Bonaventure

Quaestio V. Utrum post divortium possint vir et mulier invicem reconciliari.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum post divortium possint vir et uxor invicem reconciliari. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios septimo²: Si discesserit uxor a viro, praecipit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari: ergo potest ei reconciliari.

Item, quod vir innocens possit reconciliare uxorem invitam, videtur:

2. Quia non peccavit, ergo nihil amisit de iure suo, ergo potest petere debitum: ergo illa tenetur reddere.

3. Item, vir non tenetur continere, quia non obligatur, nec ex voto nec ex poena; et non potest alteram ducere: ergo potest sibi uxorem propriam reconciliare.

Item, quod fornicaria possit reconciliare virum invitum, videtur:

4. Esto quod sufficienter egerit poenitentiam, remissa est culpa et poena: ergo cessat causa divortii: ergo « cum, cessante causa, cesset effectus³ » videtur etc.

5. Item, possibile est, virum fornicari; sed fornicante viro, competit exceptio contra virum petentem divortium: ergo pari ratione competit actio mulieri ad repetendum virum.

Contra:

1. Regula est in canone, Causa sexta, quaestione quarta⁴: « Quod semel bene definitum est nulla debet iteratione retractari »: ergo cum divortium sit celebratum per definitionem Ecclesiae, patet etc.

2. Item, uterque potest servare continentiam et vovere post divortium: ergo unus non habet ius in altero: ergo si non habent invicem ius, non possunt invicem reconciliari amplius.

3. Item, quod fornicanti non competat actio in alium, videtur: quia regula est in iure⁵, quod « actio semel perempta non resuscitatur »: ergo si ex fornicatione amisit ius petendi debitum, patet etc.

4. Item, quod vir non possit sibi reconciliare fornicariam, videtur, quia in iudicio petiit et obtinuit separationem: ergo renuntiavit iuri petendi debitum; et si hoc, cum non possit agere ex eo cui renuntiavit, videtur etc.

Conclusio. Reconciliatio fieri potest, utraque parte consentiente, vel nocente tantum refragante; non vero vel utraque dissentiente, vel innocente refragante.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad reconciliationem faciendam aut uterque concordat, aut uterque discordat, aut unus petit et alter repugnat. — Si uterque concordat, absque dubio fit; si uterque discordat, nec potest nec debet fieri, nisi fiat propter scandalum Ecclesiae, quae scandalizatur, pro eo quod uterque fornicatur publice. Si autem alter petit, aut nocens petit innocentem; et sic non debet cogi ad reconciliationem. Aut innocens nocen-

tem, ut vir castus uxorem adulteram; et sic, ipsa invita, debet reconciliari per iudicium Ecclesiae, quia, sicut dicunt iura¹, « quod in meum favorem introductum est in meum damnum non debet retorqueri ». Aut nocens nocentem petit, ut mulier, quae prius est fornicata, repetit virum, qui est post divortium fornicatus; et sic restituendus est maritus uxori invitus, non quia actio mulieris resuscitata sit, sed in poenam fornicationis viri, quia abusus est privilegio libertatis. Quantumcumque tamen mulier faciat poenitentiam, nunquam acquirit ius in virum, ipso nolente, nisi vir fornicetur; et hoc propter contumeliam, quam intulit matrimonio, quia directe peccavit contra bonum fidei. — Ex his patet solutio obiectorum ad primam partem.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est retractanda sententia; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, quantum est de rigore iuris, non tamen quantum est de favore personae innocentis, ut dictum est.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod uterque potest vovere continentiam; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia fornicans non potest, nisi alter consentiat; et nisi post poenitentiam velit eam recipere, episcopus potest eam licentiare, ut intret religionem.

Ad 3, 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actio mulieris est perempta, et quod vir renuntiavit iuri suo; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia actio mulieris non perimitur simpliciter, sed sub conditione, scilicet si vir permanserit continens; et ratio huius est, quia vinculum semper manet. — Vel potest dici, quod actio non vivificatur, sed de novo datur vel acquiritur a iure ob peccatum viri. — Similiter sequens est falsum, quia vir non renuntiat iuri suo simpliciter, sed ad tempus².

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Question V. Whether, after a divorce, the man and the woman can be reconciled to each other.

Fifthly it is asked whether, after a divorce, the man and the wife can be reconciled to each other. And that they can, seems [to be the case].

1. First to the Corinthians, chapter seven²: If the wife depart from her husband, he commands [her] to remain unmarried, or to be reconciled to her husband: therefore she can be reconciled to him.

Likewise, that the innocent man can reconcile to himself an unwilling wife seems [to be the case]:

2. Because he did not sin, therefore he lost nothing of his right, therefore he can demand the debt: therefore she is bound to render it.

3. Likewise, the man is not bound to be continent, because he is not obligated, neither by vow nor by penalty; and he cannot marry another: therefore he can reconcile to himself his own wife.

Likewise, that a fornicatress can reconcile to herself an unwilling husband seems [to be the case]:

4. Granted that she has sufficiently done penance, the fault and the penalty are remitted: therefore the cause of the divorce ceases: therefore « since, the cause ceasing, the effect ceases³ », it seems, etc.

5. Likewise, it is possible for the man to fornicate; but with the man fornicating, an exception lies against the man demanding a divorce: therefore, by parity of reasoning, an action lies for the woman to reclaim the man.

On the contrary:

1. There is a rule in the canon, Cause six, question four⁴: « What has once been well decided ought not to be retracted by any repetition »: therefore, since the divorce has been celebrated by a decision of the Church, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, each [party] can keep continence and take a vow after the divorce: therefore the one has no right in the other: therefore, if they have no right in each other, they can no longer be reconciled to each other.

3. Likewise, that no action against the other lies for the one who has fornicated seems [to be the case]: because there is a rule in law⁵, that « an action once extinguished is not revived »: therefore, if by fornication she lost the right of demanding the debt, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, that the man cannot reconcile to himself a fornicatress seems [to be the case], because in judgment he sought and obtained the separation: therefore he renounced the right of demanding the debt; and if this [is so], since he cannot act on the basis of what he renounced, it seems, etc.

Conclusion. Reconciliation can take place when both parties consent, or when only the guilty party resists; but not when both dissent, or when the innocent party resists.

I respond: It must be said that, for making a reconciliation, either both agree, or both disagree, or one seeks it and the other refuses. — If both agree, it takes place without doubt; if both disagree, it neither can nor ought to take place, unless it be done on account of scandal to the Church, which is scandalized because both fornicate publicly. But if one seeks it, either the guilty one seeks the innocent; and thus [the innocent] ought not to be compelled to reconciliation. Or the innocent [seeks] the guilty, as a chaste husband [seeks] an adulterous wife; and thus, though she be unwilling, she ought to be reconciled by the judgment of the Church, because, as the laws say¹, « what has been introduced in my favor ought not to be turned to my harm ». Or the guilty seeks the guilty, as when a woman, who first fornicated, reclaims a husband who fornicated after the divorce; and thus the husband must be restored to the wife unwillingly, not because the woman's action has been revived, but as a penalty for the man's fornication, because he has abused the privilege of liberty. However much, nevertheless, the woman may do penance, she never acquires a right in the man, against his will, unless the man fornicates; and this on account of the affront which she inflicted on the matrimony, because she sinned directly against the good of fidelity. — From these things the solution of the objections to the first part is clear.

To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that the sentence must not be retracted; it must be said that this is true as far as the rigor of the law is concerned, yet not as far as the favor of the innocent person is concerned, as has been said.

To 2. To that which is objected, that each [party] can vow continence; it must be said that this is false, because the one who fornicates cannot [do so], unless the other consents; and unless, after penance, he wishes to receive her back, the bishop can grant her leave to enter religion.

To 3, 4. To that which is objected, that the woman's action is extinguished, and that the man renounced his right; it must be said that this is false: because the woman's action is not extinguished simply, but under a condition, namely if the man shall have remained continent; and the reason for this is that the bond always remains. — Or it can be said that the action is not revived, but is granted or acquired anew from the law on account of the man's sin. — Likewise the following [point] is false, because the man does not renounce his right simply, but for a time².

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