Bonaventure

Pars II. Probatur vanitas culpae, deinde ponitur remedium contra eam.

Vidi sub sole etc. Egit supra de vanitate naturae, hic de vanitate culpae; et quia haec est periculosa, ideo remedio indiget. Primo igitur ponit vanitatem; secundo, remedium contra eam, infra quarto⁸: Custodi pedem tuum.

Partis secundae membrum I. Ostenditur vanitas culpae sub triplici differentia, et hoc tum quoad rectores tum quoad subditos.

Vanitas autem est sub triplici differentia: primo agit de vanitate malitiae; secundo avaritiae, ibi⁹: Considerans reperi; tertio imprudentiae, ibi: Melior est puer. Vanitas autem est in rectoribus et subditis. Primo igitur agit de vanitate malitiae in regentibus et iudicantibus; secundo in subditis, ibi¹⁰: Verti me.

Art. 1. De vanitate malitiae, primo in rectoribus quadruplici ordine descripta.

Primo igitur vanitas malitiae, quae est in rectoribus, hoc ordine describitur: primo insinuat huius vanitatis considerationem; secundo, quod ex hoc devenitur in futuri iudicii praemeditationem; tertio, in praesentis status considerationem; quarto, quomodo corruit in erroneam opinionem.

(Vers. 16.). Primo igitur insinuat, se malitiam iudicum considerasse, dicens: Vidi sub sole in loco iudicii impietatem, quantum ad examinationem causae; et in loco iustitiae iniquitatem, quantum ad lationem sententiae; Isaiae primo¹¹: « Quomodo facta est meretrix civitas fidelis, plena iudicii; iustitia olim habitavit in ea, nunc autem homicidae; principes tui infideles, socii furum; omnes diligunt munera,

p. 35 sequuntur retributiones, pupillo non iudicant, et causa viduae non ingreditur ad eos »; quia dicitur in Psalmo: « In quorum manibus iniquitates sunt, dextera eorum repleta est muneribus ».

(Vers. 17.). Et dixi in corde meo: Iustum et impium iudicabit Deus. Hic secundo ostendit, quomodo ex hoc devenit in futuri iudicii praemeditationem. Propter quod subdit: Et dixi in corde meo: Iustum iudicabit, ad praemium; impium, ad supplicium; Iob trigesimo quarto¹: « Absit a Deo impietas, et ab Omnipotente iniquitas. Opus enim hominis reddet ei et iuxta vias singulorum restituet eis. Vere enim Deus non condemnabit frustra, nec Omnipotens subvertet iudicium ». Et ideo iudicabit Deus eos secundum opera, quae tunc erunt manifesta; unde subdit: Et tempus omnis rei tunc erit, id est tempus iudicii omnis hominis, qui omnis res videtur secundae ad Corinthios quinto²: « Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, sive bonum sit, sive malum ». — Vel: tempus omnis rei, id est manifestationis omnis rei; primae ad Corinthios quarto: « Nolite ante tempus iudicare, quousque veniat Dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium ». — Vel: tempus omnis rei, id est retributionis omnis rei; ad Romanos octavo: « Omnis creatura ingemiscit » etc. — Hoc tempus exspectabat Ecclesiastes esse futurum ex conspectu iniquitatis praesentis; Isaiae quinquagesimo nono: « Conversum est retrorsum iudicium, et iustitia longe stetit, quia corruit in plateis veritas, et aequitas non potuit ingredi; et vidit Dominus, et malum apparuit in oculis eius, quia non est manifestum, et indutus est iustus lorica et galea salutis ».

Dixi in corde meo de filiis hominum etc. Hic tangitur tertio, quomodo ex hoc devenit in praesentis status considerationem, quare scilicet Dominus in praesenti homines miseros esse voluit; ad hoc, ut scilicet eos probaret, ideo vitam hominis bestiis similem fecit.

(Vers. 18. 19. 20. 21.). Propter quod dicit: Dixi in corde meo, id est cognovi; de filiis hominum³, quantum ad naturam; ut probaret eos Deus et ostenderet, similes esse bestiis, id est, assimilando bestiis probaret, qui essent, utrum vere boni, vel mali; quia mali, videntes similitudinem suam ad bestias in vita, volunt assimilari in moribus et bestialiter vivunt; boni vero spiritualiter; ideo in Psalmo⁴ dicitur: « Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis ». Et ostendit similitudinem hominum ad bestias in morte et vita et in materia; non est manifesta dissimilitudo in spirituali substantia. — Quantum ad mortem dicit: Et idcirco unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio, scilicet ad hominum probationem, quia, sicut iumentum non semper vivit, immo aliquando moritur, sic et homo; infra nono⁵: « Nemo est, qui semper vivat et qui huius rei habeat fiduciam »; et ideo manifestat, quod similitudo est in morte, unde: Sicut moritur homo, sic et illa moriuntur. — Nec tantum similitudo est in termino vitae, immo etiam in actu vivendi; ideo subdit: Similiter spirant omnia, scilicet aspirantia; nec habet homo amplius iumento, scilicet quantum ad actum vitae; Sapientiae septimo⁶: « Unus est egressus hominum ad vitam et similis exitus ». Sic patet similitudo quantum ad vitam. — Et subiungit similitudinem quantum ad materiam; et propterea dicit: Cuncta subiacent vanitati, scilicet, quia ex nihilo facta sunt, ideo vana; ad Romanos octavo⁷: « Vanitati subiecta est creatura ». Non dicit, quod nihil sit materia, sed hoc vult dicere, quod non habent materiam increatam neque essentiam, sed habent materiam creatam, quam intelligit nomine terrae. — Ideo dicit: Et omnia pergunt ad unum locum, scilicet ad materiam, ex qua facta sunt. De terra facta sunt et in terram pariter revertuntur, pariter, id est conformiter. Et sic notatur similitudo in materia; Ecclesiastici quadragesimo: « Omnia, quae de terra facta sunt, ad terram convertentur; similiter et aquae omnes in mare convertentur ». — Sed tantum in his est similitudo aperta, sed non apparet differentia in anima. Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum? ad caelum, scilicet ad remunerationem, an deorsum per corruptionem; sicut econtra, spiritus iumentorum descendat deorsum? per corruptionem, aut etiam sursum, sicut et hominis ad iudicii retributionem. Pauci hoc noverunt; multi erraverunt et posuerunt, quod uniformes

p. 36 spiritus hominis et iumenti. Hoc fideles noverunt, in quorum persona dicitur infra duodecimo¹: « Corpus revertatur in terram suam, unde erat; et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum ». Sed hoc nesciunt carnales, in quorum persona dicitur infra nono: « Mortui nihil noverunt amplius nec habent ultra mercedem ».

Et deprehendi etc. Quarto loco propter huius assimilationem subiungit, quomodo incidit in voluptatis erroneam commendationem, quasi nihil illa sit melius.

(Vers. 22.). Propter quod dicit: Deprehendi, nihil esse melius, quam laetari hominem in opere suo, id est, praesentialiter delectari, sicut carnales faciunt, de quibus Isaiae quinquagesimo sexto²: « Venite, sumamus vinum et impleamur ebrietate, et erit sicut hodie, sic et cras et multo amplius ». Et ista commendatio est erronea, quia non ponit aliam remunerationem nec aliam vitam; unde subdit: Et hanc esse partem illius, quasi nihil aliud exspectet; unde Isaiae vigesimo secundo in persona talium dicitur: « Comedamus et bibamus; cras enim moriemur »; et Sapientiae secundo: « Ubique relinquamus signa laetitiae, quoniam haec est pars nostra, et haec est sors ». Et erronea opinio ista ortum suum habet a iudicii incertitudine; propter quod dicit: Quis enim eum adducet, ut post se futura cognoscat? id est, quis ostendet illi, quod futura sint aliqua bona, quae debeat exspectare? quasi dicat: nullus. Et certe nullus persuadebit, nisi elevetur ad spiritualia contemplanda; « non contemplantibus nobis, quae videntur, sed quae non videntur; quae enim videntur temporalia sunt, quae autem non videntur, aeterna », secundae ad Corinthios quarto³. Quia vero carnalis homo non respicit nisi visibilia, ideo non exspectat aeterna; ideo primae ad Corinthios secundo: « Animalis homo non percipit ea quae Dei sunt ». Ideo si vult futura bona cognoscere, necesse est carnalitatem deponere.

Quaestiones

I. Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nihil habet homo amplius iumento, et quod aequa est utriusque conditio. Quod istud sit falsum, videtur:

1. Genesis secundo⁴ dicitur: Adae non inveniebatur adiutor similis ei, ergo nullum iumentum est homini simile: ergo habet aliquid amplius iumento.

2. Item, certum est, quod homo deliberat de futuris et praeterita discernit et conceptiones suas exprimit; hoc autem non iumentum⁵: ergo etc.

3. Praeterea, homo domat iumenta, sed nullum iumentum hominem: ergo homo aliquid plus habet iumento.

Quod autem non habeat, videtur: quia nascitur, vivit et moritur et in terram vadit, sicut et iumentum.

Respondeo: quidam dicunt, quod hoc dicit in persona carnalis, qui nihil credit habere hominem plus iumento. — Aliter dici potest, quod in propria persona loquatur; et verum dicit secundum suum intellectum. Intendit enim ipse ostendere incertitudinem remunerationis animae per similitudinem ad iumentum. Illam autem similitudinem ponit et intelligit quantum ad visibilia, quae possunt sensu discerni; et per hoc non concludit similitudinem de spiritualibus, sed dubitationem; unde dicit: Quis novit etc. — Dicendum est igitur, quod secundum veritatem homo habet ultra bestias rationem, communicat autem in corruptibilitate, vita et respiratione; et quia ratio non est quid sensibile, sed intelligibile; et ipse de sensibilibus loquitur: ideo nulla est in hoc omnino instantia⁶.

II. Dubitatur de hoc quod dicit: Quis scit, utrum spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum? Quod autem sic, videtur:

1. Primo per corporis dispositionem, cuius dispositio et organizatio attenditur secundum congruentiam ad sursum. Si igitur « os homini sublime dedit caelumque tueri⁷ », et respicit sursum: ergo spiritus fertur sursum.

2. Item, omnes naturaliter appetunt beatitudinem; sed constans est, nullum beatum esse posse in miseriis, maxime cui mors cedit invite: ergo si non potest habere beatitudinem in hac vita, natus est habere post hanc vitam spiritum separatum: ergo etc.

3. Praeterea, intellectus noster est impermixtus, unde omnia intelligit⁸, ergo non dependet a corpore quantum ad actum, ergo multo minus quantum ad esse: ergo corpore descendente, possibile est, ascendere spiritum.

4. Item, per rationem ipsius Ecclesiastae: quia, si aliqui habent bona, et aliqui mala; et videmus, quod in praesenti mala bonis et bona malis contingunt: si ergo necesse est unum rectorem ponere, necesse est aliud tempus et remunerationem ponere, in quo impium et iustum iudicet Deus⁹. Cum

p. 37 igitur hoc fides nostra dicat, Ecclesiastes videtur fuisse haereticus, qui de hoc dubitavit.

Quod autem deorsum, videtur:

1. Per Scripturam: quia Sapientiae nono¹ dicitur: Corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam; ergo si corporaliter corrumpatur anima, totaliter corrumpitur.

2. Item, quod compatitur patienti commoritur morienti; sed anima compatitur corpori: ergo etc.

3. Item, substantia nulla est otiosa², ergo quod aufert alicui omnem operationem aufert ei esse et durationem; sed anima amittit omnem operationem, corpore laeso; quod patet, quia intellectum, de quo minus videtur, ut in furiosis: ergo, corrupto corpore, amittit substantiam.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod ascendere sursum ad remunerationem animas bonas, et descendere deorsum in corruptionem animas iumentorum, dicit et supponit fides nostra; et huic concordat ratio et philosophia; tamen ratio illa et philosophia et occulta est et multas habet rationes dubitandi; ideo quasi nullus vel pauci potuerunt vere certificari de animae immortalitate et eius beatitudine, nisi adiuvasset fides. Unde et Plato³, qui animam posuit immortalem, rursus erravit in beatitudine, qui posuit, animas brutorum corpora circuire. — Ecclesiastes igitur hoc non negat nec dubitat; sed dicit, hoc esse difficile demonstrare; et hoc quidem verum est infideli.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur de operatione et compassione, dicendum, quod aliquid uniri alteri, hoc est dupliciter: aut sicut motor tantum, et tunc potest separari, nulla in ipso facta immutatione; aut sicut motor et perfectio; et hoc dupliciter: aut non habet operationem propriam, sicut anima bruti, aut habet propriam, sicut anima hominis. Quoniam igitur anima hominis unitur corpori ut perfectio et motor, compatitur patienti corpori; ideo etiam impeditur, corpore impedito. Sed quoniam separabiliter coniuncta est, ideo non est necesse, quod ipsa corrumpatur; soluta omni harmonia, anima discedit.

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Part II. The vanity of fault is proved; then a remedy against it is set down.

I saw under the sun etc. Above he treated of the vanity of nature, here of the vanity of fault; and because this is dangerous, therefore it needs a remedy. First, then, he sets down the vanity; secondly, the remedy against it, below, chapter 4⁸: Keep thy foot.

Member I of the second part. The vanity of fault is shown under a threefold difference, and this both as to rulers and as to subjects.

Now the vanity is under a threefold difference: first he treats of the vanity of malice; secondly of avarice, at⁹: Considering I found; thirdly of imprudence, at: Better is a child. Now the vanity is in rulers and in subjects. First, then, he treats of the vanity of malice in those who rule and judge; secondly in subjects, at¹⁰: I turned myself.

Art. 1. On the vanity of malice, first in rulers, described in a fourfold order.

First, then, the vanity of malice which is in rulers is described in this order: first he intimates the consideration of this vanity; secondly, that from this one comes to the premeditation of the future judgement; thirdly, to the consideration of the present state; fourthly, how he fell into an erroneous opinion.

(Vers. 16.). First, then, he intimates that he considered the malice of judges, saying: I saw under the sun in the place of judgement wickedness, as to the examination of the cause; and in the place of justice iniquity, as to the passing of sentence; Isaias, chapter 1¹¹: « How is the faithful city, full of judgement, become a harlot; justice once dwelt in it, but now murderers; thy princes are faithless, companions of thieves; they all love gifts,

p. 35 they follow after rewards, they judge not for the fatherless, and the cause of the widow cometh not in to them »; for it is said in the Psalm: « In whose hands are iniquities; their right hand is filled with gifts ».

(Vers. 17.). And I said in my heart: God shall judge both the just and the wicked. Here, secondly, he shows how from this he comes to the premeditation of the future judgement. On account of which he subjoins: And I said in my heart: He shall judge the just, unto reward; the wicked, unto punishment; Job, chapter 34¹: « Far from God be wickedness, and iniquity from the Almighty. For the work of a man he will render to him, and according to the ways of every one he will reward them. For in very deed God will not condemn without cause, neither will the Almighty pervert judgement ». And therefore God will judge them according to their works, which will then be manifest; whence he subjoins: And the time of every thing shall be then, that is, the time of the judgement of every man, who seems to be every thing, II Corinthians, chapter 5²: « For we must all be manifested before the judgement seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, whether it be good or evil ». — Or: the time of every thing, that is, of the manifestation of every thing; I Corinthians, chapter 4: « Judge not before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts ». — Or: the time of every thing, that is, of the retribution of every thing; Romans, chapter 8: « Every creature groaneth » etc. — This time Ecclesiastes awaited as to come, from the sight of present iniquity; Isaias, chapter 59: « Judgement is turned away backward, and justice hath stood far off, because truth hath fallen down in the street, and equity could not come in; and the Lord saw, and it appeared evil in his eyes, because it is not manifest, and the just one put on a breastplate and a helmet of salvation ».

I said in my heart concerning the sons of men etc. Here, thirdly, is touched how from this he comes to the consideration of the present state, namely why the Lord willed men to be wretched in the present; to this end, namely that he might prove them, therefore he made the life of man like to the beasts.

(Vers. 18. 19. 20. 21.). On account of which he says: I said in my heart, that is, I knew; concerning the sons of men³, as to nature; that God would prove them, and show them to be like beasts, that is, by likening them to beasts he would prove who they were, whether truly good or evil; for the evil, seeing their likeness to the beasts in life, wish to be likened to them in morals and live beastlike; but the good live spiritually; therefore it is said in the Psalm⁴: « Man, when he was in honour, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them ». And he shows the likeness of men to beasts in death and life and in matter; there is no manifest unlikeness in the spiritual substance. — As to death he says: Therefore the death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal, namely for the proving of men, because, just as a beast does not always live, but at some time dies, so also man; below, chapter 9⁵: « There is none that always liveth, or that hath hope of this »; and therefore he makes manifest that the likeness is in death, whence: As man dieth, so those also die. — Nor is the likeness only in the end of life, but also in the act of living; therefore he subjoins: All things breathe alike, namely those that breathe; and man hath nothing more than beast, namely as to the act of life; Wisdom, chapter 7⁶: « There is one going out of men unto life, and a like departure ». Thus the likeness as to life is plain. — And he subjoins the likeness as to matter; and therefore he says: All things are subject to vanity, namely, because they were made from nothing, therefore they are vain; Romans, chapter 8⁷: « The creature was made subject to vanity ». He does not say that matter is nothing, but he means to say this: that they do not have uncreated matter nor essence, but have created matter, which he understands by the name of earth. — Therefore he says: And all things go to one place, namely to the matter from which they were made. Of earth they were made, and into earth they return together, together, that is, conformably. And so the likeness in matter is noted; Ecclesiasticus, chapter 40: « All things that were made of the earth shall be turned into earth; likewise all waters shall be turned into the sea ». — But only in these is the likeness open, but the difference in the soul does not appear. Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward? to heaven, namely to recompense, or downward through corruption; as, conversely, whether the spirit of the beasts descend downward? through corruption, or even upward, as also that of man, to the retribution of the judgement. Few have known this; many have erred and held that the spirits of man and of beast are

p. 36 uniform. This the faithful have known, in whose person it is said below, chapter 12¹: « The body returns into its earth, from whence it was; and the spirit returns to God, who gave it ». But this the carnal do not know, in whose person it is said below, chapter 9: « The dead know nothing more, neither have they a reward any more ».

And I have found etc. In the fourth place, on account of this likening, he subjoins how he falls into an erroneous commendation of pleasure, as though nothing were better than it.

(Vers. 22.). On account of which he says: I have found that nothing is better than for a man to be glad in his work, that is, to take delight in the present, as the carnal do, of whom Isaias, chapter 56²: « Come, let us take wine, and be filled with drunkenness, and it shall be as today, so also tomorrow, and much more ». And this commendation is erroneous, because it sets down no other recompense and no other life; whence he subjoins: And that this is his portion, as though he awaited nothing else; whence in Isaias, chapter 22, it is said in the person of such: « Let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we shall die »; and in Wisdom, chapter 2: « Let us everywhere leave tokens of gladness, for this is our portion, and this our lot ». And this erroneous opinion has its origin from the uncertainty of the judgement; on account of which he says: For who shall bring him to know the things that shall be after him? that is, who shall show him that there are some future goods which he ought to await? as though he should say: no one. And certainly no one will persuade him, unless he be raised to contemplate spiritual things; « while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal », II Corinthians, chapter 4³. But because the carnal man looks at nothing but visible things, therefore he does not await eternal things; therefore I Corinthians, chapter 2: « The sensual man perceiveth not those things that are of God ». Therefore, if he wishes to know the future goods, it is necessary to lay aside carnality.

Questions

I. It is asked about what he says: Man hath nothing more than beast, and that the condition of them both is equal. That this is false is shown:

1. In Genesis, chapter 2⁴, it is said: For Adam there was not found a helper like himself; therefore no beast is like to man: therefore he has something more than a beast.

2. Likewise, it is certain that man deliberates about future things and discerns past things and expresses his conceptions; but a beast does not do this⁵: therefore etc.

3. Moreover, man tames beasts, but no beast tames man: therefore man has something more than a beast.

But that he does not have more is shown: because he is born, lives and dies and goes into the earth, just as a beast does.

I respond: some say that he says this in the person of the carnal man, who believes that man has nothing more than a beast. — Otherwise it can be said that he speaks in his own person; and he says what is true according to his own understanding. For he himself intends to show the uncertainty of the recompense of the soul through the likeness to the beast. Now he sets down and understands that likeness as to visible things, which can be discerned by sense; and by this he does not conclude a likeness concerning spiritual things, but a doubt; whence he says: Who knoweth etc. — It must be said, therefore, that according to the truth man has reason beyond the beasts, but shares with them in corruptibility, life and breathing; and because reason is not something sensible but intelligible, and he himself speaks of sensible things: therefore there is in this no objection at all⁶.

II. It is doubted about what he says: Who knoweth whether the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward? But that it does is shown:

1. First through the disposition of the body, whose disposition and organization is regarded according to its fittingness for what is upward. If, then, « he gave man a lofty countenance and bade him behold the heaven⁷ », and he looks upward: therefore the spirit is borne upward.

2. Likewise, all naturally desire beatitude; but it is certain that no one can be blessed in miseries, least of all one to whom death comes unwillingly: therefore if he cannot have beatitude in this life, he is born to have it after this life as a separated spirit: therefore etc.

3. Moreover, our understanding is unmixed, whence it understands all things⁸; therefore it does not depend on the body as to its act, therefore much less as to its being: therefore when the body descends, it is possible for the spirit to ascend.

4. Likewise, by the reasoning of Ecclesiastes himself: because, if some have good things and some evil; and we see that in the present evil things happen to the good and good things to the evil: if, then, it is necessary to posit one ruler, it is necessary to posit another time and recompense, in which God shall judge the wicked and the just⁹. Since, then,

p. 37 our faith says this, Ecclesiastes seems to have been a heretic, who doubted of it.

But that it goes downward is shown:

1. Through Scripture: because in Wisdom, chapter 9¹, it is said: The body which is corrupted weigheth down the soul; therefore if the soul is bodily corrupted, it is wholly corrupted.

2. Likewise, what suffers with one who suffers dies with one who dies; but the soul suffers with the body: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, no substance is idle²; therefore what takes away from something every operation takes away from it its being and duration; but the soul loses every operation when the body is injured; which is plain, because the understanding, of which it seems less so, as in madmen: therefore, when the body is corrupted, it loses its substance.

I respond: it must be said that the good souls ascend upward to recompense, and the souls of beasts descend downward into corruption, our faith says and supposes; and with this reason and philosophy agree; yet that reason and philosophy is both hidden and has many reasons for doubting; therefore almost no one, or few, could be truly made certain of the immortality of the soul and of its beatitude, unless faith had helped. Whence Plato too³, who held the soul immortal, erred again as to beatitude, since he held that souls go round through the bodies of brutes. — Ecclesiastes, then, neither denies nor doubts this; but he says that this is difficult to demonstrate; and this indeed is true for the unbeliever.

2. 3. To the objection about operation and compassion, it must be said that for something to be united to another is so in two ways: either as a mover only, and then it can be separated with no change made in it; or as mover and perfection; and this in two ways: either it does not have an operation of its own, as the soul of a brute, or it has one of its own, as the soul of man. Since, then, the soul of man is united to the body as perfection and mover, it suffers with the body when the body suffers; therefore it is also impeded when the body is impeded. But since it is joined separably, therefore it is not necessary that it be corrupted; when all harmony is dissolved, the soul departs.

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