Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

# COMMENTARIUS IN PROLOGUM MAGISTRI.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Totali libro praemittit Magister prologum, in quo tangit causas suscepti operis. Dividitur autem in duas partes. In prima parte ponit rationes, quae moverunt¹ ipsum ad aggrediendum praesens negotium sive opus; in secunda rationes, quae debent movere discipulos ad benigne audiendum, ibi² circa finem: In quo maiorum etc., ubi incipit alloqui auditores.

Prima pars dividitur iterum in duas, quia duplex ratio potest movere aliquem ad opus faciendum, scilicet amor boni et odium mali. Primo ergo ponit rationes sumtas ex parte amoris boni, scilicet catholicae veritatis. Secundo ex parte odii mali, scilicet haereticae pravitatis, ibi: Quamvis non ambigamus etc. Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima tangit³ causam excitantem; et haec est desiderium mercedis et spes auxilii sub exemplo viduae et parabola Samaritani. In secunda ponit causam retrahentem, quae duplex est, scilicet laboris immensitas et propria infirmitas, ibi: Delectat nos etc. In tertia ponit causam ipsum⁴ propellentem, et haec est zelus ipsum accendens, ibi: Quam vincit zelus etc. In quarta ponit causam compellentem et praevalentem, ibi: Non valentes etc., et haec est petitio fratrum studiosorum, quibus non potest quis iure resistere, sed quodammodo necessario oportet collum subiicere.

DUBIA CIRCA PRIMAM PARTEM PROLOGI MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

Sed quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:⁵ Opus agere praesumsimus; sed praesumtio est peccatum: ergo peccavit.

Respondeo: Est praesumtio confidentiae de divino adiutorio, et praesumtio superbiae, quae est de proprio ingenio. Prima non est peccatum, sed est virtutis⁶; secunda vero est peccatum; sed de prima loquitur Magister.

Vel aliter: Est praesumtio secundum veritatem, et est praesumtio secundum propriam aestimatio-

nem. Prima est reprehensibilis, quia superbiae, secunda laudabilis, quia humilitatis, nec est culpabilis in aliquo; vir enim humilis in omnibus¹ operibus suis se reputat indignum et quasi praesumtuosum.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Prolatis duobus denariis supereroganti; quae sit ista supererogatio. Si tu dicas, quod sit magistrorum et Sanctorum superadditio ad sacram Scripturam; contra, Damascenus²: «Quae tradita sunt nobis per Legem et Prophetas veneremur, nihil ultra haec inquirentes».

Item, Apocalypsis ultimo³: Si quis apposuerit super haec, apponet ei Dominus plagas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est additio distrahens, et est additio complens. Addens primo modo non supererogat, sed magis diminuit et subvertit; et tales sunt haeretici, quibus datur maledictio. Addens secundo modo supererogat, quia salvo sensu Scripturae⁴ ipsam dilucidat. Per duos igitur denarios duo intelligo Testamenta, per Samaritanum, Christum, per semivivum, hominem gratuitis exspoliatum et vulneratum in naturalibus, per⁵ supererogationem intelligo doctorem exponentem.

Vel aliter dicendum, quod est additio, in qua additum est contrarium, et est⁶, in qua additum est diversum, et est, in qua additum est consonum. Prima additio est erroris, secunda praesumtionis; quia praesumtio est dicere in sacra Scriptura aliquid omnino diversum ab his, quae in ea expressa sunt; tertia fidelis instructionis; quia quod implicitum est explicat.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quam vincit zelus domus Dei, quis sit iste zelus. Et quare magis hoc zelo accenditur contra animales et carnales quam contra superbos et alios peccatores? Et cum zelus sit amor privatus, non videtur quod deberet zelo accendi.

Praeterea⁷, cum maius peccatum sit superbia, videtur quod magis deberet accendi contra superbos.

Respondeo: Ad primum dicendum, quod zelus est amor nolens habere consortium in amato. Zelus malus vitat omne consortium, sed zelus bonus vitat tantum malum⁸; unde veri zelatores domus Dei non possunt videre in Ecclesia vitia, quin insurgant contra ipsa. Unde Ioannis secundo dicit Glossa⁹: «Zelus bonus est, quo animus, abiecto humano timore, accenditur et eo comeditur, quo quaelibet prava, quae viderit, corrigere satagit, et si nequiverit, tolerat et gemit».

Ad secundum dicendum, quod Magister specialiter in Ecclesia zelabat fidem; et ideo magis succendebatur¹⁰ contra fidei corruptores. Dupliciter autem corrumpit quis fidem: aut motus perversitate voluntatis et affectionis; et hic dicitur carnalis. Nam caro dicitur hic carnalis affectio, secundum illud ad Galatas quinto¹¹: «Manifesta sunt opera carnis etc.» Alio modo corrumpit quis, motus perversitate iudicii; et hic dicitur animalis, quasi phantasticus, quia phantasiae pervertunt iudicium rationis.

Dub. IV.

Quas bigas agitat in nobis Christi caritas.

Contra: Ecclesiastis nono¹²: Nemo scit, utrum odio, an amore dignus sit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caritas uno modo dicit virtutem gratuitam, alio modo dicit large amo-

rem multum appretiantem amatum: unde caritas¹, amor carus. Primo modo sumta caritate, verum est, quod certitudinaliter nescit aliquis²; potest tamen aliquo experimento dulcedinis divinae misericordiae hoc coniicere probabiliter; secundo modo potest scire. Et si primo modo dicit Magister, non dicit asserendo, sed coniiciendo; si secundo modo, tunc assertive potest intelligi; et sic patet illud.

DIVISIO TEXTUS SECUNDAE PARTIS PROLOGI.

Quamvis non ambigamus etc. Supra posuit Magister rationes moventes ex approbatione³ boni; hic ponit rationes moventes ex odio et detestatione mali; et hoc est malum haereticae perversitatis. Habet autem haec pars quatuor particulas. In prima parte tangit eorum perversitatem, quae consistit in calumniando bonum et verum ex erroris caecitate et invidiae pari malignitate⁴. In secunda tangit huius perversitatis radicem, quae est suggestio diabolica et propria superbia, ibi: Quam Deus huius saeculi. In tertia tangit huius erroris diffusionem⁵, quae est per falsam superstitionem et mendacem et contentiosam locutionem, ibi: Habent rationem sapientiae in superstitione. In quarta infert rationem, quae ipsum movit ad praesentis operis compilationem, ibi: Horum igitur Deo odibilem. Et ratio haec est subversio erroris.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM SECUNDAE PARTIS PROLOGI.

Dub. V.

Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Veritati non intellectae. Videtur enim⁶, quod dicat male, quia veritas est lux intelligibilis, sicut lux corporalis sensibilis; sed oculus habens visum non potest ignorare lucem sensibilem: ergo pari ratione nec intellectus ignorabit lucem intelligibilem. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile; quaeritur, quare non est simile, et quare magis deficit natura intellectui quam sensui?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod simile est, si quis attendat. Triplex enim est causa, quare aliquis non videt visibile: aut enim non videt, quia non vult respicere, aut si vult, impeditur propter defectum organi, aut propter absentiam lucis. Hoc manifestum est. Similiter in spiritualibus intellectus⁷ frequenter aliqua non intelligit, quia non vult considerare; aliquando vero non intelligit propter impedimentum ex parte corporis, ut patet in phreneticis et stultis; aliquando propter absentiam lucis. Licet enim lux increata se non subtrahat quantum ad essentiam vel quantum ad qualemcumque influentiam, subtraxit⁸ tamen se homini, cum peccavit, quantum ad influentiam perfectam; unde dicitur inflixisse ei ignorantiam. Unde sicut oculus in tenebris errat, sic hodie miser humanus intellectus. Cum autem plene restituetur⁹ in lucem, sicut oculus videre poterit omne visibile, sic intellectus omne intelligibile.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Veritati offendenti. Contra: «Omnes homines natura scire desiderant»¹⁰, sicut etiam esse beati; sed beatitudo neminem offendit, quia omnes eam desiderant: ergo nec veritas offendit aliquem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de veritate quantum ad primum effectum, qui est illuminare; et quantum ad istum nemo ipsam odit: omnes enim naturaliter desiderant illuminari. Est iterum loqui quantum ad effectum consequentem, qui est arguere; et hunc habet in malis. Manifestando enim mala redarguit mala facientem¹¹; et inde est, quod mali odiunt veritatem, quia sicut dicitur Ioannis tertio¹²: Qui male agit, odit lucem.

Dub. VII.

Qui contentioni studentes contra veritatem sine foedere bellant. Contra: Tertii Esdrae quarto¹³: Magna est veritas et fortior omnibus. Omnis terra veritatem invocat, et omnes tremunt eam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod¹ est loqui de veritate simpliciter, vel de veritate in hoc sive in speciali. Primo modo veritas est inexpugnabilis, et ideo praevalet; et sic intelligitur illud Esdrae. Est iterum loqui de veritate secundo modo; et² sic contingit eam per rationes phantasticas obumbrari et per contentionem impugnari. Unde Ambrosius super primum ad Romanos³: «Contentio est impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris».

Dub. VIII.

Ex testimoniis veritatis in aeternum fundatis. Contra: primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio⁴: Scientia destruetur: ergo et testimonia.

Respondeo: Quod testimonia veritatis sunt in aeternum fundata, sicut dicitur in Psalmo⁵: Initio cognovi de testimoniis tuis etc. Quod obiicitur, quod scientia destruetur; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad modum docendi et considerandi, sed non quantum ad cognitum et rationem cognoscendi, Psalmus⁶: In aeternum Domine permanet verbum tuum etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS ULTIMAE PARTIS.

In quo maiorum exempla. Haec est pars ultima, in qua ponit Magister rationes moventes discipulos ad audiendum. Et dividitur haec pars in quatuor partes secundum quatuor, quae movent discipulos ad audiendum, duo quorum⁷ sunt ex parte operis, videlicet auctoritas et utilitas; duo vero ex parte docentis, scilicet humilitas et facilitas. In primo praeparat docilitatem, scilicet in auctoritate. In secundo, scilicet⁸ in utilitate, suscitat attentionem. In duobus autem sequentibus, scilicet humilitate et facilitate, captat benevolentiam.

In prima igitur parte ostendit, opus suum esse authenticum, in secunda compendiosum, ibi: Non igitur debet hic labor; in tertia ostendit, modum docendi esse humilem, in hoc quod vult corrigi, ibi: In hoc autem tractatu etc. In quarta ostendit, esse facilem ad inveniendum et memorandum, ibi: Ut autem quod quaeritur facilius occurrat.

DUBIUM ULTIMAE PARTIS.

Dub. IX.

Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Liberum correctorem; quid vult dicere per hoc nomen liberum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod liber corrector dicitur, sicut homo liber, qui «sui tantum causa est», ut dicit Philosophus⁹; sic corrector liber dicitur qui tantum gratia correctionis, non invidiae vel subsannationis corrigit. Hunc desiderat Magister exemplo Augustini secundo de Trinitate¹⁰, ubi dicit: «Magis amabo inspici a rectis, quam timebo morderi a perversis. Gratanter enim suscipit osculum columbinum pulcherrima et modestissima caritas; dentem vero caninum vel evitat cautissima humilitas, vel retundit solidissima veritas: magisque optabo a quolibet reprehendi, quam sive ab errante sive ab adulante laudari».

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# COMMENTARY ON THE MASTER'S PROLOGUE.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

To the book as a whole the Master prefixes a prologue, in which he touches upon the causes of the work he has undertaken. Now it is divided into two parts. In the first part he sets down the reasons which moved¹ him to take up the present business or work; in the second, the reasons which ought to move his disciples to hear him kindly, there² near the end: In it [you will find] the examples of our forebears etc., where he begins to address his hearers.

The first part is again divided into two, because a twofold reason can move anyone to the doing of a work, namely love of the good and hatred of evil. First, then, he sets down the reasons taken from the side of the love of the good, namely of catholic truth. Second, from the side of the hatred of evil, namely of heretical depravity, there: Although we do not doubt etc. The first part has four particles. In the first he touches³ the arousing cause; and this is the desire of the reward and the hope of help, under the example of the widow and the parable of the Samaritan. In the second he sets down the withdrawing cause, which is twofold, namely the immensity of the labour and his own infirmity, there: The truth of him who promises delights us etc. In the third he sets down the cause driving him⁴ forward, and this is the zeal which kindles him, there: which zeal for the house of God overcomes etc. In the fourth he sets down the compelling and prevailing cause, there: Not being able etc., and this is the petition of studious brethren, whom no one can rightly resist, but to whom in a certain way one must of necessity bow the neck.

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE FIRST PART OF THE MASTER'S PROLOGUE.

Dub. I.

But it is asked concerning this which he says:⁵ We have presumed to undertake the work; but presumption is a sin: therefore he sinned.

I respond: There is a presumption of confidence concerning the divine assistance, and a presumption of pride, which is concerning one's own native ability. The first is not a sin, but belongs to virtue⁶; the second, however, is a sin; but the Master is speaking of the first.

Or otherwise: There is a presumption according to the truth, and there is a presumption according to one's own estimate.

The first is reprehensible, because it belongs to pride; the second is praiseworthy, because it belongs to humility, and it is not culpable in anything; for a humble man in all¹ his works reckons himself unworthy and, as it were, presumptuous.

Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: Two denarii having been brought out, to him who spends beyond them; what that spending-beyond is. If you say that it is the superaddition of the masters and of the Saints to sacred Scripture — on the contrary, Damascene²: «Let us venerate the things that have been handed down to us through the Law and the Prophets, seeking nothing beyond these».

Likewise, the last chapter of the Apocalypse³: If anyone shall add to these things, the Lord shall lay upon him the plagues.

I respond: It must be said that there is an addition which draws away, and there is an addition which completes. He who adds in the first way does not spend beyond, but rather diminishes and subverts; and such are the heretics, to whom the curse is given. He who adds in the second way spends beyond, because, the sense of Scripture⁴ being safe, he makes it clear. By the two denarii, therefore, I understand the two Testaments; by the Samaritan, Christ; by the half-dead man, man despoiled of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural ones; by⁵ the spending-beyond I understand the doctor who expounds.

Or it must be said otherwise, that there is an addition in which what is added is contrary, and there is one⁶ in which what is added is diverse, and there is one in which what is added is consonant. The first addition is one of error, the second of presumption; because it is presumption to say in sacred Scripture something altogether diverse from those things which are expressed in it; the third is of faithful instruction, because it makes explicit what was implicit.

Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: Which the zeal of the house of God overcomes — what that zeal is. And why is he kindled with this zeal against the animal and the carnal rather than against the proud and other sinners? And since zeal is a private love, it does not seem that he ought to be kindled with zeal.

Furthermore⁷, since pride is the greater sin, it seems that he ought rather to be kindled against the proud.

I respond: To the first it must be said that zeal is a love unwilling to have a partner in the thing loved. Evil zeal shuns every partnership, but good zeal shuns only what is evil⁸; hence the true zealots of the house of God cannot see vices in the Church without rising up against them. Hence on the second chapter of John the Gloss says⁹: «Good zeal is that by which the mind, human fear being cast off, is kindled and is consumed by it, so that it busies itself to correct whatever perverse things it has seen, and if it cannot, bears with them and groans».

To the second it must be said that the Master was especially zealous for the faith in the Church; and therefore he was the more inflamed¹⁰ against the corrupters of the faith. Now a man corrupts the faith in two ways: either moved by a perversity of will and affection — and this man is called carnal. For flesh is here called carnal affection, according to that saying to the Galatians, chapter five¹¹: «The works of the flesh are manifest etc.» In the other way a man corrupts it moved by a perversity of judgement — and this man is called animal, as it were fantastic, because fantasies pervert the judgement of reason.

Dub. IV.

Which two horses the charity of Christ drives in us.

On the contrary: Ecclesiastes, chapter nine¹²: No man knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love.

I respond: It must be said that charity in one way names the gratuitous virtue, in another way it names broadly a love

greatly prizing the thing loved: whence caritas¹, a dear love. Charity being taken in the first way, it is true that no one knows it with certitude²; yet he can conjecture it with probability by some experience of the sweetness of the divine mercy; in the second way he can know it. And if the Master speaks in the first way, he does not speak by asserting but by conjecturing; if in the second way, then it can be understood assertively; and thus that saying is clear.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT OF THE SECOND PART OF THE PROLOGUE.

Although we do not doubt etc. Above the Master set down the reasons that move from the approval³ of the good; here he sets down the reasons that move from the hatred and detestation of evil; and this evil is the evil of heretical perversity. Now this part has four particles. In the first part he touches their perversity, which consists in calumniating the good and the true out of the blindness of error and the equal malignity of envy⁴. In the second he touches the root of this perversity, which is diabolical suggestion and one's own pride, there: Which the god of this world. In the third he touches the diffusion⁵ of this error, which is through false superstition and mendacious and contentious speech, there: They have an account of wisdom in superstition. In the fourth he brings in the reason which moved him to the compiling of the present work, there: Of these men therefore, hateful to God. And this reason is the overturning of error.

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE SECOND PART OF THE PROLOGUE.

Dub. V.

It is asked concerning this which he says: A truth not understood. For it seems⁶ that he speaks ill, because truth is an intelligible light, just as corporeal light is a sensible one; but an eye that has sight cannot be ignorant of sensible light: therefore by parity of reasoning neither will the intellect be ignorant of intelligible light. If you say that the case is not alike, it is asked why it is not alike, and why nature fails the intellect more than the sense.

I respond: It must be said that the case is alike, if one attends to it. For there is a threefold cause why someone does not see a visible thing: either he does not see because he is not willing to look; or, if he is willing, he is impeded by a defect of the organ; or by the absence of light. This is manifest. Likewise in spiritual things the intellect⁷ frequently does not understand some things because it is not willing to consider them; sometimes, however, it does not understand on account of an impediment on the part of the body, as is clear in the frenzied and in fools; sometimes on account of the absence of light. For although the uncreated light does not withdraw itself as regards its essence, or as regards any influence whatsoever, it did withdraw⁸ itself from man, when he sinned, as regards the perfect influence; whence it is said to have inflicted ignorance upon him. Hence, as the eye errs in darkness, so today does the wretched human intellect. But when it shall have been fully restored⁹ into the light, then, as the eye will be able to see every visible thing, so will the intellect every intelligible thing.

Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: A truth giving offence. On the contrary: «All men by nature desire to know»¹⁰, just as they also desire to be blessed; but blessedness offends no one, because all desire it: therefore neither does truth offend anyone.

I respond: It must be said that one may speak of truth as regards its first effect, which is to illuminate; and as regards this no one hates it, for all naturally desire to be illumined. One may speak again as regards the consequent effect, which is to convict; and this it has in the wicked. For by manifesting evils it convicts the one doing them¹¹; and hence it is that the wicked hate the truth, because, as is said in the third chapter of John¹²: He who does evil hates the light.

Dub. VII.

Who, being zealous for contention, war against the truth without a treaty. On the contrary: the fourth chapter of Third Esdras¹³: Great is truth and stronger than all things. All the earth calls upon truth, and all tremble at it.

I respond: It must be said that¹ one may speak of truth simply, or of truth in this or that case, that is, in particular. In the first way truth is unconquerable, and therefore prevails; and thus that saying of Esdras is understood. One may speak again of truth in the second way; and² thus it happens that it is overshadowed by fantastic reasonings and assailed by contention. Hence Ambrose on the first chapter to the Romans³: «Contention is the assailing of truth with the confidence of shouting».

Dub. VIII.

Out of the testimonies of truth founded unto eternity. On the contrary: the first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen⁴: Knowledge shall be destroyed: therefore the testimonies also.

I respond: That the testimonies of truth are founded unto eternity, as is said in the Psalm⁵: From the beginning I have known concerning thy testimonies etc. As to what is objected, that knowledge shall be destroyed, it must be said that this is true as regards the manner of teaching and of considering, but not as regards the thing known and the account of knowing; the Psalm⁶: For ever, O Lord, thy word remains etc.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT OF THE LAST PART.

In it [you will find] the examples of our forebears. This is the last part, in which the Master sets down the reasons that move disciples to hear. And this part is divided into four parts according to the four things which move disciples to hear, two of which⁷ are on the side of the work, namely authority and usefulness; two, however, on the side of the teacher, namely humility and easiness. In the first he prepares docility, namely in authority. In the second, namely⁸ in usefulness, he rouses attention. In the two that follow, namely humility and easiness, he wins good will.

In the first part, therefore, he shows that his work is authentic; in the second, that it is compendious, there: This labour, then, ought not; in the third he shows that his manner of teaching is humble, in this, that he wishes to be corrected, there: But in this treatise etc. In the fourth he shows that it is easy for finding and for remembering, there: And that what is sought may come to hand the more easily.

A DOUBT OF THE LAST PART.

Dub. IX.

It is asked concerning this which he says: A free corrector; what does he mean by this word free?

I respond: It must be said that a free corrector is so called just as a free man is, who «is his own cause only», as the Philosopher says⁹; so a corrector is called free who corrects only for the sake of correction, not out of envy or of mockery. Such a one the Master desires, after the example of Augustine in the second book On the Trinity¹⁰, where he says: «I shall more gladly be examined by the upright than fear to be bitten by the perverse. For a most beautiful and most modest charity gladly receives the kiss of the dove; but the tooth of the dog either a most cautious humility avoids, or a most solid truth blunts: and I shall rather choose to be reproved by anyone whatsoever than to be praised either by one who errs or by one who flatters».

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