut non impleat consilia; non tenet iuramentum nec votum: ergo nullus potest se obligare, quin semper faciat melius; sed melius est continere, sicut dicit Apostolus6: ergo etc.
4. Item, qui impedit aliquem volentem ascendere ad altiorem statum7 peccat graviter, quia Spiritui sancto obviat: ergo si vir vult continere et religionem intrare, videtur, quod uxor teneatur consentire: ergo si vult, potest ad hoc compelli de iure: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Post copulam carnalem, invita uxore, vir non potest continere, ut non reddat debitum, sed tantum, ut non petat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod continere est duobus modis: aut omnino ita, quod debitum nec petat nec solvat; aut non omnino ita, quod debitum non petat, tamen petenti solvat. Primo modo non potest vir continere, uxore invita, quia non potest ei auferre ius, quod habet in corpus viri; secundo modo continere potest, ipsa contradicente, et vovere potest; et si voveat, servare tenetur, videlicet ut nunquam debitum petat. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod non omnino potest continere.
Ad obiecta:
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest accipere crucem; dicendum, quod hoc factum est in favorem et necessitatem Terrae sanctae; nec facta est omnino derogatio iuri mulieris, quia debet mulier velle pro necessitate tanta continere ad tempus; quod si nolit, potest virum suum sequi8. Sed cum vovetur continentia, tunc omnino mulier iure suo privatur et secundum tempus totius vitae.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de martyrio, dicendum, quod mori potest pro Christo, si necessitas immineat, quia mulier tenetur hoc velle; et si vir voluntarie se offerat, mulier non potest vetare9, quia, ipso mortuo, poterit cum alio contrahere. Sed non sic est, cum vovet, uxore vivente.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper licet facere quod melius est, nec potest se homo obligare ad minus bonum; dicendum, quod verum est de eo qui habet sui corporis potestatem. — Vel dicendum, quod si continet non petendo, sed solum reddendo, non minus meretur, quam si omnino contineret. Unde Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera10: « Pro sanctificatione perfecta Deus tibi reputabit, si non quod tibi debetur exigis, sed reddis quod debes uxori ».
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui impedit aliquem etc., dicendum, quod peccat qui impedit aliquem ea ratione, qua in illo exstinguit bonum propositum et sancti Spiritus donum; sed mulier in hoc non potest consentire, quin sit sibi in praeiudicium, quia, si concedit viro, quod voveat continentiam, tenetur et ipsa continere. Quoniam igitur ipsa non potest cogi ad continentiam, quia hoc est bonum consilium; ideo dico, quod ipsa non peccat, sed si alia mulier impediret, tunc peccatum esset.
I. Quoad duas huius articuli quaestiones vide supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 1. et 2. cum scholio. Casus in 1. quaestione solutus de voto non petendi a multis aliter, scilicet negative, solvitur; quam opinionem S. Thom. (hic a. 4. ad 3.) censet esse probabiliorem. Dicit enim: « Sed quia, si alter nunquam peteret debitum, ex hoc alteri matrimonium onerosum redderetur, dum oporteret, unum semper confusionem debiti petendi subire; ideo alii probabilius dicunt, quod neutrum [non reddere et non petere] potest unus absque consensu alterius vovere ». Durandus putat, tale votum licere quidem, sed non esse « usquequaque discretum ». De 1. quaestione: Scotus hanc et seq. quaestionem tangit hic q. unica n. 2. seqq. — S. Thom., art. cit.; Suppl. q. 64. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. n. 4. 5. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
II. De seq. quaestione cfr. supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 2. et auctores ibi citatos.
III. Quoad sequentis articuli quaestionem 1. antiqui doctores communiter tenent, lepram solvere quidem sponsalia, tamen, cum non solvat matrimonium, partem sanam teneri ad reddendum debitum, sed non ad cohabitandum (ita S. Thom., hic a. 1. ad 4; Suppl. q. 64. a. 1. ad 4.). Hoc restringit Durand. (hic q. 1. n. 8.), excipiens casum, quando secundum iudicium medicorum sano immineat periculum infectionis; quae doctrina videtur esse secundum mentem omnium, praesertim S. Thomae (in corp. art.), nisi forte quis iam ante contractum matrimonium sciverit lepram alterius. De eadem praeter citatos: Scot., hic q. unica n. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2.
IV. De divortio ob adulterium permisso diffuse tractatur infra d. 35, ubi alii Lombardi commentatores etiam hanc quaestionem solvunt.
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Article I. On the obligation of spouses by comparison to the vow of continence.
Question I. Whether after carnal union a man may be continent, the wife being unwilling.
As to the first point it is shown that he may not:
1. Because after carnal union the man does not have power over his own body1: if he does not have it, then he cannot make of it a sacrifice of continence, the wife being unwilling.
2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text2: "Not only do we not exhort you, but we even forbid you to fulfill what you have vowed, if perchance your spouse refuses to undertake this with you through weakness of soul or of flesh."
3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the woman is not bound to be continent, nor can the man compel her to continence; but he does compel her if, she being unwilling, he wishes3 to keep continence: therefore, since he cannot compel [her], he cannot be continent.
4. Likewise, just as a servant is bound to obey his master, so a man [is bound] to render the debt to his wife, and more strongly so, because it is confirmed by the Lord4; but a servant, his master forbidding, cannot enter religion, or withdraw himself from his master's service: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. It is licit for a man, even his wife forbidding, to take the cross in aid of the Holy Land5; but the vow of continence is still better: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the wife forbidding, one may expose his body to martyrdom and death; and then it is agreed that he renders himself unable to pay the debt: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, however much one swears, or vows, or binds himself not to fulfill the counsels; neither the oath nor the vow holds: therefore no one can bind himself so as not always to do the better thing; but it is better to be continent, as the Apostle says6: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, whoever hinders someone willing to ascend to a higher state7 sins gravely, because he opposes the Holy Spirit: therefore if a man wishes to be continent and to enter religion, it seems that the wife is bound to consent: therefore if he wishes, he can be compelled to this by law: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
After carnal union, the wife being unwilling, a man cannot be continent so as not to render the debt, but only so as not to demand it.
I respond: It must be said that to be continent is [understood] in two ways: either wholly so, that he neither demands nor pays the debt; or not wholly so, that he does not demand the debt, yet pays it to the one demanding. In the first way a man cannot be continent, the wife being unwilling, because he cannot take from her the right which she has over the man's body; in the second way he can be continent, she contradicting, and he can vow [it]; and if he vows, he is bound to keep [it], namely that he never demand the debt. — Therefore the reasons proving that he cannot be wholly continent are to be granted.
To the objections:
1. To that which is objected, that he can take the cross; it must be said that this was done in favor and for the necessity of the Holy Land; nor was there made an entire derogation of the woman's right, because the woman ought to will to be continent for a time on account of so great a necessity; and if she is unwilling, she can follow her husband8. But when continence is vowed, then the woman is wholly deprived of her right, and that for the time of her whole life.
2. To that which is objected concerning martyrdom, it must be said that one can die for Christ, if necessity presses, because the woman is bound to will this; and if the man voluntarily offers himself, the woman cannot forbid [it]9, because, he being dead, she will be able to contract with another. But it is not so when he vows, the wife being alive.
3. To that which is objected, that it is always licit to do what is better, nor can a man bind himself to a lesser good; it must be said that this is true of him who has power over his own body. — Or it must be said that if he is continent by not demanding, but only by paying, he merits no less than if he were wholly continent. Hence Augustine says, and it is contained in the text10: "For perfect sanctification God will reckon it to you, if you do not exact what is owed to you, but render what you owe to your wife."
4. To that which is objected concerning him who hinders someone etc., it must be said that he sins who hinders someone for this reason, that in him he extinguishes a good purpose and a gift of the Holy Spirit; but the woman in this cannot consent without its being to her own prejudice, because, if she grants to the man that he vow continence, she too is bound to be continent. Since therefore she cannot be compelled to continence, because this is a counsel; therefore I say that she does not sin, but if another woman were to hinder [him], then it would be a sin.
I. As to the two questions of this article, see above, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1 and 2, with the scholion. The case in the first question, [namely] concerning the vow of not demanding, is solved by many otherwise, that is, negatively; which opinion S. Thomas (here a. 4, ad 3) judges to be more probable. For he says: "But because, if one party should never demand the debt, from this the marriage would be rendered burdensome to the other, since one would always have to undergo the confusion of demanding the debt; therefore others say more probably that neither [not rendering and not demanding] can one vow without the consent of the other." Durandus thinks that such a vow is indeed licit, but is not "in every way discreet." On the first question: Scotus touches this and the following question here, q. unica, n. 2 ff. — S. Thom., art. cit.; Suppl. q. 64, a. 4. — B. Albert., here a. 2, 4. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 1, quaestiunc. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2, q. 1. — Durand., here q. 2, n. 4, 5. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions, here q. unica.
II. On the following question cf. above, d. 27, a. 3, q. 2, and the authors cited there.
III. As to the question of the following article, 1., the ancient doctors commonly hold that leprosy indeed dissolves espousals, yet, since it does not dissolve marriage, that the healthy party is bound to render the debt, but not to cohabit (thus S. Thom., here a. 1, ad 4; Suppl. q. 64, a. 1, ad 4). Durandus restricts this (here q. 1, n. 8), excepting the case when, according to the judgment of physicians, danger of infection threatens the healthy [party]; which doctrine seems to be according to the mind of all, especially S. Thomas (in the body of the article), unless perhaps someone knew of the other's leprosy already before the marriage was contracted. On the same, besides those cited: Scot., here q. unica, n. 6, 7. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 3, quaestiunc. 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 4, q. 2.
IV. On divorce permitted on account of adultery it is treated at length below, d. 35, where the other commentators on Lombard also solve this question.
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- 1Epist. I. Cor. 7, 4. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 7. seq.First Letter to the Corinthians 7:4. See above in the Master's text, d. XXVII, c. 7 and following.
- 2Hic c. 2. — Pro recusat cod. aa recusaret.Here, c. 2. — For recusat codex aa reads recusaret.
- 3Cod. F vir vult.Codex F reads vir vult ("the man wishes").
- 4Cfr. I. Cor. 7, 3. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 655, nota 4.Cf. I Corinthians 7:3. — On the lesser [good] cf. above, p. 655, note 4.
- 5Secundum C. Ex multa (9.), § In tanta quoque necessitate, X. de Voto et voti redemptione (lib. III. tit. 34.).According to the decretal Ex multa (9.), § In tanta quoque necessitate, in the Decretals, "On the Vow and the Redemption of a Vow" (bk. III, tit. 34).
- 6Epist. I. Cor. 7, 1. 8. et 38.First Letter to the Corinthians 7:1, 8, and 38.
- 7Cod. W gradum.Codex W reads gradum ("step").
- 8Ut dicitur in fine C. Quod super his (8.), X. de Voto et voti redemptione (lib. III. tit. 34.). — Superius pro iuri permulti codd. et ed. J perperam viri et.As is said at the end of the decretal Quod super his (8.), in the Decretals, "On the Vow and the Redemption of a Vow" (bk. III, tit. 34). — Above, for iuri very many codices and ed. J wrongly read viri et.
- 9Edd. negare, inferius pro vivente cod. O nolente.The editions read negare; below, for vivente codex O reads nolente.
- 10Hic c. 2.Here, c. 2. ---