Dist. 4, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 4
Quaestio II. Utrum parvuli in baptismo recipiant plene rem Sacramenti.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum parvuli recipiant plene rem, hoc est gratiam cum habitibus virtutum1. Et quod non, videtur.
1. Augustinus, de Baptismo parvulorum2: «Parvulos, etsi nondum fides, quae in credentium voluntate consistit, iam tamen ipsius fidei Sacramentum fideles facit»: ergo non habent habitum fidei.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia virtus est habitus; sed habitus reddit potentiam facilem ad opus3; sed hoc non est in parvulo: ergo etc.
3. Item, virtus est habitus perfectus, quia «virtus est, quae habentem perficit4»; sed perfectio moris praesupponit perfectionem naturae: ergo cum in parvulo non sit perfectio naturae, nec erit in eo perfectio moris, et sic etc.
4. Item, virtus est habitus potentiae motivae5; sed cognitiva praecedit motivam: ergo cum parvuli non sint susceptibiles habitus cognitivi, nec erunt motivi.
Contra:
1. Augustinus ad Bonifacium6: «Regenerans Spiritus in maioribus offerentibus et parvulis oblatis communis est»: ergo eundem effectum habet in magnis et parvis.
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia baptismus ita facit evolare parvulum, si moriatur, ut adultum; p. 114sed virtutes sunt pennae ad volandum in caelum7: ergo parvulus habet virtutes, si baptizatur.
3. Item, baptismus delet originale in parvulo; sed originale non solum substantias, sed etiam potentias deformat in pueris8: ergo si baptismus est perfectum remedium, reformat potentias. Sed potentiae reformantur habitibus virtutum: ergo baptismus dat parvulis habitus virtutum.
4. Item, baptismus facit parvulum dignum et idoneum ad dotes gloriae, quae sunt visio, dilectio, tentio: sed ad visionem disponitur fide, ad dilectionem caritate, ad tentionem spe9: ergo parvulus habet virtutes theologicas et alias per consequens.
Conclusio.
Parvulis in baptismo cum gratia habitus perfecti virtutum conferuntur.
Respondeo: Quidam dixerunt, virtutes parvulis dari quantum ad radicem, non quantum ad habitus, quia datur eis gratia delens culpam, non ut habilitas potentiae; quia potentiae sunt ligatae, unde non sunt natae habilitari; sed cum potentiae solvuntur, gratia ramificatur in habitus virtutum. — Sed haec positio non potest stare, quia tunc aliquis habens virtutes, si ligarentur in eo potentiae per stultitiam vel furiam, amitteret eas; quod stultum est dicere, cum sola culpa perdantur.
Alia positio est, quod dantur parvulis quantum ad habitum, sed non quantum ad usum. — Sed tunc quaeritur: quid vocatur ibi usus? aut facultas utendi10, aut actus. Si facultas; tunc qui habet habitum habet facultatem, nec est distinguere. Si actus; sed adulti non semper utuntur virtutibus, ut quando aliis intendunt, tamen complete habent habitus. Si usus vocatur quaedam assuefactio addita numeri virtutis, sicut patientia dicitur fuisse in Iob; adhuc non solvit, quia haec non est in omnibus adultis bonis.
Tertia positio est, quod dantur eis habitus, sed secundum statum imperfectionis; unde habitus ille quasi medius est inter potentiam nudam et perfecte dispositam, sicut est visus in oculo canis ante nonum diem11. — Sed ista positio non potest stare convenienter, quia perfectio habituum infusorum venit ex parte gratiae; et per id quod habent, absque additione possunt parvuli bene operari, cum creverunt.
Et propterea dicendum, quod dantur eis habitus perfecti virtutum, sicut et adultis, quamvis per illos non operentur. — Propter quod notandum, quod potentiae animae dupliciter impediuntur, ne indebite exeant in actus suos: uno modo a corporis imperfectione et corruptione12; et sic impediuntur in parvulis et stultis et dormientibus, et contra hoc expeditivum est corporis perfectio et bona dispositio. Alio modo impediuntur ab habitu malo, ut a concupiscentia sive a culpa; et sic expediuntur per gratiam sive virtutes13. Virtutes ergo reddunt potentias faciles ipsas perficiendo, et hoc removendo culpam; aliam autem expeditionem non faciunt. Unde cum parvulus sit habens utrumque impedimentum, alterum removetur per virtutes, non utrumque; et ideo non est omnino facilis14.
Huiusmodi autem habitus expeditivus habet triplicem ortum: nam quidam est innatus, quidam acquisitus, quidam infusus. Primus incipit cum natura et ab eius principio ortum habet; et ideo in natura imperfecta est imperfectus, et cum natura crescente crescit, et cum natura perfecta perficitur, ut patet in naturali iudicatorio15. Secundus vero, scilicet acquisitus, ortum habet a libero arbitrio, qui non habet usum, donec natura aliquo modo perficiatur; et ideo sequitur naturam perfectam. Tertius vero ortum habet a Deo, non a natura nec a libero arbitrio; et quia non habet ortum a libero arbitrio, potest esse in parvulo ante usum liberi arbitrii; quia vero non habet ortum a natura, potest esse perfectus, natura existente imperfecta. — Per haec patent obiecta.
p. 1151. Nam fides aliquid habet infusum, aliquid acquisitum, ut cognitionem substratam; ratione primi est in parvulo, non ratione secundi.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de facilitate, patet responsio, quia habitus ille reddit potentiam facilem, sed non omnino.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est habitus perfectus etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio moris quaedam est acquisita, et haec praesupponit perfectionem naturae; quaedam infusa, et haec non praesupponit necessario16. — Posset tamen dici, quod potentiae naturales in parvulo, in quibus natae sunt inesse virtutes, quantum est de se, perfectae sunt, licet non exeant in actum propter impedimentum corporis. Unde statim, cum anima parvuli soluta est a carne, habet operationes sibi debitas.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus cognitivi praecedunt etc.; dicendum, quod licet habitus cognitivi sint secundum acquisitionem, tamen gratuiti sunt per infusionem17. — Sed, cum cognitivi possint infundi, quare non dantur? Ratio est, quia sunt ad cognoscendum, et hunc actum non habent ante usum rationis. Sed habitus motivi non tantum sunt ad dirigendum, sed ad faciendum dignum gloria et purificandum a culpa18.
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Question II. Whether infants in baptism fully receive the reality of the Sacrament.
Second it is asked, whether infants receive the reality fully, that is, grace with the habits of the virtues1. And that they do not, it seems:
1. Augustine, On the Baptism of Infants2: "Infants, although not yet faith, which consists in the will of believers, nevertheless the Sacrament of faith itself makes them faithful": therefore they do not have the habit of faith.
2. Likewise, by reason it seems: because virtue is a habit; but a habit renders a power facile for a work3; but this is not in an infant: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, virtue is a perfect habit, because "it is virtue that perfects the one having it4"; but perfection of conduct presupposes perfection of nature: therefore since in an infant there is no perfection of nature, neither will there be in him perfection of conduct, and so etc.
4. Likewise, virtue is a habit of the motive power5; but the cognitive [power] precedes the motive: therefore since infants are not susceptible of cognitive habits, neither will they be [susceptible] of motive ones.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine to Boniface6: "The regenerating Spirit is common to the greater ones offering and to the infants offered": therefore it has the same effect in great and small.
2. Likewise, by reason it seems, because baptism makes an infant fly away, if he die, just as an adult; but the virtues are the wings for flying into heaven7: therefore an infant has the virtues, if he is baptized.
3. Likewise, baptism blots out the original [guilt] in an infant; but the original [guilt] deforms not only the substances, but also the powers in children8: therefore if baptism is a perfect remedy, it reforms the powers. But the powers are reformed by the habits of the virtues: therefore baptism gives to infants the habits of the virtues.
4. Likewise, baptism makes an infant worthy and fit for the dowries of glory, which are vision, love, possession: but for vision he is disposed by faith, for love by charity, for possession by hope9: therefore an infant has the theological virtues and the others consequently.
Conclusion.
To infants in baptism, together with grace, the perfect habits of the virtues are conferred.
I respond: Some have said that the virtues are given to infants as regards their root, not as regards their habits, because grace is given to them blotting out guilt, not as an aptitude of the power; because the powers are bound, whence they are not apt to be made fit; but when the powers are loosed, the grace ramifies into the habits of the virtues. — But this position cannot stand, because then someone having the virtues, if his powers were bound in him through folly or madness, would lose them; which is foolish to say, since they are lost by guilt alone.
Another position is, that they are given to infants as regards the habit, but not as regards the use. — But then it is asked: what is there called use? either the faculty of using10, or the act. If the faculty; then he who has the habit has the faculty, and there is no distinguishing. If the act; but adults do not always use the virtues, as when they attend to other things, yet they completely have the habits. If use is called a certain practice added to the number of the virtue, just as patience is said to have been in Job; even so it does not resolve [the matter], because this is not in all good adults.
A third position is, that habits are given to them, but according to a state of imperfection; whence that habit is as it were midway between a bare power and one perfectly disposed, just as is sight in the eye of a dog before the ninth day11. — But this position cannot stand fittingly, because the perfection of infused habits comes from the side of grace; and by that which they have, without addition infants can act well, when they have grown up.
And therefore it must be said that the perfect habits of the virtues are given to them, just as also to adults, although they do not operate through them. — On account of which it is to be noted that the powers of the soul are impeded in two ways, lest they go out unduly into their acts: in one way by the imperfection and corruption of the body12; and thus they are impeded in infants and the foolish and those sleeping, and against this the perfection and good disposition of the body is the remedy. In another way they are impeded by an evil habit, as by concupiscence or by guilt; and thus they are freed through grace or the virtues13. Therefore the virtues render the powers facile by perfecting them, and this by removing guilt; but they do not effect the other freeing. Whence since the infant has both impediments, the one is removed through the virtues, not both; and therefore he is not altogether facile14.
But a habit of this expediting kind has a threefold origin: for one is innate, one acquired, one infused. The first begins with nature and has its origin from its principle; and therefore in an imperfect nature it is imperfect, and grows with the growing nature, and is perfected with the perfected nature, as is plain in the natural faculty of judgment15. The second, namely the acquired, has its origin from free choice, which does not have use until nature is in some way perfected; and therefore it follows perfected nature. The third has its origin from God, not from nature nor from free choice; and because it does not have its origin from free choice, it can be in an infant before the use of free choice; but because it does not have its origin from nature, it can be perfect, while nature is imperfect. — Through these things the objections are plain.
1. For faith has something infused, something acquired, namely the cognition that underlies it; by reason of the first it is in an infant, not by reason of the second.
2. To that which is objected concerning facility, the response is plain, because that habit renders the power facile, but not altogether.
3. To that which is objected, that virtue is a perfect habit, etc.; it must be said that one perfection of conduct is acquired, and this presupposes perfection of nature; another infused, and this does not necessarily presuppose [it]16. — Yet it could be said that the natural powers in an infant, in which the virtues are apt to inhere, as far as they are of themselves, are perfect, although they do not go out into act on account of the impediment of the body. Whence at once, when the soul of the infant is loosed from the flesh, it has the operations due to it.
4. To that which is objected, that the cognitive habits precede, etc.; it must be said that, although the cognitive habits are according to acquisition, nevertheless they are gratuitous through infusion17. — But, since the cognitive [habits] can be infused, why are they not given? The reason is, because they are for knowing, and they do not have this act before the use of reason. But the motive habits are not only for directing, but for making [one] worthy of glory and for purifying from guilt18.
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- 1Vide supra d. 1. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.See above, d. 1. Pars I. q. 2. ad 3.
- 2Libr. 1. c. 25. n. 38. et c. 33. n. 61; sententialiter, ipsa verba habentur in Epist. 98. (alias 23.) n. 10.Bk. 1, c. 25, n. 38, and c. 33, n. 61; as to sense, the very words are had in Letter 98 (alias 23), n. 10.
- 3Vide tom. III. pag. 796, nota 4. verba August. et Averrois. — Maior est secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5.See vol. III, p. 796, note 4, the words of Augustine and Averroes. — The major is according to Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 5.
- 4Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 388, nota 2.Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6. Cf. vol. III, p. 388, note 2.
- 5Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. argg. ad 2. partem. — De minori vide ibid. pag. 740, nota 4. — Retinuimus cum edd. motivae, pro quo codd. G I bene affectivae, alii codd. effectivae. Finem arg. cod. R sic sonat: habitus cognitivae, nec erunt motivae.Cf. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2, the arguments to the second part. — On the minor see ibid., p. 740, note 4. — We retained with the editions motivae ("motive"), for which codices G I rightly [read] affectivae ("affective"), other codices effectivae ("effective"). Codex R gives the end of the argument thus: habitus cognitivae, nec erunt motivae ("a habit of the cognitive, nor will they be motive").
- 6Epist. 98. (alias 23.) n. 2: Regenerans... et parvulo oblato renatoque communis est. — Non pauci codd. obligatis pro oblatis.Letter 98 (alias 23), n. 2: "The regenerating [Spirit]... is common also to the infant offered and reborn." — Not a few codices [read] obligatis ("bound") for oblatis ("offered").
- 7Gregor., XXIV. Moral. c. 8. n. 19: Quid namque alas animalium nisi virtutes debemus sentire Sanctorum? Qui dum terrena despiciunt, ad caelestia volando sublevantur. Unde recte etiam per Isaiam [40. 31.] dicitur: Qui confidunt in Domino, mutabunt fortitudinem, assument pennas ut aquilae. Cfr. I. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 10. n. 31.Gregory, Morals XXIV, c. 8, n. 19: "For what else than the virtues of the Saints ought we to understand by the wings of animals? Who, while they despise earthly things, are raised by flying to the heavenly. Whence rightly also through Isaiah [40:31] it is said: They who hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles." Cf. I. Homily on Ezechiel, homily 10, n. 31.
- 8Vide II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. — De reformatione potentiarum per virtutes cfr. ibid. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3, d. 26. q. 5, et III. d. 36. q. 1. — Pro substantias codd. G I substantiam, Vat. animae substantiam.See II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. — On the reformation of the powers through the virtues cf. ibid., d. 16. a. 2. q. 3, d. 26. q. 5, and III. d. 36. q. 1. — For substantias ("substances") codices G I [read] substantiam ("substance"), the Vatican edition animae substantiam ("the substance of the soul").
- 9Cfr. infra d. 49. p. I. q. 5, et III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.Cf. below, d. 49. Pars I. q. 5, and III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3, in the body [of the article].
- 10Sive facilitas exeundi in actum. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 8. m. 8. a. 3. § 1.Or the facility of going out into act. Cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 8. m. 8. a. 3. § 1.
- 11Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis (de privatione et habitu), quod Boëth. exponens ait: Parvos vero catulos, quibus visus non est, non satis digne aliquis caecos esse pronuntiet; eo enim tempore nondum naturaliter visum habere possunt etc. — Pro visus cod. Z virtus. Inferius pro cum crecerunt plures codd. cum creverint.Cf. Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter on Opposites (on privation and habit), expounding which Boethius says: "But one would not sufficiently fittingly pronounce small puppies, which do not have sight, to be blind; for at that time they cannot yet naturally have sight," etc. — For visus ("sight") codex Z [reads] virtus ("virtue"). Below, for cum crecerunt most codices [read] cum creverint ("when they have grown").
- 12Cod. X addit sive mala dispositione. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 6. Inferius pro expeditivum edd. cum paucis codd. impeditivum, cod. H impedimentum.Codex X adds sive mala dispositione ("or by an evil disposition"). Cf. II. Sent. d. 25. Pars II. q. 6. Below, for expeditivum ("the remedy/freeing thing") the editions with a few codices [read] impeditivum ("the impeding thing"), codex H impedimentum ("impediment").
- 13Edd. ab habitu malo et a concupiscentia sive [cod. Y et] a culpa, et contra hoc impedimentum est gratia sive virtutes, per quas expediuntur ad operandum.The editions [read] ab habitu malo et a concupiscentia sive [codex Y: et] a culpa, et contra hoc impedimentum est gratia sive virtutes, per quas expediuntur ad operandum ("by an evil habit and by concupiscence or [codex Y: and] by guilt, and against this impediment is grace or the virtues, through which they are freed for operating").
- 14Vat. supplet ad operandum.The Vatican edition supplies ad operandum ("for operating").
- 15Cfr. tom. II. pag. 901, nota 2. et pag. 903, nota 9. nec non tom. III. pag. 500, nota 6. — Inferius pro sequitur cod. aa requirit.Cf. vol. II, p. 901, note 2, and p. 903, note 9, as also vol. III, p. 500, note 6. — Below, for sequitur ("follows") codex aa [reads] requirit ("requires").
- 16Vat. repetit perfectionem naturae. Mox pro natae sunt permulti codd. innatae sunt, cod. U etiam natae sunt. In fine solut. cod. F sibi proprias vel debitas. Cfr. infra d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.The Vatican edition repeats perfectionem naturae ("perfection of nature"). Soon, for natae sunt ("are apt") very many codices [read] innatae sunt ("are inborn"), codex U etiam natae sunt ("are also apt"). At the end of the solution codex F [reads] sibi proprias vel debitas ("proper or due to it"). Cf. below, d. 50. Pars II. a. 1. q. 1. and following.
- 17Sensus est: Dicendum, quod licet habitus cognitivi, sint per acquisitionem et sub hoc respectu parvulis convenire nequeant, tamen in quantum sunt gratuiti, sunt per infusionem et in parvulis inveniuntur. Cfr. supra ad 1. — Superius post cognitivi sint cod. R addit prius, Vat. priores, et subinde pro sunt substituit praecedunt. Pro tamen gratuiti sunt cod. R tamen gratuitum.The sense is: It must be said that, although the cognitive habits are by acquisition and under this respect cannot belong to infants, nevertheless inasmuch as they are gratuitous, they are by infusion and are found in infants. Cf. above, ad 1. — Above, after cognitivi sint codex R adds prius ("first"), the Vatican edition priores ("former"), and thereupon for sunt substitutes praecedunt ("precede"). For tamen gratuiti sunt codex R [reads] tamen gratuitum ("nevertheless gratuitous").
- 18Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.
St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum, Dist. 4, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1889), tom. IV, pp. 113–115.
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