Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de situ huius partis, quia cum Magister agat de appropriatione distinctione trigesima quarta, et de appropriatis distinctione trigesima quinta usque ad finem, videtur, quod male situet hic¹ tractatum de appropriatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplici de causa ponit hic Magister tractatum de appropriatis. Una [Ratio 1] est, quia egerat de nominibus, quae dicunt relationem secundum² relationem communem, secundum quae attenditur appropriatio, sicut sunt similis et aequalis; et ita incidenter haec pars hic introducitur. Alia [Ratio 2] ratio est, quia appropriata faciunt ad evidentiam propriorum; et ideo statim post tractatum de propriis, egit de appropriatis, et hoc maxime prout faciunt ad evidentiam propriorum. Ideo de his agit hic, quae non dicunt respectum ad creaturas; infra vero agit de his appropriatis, quae respectum ad creaturas dicunt: et ita patet distinctio huius partis ab illa. Unde tria appropriata Hilarii manifestant nobis personarum emanationem, tria vero appropriata Augustini nobis manifestant personarum ordinem, si quis inspiciat.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod est ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis etc. Videtur enim maledicere, quia unusquisque, non intellecta arte, est iners: ergo si Filius est ars Patris, non intellecto Filio esse, Pater est iners: ergo videtur, quod rationabiliter operari habeat Pater a Filio suo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo, quia non dicit, quod sit ars simpliciter, sed quod sit ars quaedam, quia non est ars, qua Pater novit, sed ubi novit; non est ars Patris, qua Pater sit sapiens, sed quae est a Patre sapiente, per quam Pater omnia operatur, quia omnia produxit per Filium. Et notandum [Quid sit ars], quod cum ars includat intentionem virtutis et sapientiae, et similiter et verbum; tamen differenter, quia verbum dicit emanationem et respectum, ideo est proprium, ars autem appropriatum.

DUB. III.³

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus ingenti largitate perfundit ceteras creaturas; ergo secundum hoc videtur, quod omnibus donetur Spiritus sanctus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus non dicitur dari⁴ ratione cuiuslibet effectus, sed proprie ratione eius, qui facit Spiritum sanctum haberi et ita inhabitare in aliquo ut in templo⁵. Et quia huiusmodi sola rationalis creatura capax est, et soli iusti capiunt; ideo patet, quod illis solis Spiritus sanctus datur. Ideo autem Spiritus sanctus dicitur perfundere ceteras creaturas, non quia ei attribuatur actus creandi, sed quia attribuitur ei actus conservandi.

DUB. IV.⁶

Item quaeritur de ratione Hilarii, quae ponitur in notula: Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens. Primo videtur ratio ista non esse convertibilis, quia totum videtur convenire Spiritui sancto. — Item, species aut accipitur essentialiter, aut personaliter. Si essentialiter: ergo idem sensus est qui est⁷ species indifferens, qui etiam est, si diceretur essentia indifferens; sed hoc convenit Patri, non tantum Filio. Et iterum, essentia non dicitur ut alicuius. Si stat pro persona: ergo idem sensus est species indifferens, qui est, cum dicitur persona indifferens, hoc autem falsum.

Item de secunda ratione obiicitur, quae talis⁸ est: Imago est rei ad rem coaequandam imaginata et indiscreta⁹ similitudo. Videtur enim falsa, quia frequenter imago non aequatur ei cuius est imago. — Item, si est ad rem coaequandam, tunc videtur esse aequalitas, non similitudo. — Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit indistincta similitudo, quoniam omnis imago et similitudo distinguitur ab eo cuius est imago.

Item, cum unius rei una sit definitio¹⁰, quaeritur, quomodo differenter istae rationes assignentur?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic definitur imago [Ad quaesitum I] increata, prout est proprium solius Filii, et sic semper dicit respectum ad Patrem; et in prima ratione ponitur genitivus ut in ratione principii, in secunda ponitur ut in ratione termini: quoniam imago habet comparari ad Patrem, non solum tanquam ad aliquem, ad quem sive in quem ducit¹¹, sed etiam a quo emanat. Et ita patet harum rationum distinctio et ordo.

Et prima ratio tres conditiones continet. Per [Per 1. rationem] primam notatur Filius esse ab alio — cum dicitur imago eius rei, ad quam imaginatur — et per genitivum, et verbum, quod est passivum. Per secundam notatur, quod est secundum modum expressum¹² emanandi, scilicet per hoc quod dicitur species, quae includit perfectam similitudinem cognoscendi.

Per tertiam vero notatur, quod sit indifferens secundum substantiam, scilicet per hoc quod est indifferens. Et per primam conditionem differt et ab essentia et a Patre, per secundam a Spiritu sancto, per tertiam ab imagine creata.

Et per hoc patet¹³, quod species, etsi de se sit essentiale, tamen accipitur hic ut tractum ad personam; et indifferens non dicit indistinctionem in hoc nomine species, sed in substantia. Et sic patent obiecta de ratione prima.

Hac visa, similiter patet ratio secunda, quae datur in comparatione ad ipsum Patrem ut ad terminum [Ad 2. rationem]. Et hoc patet, cum dicitur ad rem coaequandam rei, id est personam Filii personae Patris, et per hoc excluditur persona Patris; per hoc quod dicitur imaginata, excluditur persona Spiritus sancti; per hoc quod dicitur indiscreta, excluditur ipsa imago creata, et indiscreta non dicit indifferentiam personalem, sed solum essentialem.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de aequalitate [Coaequatio non in creata imagine], dicendum, quod illud non est necessarium de creata imagine. Et rursus, quoniam imago de ratione sui nominis dicit qualitatem in quantitate, ideo¹⁴ prima dicitur similitudo ad rem coaequandam, id est similitudo, secundum quam res coaequatur rei.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de differentia horum trium, quae attribuit¹⁵, scilicet speciem, naturam et essentiam, quomodo haec distinguantur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod uniuscuiusque forma substantialis et completiva dicitur species, natura et essentia, et hoc [Species, natura, et essentia ad invicem] secundum triplicem considerationem. Potest¹⁶ enim considerari in se, et sic dicitur essentia; potest considerari in comparatione ad operationem propriam, et sic dicitur natura; potest iterum considerari in comparatione ad nostram cognitionem, et sic dicitur species¹⁷. Speciem habet imago auctoris, eo quod similitudo est eius; naturam autem habet, quia similitudo genita vel imaginata naturaliter; essentiam vero, quia similitudo indiscreta, scilicet per substantiam.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si quis innascibilem et sine initio dicat Filium. Videtur enim, quod Hilarius non dicat bene, quod qui dicit duos innascibiles, dicit duos deos; quia innascibilitas in divinis non est proprietas essentiae, sed personae: ergo non sequitur, quod si sunt duo innascibiles, quod duae essentiae, sed quod duae personae. — Item, innascibilitas dicit privationem eius quod est natus, unde tantum valet innascibilis, quantum non-filius; sed non sequitur: sunt duo filii in divinis, ergo duo dii: ergo pari ratione non sequitur, sunt duo innascibiles, ergo duo dii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod innascibilis, sicut [Defenditur ratio Hilarii] supra dictum est¹⁸, privat sive negat esse ab alio, et ex hoc ponit fontalem plenitudinem in illo qui innascibilis dicitur; et ex utraque parte concluditur, quod si sint duo innascibiles, quod sunt duo dii. Sequitur enim: sunt duo, quorum quilibet non est ab alio, ergo non distinguuntur per originem: ergo necesse est, quod distinguantur per substantiam. Item, si sunt duo, in quorum quolibet est fontalis plenitudo: ergo quilibet potest esse Trinitatis principium et est «principium totius deitatis»¹⁹, sicut dicitur de Patre. Sed si principia sunt distincta, et principiata: ergo si quilibet est principium totius deitatis, et sunt duo: ergo duae deitates. Quamvis ergo ingenitus non sit proprietas substantiae, sed personae, quia tamen est primae personae, et in unica persona non potest esse nisi una innascibilitas: ideo de necessitate ponit deorum diversitatem²⁰.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Caput enim omnium Filius est. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut dicitur caput ratione deitatis, aut ratione conformitatis in natura. Si ratione deitatis, eadem ratione Spiritus sanctus potest dici caput. Item, si ratione deitatis, tunc Filii caput non potest dici Deus, quia caput superexcellit et maioritatem tenet nobilitatis, quam non habet Pater respectu Filii. Si tu dicas, quod caput non dicit nobilitatem sive superexcellentiam; obiicitur ex littera sequenti ubi dicitur: «hoc gradu omnia referuntur»; sed constat, quod inter Patrem et Filium ratione deitatis non est gradus: ergo non potest accipi ratione deitatis. — Si ratione conformitatis, cum Filius non habeat conformitatem in natura cum omnibus, sed tantum cum hominibus, non erit caput omnium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caput, secundum quod proprie accipitur, importat rationem influentiae et conformitatis naturae: et sic dicitur Christus caput esse totius Ecclesiae; sed Hilarius extensiori modo accipit, prout caput dicit originale principium. Et quoniam Deus Pater est principium Filii, et Filius principium omnium, ita quod Filius producitur et producit, ideo est caput, et habet caput. Sed Pater, quoniam caput non habet, cum sit innascibilis, est caput omnium: et ideo dicitur fontale principium, a quo omnia et in quem omnia per Filium reducuntur. Et in hac reductione gradus est, comparando creaturas ad Filium; sed ultra comparando Filium ad Patrem non est gradus, sed ordo et origo. Et ideo Hilarius non dicit his gradibus, sed hoc gradu. — Quod obiicitur de Spiritu sancto, dicendum, quod ipse Spiritus sanctus, cum procedat a Filio, per Filium cum aliis ad Patrem reducitur: et propterea Filio appropriatur reductio.

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ut sint per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum²¹, quia videtur haec confessio fidei non esse conveniens, quia de tribus hominibus concordantibus²² potest illud dici, quod per substantiam sunt tria, per consonantiam vero unum.

Item quaeritur de ratione Hilarii, qua dicit, quod debet dici per consonantiam propter Spiritum sanctum, quia scilicet, Spiritu sancto nominato, consonantiae potius quam essentiae praedicari convenit unitatem. Videtur enim istud falsum, quia Spiritus sanctus est eiusdem essentiae cum Patre, sicut Filius.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius intendit ostendere catholicam Patrum confessionem cum dixerunt, quod «sunt per substantiam tria, per consonantiam unum». Sancti enim Patres, volentes elidere haeresim Sabellianam — quae elidebat²³, id est evacuabat veritatem Patris et Filii per nominationem solam, quam dicebat ibi esse, non rem — confessi sunt adeo expresse pluralitatem, ut minus expresse confiterentur essentiae unitatem; non tamen recesserunt a veritate, quia per tres res intelliguntur, id est tres hypostases; per substantiam²⁴ vero non usia intelligitur, sed persona: et ideo ex hac parte verum dixerunt. — Ex parte consonantiae similiter verum dixerunt et irreprehensibiliter. Nam, sicut per Patris et Filii nomen innuitur unitas naturae, quia Filius est connaturalis Patri, ita per Spiritum sanctum, qui est amor, datur intelligi unitas consonantiae. Et ideo verbum non habebat calumniam, et propter hoc ipsum dixerunt: et hoc vult dicere Hilarius, cum dicit, quod potius consonantiae quam essentiae; non quia²⁵ utrumque non sit verum, sed quia hoc est expressius et minorem habet calumniam. Tamen adhuc sequitur illud, quod si Pater et Filius unum ex se producunt spiritum, ratione cuius est ibi unitas per consonantiam, necesse est, quod unitatem habeant in essentia.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the placement of this part: for since the Master treats of appropriation in the thirty-fourth distinction, and of the appropriated [names] from the thirty-fifth distinction to the end, it seems that he places the treatise on appropriated [names] badly here¹.

I respond: It must be said that for a twofold cause the Master places the treatise on appropriated [names] here. One [Reason 1] is that he had been treating of names which signify a relation according to² common relation, according to which appropriation is observed, such as like and equal; and so this part is incidentally introduced here. Another [Reason 2] reason is that the appropriated [names] serve to make manifest the proper [names]; and therefore immediately after the treatise on the proper [names], he treated of the appropriated [names], and especially insofar as they serve to manifest the proper ones. Therefore he treats here of those that do not signify a relation to creatures; below, however, he treats of those appropriated [names] which do signify a relation to creatures: and thus the distinction of this part from that one is plain. Whence the three appropriations of Hilary make manifest to us the emanation of the persons, while the three appropriations of Augustine make manifest to us the order of the persons, if anyone considers them.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that [the Son] is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise etc. For he seems to speak ill, since each one, when the art is not understood, is sluggish: therefore if the Son is the art of the Father, when the Son's being is not understood, the Father is sluggish: therefore it seems that the Father has rationally to operate from his Son.

I respond: It must be said that emphasis must be placed on the wording, because he does not say that he is art simply, but that he is a certain art, because he is not the art by which the Father knows, but [the art] where he knows; he is not the Father's art by which the Father is wise, but [the art] which is from the wise Father, through which the Father works all things, since he produced all things through the Son. And it should be noted [What art is] that, since art includes the intention of power and wisdom, and likewise also the Word; nevertheless they differ, because the Word signifies emanation and respect, and so it is proper, while art is appropriated.

DOUBT III.³

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Holy Spirit with a vast bounty pours forth upon the other creatures; therefore according to this it seems that the Holy Spirit is given to all.

I respond: It must be said that the Holy Spirit is not said to be given⁴ by reason of any effect whatever, but properly by reason of him who causes the Holy Spirit to be possessed and so to indwell in someone as in a temple⁵. And because the rational creature alone is capable of this, and only the just receive him; therefore it is plain that to those alone is the Holy Spirit given. The Holy Spirit is, however, said to pour forth upon the other creatures, not because the act of creating is attributed to him, but because the act of conserving is attributed to him.

DOUBT IV.⁶

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, which is set down in the gloss: An image is of that thing of which it is the image, an undifferentiated species. First, that account seems not to be convertible, because the whole seems to fit the Holy Spirit. — Likewise, species is taken either essentially or personally. If essentially: then the same sense is the one that is⁷ undifferentiated species, which is also so if one were to say undifferentiated essence; but this fits the Father, not only the Son. And again, essence is not said as of something. If it stands for person: then the same sense is undifferentiated species, which is so when one says undifferentiated person, but this is false.

Likewise, against the second account it is objected, which is as such⁸: An image is a likeness imagined unto the equating of a thing to a thing, and undivided⁹. For it seems false, because frequently an image is not equated to that of which it is the image. — Likewise, if it is unto the equating of a thing, then it seems to be equality, not likeness. — Likewise, it seems false to say undistinguished likeness, since every image and likeness is distinguished from that of which it is the image.

Likewise, since of one thing there is one definition¹⁰, it is asked, how are these accounts assigned differently?

I respond: It must be said that here is defined the uncreated image [To the first question], insofar as it belongs to the Son alone, and so it always signifies a relation to the Father; and in the first account the genitive is set down as in the account of principle, in the second it is set down as in the account of term: since the image must be compared to the Father not only as to one to whom or unto whom it leads¹¹, but also as to one from whom it emanates. And thus the distinction and order of these accounts is plain.

And the first account contains three conditions. By [By the first account] the first, the Son is noted as being from another — when it is said image of that thing of which it is the image — and through the genitive, and the verb, which is passive. By the second is noted that it is according to an expressed¹² mode of emanating, namely by the fact that it is called species, which includes a perfect likeness of cognition.

Through the third is noted that it is undifferentiated according to substance, namely by the fact that it is undifferentiated. And by the first condition it differs both from essence and from the Father, by the second from the Holy Spirit, by the third from the created image.

And by this it is plain¹³ that species, although in itself essential, is here taken as drawn over to the person; and undifferentiated does not signify indistinction in this name species, but in substance. And thus the objections against the first account are plain.

This being seen, the second account is similarly plain, which is given by comparison to the Father himself as to the term [To the second account]. And this is plain when it is said unto the equating of a thing to a thing, that is, of the person of the Son to the person of the Father, and by this the person of the Father is excluded; by what is said imagined, the person of the Holy Spirit is excluded; by what is said undivided, the created image itself is excluded, and undivided does not signify personal indifference, but only essential.

To that, then, which is objected concerning equality [Equating not [present] in the created image], it must be said that this is not necessary in the case of the created image. And again, since image by reason of its very name signifies quality in quantity, therefore the first¹⁴ is called a likeness unto the equating of a thing, that is, a likeness according to which a thing is equated to a thing.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of these three which he attributes¹⁵, namely species, nature, and essence, how these are distinguished.

I respond: It must be said that the substantial and completive form of each thing is called species, nature, and essence, and this [Species, nature, and essence in relation to one another] according to a threefold consideration. For it can¹⁶ be considered in itself, and so it is called essence; it can be considered in comparison to its own operation, and so it is called nature; it can again be considered in comparison to our cognition, and so it is called species¹⁷. The image of the Author has species, because it is his likeness; it has nature, because [it is] a likeness begotten or imagined naturally; essence truly, because [it is] a likeness undivided, namely through substance.

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: If anyone should call the Son unbegotten and without beginning. For it seems that Hilary does not say well, that one who says two unbegottens says two gods; because unbegottenness in divine things is not a property of the essence, but of the person: therefore it does not follow, if there are two unbegottens, that there are two essences, but [only] that there are two persons. — Likewise, unbegottenness signifies the privation of that which is begotten, whence unbegotten is worth as much as non-son; but it does not follow: there are two sons in divine things, therefore two gods: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow, there are two unbegottens, therefore two gods.

I respond: It must be said that unbegotten, as [Hilary's reasoning is defended] was said above¹⁸, denies or negates being from another, and from this it places fontal fullness in him who is called unbegotten; and from each side it is concluded that, if there be two unbegottens, there are two gods. For it follows: there are two, of whom each is not from another, therefore they are not distinguished by origin: therefore it is necessary that they be distinguished by substance. Likewise, if there are two, in each of whom there is fontal fullness: therefore each can be the principle of the Trinity and is «the principle of the whole deity»¹⁹, as is said of the Father. But if the principles are distinct, then so also are the things principled: therefore if each is the principle of the whole deity, and there are two, then there are two deities. Although, then, unbegotten is not a property of the substance, but of the person, since it is, however, [a property] of the first person, and in a single person there cannot be more than one unbegottenness: therefore of necessity it posits a diversity of gods²⁰.

DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: For the Son is the head of all. For he seems to speak ill, because either he is called head by reason of the deity, or by reason of conformity in nature. If by reason of the deity, by the same reason the Holy Spirit can be called head. Likewise, if by reason of the deity, then God cannot be called the head of the Son, because the head surpasses and holds majority of nobility, which the Father does not have with respect to the Son. If you say that head does not signify nobility or surpassing-eminence; the objection is brought from the following text where it is said: «in this gradation all things are referred back»; but it is established that between Father and Son by reason of the deity there is no gradation: therefore it cannot be taken by reason of the deity. — If by reason of conformity, since the Son does not have conformity in nature with all things, but only with men, he will not be the head of all.

I respond: It must be said that head, according as it is properly taken, conveys the account of influence and of conformity of nature: and thus Christ is called the head of the whole Church; but Hilary takes [it] in a more extended way, insofar as head signifies original principle. And since God the Father is the principle of the Son, and the Son the principle of all things, in such wise that the Son is produced and produces, therefore he is head, and has a head. But the Father, since he does not have a head, being unbegotten, is the head of all: and therefore he is called fontal principle, from whom all things [proceed] and unto whom all things are led back through the Son. And in this leading-back there is gradation, comparing creatures to the Son; but further, comparing the Son to the Father, there is no gradation, but order and origin. And therefore Hilary does not say by these gradations, but by this gradation. — As to what is objected concerning the Holy Spirit, it must be said that the Holy Spirit himself, since he proceeds from the Son, through the Son together with the others is led back to the Father: and on this account the leading-back is appropriated to the Son.

DOUBT VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: That [they may be] three by substance, but one by consonance²¹, because this confession of faith seems not to be fitting, because of three concordant²² men this can be said, that they are three by substance, but one by consonance.

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, by which he says that one ought to say by consonance on account of the Holy Spirit, namely because, the Holy Spirit having been named, it fits to predicate unity of consonance rather than of essence. For this seems false, since the Holy Spirit is of the same essence with the Father, just as the Son [is].

I respond: It must be said that Hilary intends to show the catholic confession of the Fathers when they said that «they are three by substance, by consonance one». For the holy Fathers, wishing to dash the Sabellian heresy — which would dash²³, that is, evacuate the truth of the Father and the Son by mere naming, which it said was there, but not the reality — confessed plurality so expressly that they confessed essential unity less expressly; nevertheless they did not depart from the truth, since by three things are understood, that is, three hypostases; by substance²⁴ truly is understood not ousia, but person: and therefore on this side they spoke truly. — On the side of consonance similarly they spoke truly and irreprehensibly. For just as by the name Father and Son the unity of nature is intimated, since the Son is connatural to the Father, so by the Holy Spirit, who is love, is given to be understood the unity of consonance. And therefore the wording incurred no calumny, and on this account they said it: and this is what Hilary wishes to say when he says, rather of consonance than of essence; not because²⁵ both are not true, but because this [way of speaking] is more express and incurs less calumny. Yet there still follows this, that if the Father and the Son produce the Spirit one from themselves, by reason of which there is unity by consonance there, it is necessary that they have unity in essence.

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