Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 42
Quaestio II. Utrum cognatio legalis debeat impedire matrimonium.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum cognatio legalis debeat impedire matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Causa trigesima, quaestione tertia6, Ita diligere, Nicolaus Papa dicit, et habetur in littera: « Inter eos non contrahitur matrimonium, quos adoptio iungit ».
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia alius est et debet esse affectus paternus et maritalis7: si ergo adoptans aliquam tenetur eam tractare affectione paterna, ergo nullatenus potest nec debet affectione mariti.
3. Item, cognationis vinculum impedit propter p. 875 proximitatem; sed in cognatione legali fit proximitas1: ergo fit matrimonio impedimentum.
Contra: 1. Cognatio legalis est de iure positivo, sed matrimonium de iure naturali; sed ea quae sunt iuris positivi, non possunt super ea quae sunt naturalis alligationis2: ergo nec talis adoptio potest impedire matrimonium.
2. Item, matrimonia reguntur iure poli, non iure fori3; sed tales adoptiones sunt de iure fori: ergo per tales adoptiones non habet matrimonium impediri.
3. Item, talis cognatio legalis nulli bono matrimonii repugnat; sed omne quod praestat impedimentum matrimonio, ratione alicuius boni4 impedimentum praestat: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Cognatio legalis impedit matrimonium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cognatio legalis impedit matrimonium. Et ratio huius est statutum Ecclesiae, quae legem confirmat et approbat.
Si autem quaeritur: quare Ecclesia statuit? dici potest, quod ratione honestatis: quoniam isti affectus, scilicet paternus et maritalis, circa eandem personam sunt incompossibiles, salva honestate; et quoniam alis cognatio ad affectum consanguinitatis perducit, si quis contraheret, iam in hoc honestati derogaret; et qui assuesceret contrahere cum filia adoptiva, aut parum aut nihil cum naturali timeret contrahere, cum illam assumserit ad pertractandum ut filiam naturalem. Et sic patet, quare debet impedire.
Quomodo autem impediat secundum tres differentias ita, quod secundum alteram ad tempus tantum, supra5 dictum est. — Ratio autem huius est: quia illa adoptio tenet ratione eius, quod sub eadem potestate sunt filia naturalis et filius adoptivus, nec se habent ut fratres, nisi quamdiu sic sunt; et ideo, hoc cessante, possunt se habere secundum affectionem coniugalem. — His visis, satis patent obiecta.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod ius positivum non repugnat iuri naturali; dicendum, quod matrimonium non tantum est de iure naturali, secundum quod currit nunc Ecclesia, sed etiam regi oportet secundum ecclesiastica statuta.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod regitur iure poli; iam patet responsio: quia Ecclesia tale impedimentum sua constitutione et approbatione fecit esse validum; alioquin non posset impedire.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non impedit aliquod bonum matrimonii; dicendum, quod sicut supra6 dictum fuit de cognatione carnali, quod impeditur bonum naturalis honestatis, propter quod conservandum principaliter est institutum matrimonium7.
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Question II. Whether legal kinship ought to impede marriage.
Secondly it is asked whether legal kinship ought to impede marriage. And that it ought, it seems.
1. In Cause thirty, question three6, [the canon] Ita diligere, Pope Nicholas says — and it is contained in the [Master's] text: «Between those whom adoption joins, marriage is not contracted».
2. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: because paternal and marital affection is, and ought to be, distinct7: if therefore one adopting some woman is bound to treat her with paternal affection, then in no way can he, nor ought he, [treat her] with a husband's affection.
3. Likewise, the bond of kinship impedes on account of p. 875 nearness; but in legal kinship nearness is produced1: therefore it becomes an impediment to marriage.
Contra: 1. Legal kinship is of positive law, but marriage is of natural law; but those things which are of positive law cannot [prevail] over those which are of natural binding2: therefore neither can such adoption impede marriage.
2. Likewise, marriages are governed by the law of heaven [ius poli], not by the law of the court [ius fori]3; but such adoptions are of the law of the court: therefore marriage cannot be impeded through such adoptions.
3. Likewise, such legal kinship is repugnant to no good of marriage; but everything that furnishes an impediment to marriage furnishes an impediment by reason of some good4: therefore etc.
Conclusio
Legal kinship impedes marriage.
Respondeo: It must be said that legal kinship impedes marriage. And the reason for this is the statute of the Church, which confirms and approves the law.
But if it is asked: why did the Church establish [this]? it can be said [that it is] by reason of honesty: because these affections, namely the paternal and the marital, are incompossible in regard to the same person, honesty being preserved; and because such kinship leads to the affection of consanguinity, if anyone were to contract [marriage], he would in this very act derogate from honesty; and one who grew accustomed to contracting with an adoptive daughter would fear little or nothing to contract with a natural one, since he had taken her up to be treated as a natural daughter. And thus it is clear why it ought to impede.
But in what manner it impedes according to three differences — such that according to one [of them only] for a time — has been said above5. — And the reason for this is: because that adoption holds by reason of the fact that the natural daughter and the adoptive son are under the same power, nor do they stand to one another as brother and sister except so long as they are so; and therefore, this ceasing, they can behave toward one another according to conjugal affection. — These things having been seen, the objections are sufficiently clear.
To the arguments:
Ad 1. As for what is objected, that positive law is not repugnant to natural law; it must be said that marriage is not only of natural law, according to which the Church now proceeds, but also must be governed according to ecclesiastical statutes.
Ad 2. To that which is objected, that it is governed by the law of heaven; the response is now clear: because the Church, by its constitution and approbation, made such an impediment to be valid; otherwise it could not impede.
Ad 3. To that which is objected, that it does not impede any good of marriage; it must be said that, as was said above6 concerning carnal kinship, the good of natural honesty is impeded, for the preserving of which marriage was principally instituted7.
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- 6Can. 1. allegatus hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.Canon 1, cited here in the text of the Master, c. 3.
- 7Vide supra d. 40. q. 2. in corp.See above, d. 40, q. 2, in the body.
- 1Ut ostensum est quaest. praeced.As was shown in the preceding question.
- 2Cod. G addit vel iuris.Codex G adds or of law [«naturalis alligationis vel iuris»].
- 3Cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.Cf. above, d. 37, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
- 4Codd. G aa supplent matrimonii.Codices G aa supply of marriage [«alicuius boni matrimonii»].
- 5In Praenotatis ad hunc art. — Superius pro naturalem multi codd. naturaliter. Circa finem corp. pro possunt edd. potest.In the Prolegomena to this article. — Above, for naturalem many codices [read] naturaliter. Near the end of the body, for possunt the editions [read] potest.
- 6Dist. 40. q. 2. — Mox pro impeditur Vat. impedit.[See] d. 40, q. 2. — Soon after, for impeditur the Vatican [edition reads] impedit.
- 7Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---