Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum suffragia magis prosint ei qui magis meruit, an ei, pro quo specialiter fiunt.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page, so this chunk carries two sequences: notes 1–7 of page 946 and notes 1–6 of page 947. Notes 7 and 8 of page 947 are anchored in the body of Article III, Question I, and are rendered there.

Tertio quaeritur, quantum prosint suffragia; et cum non prosint aequaliter omnibus, quaeritur, cui magis prosint, an ei qui magis meruit, an ei, pro quo specialiter fiunt. Et quod ei qui magis meruit, videtur.

1. « Ideo prosunt, quia meruit, ut prodessent¹ »: ergo si magis meruit, magis prosunt, quia in per se praedicatis talis consequentia tenet.

2. Item, profectus suffragiorum est secundum Dei distributionem: ergo si ipse non est acceptor personarum², videtur, quod magis debet distribuere ei qui magis est dignus.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur per impossibile: quia qui meruit, ut prodessent, citius meruit liberari; sed si non magis prosunt, non citius liberatur: ergo qui meruit citius liberari tardius liberatur. Sed hoc est contra Dei iustitiam: ergo etc.

4. Item, oblatio pretii in cruce aequaliter profuit, ac si esset oblata pro quolibet per se, et tantum prodest cuilibet, quantum meruit: ergo oblatio sacrificii in altari pari ratione, cum sit illius oblationis memoriale: ergo magis ei qui magis meruit.

Contra: 1. Cum Deus exaudit nos, quodam modo conformat voluntatem suam nobis, quia obedit Deus voci hominis³: ergo si aliquis habens caritatem oret specialiter pro aliquo, videtur, quod Deus specialiter accipit pro illo: ergo videtur, quod magis prosint illis, pro quibus specialius et crebrius fiunt.

2. Item, si in vita ista aliquis dives daret eleemosynam, magis sibi prodesset quam alii: ergo si ad eius imperium detur post mortem; cum pro tali habeat Deus, ac si impenderet⁴, magis ergo prodest sibi quam alii.

3. Item, Deus acceptat opus secundum intentionem⁵; sed intentio facientis est, quod specialius et magis prosit illi, pro quo facit: ergo etc.

4. Item, per impossibile ostenditur: quia, si non prodest magis, ergo non oportet specialiter rogare pro aliquo: ergo movetur stulte tota Ecclesia, quae specialiter orat.

Conclusio. Suffragia, si fiant in communi, ceteris paribus, prosunt magis ei qui magis meruit; si vero in speciali, magis prosunt ei, pro quo fiunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquorum opinio fuit, ut Praepositivi⁶, quod suffragia Ecclesiae, sive specialiter, sive generaliter facta, magis prosint ei qui magis meruit. Et ponunt exemplum: sicut si candela accenditur coram divite, non tantum praebet sibi lumen, sed etiam aliis, et eis qui melius vident, maius lumen praebet. Exemplum etiam patet in lectione, quae tantum valet, si legatur omnibus in communi, quantum si cuilibet in speciali, et plus valet assistenti, qui melius intelligit, etiam si pro alio legatur, qui minus intelligit, etsi pro ipso legatur specialiter. Si ergo ita est in lumine, quanto⁷ magis in Sacramento. Si ita est in lectione; quomodo non in oratione? Absque dubio ita videtur. — Et si obiiciatur communis mos Ecclesiae; respondent, quod hoc quod specialiter Ecclesia magis facit pro aliquo, non facit propter hoc, quod magis illi prosit, sed quia libentius facit homo pro eo quem diligit specialius, et magis animatur ad faciendum. Unde si istud esset notum simplicibus, non ita libenter facerent suffragia. — Sed istud non credo, quia, sicut

dicit Augustinus, de Cura pro mortuis agenda¹, sepultura valet in loco sancto propter orationes Sanctorum, qui orant pro eo, ad cuius tumulum memorantur. — Amplius, suffragia sunt ad solvendum poenam sive reatum; sed plus est satisfacere pro debito multorum quam unius, et facilius satisfit pro debito unius quam plurium: ergo pluribus indigent suffragiis duo quam unus solus: ergo si dividuntur inter eos, uterque habet minus: ergo non videtur, quod aequaliter se extendant ad omnes. — Et ideo dicendum, quod illud non est simile: quia illuminatio totam speciem rei visae defert ad oculum, et similiter lectio totam similitudinem vocis; sed non sic est in solutione, sicut est in aspectu et consideratione. Quamvis enim duo creditores aequaliter possint et simul² videre unum aureum, non tamen potest aequaliter solvi duobus. Sic intelligendum est in proposito, quod per suffragia fit. Unde refert, utrum fiant pro pluribus, an pro uno.

Et ideo distinguendum est hic, quia suffragia Ecclesiae aut fiunt in communi, aut in speciali. Si in communi, prosunt ei magis, qui magis meruit, ut prodessent, aliis conditionibus paribus, quia non tantum dignitas, sed etiam necessitas consideratur³. — Et sic probant primae rationes. — Si autem fiant in speciali; ei magis prosunt, pro quo fiunt; et sic probant rationes sequentes.

Ad 1. 2. Ad illud tamen, quod primo obiicitur, quod magis prosunt ei qui magis meruit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est de se, nisi aliud reformet pactum; et hoc est intentio facientis. — Et similiter ad sequens respondendum, quod Deus distribuit secundum intentionem illius qui offert suffragium.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod citius meruit liberari; dicendum, quod verum est, ceteris paribus; et quia ille qui minus meruit, maiores et plures habuit adiutores: hinc est, quod citius liberatur ratione auxilii⁴ alieni. Et iterum, iste meruit citius liberari, non quantum ad ea quae sunt propria, sed ad ea quae sunt communia, de quibus magis percipit, ceteris paribus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sacrificio crucis et altaris, dicendum, quod quamvis idem sit, non tamen utrobique uniformiter operatur; nam in cruce effusum est pretium in omnimoda plenitudine, sed in altari habet effectum determinatum, cum quotidie assumatur. Et propter hoc prima oblatio non iteratur, sed secunda iteratur; et ideo non valet illa ratio, quia procedit, ac si esset aequalis effectus. — Et iterum, illa pro omnibus est oblata, haec autem specialiter potest fieri. Nec obstat illud Hieronymi de Consecratione, distinctione quinta⁵: « Cum pro centum defunctorum animabus psalmus vel Missa dicitur, nihil minus, quam si pro uno quolibet diceretur, accipitur ». Dicendum enim, quod Hieronymus, sicut patet ex adiunctis, loquitur quantum ad meritum facientis, non quantum ad utilitatem eius, pro quo fit⁶.

[Continuatio altera, minoribus litteris ad calcem pag. 946 impressa:]

…in domo et illuminat omnes circumstantes, alios plus, alios minus secundum vim acuminis visus eorum; ita eleemosyna oblata pro uno, qui est in purgatorio, omnibus prodest et forte plus prodest illi, pro quo non fit, quam illi, pro quo fit, immo potest esse, quod ei non prosit, pro quo fit, ut si est valde malus vel valde bonus; prodest tamen illis, pro quibus non fit, ut domino caeco vel in summa claritate diei constituto, ad cuius honorem in domo obscura candela accenditur, non prodest, sed prodest aliis. Et hoc videtur velle Hieronymus, qui ait: « Cum pro defunctis psallimus animabus, vel Missa cantatur, nil minus, quam si pro unoquolibet ipsorum diceretur, accipitur ». [Vide infra in solut. ad 4.]. Sed obiicient: secundum hoc non debent fieri nisi generales orationes. Ad hoc respondetur, quod necessarium fuit, ut fierent speciales, ad devotionem excitandam; identitas enim mater est fastidii, sicut econtra varietas desiderii. Et hoc mihi placere magis confiteor.

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Question III. Whether suffrages profit more the one who merited more, or the one for whom they are specially made.

Thirdly it is asked how much suffrages profit; and since they do not profit all equally, it is asked whom they profit more — the one who merited more, or the one for whom they are specially made. And it seems that they profit the one who merited more.

1. "They profit for this reason, because he merited that they should profit¹": therefore, if he merited more, they profit more, since in per se predications such a consequence holds.

2. Likewise, the benefit of suffrages is according to God's distribution: therefore, if He is not a respecter of persons², it seems that He ought rather to distribute to the one who is more worthy.

3. Likewise, this is shown through the impossible: because he who merited that they should profit, merited to be freed sooner; but if they do not profit more, he is not freed sooner: therefore he who merited to be freed sooner is freed later. But this is against God's justice: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the offering of the price on the cross profited equally, as if it had been offered for each one by himself, and it profits each one as much as he merited: therefore the offering of the sacrifice on the altar for a like reason, since it is the memorial of that offering: therefore [it profits] more the one who merited more.

On the contrary: 1. When God hears us, He in a certain way conforms His will to us, because God obeyed the voice of a man³: therefore if someone having charity prays specially for someone, it seems that God specially receives it on his behalf: therefore it seems that they profit more those for whom they are made more specially and more frequently.

2. Likewise, if in this life some rich man were to give an alms, it would profit himself more than another: therefore if at his command it be given after death — since God accounts it for such a man as if he himself were expending it⁴ — therefore it profits him more than another.

3. Likewise, God accepts a work according to the intention⁵; but the intention of the one making it is that it profit more specially and more that man for whom he makes it: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it is shown through the impossible: because, if it does not profit more, then there is no need to pray specially for anyone: therefore the whole Church is moved foolishly, which prays specially.

Conclusion. Suffrages, if they are made in common, other things being equal, profit more the one who merited more; but if in particular, they profit more the one for whom they are made.

I respond: It must be said that the opinion of some was — as of Praepositivus⁶ — that the suffrages of the Church, whether made specially or generally, profit more the one who merited more. And they set down an example: just as if a candle is lit before a rich man, it not only affords light to him, but also to others, and to those who see better it affords greater light. The example is also clear in a reading, which is worth as much if it be read to all in common as if to each in particular, and is worth more to the bystander who understands better, even if it be read for another who understands less, even though it be read specially for that other. If, then, it is so in light, how much⁷ more in the Sacrament. If it is so in a reading, how not in prayer? Without doubt it seems so. — And if the common custom of the Church be objected, they answer that the fact that the Church does more for someone specially, it does not do on this account, that it should profit him more, but because a man acts more willingly for the one whom he loves more specially, and is more animated to the doing of it. Hence, if this were known to simple folk, they would not so willingly perform suffrages. — But this I do not believe, because, as

Augustine says, On the Care to be Had for the Dead¹, burial in a holy place avails on account of the prayers of the Saints, who pray for him at whose tomb they are remembered. — Further, suffrages are for the discharging of punishment or of guilt; but it is more to make satisfaction for the debt of many than of one, and satisfaction is more easily made for the debt of one than of several: therefore two need more suffrages than one alone: therefore if they are divided between them, each has less: therefore it does not seem that they extend equally to all. — And therefore it must be said that that [example] is not alike: because illumination carries the whole appearance of the thing seen to the eye, and likewise a reading the whole likeness of the voice; but it is not so in discharge as it is in sight and consideration. For although two creditors can equally and at the same time² look upon one gold piece, nevertheless it cannot be equally paid out to two. So must it be understood in the matter proposed, which is done through suffrages. Hence it makes a difference whether they are made for several or for one.

And therefore a distinction must be made here, because the suffrages of the Church are made either in common or in particular. If in common, they profit more the one who merited more that they should profit, other conditions being equal, because not only worthiness but also need is considered³. — And thus the first arguments prove. — But if they are made in particular, they profit more the one for whom they are made; and thus the following arguments prove.

To 1 and 2. To that, however, which is objected first — that they profit more the one who merited more — it must be said that this is true so far as it is of itself, unless a compact should shape it otherwise; and this is the intention of the one making it. — And likewise it must be answered to the next, that God distributes according to the intention of him who offers the suffrage.

To 3. To that which is objected, that he merited to be freed sooner: it must be said that this is true, other things being equal; and because the one who merited less had greater and more helpers, hence it is that he is freed sooner by reason of another's aid⁴. And again, this man merited to be freed sooner, not as regards those things which are proper, but as regards those which are common, of which he receives more, other things being equal.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the sacrifice of the cross and of the altar, it must be said that although it is the same, nevertheless it does not operate uniformly in both; for on the cross the price was poured out in every kind of fullness, but on the altar it has a determinate effect, since it is taken up daily. And on this account the first offering is not repeated, but the second is repeated; and therefore that argument is not valid, because it proceeds as if the effect were equal. — And again, that one was offered for all, whereas this one can be made specially. Nor does that saying of Jerome stand in the way, in On Consecration, distinction five⁵: "When a psalm or a Mass is said for the souls of a hundred departed, it is received nothing less than if it were said for any one of them." For it must be said that Jerome, as is clear from the surrounding words, speaks as regards the merit of the one making it, not as regards the profit of him for whom it is made⁶.

[An alternative continuation, printed in smaller type at the foot of p. 946:]

…in a house it also illumines all the bystanders, some more, some less, according to the strength of the keenness of their sight; so an alms offered for one man who is in purgatory profits all, and perhaps profits more the one for whom it is not made than the one for whom it is made — indeed it may be that it does not profit the one for whom it is made, as if he is exceedingly wicked or exceedingly good; yet it profits those for whom it is not made, just as it does not profit a master who is blind, or set in the full brightness of day, in whose honour a candle is lit in a dark house, but profits others. And this Jerome seems to intend, who says: "When we sing psalms for the souls of the departed, or a Mass is chanted, it is received nothing less than if it were said for any one of them." [See below in the solution to 4.] But they will object: on this account only general prayers ought to be made. To this it is answered that it was necessary that special ones be made, for the stirring up of devotion; for sameness is the mother of tedium, just as, on the contrary, variety is the mother of desire. And I confess that this pleases me more.

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