Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1
Articulus I. Quaestio II. Utrum omni creato utendum sit.
Secundo, viso quid sit uti per essentiam, quaeritur de utibili, utrum scilicet omni creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.
1. Proverbiorum decimo sexto1: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus: ergo omnia sunt ordinabilia in Deum; sed omne ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare; sed ordinando ad Deum ordinabile recte utimur: ergo si omnia contingit ordinare, omnibus est utendum.
2. Item, ens et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius2; sed omnia sunt entia: ergo omnia sunt bona. Sed omne bonum diligendum: ergo omne creatum est diligendum; sed non est diligendum propter se: ergo propter aliud; sed hoc est uti: ergo uti contingit omni creato.
3. Item, omni virtute contingit recte uti3: ergo opus omnis virtutis est rectus usus; sed usus alicuius virtutis est respectu mali poenae, ut patientiae, alicuius respectu mali culpae, ut poenitentiae: ergo malis omnibus, scilicet culpae et poenae, contingit recte uti: ergo multo fortius bonis: ergo etc.
4. Item, «Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem4»; sed omnibus contingit abuti: ergo omnibus contingit recte uti: ergo utendum est omni creato.
Contra:
1. Caritas est, per quam recte utimur, quia omnia ordinantur in finem per caritatem quaecumque recte ordinantur; sed sicut dicit Augustinus de Doctrina christiana5: «Tantum quatuor diligenda sunt ex caritate et tria tantum creata, ut nos, proximus et corpus proprium»: ergo tantum tria referuntur sive ordinantur in finem per caritatem, cum non sit uti recte nisi per caritatem: ergo tantum tribus est utendum, non ergo omni creato.
2. Item, omnia, quibus utimur, subiacent nostrae voluntati; sed quaedam sunt, quae non subiacent nostrae voluntati, ut necessaria et perpetua: ergo illis non est utendum.
3. Item, omne illud, quo recte utimur, bono fine facimus; sed quaedam sunt, quae nullo bono fine possunt fieri, ut mentiri et talia, «quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo6»: ergo talibus non est utendum.
4. Item, virtute non contingit male uti, sicut patet ex eius definitione7: ergo ab oppositis malo culpae sive vitiis non contingit recte uti: ergo non omnibus aliis a Deo est utendum.
Conclusio.
Non omni re creata possumus uti ut instrumento neque ut habitu neque ut actu, omni tamen re uti possumus ut obiecto, sed quadrupliciter, vel operando, vel acceptando, vel tolerando, vel respuendo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod uti aliquo dicitur quatuor modis: aut sicut instrumento, quo operamur, sicut aliquis utitur8 instrumento vel organo; et sic non omnibus contingit uti, utpote potentiis, quae sunt pure naturales, accipiendo uti proprie, sicut accipit Augustinus9; aut sicut habitu, quo regulamur, utpote virtute; et sic non omnibus contingit recte uti, ut habitu vitii, quo potius contingit obliquari; aut sicut actu, quo movemur; et sic non omni actu contingit bene10 uti, sicut illis p. 33quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; aut sicut obiecto, ad quod inclinamur; et sic omnibus contingit uti et abuti. Omnia enim possunt sumi in facultatem voluntatis ad approbandum vel respuendum; et hoc patet per Augustinum libro octoginta trium Quaestionum11: «Utimur assumendis vel respuendis ad valetudinem, tolerandis ad patientiam, ordinandis ad iustitiam».
Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate12: «Voluntas totam intelligentiam capit, dum utor omni eo quod intelligo»; sed mala intelliguntur: ergo contingit uti malis.
Aliter tamen utimur bonis, aliter malis. Ratio enim ordinationis in bonis non tantum est ex parte ordinantis, sed etiam ex parte ordinati, quia per se bona sunt utibilia et ordinabilia, et de sui natura; sed in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed potius ex parte ordinantis; et ideo mala non dicuntur utibilia.
Unde nota, quod, cum uti sit assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter: vel in facultatem voluntatis operantis13, sicut est de his quae proprie pertinent ad usum humanum; vel in facultatem voluntatis acceptantis, sicut est dilectio proximi et huiusmodi; vel in facultatem voluntatis tolerantis, sicut sunt mala poenae; vel in facultatem voluntatis respuentis, et sic assumuntur mala culpae et ordinantur. Primis duobus modis intelligitur illud: «Cuius usus bonus etc.».
Ad opposita:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de caritate, quod tantum tria creata14 sunt diligenda; dicendum, quod diligi aliquid ex caritate hoc est ordinari in summum bonum, quod per se caritas diligit. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut enim contingit ordinare quod natum est devenire in finem; et sic tantum tria creata diligenda sunt ex caritate; aut illud per quod devenire est in summum bonum; et quia hoc potest esse suo modo per omnem creaturam, omnis creatura potest diligi ex caritate, et omni creatura contingit uti.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non omnia subiacent voluntati; dicendum, quod aliquid15 dicitur subesse dominio voluntatis dupliciter: aut quantum ad esse ipsius rei; et sic non omnia subiacent; aut quantum ad actum voluntatis, qui est in respuendo ipsam rem vel approbando, et hoc16 propter se vel propter aliud; et tali modo omnia subiacent voluntati nostrae, scilicet quantum ad actum appetitionis vel respuitionis, licet non primo modo.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam nullo bono fine possunt fieri, similiter, quod semper vitiis abutimur; dicendum, quod obiicitur secundum viam, qua contingit uti aliquo ut actu medio; et sic non contingit17 uti peccato; vel sicut habitu regulante, similiter; contingit tamen eo uti sicut obiecto recte per motum contritionis et detestationis.
Article I. Question II. Whether every created thing is to be used.
Secondly, having seen what to use is per essence, the question is asked about the useable, namely whether every created thing is to be used. And that it is so, is shown in this way.
1. Proverbs sixteen1: God has worked all things for his own sake: therefore all things are orderable to God; but whatever is orderable to God can be ordered; but in ordering to God we rightly use the orderable: therefore if all things can be ordered, all things are to be used.
2. Likewise, being and good are convertible, as Dionysius holds2; but all things are beings: therefore all things are good. But every good is to be loved: therefore every created thing is to be loved; but it is not to be loved for its own sake: therefore for the sake of another; but this is to use: therefore it can be used in the case of every created thing.
3. Likewise, every virtue can be rightly used3: therefore the work of every virtue is right use; but the use of a certain virtue is with respect to the evil of penalty, as patience, of another with respect to the evil of fault, as penitence: therefore all evils, namely of fault and of penalty, can be rightly used: therefore much more strongly, goods: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, «Opposites are naturally to arise about the same thing4»; but all things can be misused: therefore all things can be rightly used: therefore every created thing is to be used.
On the contrary:
1. Charity is that by which we rightly use, because all things are ordered to the end through charity, whatever things are rightly ordered; but as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine5: «Only four things are to be loved out of charity, and only three created, namely ourselves, our neighbor, and our own body»: therefore only three are referred or ordered to the end through charity, since there is no right using except through charity: therefore only three are to be used, therefore not every created thing.
2. Likewise, all things which we use are subject to our will; but there are certain things which are not subject to our will, such as necessary and perpetual things: therefore those are not to be used.
3. Likewise, everything that we rightly use, we do with a good end; but there are certain things which can be done with no good end, such as lying and the like, «which, as soon as named, are conjoined with evil6»: therefore such things are not to be used.
4. Likewise, a virtue cannot be ill used, as is clear from its definition7: therefore from things opposite to the evil of fault, that is, from vices, one cannot rightly use: therefore not all things other than God are to be used.
Conclusion.
Not every created thing can we use as an instrument, nor as a habit, nor as an act; but every thing we can use as an object, yet in fourfold manner: either by operating, or by accepting, or by tolerating, or by spurning.
I respond: It must be said that to use something is said in four modes: either as an instrument, by which we operate, just as someone uses8 an instrument or organ; and thus it is not possible to use all things, namely the powers which are purely natural, taking to use properly, as Augustine takes it9; or as a habit, by which we are regulated, namely virtue; and thus it is not possible to rightly use all things, as the habit of vice, by which rather one can be turned aside; or as an act, by which we are moved; and thus it is not possible to use well10 every act, such as those p. 33which, as soon as named, are conjoined with evil; or as an object, to which we are inclined; and thus all things can be used and misused. For all things can be taken up into the faculty of the will for approving or spurning; and this is clear from Augustine in the book On Eighty-Three Questions11: «We use things to-be-taken-up or to-be-spurned for health, things to-be-tolerated for patience, things to-be-ordered for justice».
Likewise, Augustine in book ten On the Trinity12: «The will grasps the whole intellect, while I use all of that which I understand»; but evils are understood: therefore evils can be used.
Yet otherwise we use goods, and otherwise evils. For the ground of the ordering in goods is not only on the part of the one ordering, but also on the part of the thing ordered, because of themselves goods are useable and orderable, and from their own nature; but in evils the ground of ordering is not on the part of the things ordered, but rather on the part of the one ordering; and therefore evils are not called useable.
Hence note that, since to use is to take up something into the faculty of the will, this can be in a fourfold manner: either into the faculty of the operating will13, as is the case with those things which properly pertain to human use; or into the faculty of the accepting will, as is the love of neighbor and the like; or into the faculty of the tolerating will, as are the evils of penalty; or into the faculty of the spurning will, and thus evils of fault are taken up and ordered. By the first two modes is understood that saying: «Whose use is good etc.».
To the opposing arguments:
1. To that which is objected concerning charity, that only three created things14 are to be loved; it must be said that for something to be loved out of charity is for it to be ordered to the highest good, which charity loves per se. But this happens in two ways: either it is possible to order that which is naturally fitted to come to the end; and thus only three created things are to be loved out of charity; or that through which one comes to the highest good; and because this can be in its own way through every creature, every creature can be loved out of charity, and every creature can be used.
2. To that which is objected, that not all things are subject to the will; it must be said that something15 is said to be under the dominion of the will in two ways: either as to the being of the thing itself; and thus not all things are subject; or as to the act of the will, which is in spurning the thing itself or approving, and this16 either for its own sake or for the sake of another; and in such a way all things are subject to our will, namely as to the act of seeking-after or spurning, although not in the first way.
3. 4. To that which is objected, that certain things can be done with no good end, similarly, that we always misuse vices; it must be said that the objection proceeds along the way in which one can use something as a middle act; and thus17 one cannot use sin; or as a regulating habit, similarly; yet it can be used as an object rightly through the motion of contrition and detestation.
I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem antiqui doctores sub una quaestione et minus accurate tractare solent. — Ostensum iam supra est, quod uti in sensu activo sit solius voluntatis; in secunda hac quaestione inquiritur, ad quae obiecta se extendat usus voluntatis, sive quibus rebus uti passive conveniat. In responsione S. Doctor primo ponit quadruplicem distinctionem circa obiecta voluntatis ordinanda et resolvit quaestionem in genere. Quoad primum membrum huius distinctionis, patet quod voluntas non possit omnia assumere in facultatem suam, ut iis utatur sicut instrumento. Nam aliquae potentiae ipsius animae non subiacent imperio voluntatis; unde vocantur pure naturales, ut potentiae vegetativae. Secundo, incidendo in specialem quaestionem, scil. quo sensu quis malis uti possit, iterum quadrupliciter distinguit modum voluntatis ordinantis, scil. operantis, acceptantis, tolerantis et respuentis. Hic usus mali ex parte ordinantis est «usus per accidens», ut bene dicit Richard. (hic q. 2. ad ult.), «eo quod ordinatum aliunde accipit ordinabilitatem, scil. a voluntate». — Circa hanc quaestionem de usu mali S. Thom. (hic loc. cit.) aliis verbis quam S. Bonaventura loquitur, sed in sententia nulla est differentia, immo in S. II. II. q. 78. a. 4. Angelicus etiam in modo loquendi cum illo convenit.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 3. et 5. et Quodl., q. 17. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 3. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 10. et 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. ita presse sequitur S. Doctorem, ut Dionys. Carth. de ipso dicat: «Petrus, qui scripsit post Bonaventuram, ex ipso Bonaventura suam responsionem videtur sumsisse». — Richard., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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I. This and the following question the ancient doctors are accustomed to treat under one question and less accurately. — It has already been shown above, that to use in the active sense belongs only to the will; in this second question it is asked, to what objects the use of the will extends, or with what things to use in the passive sense agrees. In the response the holy Doctor first sets down a fourfold distinction concerning the objects of the will to be ordered and resolves the question in general. As to the first member of this distinction, it is clear that the will cannot take up all things into its faculty, so as to use them as an instrument. For some powers of the soul itself are not subject to the command of the will; whence they are called purely natural, such as the vegetative powers. Secondly, falling into a special question, namely in what sense one can use evils, again he distinguishes in fourfold manner the mode of the ordering will, namely operating, accepting, tolerating, and spurning. This use of evil on the part of the one ordering is a «use per accidens», as Richard well says (here q. 2. ad ult.), «because the ordered thing receives its orderability from elsewhere, namely from the will». — Concerning this question of the use of evil, St. Thomas (here at the cited place) speaks in other words than St. Bonaventure, but in substance there is no difference; indeed in Summa II–II, q. 78, a. 4, the Angelic Doctor also agrees with him even in the mode of speaking.
II. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 3 and 5, and Quodl., q. 17. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; Summa I–II, q. 16, a. 3. — Bl. Albert the Great, here a. 10 and 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, so closely follows the holy Doctor that Dionysius the Carthusian says of him: «Peter, who wrote after Bonaventure, seems to have taken his response from Bonaventure himself». — Richard, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius [the Carthusian], here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- 1Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata pro Deus legit Dominus. — Mox et pluries in seqq. argg. posuimus contingit loco convenit. Notamus hic et pro semper, quod codd. praesertim antiquiores saepissime ista duo vocabula eodem modo exhibeant abbreviata, ita ut sive contingit sive convenit legi possit.Verse 4, where the Vulgate reads Dominus (Lord) instead of Deus (God). — Hereafter and several times in the following arguments we have placed contingit in place of convenit. We note here once for all that the codices, especially the older ones, very often present these two words abbreviated in the same way, so that either contingit or convenit may be read.
- 2Cap. 5. de Div. Nom., ubi secundum textum Graecum legitur: Non aliud dicit esse bonum et aliud ens. — Mox cod. cc sed si omnia.Chapter 5 of On the Divine Names, where according to the Greek text it is read: He does not say that the good is one thing and being another. — Next, codex cc reads sed si omnia (but if all).
- 3Elicitur ex definitione virtutis, quam August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. et 19. ponit: Bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur. — Mox multi codd. ut C G H K O P Q R S U etc. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post poenae omittunt ut patientiae, quod tamen codd. praedicti postea male loco ut poenitentiae ponunt, editiones autem praeallegatae verbis ut poenitentiae praemittunt.Drawn from the definition of virtue which Augustine, On Free Choice II, c. 18 and 19, sets down: A good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly and which no one uses ill. — Next, many codices such as C G H K O P Q R S U etc. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, after poenae omit ut patientiae, which however the said codices afterward wrongly put in place of ut poenitentiae; the editions just cited prepose the words ut poenitentiae.
- 4Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis circa finem. Vide supra q. I. fundam. 1.Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, near the end. See above q. I, fundament 1.
- 5Lib. I. c. 23. n. 22: Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum, quod supra nos est; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est; quartum, quod infra nos est: de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant. — Et ibidem c. 26. n. 27: Quod si te totum intelligas, id est animum et corpus tuum et proximum tuum, id est animum et corpus eius. — Cod. W post caritate addit scilicet Deus. — Paulo ante fide codd. et ed. 1 addidimus sicut.Book I, c. 23, n. 22: Since therefore there are four things to be loved: one, which is above us; another, which we ourselves are; a third, which is alongside us; a fourth, which is below us: concerning the second and the fourth no precepts had to be given. — And in the same place, c. 26, n. 27: But if you understand yourself whole, that is your soul and your body, and your neighbor, that is his soul and body. — Codex W after caritate adds scilicet Deus (namely God). — Slightly earlier, on the faith of the codices and ed. 1, we have added sicut.
- 6Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6: Quaedam enim confestim nominata convoluta sunt cum malitia. (Translatio antiqua in ed. Operum S. Thomae a P. Fiaccadori 1866. tom. 21.)Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6: For certain things as soon as named are wrapped up with wickedness. (Old translation in the edition of the Works of St. Thomas by P. Fiaccadori, 1866, tom. 21.)
- 7August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. et 19. n. 50. Vide paulo supra fundam. 3.Augustine, On Free Choice II, c. 18 and 19, n. 50. See slightly above, fundament 3.
- 8Substituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 aliquis utitur pro utimur. Cod. V sicut aliquo utimur. Mox ex plurimis codd. cum ed. 1 bis substituimus utpote loco ut puta.From almost all manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted aliquis utitur (someone uses) for utimur (we use). Codex V reads sicut aliquo utimur (as we use something). Next, from very many codices with ed. 1, we have twice substituted utpote for ut puta.
- 9Quatenus uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis. Vid. supra q. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. ult., ubi agit de potentiis, quae non subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis.Inasmuch as to use is to take up something into the faculty of the will. See above, q. 1. Compare also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, last chapter, where he treats of the powers which are not subject to the command of reason and the will.
- 10Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit bene, quod antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 suppeditant, mutavimusque convenit in contingit.The Vatican edition with codex cc wrongly omits bene, which the older manuscripts and ed. 1 supply; and we have changed convenit into contingit.
- 11Quaest. 30: Sic enim utitur suo corpore: quibusdam assumendis vel respuendis ad valitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustitiam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod veritatis documentum. — In quo textu plurimi codd. ut A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omittunt assumendis vel, pro quo ed. 1 ponit conferendis aut.Question 30: For thus he uses his body: by taking up or spurning some things for health, by tolerating some for patience, by ordering some for justice, by considering some for some demonstration of truth. — In which text very many codices such as A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omit assumendis vel, for which ed. 1 puts conferendis aut.
- 12Cap. 11. n. 18: Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam, totam memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor, quod intelligo et memini.Chapter 11, n. 18: My will also grasps my whole intellect and my whole memory, while I use the whole of what I understand and remember.
- 13Renitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, Vat. pro operantis ponit imperantis, sed mendose, quia hoc membrum non excludit tria alia membra divisionis. Eamdem distinctionem Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. breviter sic proponit: Potest aliquid assumi in facultatem voluntatis quadrupliciter: vel voluntatis operantis, ut bona nostra, vel approbantis, ut aliena bona, vel tolerantis, ut mala poenae propria et culpae alienae, vel respuentis, ut mala culpae propriae.Against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, the Vatican puts imperantis (commanding) for operantis (operating), but erroneously, because this member does not exclude the three other members of the division. The same distinction is briefly proposed by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, thus: Something can be taken up into the faculty of the will in fourfold manner: either of the operating will, as our own goods, or of the approving, as the goods of another, or of the tolerating, as the evils of penalty of oneself and of fault of another, or of the spurning, as the evils of one's own fault.
- 14Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt creata, quod, ut certo subintelligendum, claritatis gratia retinuimus, praesertim cum et paulo post in mss. inveniatur. Mox Vat., post caritate omisso hoc, propositionem ipsam exhibet modo activo: diligere aliquid ex caritate est ordinare, renitentibus tamen mss. et ed. 1. — Obiectionem, quam hic S. Doctor solvit, infra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. sub alio respectu pertractat.The codices with ed. 1 omit creata, which, as certainly to be understood, we have retained for the sake of clarity, especially since it is also found shortly after in the manuscripts. Next the Vatican, having omitted hoc after caritate, presents the proposition itself in the active mode: to love something out of charity is to order [it], though against the manuscripts and ed. 1. — The objection which the holy Doctor here resolves, he treats below at d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, under another aspect.
- 15Nullo suffragante ms. nec ed. 1, Vat. aliquis.With no manuscript or ed. 1 supporting it, the Vatican reads aliquis (someone).
- 16Cod. Z hic non male addit vel.Codex Z here not badly adds vel (or).
- 17Postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus sic pro hoc modo, et bis contingit loco convenit. Mox mendum Vat. recto per modum castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.At the demand of almost all manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted sic (thus) for hoc modo (in this way), and twice contingit in place of convenit. Next we have corrected the Vatican error recto per modum (rightly through the mode) from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in I librum Sententiarum, Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1882), tom. I, pp. 32–33.
English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/1/d1/a1-q2. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.
Aristotle, Categoriae (Praedicamenta), Ethica Nicomachea (2) · Augustine of Hippo, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, De doctrina christiana, De libero arbitrio (2), De Trinitate · Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), De divinis nominibus · Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V), In IV libros Sententiarum