Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 35, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus

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Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo super hoc quod dicit: Nequit adultera uxor dimitti a viro; quaeritur, utrum vir, qui fornicatur in occulto, possit dimittere uxorem, quae fornicatur in aperto. Et quod sic, videtur: quoniam vir potest agere contra uxorem, et illa non potest excipere contra virum, et si excipit, nihil valet, cum non possit probare. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, in quibus casibus competat uxori excipere contra virum petentem divortium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod talis vir fornicans non debet eam dimittere nec potest sine peccato in conspectu Dei, licet possit in conspectu Ecclesiae, pro eo quod uxori non defuit ius excipiendi, quamvis desit probatio. Argumentum est Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione sexta per totum. Si tamen vir egisset poenitentiam, et illa accusata nollet agere poenitentiam, sed perseveraret in adulterio; creditur tunc, quod vir possit eam accusare et dimittere per sententiam; si vero vir esset in crimine notorio, sicut uxor, non posset. — Unde septem sunt casus, in quibus secundum iura adultera potest excipere contra virum. Primus est, si fornicari convincitur; Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione sexta per totum, et Extra, de Divortiis⁴. — Secundus, si quis prostituit eam; Extra, de Eo qui cognovit consanguineam uxoris suae, Discretionem etc. — Tertius, cum credebat maritum in bello defunctum et nupsit alii; Causa trigesima quarta, quaestione prima: Cum per bellicam⁵. — Quartus, si cognita fuit latenter ab aliquo, quem credebat esse virum suum; Argumentum Causa trigesima quarta, quaestione prima⁶. — Quintus, si fuerit vi oppressa; Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione quinta, Proposito etc.; hoc autem intelligendum est de vi absoluta, non de metu. — Sextus, quando reconciliavit eam sibi post adulterium et petiit debitum; Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione prima. — Septimus est rarus, si infidelis repudiat uxorem, et illa ducit virum alterum; si veniat ad fidem, debet eam recipere, non obstante, quod fuerit fornicata; Extra, de Divortiis⁷, Gaudemus.

Dub. II.

Item super hoc quod dicit: Cum tanto gravius eos puniri oportuerit etc.; quaeritur: quis gravius peccat, utrum mulier, quae adulteratur, quam vir, vel e converso? Et quod magis vir, videtur littera⁸ dicere. — Item, sexus muliebris est infirmior et ad

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lapsum pronior per naturam: ergo magis excusatur in culpa. — Sed contra hoc est, quia sexus muliebris naturaliter est verecundior et viro debet esse subiectior: ergo videtur, quod gravius peccat, si adulteratur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista duo crimina se habent sicut excedentia et excessa. In hoc enim, quod sexus virilis est stabilior per naturam et debet regere feminam, gravius peccat adulterando; sed quia vir maiorem habet impulsionem ad luxuriam propter fortitudinem caloris et quia maiorem habet copiam, nec est ita sexus verecundus per naturam: hinc est, quod mulier gravius peccat, et ideo maior ex peccato mulieris oritur infamia tam viro quam mulieri. Unde aliquo modo verum est hic quod dicit Gregorius¹ de carnalibus vitiis, quod sunt minoris culpae, sed maioris infamiae. — Fere enim in omnibus vitiis istud reperitur, quod ad invicem comparata se habent ut excedentia et excessa. — Verumtamen, si quaeratur, quod magis excedat; videtur, quod fornicatio mulieris, quia magis laedit virum et minus habet impulsivum, licet sit minus fortis ad resistendum; illud enim recompensatur per humanam verecundiam, quae debet eam retrahere multum².

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Chrysostomus: Patronus enim est turpitudinis qui celat crimen uxoris. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Proverbiorum undecimo³: Fidelis est qui celat crimen amici: ergo bonum est crimen celare. — Item, qui scienter infamat alterum aufert ei maximum bonum: ergo graviter peccat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod celare est dupliciter: aut cum scit, sed tamen est occultum aliis, et non detegit; aut cum scit⁴ apertum et notum et dissimulando cooperit. Et primum est fidelitatis, secundum vero est praebere patrocinium sceleri. — Vel aliter, celare hoc est dupliciter: aut in praeiudicium correptionis, aut in supportationem peccatoris et infirmi; et primum est malum, secundum vero est bonum. — Vel aliter, celare crimen est dupliciter: aut personae, quae potest prodesse; aut personae, quae potest obesse⁵; primum est malum, secundum licitum. Et sic patet illud.

Dub. IV.

Item super hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Quod si tibi durum videtur, ut post adulterium tibi reconcilietur coniux etc.; quaeritur, si sententia divortii lata est per errorem, et post vir promotus est ad sacerdotium; si error Ecclesiae et deceptio pateat, utrum reddendus sit uxori, si ipsa non vult continere. Et quod sic, videtur: quia mulier habebat ius suum, et salvo iure mulieris non poterat continentiam vovere contra voluntatem uxoris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod inducenda est ad continentiam; quodsi manifesta deceptio in latione prioris sententiae appareat, et ipsa non vult continere; debet vir suus sibi reddi. Verumtamen ille non poterit petere debitum, quoniam, quantum in se fuit, continentiam vovit⁶; et hoc dico, nisi mulier fuerit fornicata.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et insuper moechae iuramentum dedisse etc. Videtur enim, quod fides superaddita impediat suum iuramentum. Sed videtur, quod non: quia licitum est hanc ducere uxorem post mortem viri: ergo licitum est promittere: ergo propter illam promissionem non debet impediri sequens matrimonium, sed confirmari: si ergo simplex adulterium non impedit, videtur, quod nec impediat cum fidei datione.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod talis fides non est fides, sed potius infidelitas, pro eo quod est contra bonum fidei, quo uxor tenetur alligata viro; et ideo, cum in fidei datione matrimonia inchoentur, et talis fides matrimonio repugnet; non initiat, immo simpliciter inhabiles reddit, quia nec initiari amplius inter tales personas potest nec consummari. Similiter, si alter in mortem viri machinetur propter contrahendum matrimonium, potius se facit inhabilem, quam se reddat habilem⁷. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod est licitum; dicendum, quod non est, tum quia fit ex mala causa, tum quia est occasio multorum malorum; et ideo, si iurat, non obligatur ad iuramentum servandum, sed potius ad poenitentiam faciendam pro iuramento male et inordinate emisso. Et sic patet illud.

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English Translation

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first upon that which he says: An adulterous wife cannot be dismissed by her husband; it is asked whether a husband who fornicates in secret may dismiss a wife who fornicates openly. And that he can, it seems: since the husband can bring an action against the wife, while she cannot lodge an exception against the husband, and if she does lodge it, it is of no avail, since she cannot prove it. — Along with this it is asked in which cases it is competent to a wife to lodge an exception against a husband who seeks a divorce.

I respond: It must be said that such a fornicating husband ought not to dismiss her, nor can he do so without sin in the sight of God, although he can in the sight of the Church, for the reason that the wife did not lack the right of lodging an exception, even though proof is wanting. The argument is Causa 32, question 6, throughout. If, however, the husband had done penance, and she, being accused, were unwilling to do penance but persevered in adultery, then it is held that the husband can accuse her and dismiss her by sentence; but if the husband were in a notorious crime, like the wife, he could not. — Hence there are seven cases in which, according to the laws, an adulteress can lodge an exception against her husband. The first is if he is convicted of fornication; Causa 32, question 6, throughout, and the Decretals, On Divorces⁴. — The second, if someone has prostituted her; the Decretals, On the man who has known a kinswoman of his wife, Discretionem etc. — The third, when she believed her husband dead in war and married another; Causa 34, question 1: Cum per bellicam⁵. — The fourth, if she was secretly known by someone whom she believed to be her own husband; the argument, Causa 34, question 1⁶. — The fifth, if she was overpowered by force; Causa 32, question 5, Proposito etc.; but this is to be understood of absolute force, not of fear. — The sixth, when he reconciled her to himself after the adultery and demanded the [marriage] debt; Causa 32, question 1. — The seventh is rare: if an unbeliever repudiates his wife, and she takes another husband; if he comes to the faith, he ought to take her back, notwithstanding that she has fornicated; the Decretals, On Divorces⁷, Gaudemus.

Doubt II.

Likewise, upon that which he says: Since they must be punished so much the more gravely etc.; it is asked: who sins more gravely, whether the woman who commits adultery, or the man, or the reverse? And that the man does more, the text seems⁸ to say. — Likewise, the female sex is weaker and more

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prone to a fall by nature: therefore it is more excused in fault. — But against this stands the fact that the female sex is naturally more modest and ought to be more subject to the man: therefore it seems that she sins more gravely if she commits adultery.

I respond: It must be said that these two crimes stand to one another as the exceeding and the exceeded. For in this respect, that the male sex is more stable by nature and ought to rule the woman, he sins more gravely in committing adultery; but because the man has a greater impulse toward lust on account of the strength of his heat, and because he has greater abundance, and the sex is not so modest by nature: hence it is that the woman sins more gravely, and therefore a greater infamy arises from the woman's sin, both for the man and for the woman. Hence in some way what Gregory¹ says of the carnal vices is true, namely that they are of lesser guilt but greater infamy. — For in nearly all vices this is found, that when compared with one another they stand as the exceeding and the exceeded. — Nevertheless, if it be asked which exceeds the more, it seems that the woman's fornication does, because it harms the husband more and has less that impels it, although she is less strong for resisting; for this is compensated by the human modesty which ought to hold her back greatly².

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which Chrysostom says: For he is a patron of baseness who conceals his wife's crime. For he seems to speak ill, because in Proverbs, chapter eleven³: Faithful is he who conceals a friend's crime: therefore it is good to conceal a crime. — Likewise, he who knowingly defames another takes from him the greatest good: therefore he sins gravely.

I respond: It must be said that to conceal is twofold: either when one knows, but it is nonetheless hidden from others, and he does not disclose it; or when one knows⁴ it open and manifest and, by dissembling, covers it up. And the first belongs to faithfulness, but the second is to furnish patronage to wickedness. — Or otherwise, to conceal this is twofold: either to the prejudice of correction, or unto the bearing-with of a sinner and a weak person; and the first is evil, but the second is good. — Or otherwise, to conceal a crime is twofold: either to a person who can be benefited, or to a person who can be harmed⁵; the first is evil, the second permissible. And thus that [saying] is clear.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, upon that which Augustine says: But if it seems hard to you that after adultery your spouse should be reconciled to you etc.; it is asked, if a sentence of divorce was passed through error, and afterward the man was promoted to the priesthood; if the error and deception of the Church become manifest, whether he must be restored to his wife, if she is unwilling to remain continent. And that he must, it seems: because the woman had her right, and, the woman's right being preserved, he could not vow continence against his wife's will.

I respond: It must be said that she must be led to continence; but if a manifest deception should appear in the passing of the prior sentence, and she is unwilling to remain continent, her own man must be restored to her. Nevertheless he will not be able to demand the debt, since, as far as lay in him, he vowed continence⁶; and this I say unless the woman has fornicated.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: And moreover that the adulteress has given her oath etc. For it seems that the superadded faith [i.e. the pledge given] impedes his oath. But it seems that it does not: because it is permissible to take this woman as wife after the husband's death: therefore it is permissible to promise: therefore on account of that promise the subsequent marriage ought not to be impeded but confirmed: if therefore simple adultery does not impede, it seems that neither would it impede along with the giving of faith.

I respond: It must be said that such faith is not faith, but rather infidelity, for the reason that it is against the good of faith by which the wife is held bound to her husband; and therefore, since marriages are begun in the giving of faith, and such a faith is repugnant to marriage, it does not initiate [the marriage], but rather renders them simply incapable, since such persons can neither be initiated further [into marriage] nor consummate it. Likewise, if one party contrives the death of the [other's] husband in order to contract marriage, he rather makes himself incapable than renders himself capable⁷. As to the objection, then, that it is permissible, it must be said that it is not, both because it is done from an evil cause, and because it is the occasion of many evils; and therefore, if he swears, he is not bound to keep the oath, but rather to do penance for an oath wickedly and inordinately uttered. And thus that [saying] is clear.

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Apparatus Criticus

4
Libr. IV. tit. 19. C. Significasti (4.). — Seq. locus est ibid. tit. 13. c. 6.
Decretals, Book IV, tit. 19, ch. Significasti (4.). — The following passage is ibid., tit. 13, c. 6.
5
Can. 1. (Codd. et edd. Cum per bellicas). — Post nupsit alii cod. B addit: tunc enim maritus rediens tenetur eam recipere, non obstante adulterio, si steterit cum secundo, postquam primus venerit.
Canon 1. (The codices and editions read Cum per bellicas). — After nupsit another codex, B, adds: for then the returning husband is bound to take her back, notwithstanding the adultery, if she remained with the second [husband] after the first returned.
6
Can. In lectum (6.). — Seq. locus est C. 32. q. 5. c. 4. Cfr. ibid. Gratian. super C. Puto (16), qui etiam a nonnullis codd. allegatur. Tertius (sextus) habetur C. 32. q. 1. C. Si quis uxorem (4.), seqq.
Canon In lectum (6.). — The following passage is C. 32, q. 5, c. 4. Cf. ibid. Gratian on C. Puto (16), which is also cited by several codices. The third (sixth) is found at C. 32, q. 1, C. Si quis uxorem (4.), and following.
7
Libr. IV. tit. 19. c. 8. — Vide de hoc dubio supra q. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 1.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1.
Decretals, Book IV, tit. 19, c. 8. — On this doubt see above, q. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1.
8
Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Inferius pro in culpa edd. a culpa.
See here in the text of the Master, ch. 2. — Below, for in culpa the editions read a culpa.
1
Libr. XXXIII. Moral. c. 12. n. 23: Scimus autem, quia aliquando minus est in corporis corruptionem cadere quam cogitatione tacita ex deliberata elatione peccare; sed cum minus turpis superbia creditur, minus vitatur. Luxuriam vero eo magis erubescunt homines, quo simul omnes turpem noverunt. Unde fit plerumque, ut nonnulli, post superbiam in luxuriam corruentes, ex aperto casu malum culpae latentis erubescant.
Book XXXIII of the Morals, c. 12, n. 23: But we know that sometimes it is a lesser thing to fall into corruption of the body than to sin by a silent thought out of deliberate pride; but since pride is held to be less base, it is less avoided. Lust, however, men blush at all the more, because all alike recognize it as base. Hence it usually comes about that some, falling from pride into lust, blush at the evil of a hidden fault through an open lapse.
2
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. et circa lit.
Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4 and on the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4, and on the text.
3
Vers. 13: Qui autem fidelis est animi celat amici commissum. Codd. allegant c. 17, ubi v. 9: Qui celat delictum quaerit amicitias. — Pro arg. seq. cfr. ibid. 22, 1: Melius est nomen bonum quam divitiae multae.
Verse 13: But he who is of a faithful mind conceals what is committed to him by a friend. The codices cite c. 17, where v. 9 reads: He who conceals a fault seeks friendships. — For the following argument cf. ibid. 22, 1: A good name is better than many riches.
4
Plures codd. sit, quod etiam a nonnullis codd. paulo ante pro scit substituitur.
Several codices read sit, which some codices also substitute a little earlier for scit.
5
Codd. A F G Q V quae non prodesse, sed obesse potest. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. hic circa lit.
Codices A F G Q V read quae non prodesse, sed obesse potest. — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
6
Vide supra d. 27. dub. 4. — De hoc dub. cfr. Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
See above, d. 27, dub. 4. — On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
7
Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 3. — Superius post personas potest edd. prosequuntur: nec consummari similiter. Si autem alter etc.
Cf. below, d. 37, a. 2, q. 3. — Above, after personas potest, the editions continue: nec consummari similiter. Si autem alter etc. ---