Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: Neque dimensionem habet, sicut corpus etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia dicitur ad Ephesios tertio¹: Ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo etc., et Glossa exponit illud de Deo.

Respondeo: Magister loquitur proprie et ad litteram, sed Apostolus loquitur metaphorice. Unde multipliciter exponuntur illa verba. In Deo enim longitudo est longanimitatis, latitudo caritatis, sublimitas misericordiae, et profundum maiestatis sive sapientiae quantum ad Dei iudicia.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus in littera, quod movet creaturam corporalem per tempus et locum. Videtur enim mala ista divisio Augustini, primo, quia a Philosopho ponitur nulla mutatio secundum tempus. Et iterum, sua divisio non videtur sufficiens, quia Philosophus ponit sex species motus².

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum omnis species motus ad hunc duplicem motum reducitur, scilicet ad motum ad situm, et ad motum ad formam; Augustinus autem motum ad situm intelligit per motum secundum locum, qui est entis perfecti et completi, sine deperditione vel innovatione sive circa qualitatem sive proprietatem substantiae, eatenus qua ad situm est, nisi pariter sit ad formam. Motum autem ad formam, qui subdividitur per quinque species, comprehendit sub mutatione secundum tempus propter hoc, quod de se dicit mensuram variabilem et rei variabilis³. Unde omnem mutationem, quae est secundum proprietates rei absolutas et intrinsecas, sive secundum qualitates corporales sive secundum spirituales, ut sunt affectiones in animabus, ipse vocat mutationem secundum tempus. Et ita patet ratio divisionis et sufficientia⁴.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod spiritualis creatura per tempus movetur. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia spiritualis creatura mensuratur aevo, cum sit perpetua: ergo si movetur, non per tempus movetur, sed per aevum. — Item, intellectus angelicus est deiformis, sicut vult Philosophus⁵, ergo intelligit in instanti; pari ratione et afficitur: non ergo in tempore. — Praeterea, tempus per prius est mensura motus primi mobilis: ergo illud solum mensuratur tempore, quod subiacet illi motui; sed tale non est Angelus nec eius motus: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Ad praesens notandum⁶, quod tempus uno modo dicitur proprie, et sic dicit mensuram rei mutabilis, in quantum mutabilis, tamen sub ratione continui; et quoniam motus primi mobilis est motus maxime evidens et continuus inter omnes: ideo tempus hoc modo dicitur proprie esse in primo mobili, sicut in subiecto, in quo primo est et in quo primo apparet. Alio modo dicitur tempus mensura cuiuslibet rei mutabilis, secundum quod mutabilis, sive moveatur instantanee sive continue; et sic non tantum est in motu primi mobilis, et in his quae ei subiacent, sed etiam in omni creato, circa quod accidit variatio; et sic est in Angelis. Et per hoc patent obiecta.

Quod enim obiicit de aevo, dicendum, quod aevum est mensura Angelorum quantum ad substantiale, quod est invariabile et incorruptibile, sed tempus quantum ad proprietates, quae variantur, et quaedam subito, quaedam successive, sicut patet⁷ in Angelis per naturam paulative intendi aliqua affectio. Et sic patent cetera.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod eadem sapientia est in duobus, neque maior neque minor. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia sapientia est accidens et qualitas sapientis, et accidens per substantiam numeratur⁸.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod eadem sapientia creata esset in duobus sapientibus, et hoc dant intelligere per duas suppositiones. Una est, quod species rei in anima non differant per essentiam a re extra. Alia suppositio est, quod eandem rem nosse possunt duo sapientes, scilicet unum enuntiabile, quod dictum est singulare. Et hoc ultimum non indiget persuasione; sed prius ostendunt, quod eadem sit, quia per eadem res cognoscitur, per quae res habet esse⁹. Si ergo per formam suam habet esse, ergo et cognosci; et forma rei vere est in anima, et cum intellectus sit sciens per illam formam, et contingat aliquos duos omnino idem scire et cogitare, illa non est tantum vera forma, sed etiam una. Et quod hoc verum sit, persuadent per hoc, quod si forma potest secundum veritatem consimilem formam in materia producere et se ipsam facere in aliena materia, quare non est simile in anima, quae habilior est ad recipiendum? Unde et hoc dicunt sensisse Augustinum.

Unde dicunt, quod sapientia non est ad modum aliarum proprietatum. — Sed haec positio deviat ab Augustino, quia Augustinus¹⁰ vult, et alii Sancti, quod esse in pluribus omnino distinctis non convenit uni et eidem creaturae nisi per miraculum. Et iterum, positio ista super falsum¹¹ fundata est: quia si veritas esse asini esset in anima, quare non diceretur anima esse asinus? Et iterum, si esset veritas, adhuc non esset eadem, quia nulla forma, cum generat se, generat se omnino eandem, sed de necessitate plurificatur essentia in generante et generato, praeterquam in Deo: et non valet ad propositum.

Et ideo secundus modus dicendi est, quod Augustinus intelligit de sapientia increata, quae est in sapientibus et attingit ubique propter sui munditiam. — Sed cum Augustinus intendat ponere exemplum in creaturis, non videtur adhuc hoc esse secundum eius intellectum. Et iterum, ipse dicit quod illa sapientia est aequalis in duobus, qui sunt aequaliter sapientes, non autem in aliis: ergo videtur loqui de habitu.

Et ideo est tertius modus, quod ipse loquitur de unitate per conformitatem. — Sed illud adhuc non esset sufficienter dictum, quia tunc maior esset in duobus quam in uno, sicut patet in duobus divitibus, qui sunt in divitiis conformes et aequales.

Propter hoc dicendum, quod similitudo sive intentio in anima habet comparari ad animam, in qua est, et ad illud cuius est. Et quoniam ortum habet ab eo cuius est, et ad illud dicitur; ideo similitudines unius rei in animabus pluribus, quia in unam et eandem veritatem ducunt, et tantum una, quantum duae, hinc est, quod per comparationem ad illud cuius sunt, habent unitatem, nec maius sunt duae quam una, similiter nec sapientia; sed in comparatione ad animas, quae per illas cognoscunt, habent pluralitatem, et plus sunt duae quam una. Et ideo patet, quod non potest poni omnino simile, quia res differunt intentione sive similitudine; in Deo autem, in quo non differunt, patens est, quod unus potest esse in multis. Et sic patent cetera obiecta.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: Nor does it have dimension as a body etc. For he seems to speak ill, because it is said in Ephesians 3¹: That you may be able to comprehend with all the saints, what is the length, the breadth, etc., and the Gloss expounds that of God.

I respond: The Master speaks properly and to the letter, but the Apostle speaks metaphorically. Hence those words are expounded in many ways. For in God length is of long-suffering, breadth of charity, height of mercy, and depth of majesty or of wisdom as regards God's judgments.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the text, that he moves the bodily creature through time and place. For this division of Augustine's seems faulty, first, because by the Philosopher no change according to time is posited. And again, his division does not seem sufficient, because the Philosopher posits six species of motion².

I respond: It must be said that according to the Philosopher every species of motion is reduced to this twofold motion, namely to motion to position (ad situm) and to motion to form (ad formam); but Augustine understands motion to position by motion according to place, which is of a perfect and complete being, without loss or innovation either as regards quality or property of substance, in so far as it is to position, unless it be equally to form. But motion to form, which is subdivided through five species, he comprehends under change according to time, on account of this, that of itself it says a measure that is variable and of a variable thing³. Hence every change which is according to the absolute and intrinsic properties of a thing, whether according to bodily qualities or according to spiritual ones, such as the affections in souls, he himself calls change according to time. And so the account of the division and its sufficiency is plain⁴.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the spiritual creature is moved through time. For he seems to speak falsely, because the spiritual creature is measured by aevum (aevum), since it is perpetual: therefore if it is moved, it is not moved through time, but through aevum. — Likewise, the angelic intellect is deiform, as the Philosopher wishes⁵; therefore it understands in an instant; by parity of reasoning it is also affected: therefore not in time. — Furthermore, time is by priority the measure of the motion of the first mobile: therefore that alone is measured by time which lies under that motion; but the Angel is not such, nor is his motion: therefore etc.

I respond: For the present it is to be noted⁶ that time is said in one way properly, and so it says the measure of a changeable thing in so far as changeable, yet under the account of the continuous; and since the motion of the first mobile is the most evident and continuous motion among all: therefore time in this way is properly said to be in the first mobile, as in a subject, in which it primarily is and in which it primarily appears. In another way time is said the measure of any changeable thing, in so far as changeable, whether it be moved instantaneously or continuously; and so it is not only in the motion of the first mobile and in those things which are subject to it, but also in every created thing about which variation occurs; and so it is in the Angels. And by this the objections are plain.

For as for what he objects concerning aevum, it must be said that aevum is the measure of the Angels as regards the substantial, which is invariable and incorruptible, but time as regards the properties, which vary, some suddenly, some successively, as is plain⁷ in the Angels by their nature, [namely] that some affection is intensified gradually (paulative). And so the rest are plain.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the same wisdom is in two persons, neither greater nor lesser. For it seems false to say [this], because wisdom is an accident and a quality of the wise person, and an accident is numbered through substance⁸.

I respond: It must be said that for this some have wished to say that the same created wisdom would be in two wise persons, and they give this to be understood through two suppositions. One is that the species of a thing in the soul does not differ in essence from the thing outside. The other supposition is that two wise persons can know the same thing, namely one enuntiabile, which has been said to be singular. And this last [point] needs no persuasion; but they first show that it is the same, because a thing is known through the same things by which the thing has being⁹. If therefore a thing has being through its form, therefore [it has it] also to be known; and the form of the thing is truly in the soul, and since the intellect knows through that form, and it happens that two persons know and think altogether the same, that [form] is not only a true form but also one. And that this is true they persuade through this, that if a form can according to truth produce a like form in matter and make itself in foreign matter, why is it not similar in the soul, which is more apt for receiving? Hence they also say that Augustine thought thus.

Hence they say that wisdom is not after the manner of the other properties. — But this position deviates from Augustine, because Augustine¹⁰ wishes, and the other Saints, that to be in plural altogether-distinct things does not befit one and the same creature except by miracle. And again, this position is founded upon a falsehood¹¹: because if the truth of being-an-ass were in the soul, why would the soul not be said to be an ass? And again, even if there were [such a] truth, still it would not be the same, because no form, when it generates itself, generates itself altogether the same, but of necessity the essence is multiplied in the generating and the generated, except in God: and it does not avail to the proposition.

And therefore the second mode of speaking is that Augustine understands [this] of uncreated wisdom, which is in the wise and reaches everywhere on account of its purity. — But since Augustine intends to set an example in creatures, this still does not seem to be according to his understanding. And again, he himself says that that wisdom is equal in two persons who are equally wise, but not in others: therefore he seems to speak of a habit.

And therefore there is a third mode, that he speaks of unity by conformity. — But that still would not be sufficiently said, because then it would be greater in two than in one, as is plain in two rich men who are conformed and equal in riches.

On account of this it must be said that the likeness or intention in the soul has to be compared to the soul in which it is, and to that of which it is. And since it has its origin from that of which it is, and is said with respect to that; therefore the likenesses of one thing in plural souls, since they lead into one and the same truth, and two are as much [one] as one, hence it is that by comparison to that of which they are, they have unity, nor are two greater than one, nor likewise is the wisdom; but in comparison to the souls, which know through them, they have plurality, and two are more than one. And therefore it is plain that an altogether-similar [case] cannot be set down, because things differ in intention or likeness; but in God, in whom they do not differ, it is plain that one [wisdom] can be in many. And so the rest of the objections are plain.

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