Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 42
Articulus II. De cognatione legali.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de cognatione legali. Circa quam primo procedendum est per modum narrationis, secundo per modum inquisitionis.
Praenotata.
Circa primum tria sunt praenotanda. Primo, quid sit, et quae eius species. Secundo, qualiter contrahatur. Tertio, quomodo impedit matrimonium.
Primo igitur sciendum est, quod cognatio legalis ita describitur: Cognatio legalis est proximitas proveniens ex adoptione. Oritur autem quasi triplex proximitas ex adoptione. Una est quasi descenden-
tium, quae attenditur inter adoptantem et filiam, vel neptem adoptatam. Alia est quasi a latere, scilicet illa quae est inter filium naturalem et filiam adoptivam. Tertia vero est quasi quaedam affinitas, quae est inter adoptatum et uxorem adoptantis, vel adoptantem et uxorem adoptati. Hae sunt species, de quibus parum dicitur in iure canonum1.
Secundo intelligendum est, quod ista cognatio, sicut patet per rationem suam, contrahitur per actum adoptandi. Adoptare autem est extraneam personam in filium, vel filiam, vel nepotem, vel deinceps legitime assumere2. Legitima autem assumtio dicitur, quia non omnis persona potest omnem adoptare. Nam adoptare non potest mulier, nisi ex rescripto principis sibi concedatur in solatium filiorum. Iste enim actus est proprie virorum3. Item, non omnium, quia adoptare non potest minor viginti annis, nisi forte iusta causa interveniat. Ille vero potest adoptare, qui paterfamilias est et sui iuris et potest generare; nam spado vel frigidus non potest adoptare. — Quilibet autem potest adoptari, sive masculus sit, sive femina, dummodo sit minoris aetatis patre adoptivo. Unde sive sit minor, sive maior4, sive habeat patrem, sive non; adoptari potest, differenter tamen. Qui enim sui iuris est dicitur arrogatus et transit in potestatem arrogantis. Qui autem est in potestate patris non transit in potestatem adoptantis et dicitur simpliciter adoptari. Primum debet fieri auctoritate principis, secundum imperio magistratus. — Alia etiam differentia est, quia adoptans filio arrogato tenetur relinquere quartam partem bonorum, filio adoptivo nihil, si non vult5.
Tertio intelligendum est, quod cognatio legalis per modum descendentium et per modum affinitatis semper impedit matrimonium. Unde nunquam adoptans potest contrahere cum filia adoptiva nec cum uxore filii adoptivi, et sic de aliis. Sed in secunda specie non manet impedimentum nisi ad tempus, scilicet quamdiu est et durat adoptio; sed ea soluta emancipatione filii adoptivi, vel naturalis, postea non impedit, Extra, de Cognatione legali6, et Causa trigesima, quaestione tertia, Ita diligere etc., et iterum, Per adoptionem etc.
Ad intelligentiam autem horum tria breviter quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum cognatio legalis sit aliquod vinculum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum impediat matrimonium. Tertio, utrum transeat ab uno in alterum.
Quaestio I. Utrum cognatio legalis sit aliquod vinculum.
Circa primum proceditur sic, et ostenditur, quod cognatio legalis dicat aliquod vinculum secundum veritatem.
1. Nicolaus Papa dicit, et habetur in littera7: «Inter eos non contrahitur coniugium, quos adoptio iungit»: ergo aliqua iunctura et vinculum est ibi.
2. Item, cognatio primo est per legem naturalem: si ergo lex divina ultra naturalem addit spiritualem, pari ratione lex humana ultra naturalem addere poterit et debebit legalem.
3. Item, sicut patris est generare filium, ita et fovere et hereditatem relinquere: ergo cum aliquis assumit sibi aliquem ad hos actus, recte dici potest pater, et ille filius; sed istae duae sunt relationes8 proximitatis: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Nullus potest sibi aliquem adoptare in patrem, ita quod sit ibi vinculum: ergo pari ratione nullus, ut videtur, potest sibi aliquem adoptare in filium: ergo nullum est adoptionis vinculum.
2. Item, omnes iusti sunt filii Dei adoptivi9: ergo adoptio est vinculum generale; sed non attenditur ibi adoptio penes vinculum generale: ergo etc.
3. Item, in nobis non sunt nisi duo, scilicet anima et corpus; sed ex parte animae est cognatio spiritualis, ex parte corporis cognatio carnalis: ergo aut legalis non differt ab istis, aut superfluit10.
4. Item, cognatio est vinculum perpetuum, si est vera cognatio11; sed adoptio non est perpetuum vinculum, quia adoptivus potest emancipari: ergo videtur, quod nulla sit talis cognatio.
Conclusio.
Cognatio legalis est aliquod vinculum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est ponere vinculum cognationis legalis; hoc autem vinculum transumtum est et habet originem a cognatione carnali, sicut et cognatio spiritualis12. Patris enim carnalis est filium generare et filium educare; quoniam igitur per Sacramentum regenerationis est spiritualis generatio, hinc est, quod contrahitur spiritualis cognatio. — Rursus, quoniam in adoptione fit assumtio alicuius ad actum paternum, qui est fovere, educare, possessionem dimittere; hinc est, quod est ibi affectus13 paternus et officium, ac per hoc aliquod vinculum; hoc autem a legibus statutum est in solatium filiorum, quod est maximum inter cetera ipsis coniugatis. — Et sic patet, quomodo cognatio legalis sit vinculum.
Si autem quaeratur sufficientia harum trium cognationum, scilicet carnalis, spiritualis et legalis; dicendum, quod tripliciter potest sumi: uno modo penes triplicem legem, a qua est, scilicet legem naturalem, divinam et legem positivam. Quantum ad primam est cognatio carnalis, quantum ad secundam spiritualis, quantum ad tertiam legalis. — Secundo modo potest sumi penes illud quod respiciunt. Tria enim sunt in nobis bona: bonum naturae, bonum gratiae et bonum fortunae; et bonum naturae respicit cognatio carnalis, bonum gratiae cognatio spiritualis, bonum vero fortunae cognatio legalis. — Tertio modo sic, ut cognatio carnalis respiciat carnem, spiritualis animam, legalis vero totum hominem. — His visis, facile est obiectis respondere.
1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod filius non potest adoptare patrem; dicendum, quod sicut in naturalibus pater generat filium, non e converso, ita et in legalibus patris est adoptare filium, non e converso. Nam adoptio est quaedam generatio14.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes iusti sunt filii adoptivi Dei; dicendum, quod sicut omnes sumus a Deo, tamen non sumus omnes consanguinei, quamvis habeamus unum patrem, pro eo quod ipse est principium commune; sed quando ab eodem patre carnali generamur, habemus aliquod vinculum speciale: sic in proposito oportet intelligere.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in nobis non est nisi anima et corpus; dicendum, quod non tantum in hominibus ista attenduntur, sed etiam adiuncta possunt15; et quaedam respiciunt animam magis, quaedam magis corpus, quaedam magis coniunctum, ut patet, cum dicitur: homo intelligens, albus et risibilis. Primum est ratione animae; secundum ratione corporis; tertium ratione coniuncti: sic in proposito potest intelligi.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est vinculum perpetuum; dicendum, quod duo sunt in adoptione: et est16 dominium et subiectio, et hoc potest amoveri per emancipationem; et est quaedam honestatis alligatio, quae non relinquit, ex quo semel alicui inest.
I. In Praenotatis S. Doctor distinguit duplicem adoptionem: perfectam, quae vocatur arrogatio, et imperfectam. Ad primam requiritur, ut adoptatus reducatur in potestatem adoptantis, quod non potest fieri, quando non est sui iuris v. g. adhuc vivens sub potestate patris, nisi talis sit emancipatus a principe. Hoc impedimentum a iure civili Romano introductum et ab Ecclesia receptum est, ita ut non incidat, nisi adoptio sit perfecta.
II. De his tribus quaestionibus, iam solutis iure canonico, omnes idem sentiunt, tamen aliter quaestiones dividunt.
III. De eisdem agunt: Scot., hic q. unica n. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1-3; Suppl. q. 87. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 7-14. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1-3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.
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Article II. On legal kinship.
Consequently, with respect to the second article, inquiry is made concerning legal kinship. Concerning it, one must proceed first by way of narration, secondly by way of inquiry.
Preliminary notes.
Concerning the first, three things are to be noted beforehand. First, what it is, and what are its species. Secondly, how it is contracted. Thirdly, in what manner it impedes marriage.
First, therefore, it must be known that legal kinship is thus described: Legal kinship is a proximity arising from adoption. Now from adoption there arises a threefold proximity, as it were. One is, as it were, of descen-
dants, which is considered between the one adopting and the daughter, or granddaughter, adopted. Another is, as it were, from the side, namely that which is between a natural son and an adopted daughter. But the third is, as it were, a certain affinity, which is between the one adopted and the wife of the one adopting, or between the one adopting and the wife of the one adopted. These are the species, of which little is said in the law of the canons1.
Secondly, it must be understood that this kinship, as is evident from its very nature, is contracted through the act of adopting. Now to adopt is to take up legitimately an outside person as a son, or daughter, or grandchild, or so on2. And it is called legitimate taking-up, because not every person can adopt everyone. For a woman cannot adopt, unless by rescript of the prince it be granted to her as a consolation for children. For this act properly belongs to men3. Likewise, not of everyone, because one under twenty years cannot adopt, unless perhaps a just cause intervene. But he can adopt who is a father of a family and of his own right and able to beget; for a eunuch or an impotent man cannot adopt. — Now anyone can be adopted, whether he be male or female, provided he be of a lesser age than the adoptive father. Hence whether he be younger or older4, whether he have a father or not; he can be adopted, differently nevertheless. For he who is of his own right is called arrogated and passes into the power of the one arrogating. But he who is in the power of a father does not pass into the power of the one adopting and is said to be adopted simply. The first ought to be done by the authority of the prince, the second by the command of a magistrate. — There is also another difference, because the one adopting is bound to leave a fourth part of his goods to an arrogated son, nothing to an adoptive son, if he does not wish5.
Thirdly, it must be understood that legal kinship, by way of descendants and by way of affinity, always impedes marriage. Hence the one adopting can never contract with the adoptive daughter, nor with the wife of the adoptive son, and so of others. But in the second species the impediment does not remain except for a time, namely as long as the adoption exists and lasts; but once it is dissolved by the emancipation of the adoptive son, or of the natural son, thereafter it does not impede, Extra, On Legal Kinship6, and Cause 30, question 3, Ita diligere etc., and again, Per adoptionem etc.
Now for the understanding of these things three questions are briefly asked. First it is asked, whether legal kinship is any kind of bond. Secondly it is asked, whether it impedes marriage. Thirdly, whether it passes from one to another.
Question I. Whether legal kinship is any kind of bond.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that legal kinship does denote some kind of bond in truth.
1. Pope Nicholas says, and it is had in the text7: "Between those whom adoption joins marriage is not contracted": therefore there is some joining and bond there.
2. Likewise, kinship is firstly by natural law: if therefore the divine law adds a spiritual [kinship] beyond the natural, by the same reasoning human law will be able and bound to add a legal [kinship] beyond the natural.
3. Likewise, just as it belongs to a father to beget a son, so also to cherish him and to leave him an inheritance: therefore when someone takes up another for these acts, he can rightly be called father, and that one son; but these two are relations8 of proximity: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. No one can adopt someone for himself as a father, in such a way that there be a bond there: therefore by the same reasoning no one, as it seems, can adopt someone for himself as a son: therefore there is no bond of adoption.
2. Likewise, all the just are adoptive sons of God9: therefore adoption is a general bond; but adoption is not there considered in respect of a general bond: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in us there are but two things, namely soul and body; but on the part of the soul there is spiritual kinship, on the part of the body carnal kinship: therefore either legal kinship does not differ from these, or it is superfluous10.
4. Likewise, kinship is a perpetual bond, if it is true kinship11; but adoption is not a perpetual bond, because the adoptive [son] can be emancipated: therefore it seems that there is no such kinship.
Conclusion.
Legal kinship is some kind of bond.
I respond: It must be said that a bond of legal kinship is to be posited; but this bond is transferred and takes its origin from carnal kinship, just as also spiritual kinship does12. For it belongs to a carnal father to beget a son and to bring up a son; since therefore through the Sacrament of regeneration there is a spiritual generation, hence it is that spiritual kinship is contracted. — Again, since in adoption there takes place a taking-up of someone for a paternal act, which is to cherish, to bring up, to relinquish possession; hence it is that there is there a paternal affection13 and duty, and through this some kind of bond; and this has been established by the laws as a consolation for children, which is the greatest among the other things for the married themselves. — And thus it is evident how legal kinship is a bond.
But if the sufficiency of these three kinships be asked, namely carnal, spiritual, and legal; it must be said that it can be taken in three ways: in one way in respect of the threefold law from which it is, namely natural law, divine law, and positive law. As to the first there is carnal kinship, as to the second spiritual, as to the third legal. — In a second way it can be taken in respect of that which they regard. For there are three goods in us: the good of nature, the good of grace, and the good of fortune; and carnal kinship regards the good of nature, spiritual kinship the good of grace, but legal kinship the good of fortune. — In a third way thus, that carnal kinship regards the flesh, spiritual [kinship] the soul, but legal [kinship] the whole man. — These things having been seen, it is easy to answer the objections.
1. For to that which is objected, that a son cannot adopt his father; it must be said that just as in natural things a father begets a son, not the reverse, so also in legal things it belongs to a father to adopt a son, not the reverse. For adoption is a certain generation14.
2. To that which is objected, that all the just are adoptive sons of God; it must be said that just as we are all from God, yet we are not all blood-relations, although we have one father, for the reason that He is the common principle; but when we are begotten from the same carnal father, we have some special bond: so in the matter at hand it must be understood.
3. To that which is objected, that in us there is nothing but soul and body; it must be said that these are considered not only in men, but adjuncts also can [be considered]15; and some regard the soul more, some more the body, some more the composite, as is evident when it is said: a man is intelligent, white, and capable of laughter. The first is by reason of the soul; the second by reason of the body; the third by reason of the composite: so in the matter at hand it can be understood.
4. To that which is objected, that it is not a perpetual bond; it must be said that there are two things in adoption: there is16 dominion and subjection, and this can be removed through emancipation; and there is a certain bond of honorableness, which does not depart, from the moment it is once present in someone.
I. In the Preliminary notes the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold adoption: the perfect, which is called arrogation, and the imperfect. For the first it is required that the one adopted be brought back into the power of the one adopting, which cannot be done when he is not of his own right, e.g. still living under the power of his father, unless such a one be emancipated by the prince. This impediment was introduced by the Roman civil law and received by the Church, in such a way that it is not incurred unless the adoption is perfect.
II. Concerning these three questions, now resolved by canon law, all hold the same opinion, yet they divide the questions differently.
III. On the same subjects treat: Scotus, here the sole question, n. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1-3; Supplement q. 87, a. 1-3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7-14. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1-3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here the sole question.
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- 1Cfr. Glossa in Introductionem (Quod autem), C. 30. q. 3. et in C. Si qua per adoptionem (I.), X. de Cognatione legali (lib. IV. tit. 12.). — Codd. E F G canonico.Cf. the Gloss on the Introduction (Quod autem), C. 30, q. 3, and on the canon Si qua per adoptionem (I.), X. On Legal Kinship (Book IV, tit. 12). — Codices E F G [read] canonico.
- 2Vide tom. III. pag. 234, nota 1.See tom. III, p. 234, note 1.
- 3Secundum Iustinian., I. Instit. imperial. de Adoptionibus (tit. 11.), lex Non solum (I.), § Feminae. In hac lege insinuantur etiam ea quae sequuntur.According to Justinian, Institutes, Book I, On Adoptions (tit. 11), the law Non solum (I.), § Feminae. In this law are also intimated the things which follow.
- 4Cod. L (E a secunda manu) addit sive emancipatus [cod. E sive non]. Pro sive sit plurimi codd. si sit, et mox differt pro differenter. Subinde post arrogantis cod. aa addit vel adoptantis.Codex L (E by a second hand) adds sive emancipatus [codex E sive non]. For sive sit very many codices [read] si sit, and shortly after differt for differenter. Then after arrogantis codex aa adds vel adoptantis.
- 5Codd. F G nisi velit.Codices F G [read] nisi velit.
- 6Libr. IV. tit. 12. c. 1. — Seq. locus est C. 30. q. 3. c. 1. et 6.Book IV, tit. 12, c. 1. — The following place is C. 30, q. 3, c. 1 and 6.
- 7Hic c. 3. — Pro coniugium cod. aa cum textu originali matrimonium. Subinde verbis et vinculum codd. L Y interserunt aliquod.Here c. 3. — For coniugium codex aa, with the original text, [reads] matrimonium. Then between the words et vinculum codices L Y insert aliquod.
- 8Cod. Z rationes.Codex Z [reads] rationes.
- 9Cfr. Rom. 8, 15. et 23; Gal. 4, 5; Eph. 1, 5. — Inferius pro ibi adoptio nonnulli codd. ibi cognatio, edd. ibi cognatio vel adoptio.Cf. Rom. 8:15 and 23; Gal. 4:5; Eph. 1:5. — Below, for ibi adoptio some codices [read] ibi cognatio, the editions ibi cognatio vel adoptio.
- 10Vat. pro conclusione arg. substituit contrahitur.The Vatican edition, in place of the conclusion of the argument, substitutes contrahitur.
- 11Cfr. supra d. 41. Praenotata, circa finem. — Inferius pro potest plures codd. et edd. non potest.Cf. above, d. 41, Preliminary notes, near the end. — Below, for potest several codices and the editions [read] non potest.
- 12Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. — Pro transumtum cod. P transumtivum, cod. Q transumtive.See above, a. 1, q. 1. — For transumtum codex P [reads] transumtivum, codex Q transumtive.
- 13Edd. effectus.The editions [read] effectus.
- 14Iustinian., I. Instit. imperial. de Adoptionibus (tit. 11.), lex Non solum (I.), § Minorem natu, ait: Adoptio enim naturam imitatur.Justinian, Institutes, Book I, On Adoptions (tit. 11), the law Non solum (I.), § Minorem natu, says: "For adoption imitates nature."
- 15Supple: attendi. Edd. coniunctum, omisso possunt. Inferius pro intelligens, quod plures codd. omittunt, codd. F G rationalis.Supply: attendi. The editions [read] coniunctum, omitting possunt. Below, for intelligens, which several codices omit, codices F G [read] rationalis.
- 16Pro et est edd. scilicet, et haec possunt pro hoc potest. Pro alligatio cod. Z obligatio.For et est the editions [read] scilicet, and haec possunt for hoc potest. For alligatio codex Z [reads] obligatio.