Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

PRAELOCUTIO

SANCTI BONAVENTURAE

PROOEMIO IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM PRAEMISSA¹

Salvatoris opitulante gratia, ex quo perventum est ad completionem primi Sententiarum, Patrum interveniente instantia, oportet inchoare secundum. At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedam. Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas retexere. Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator. — Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magistri Sententiarum, maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod, cum Magister primi libri distinctione tertia², in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat distinctione septima, quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. — Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi, in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia, si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra³, iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est⁴, sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit: mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint animae consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipitur pro tota, id est pro anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi.

Similiter nec in alio, scilicet in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister distinctione septima innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum substantiam, et quod alii dicunt, esse dictam secundum relationem et esse proprium, non est controversia, immo utrumque verum est, si quis attendat. Nam si divisim loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec duo

nomina, sic, cum nomen potentiae de se sit essentiale, et nomen virtutis generativae sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona. Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod concurrant¹ in unius vocabuli intellectum, tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentia generandi quam fecunditas potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem, nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio potentia generandi vel posse generare dicitur secundum relationem. Et sic patet, quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, nec una repugnat alteri. Sed hanc sententiam magis approbavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere. — In his igitur et in aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens, debita servata reverentia²... et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem ingenii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potero, sustinere, his dumtaxat exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium. Haec autem sunt octo, ita quod in quolibet libro sunt duae de illis positionibus.

In primo enim libro haec duo dicit Magister quae communiter non tenentur, videlicet quod caritas, quae est amor Dei et proximi, non sit quid creatum, sed increatum, ut Spiritus sanctus. Aliud est, quod haec nomina trinus, trinitas, et alia numeralia non ponunt, sed tantum privant³.

In his autem duabus positionibus deceptum credimus Magistrum, occasione sumta ex verbis Hilarii et Augustini. Unde utraque istarum fuit improbata.

In secundo libro similiter duae sunt, quarum una est, quod in Angelis beatis praemium praecessit meritum, meritum, inquam, respectu praemii substantialis, quod etsi valde videatur probabile, communiter tamen non tenetur. Altera est, quod nihil de cibo transit in veritatem humanae naturae, sed tota veritas humanae naturae fuit in Adam⁴.

In tertio libro similiter duae inveniuntur opiniones: una est, quod anima soluta a corpore est persona; alia est, quod Christus in triduo fuit homo⁵.

In quarto similiter duae reperiuntur: una de baptismo Ioannis; altera de potestate baptizandi sive dimittendi peccata, quam potuit conferre creaturae⁶.

In his positionibus Magister a communi via recessit, et sicut in suis locis tractabuntur, ad minus probabilem partem declinavit, et ideo non sustinetur communiter a magistris. Et licet fortassis aliquis eum in aliquibus harum opinionum sustineat, verumtamen pater et magister noster bonae memoriae frater Alexander in nulla harum ipsum sustinuit, sed potius contrarium sensit, cuius vestigiis praecipue inhaerere propono.

Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me ab eius⁷ sententia deviasse, cum sermo fuit de generatione aeterna in primo libro, distinctione vigesima septima⁸. Cum enim scribatur in Summa⁹, quod ideo generat, quia est pater, magis visus sum adhaerere illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod Pater ideo generat, quia Deus innascibilis. Cum iterum ab eodem scribatur¹⁰, quod est aliquod dicere in divinis, cui non respondet verbum, magis adhaesi¹¹ illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod non est dicere sine verbo, ac per hoc ab eius recessisse vestigio. — Sed si quis recte intelligat, non discordavi ab ipso nec in primo nec in secundo, quia verum non contrariatur vero.

Verum autem esse arbitror, et quod Pater generat, quia innascibilis, et quod generat, quia Deus pater; et hoc patet sic. Planum est enim et secundum omnem opinionem verum, quod ideo potentia Patris generat, quia fecunda est. Illud ergo recte dicitur esse ratio generandi, quod fecunditatem potentiae Patris importat. Fecunditas autem importatur et nomine innascibilitatis et nomine paternitatis, sed aliter et aliter. Nam paternitas importat fecunditatem quasi praesupponendo et praeintelligendo, licet principaliter imponatur ab habitudine. Dicitur enim paternitas habitudo Patris ad Filium. Innascibilitas autem importat fecunditatem ex consequenti intellectu: nam ex primo intellectu importat privationem habitudinis ad prius; sed ex illa sola privatione non posset esse proprietas, cum sit consequens essentiam. Et ideo innascibilis non solummodo dicitur Pater, quia ab alio non accipit esse, sed quia ab alio non accipit esse, et quia habet unde alii det esse.

Qui igitur superficialiter intelligit, attendendo vel aspiciendo, a quo primo nomen imponitur, utrumque negabit dicens, Patrem non ideo generare, quia pater est, nec ideo generare, quia innascibilis est, quia nec habitudo nec habitudinis privatio est ratio producendi personam. Et quantum ad hoc verum dicet, sed non plene. Qui autem plenarium intellectum capit utriusque, attendens fecunditatem importari per utrumque nomen, utrumque dicet: et quod generat, quia Deus innascibilis, et quod generat, quia Deus pater. Verum est enim, quod Pater generat, quia ipse nihil habet ab alio, sed habet unde det alii. Verum est etiam, quod Pater generat, quia fecunditatem habet in producendo sibi per omnia similem per modum naturae.

Cum ergo dixi, quod Pater ideo est pater, quia generat, et non ideo generat, quia pater, non hoc dixi ratione fecunditatis, quam importat hoc nomen paternitas in divinis, sed ratione habitudinis, a qua verius nomen patris imponitur; et ideo magistro non contradixi, sed hoc ibi dicere omisi et nunc suppleo, quod paternitas non tantummodo dicit habitudinem, sed etiam fecunditatem. Unde licet rationes ibi inductae ostendant, quod non ideo generat, quia pater, et concessae sint, quia verum concludebant, secundum quod pater imponitur ab habitudine; addendum fuit, quod non concludunt, secundum quod nomen patris importat fecunditatem. Cum autem dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non hoc dixi, in quantum hoc quod est innascibilis importat privationem habitudinis; sic enim negat magister; sed hoc dixi, in quantum in nomine innascibilitatis clauditur potentia fecunditatis. Et hoc necessarium est ponere ad hoc, quod innascibilitas sit proprietas, sicut ibi multipliciter ostensum fuit. Magis autem adhaesi huic positioni, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non quia innascibilitas magis sit ratio generandi quam paternitas, vel quod sit adeo propria ratio sicut paternitas, sed quia magis est ibi status, ultra quem non contingit quaerere. Si enim quaeratur, quare Pater generat, et respondeatur, quia pater est, id est, fecundus fecunditate naturae, adhuc dubitabit et quaeret, quare illa potentia magis est fecunda quam alia? Et respondebitur: hoc est, quia ipsa a nullo alio habet esse. Ideo enim Pater est totius deitatis principium, quia a nullo, ut dicit Magister¹; hac ratione reddita, ibi status est, nec est ultra procedere. Et ideo dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non ut assignarem generationis propriam rationem, sed magis propter inquisitionis terminationem. Nam in nomine patris importatur ratio generationis, ut propria, nomine vero innascibilitatis, ut prima; in uno antecedenter, in alio consequenter; in uno communiter, in altero specialiter.

In secundo autem nemo me arbitrabitur discordasse qui sciat distinguere inter propria et transumta. Sicut enim dicens, non esse verum risum sine ore, nec esse verum volatum sine alis, non contradicit ei qui dicit, pratum sine ore ridere, et sagittas sine alis volare; sic qui dicit, nomen loquendi vel dicendi proprie sumtum non esse sine verbo, sicut nec generare sine filio, non contradicit ei qui dicit, loqui vel dicere sic transumi posse et secundum aliquam significationem transumtivam dici de aliquo sine verbo generato.

In his igitur et in omnibus aliis, si quis aspiciat diligenter et pie, inveniet, me a patrum et maiorum vestigiis non fuisse ausum recedere; quoniam iuxta consilium Gregorii² sanius est alieno intellectui cedere quam contentionibus deservire, pro eo quod, sicut dicit documentum Doctoris gentium ad Timotheum³: Servum Domini non oportet litigare, sed mansuetum esse ad omnes, docibilem, patientem, cum modestia corripientem eos qui renitent veritati.

His igitur praelibatis, cum invocatione gratiae Dei calamus sumatur. Exordium: Solummodo hoc inveni etc.

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PRAELOCUTIO

OF SAINT BONAVENTURE

PREFIXED TO THE PROEMIUM TO THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES¹

By the help of the Saviour's grace, now that we have come to the completion of the first book of the Sentences, and at the insistence of the Fathers, we must begin the second. But just as in the first book I held to the sentences and to the common opinions of the masters, and most of all of our master and father of good memory, brother Alexander, so in the books that follow I shall not depart from their footsteps. For I do not intend to set new opinions against them, but to weave together the common and approved ones. Nor let anyone suppose that I wish to be the fabricator of a new writing; for this I think and confess, that I am a poor and slender compiler. — Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I have turned aside from the positions of the Master of the Sentences, chiefly in two places: in this, namely, that whereas the Master, in the third distinction of the first book², in the second assigning of a trinity, which he says consists in mind, knowledge and love, says that mind is taken not for the soul but for the higher portion, it is found to be said by me that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, whereas the Master says, in the seventh distinction, that the power of generating is common to the three persons, inasmuch as it is a name signifying the essence, I rather held to that opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. — But if anyone look rightly, in neither of the aforesaid will he find that I have turned aside either from the Master's position or from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assigning of a trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of its higher part, this was said for this reason: that if mind stood there for the higher portion, since that is a power of the soul, and since to know and to love do not belong to one power, as will be seen below³, there would then be there not a trinity but a quaternity. Again, it does not properly belong to a power⁴, but to the substance through a power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly when he says the mind knows etc., mind there supposits for the substance of the soul. And Augustine intimates this again when afterwards, on occasion of this trinity, he shows through almost the whole tenth book On the Trinity that the soul knows itself. Lastly, since those habits of knowledge and of love are consubstantial with the soul, they do not add a new essence over the power, but by their very selves are fitted to the power, and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or with the higher part of reason. And therefore the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is not taken for the whole soul, that is, for the soul according to all its powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the higher portion. In this, therefore, I did not contradict the Master, but rather set forth his word according to the rule of truth, as I judge.

Likewise neither in the other matter, namely in the power of generating, did I disagree with him. That the same Master intimates, in the seventh distinction, that the power of generating is said according to substance, and that others say it is said according to relation and is a proper [attribute] — there is no controversy here; rather both are true, if one attend. For if we speak dividedly of the power of generating, according to what is signified by these two

names, then, since the name of power is of itself essential and the name of generative virtue is personal, it names the essence or nature as in a person. But if we speak of that which is signified through those two words, so that they run together¹ into the understanding of a single word, then, since the power of generating is nothing other than the fecundity of a power, and fecundity in producing some person is said wholly according to relation, and is not common but proper, so without doubt the power of generating or to be able to generate is said according to relation. And so it is clear that each of these opinions is true, and that the one is not repugnant to the other. But I rather approved this sentence, because it reaches further to the truth of the thing, although for the full expression of the truth both must be upheld. — Cleaving, therefore, to these and to other words of the Master, with due reverence preserved²... I both have proposed and do propose, according to the slenderness of my wit and the poverty of my knowledge, to uphold those things in which I shall be able, these only excepted in which more commonly it is not upheld, but rather the common opinion holds the contrary. And these are eight, so that in each book there are two of those positions.

For in the first book the Master says these two things which are not commonly held, namely, that charity, which is the love of God and of neighbour, is not something created but uncreated, as the Holy Spirit is. The other is that these names threefold, trinity, and the other numerals do not posit anything, but only remove³.

Now in these two positions we believe the Master to have been deceived, the occasion being taken from the words of Hilary and of Augustine. Whence each of these was disapproved.

In the second book likewise there are two, of which one is that in the blessed Angels reward preceded merit — merit, I say, in respect of the substantial reward — which, although it seem very probable, is nevertheless not commonly held. The other is that nothing of food passes over into the truth of human nature, but the whole truth of human nature was in Adam⁴.

In the third book likewise two opinions are found: one is that the soul separated from the body is a person; the other, that Christ during the three days was a man⁵.

In the fourth likewise two are found: one about the baptism of John; the other about the power of baptizing or of forgiving sins, which he could have conferred upon a creature⁶.

In these positions the Master withdrew from the common way, and, as will be treated in their proper places, turned aside to the less probable part, and therefore he is not commonly upheld by the masters. And although perhaps someone may uphold him in some of these opinions, nevertheless our father and master of good memory brother Alexander upheld him in none of them, but rather held the contrary, in whose footsteps I chiefly propose to walk.

Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I deviated from his⁷ sentence when the discourse was about the eternal generation, in the first book, the twenty-seventh distinction⁸. For since it is written in the Summa⁹ that he generates for this reason, that he is father, I was rather seen to hold to that opinion which says that the Father generates for this reason, that he is unbegotten God. And since again it is written by the same¹⁰ that there is some saying in divine things to which no word answers, I rather held¹¹ to that opinion which says that there is no saying without a word, and by this to have withdrawn from his footstep. — But if anyone understand rightly, I did not disagree with him either in the first or in the second, because the true is not contrary to the true.

But I judge it to be true both that the Father generates because he is unbegotten, and that he generates because he is God the Father; and this appears thus. For it is plain, and true according to every opinion, that the power of the Father generates for this reason, that it is fruitful. That, therefore, is rightly said to be the ground of generating which imports the fecundity of the Father's power. Now fecundity is imported both by the name of unbegottenness and by the name of paternity, but otherwise and otherwise. For paternity imports fecundity as it were by presupposing and pre-understanding it, although it is principally imposed from a respect. For paternity is said to be the respect of the Father to the Son. But unbegottenness imports fecundity by a consequent understanding: for by the first understanding it imports the privation of a respect to something prior; but from that privation alone there could not be a property, since it is consequent upon the essence. And therefore the Father is called unbegotten not only because he does not receive being from another, but because he does not receive being from another, and because he has whence he may give being to another.

He, therefore, who understands superficially, attending or looking to that from which the name is first imposed, will deny both, saying that the Father does not generate because he is father, nor generate because he is unbegotten, since neither a respect nor the privation of a respect is the ground of producing a person. And as to this he will say what is true, but not fully. But he who takes the full understanding of both, attending that fecundity is imported through each name, will say both: both that he generates because he is unbegotten God, and that he generates because he is God the Father. For it is true that the Father generates because he himself has nothing from another, but has whence he may give to another. It is true also that the Father generates because he has fecundity in producing one like to himself in all things by way of nature.

When, therefore, I said that the Father is father for this reason, that he generates, and does not generate for this reason, that he is father, I did not say this by reason of the fecundity which this name paternity imports in divine things, but by reason of the respect, from which the name of father is more truly imposed; and therefore I did not contradict the master, but I there omitted to say this and now supply it, that paternity names not only a respect, but also a fecundity. Whence, although the reasons there adduced show that he does not generate for this reason, that he is father, and although they were granted because they concluded what was true according as father is imposed from a respect, it ought to have been added that they do not conclude according as the name of father imports fecundity. But when I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, I did not say this inasmuch as this which is unbegotten imports the privation of a respect — for so the master denies it — but I said this inasmuch as in the name of unbegottenness the power of fecundity is enclosed. And this is necessary to posit in order that unbegottenness may be a property, as was there shown in many ways. But I rather held to this position, that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, not because unbegottenness is more the ground of generating than paternity is, or because it is as proper a ground as paternity, but because there is there rather a stopping-place, beyond which it does not fall to us to inquire. For if it be asked why the Father generates, and it be answered, because he is father, that is, fruitful with the fecundity of nature, one will still doubt and ask, why that power is more fruitful than another? And it will be answered: this is because it has being from no other. For the Father is the principle of the whole deity for this reason, that he is from none, as the Master says¹; and this ground being rendered, there is the stopping-place, nor is there any going further. And therefore I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, not in order to assign the proper ground of generation, but rather for the sake of terminating the inquiry. For in the name father the ground of generation is imported as proper, but in the name of unbegottenness as first; in the one antecedently, in the other consequently; in the one commonly, in the other specially.

But in the second matter no one will judge that I disagreed, who knows how to distinguish between what is proper and what is taken by transumption. For just as one who says that there is no true laughter without a mouth, nor true flight without wings, does not contradict him who says that a meadow laughs without a mouth and that arrows fly without wings; so he who says that the name of speaking or of saying, taken properly, is not without a word, just as neither is generating without a son, does not contradict him who says that to speak or to say can be so transumed and, according to some transumptive signification, be said of something without a word generated.

In these things, therefore, and in all others, if anyone look diligently and piously, he will find that I have not dared to withdraw from the footsteps of the fathers and of our elders; since, according to Gregory's counsel², it is sounder to yield to another's understanding than to be a slave to contentions, for this reason, that, as the teaching of the Doctor of the Gentiles to Timothy says³: The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all, apt to teach, patient, with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth.

These things, therefore, being set down beforehand, let the pen be taken up with the invocation of God's grace. Exordium: Only this I have found etc.

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