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Dist. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 86

Distinctio III.

Pars I.

Cap. I. Quales facti fuerint Angeli.

Ecce ostensum est, ubi Angeli fuerint, mox ut creati sunt. Nunc consequens est investigare, quales facti fuerint in ipso primordio suae conditionis. Et quatuor quidem Angelis videntur esse attributa in initio subsistentiae suae1, scilicet essentia simplex, id est indivisibilis et immaterialis; et discretio personalis; et per rationem naturaliter insitam intelligentia, memoria et voluntas sive dilectio; liberum quoque arbitrium, id est libera inclinandae voluntatis sive ad bonum sive ad malum facultas. Poterant enim per liberum arbitrium sine violentia et coactione ad utrumlibet propria voluntate deflecti2.

Cap. II. An omnes Angeli fuerint aequales in essentia, sapientia, libertate arbitrii.

Hic considerandum est, utrum in sua substantia spirituali et sapientia rationali et libertate arbitrii, quae omnibus inerant, omnes aequales fuerint, ut sit prima consideratio de substantia, secunda de forma, tertia de potestate. Persona quippe substantia est, sapientia forma, arbitrium potestas. Et ad substantiam quidem pertinet naturae subtilitas, ad formam vero intelligentiae perspicacitas, et ad potestatem voluntatis rationalis habilitas. — Illae igitur essentiae rationales, quae personae erant et spiritus erant naturaque simplices ac vita immortales, differentem essentiae tenuitatem et differentem sapientiae perspicacitatem atque differentem arbitrii habilitatem3 recte habuisse intelliguntur; sicut in corporibus nonnulla differentia est secundum essentiam ac formam et pondus: quaedam enim aliis meliorem ac digniorem essentiam et formam habent, et alia aliis leviora atque agiliora sunt. Ad hunc ergo modum credendum est, illas spirituales naturas convenientes suae puritati et excellentiae et in essentia et in forma et in facultate differentias accepisse in exordio suae conditionis, quibus alii superiores, alii inferiores Dei sapientia constituerentur, aliis maiora, aliis minora dona praestans, ut qui tunc per naturalia bona aliis excellebant, ipsi etiam post per munera gratiae eisdem praeessent. Qui enim natura magis subtiles et sapientia amplius perspicaces creati sunt, hi etiam maioribus gratiae muneribus praediti sunt et dignitate excellentiores aliis constituti. Qui vero natura minus subtiles et sapientia minus perspicaces conditi sunt, minora gratiae dona habuerunt inferioresque constituti sunt sapientia Dei, aequo moderamine cuncta ordinantis. In ipsa facultate arbitrii differentia animadvertenda est secundum differentem naturae virtutem et differentem cognitionis et intelligentiae vim. Et sicut differens vigor et subtilitas naturae infirmitatem non adducit, minorque cognitio sapientiae ignorantiam non ingerit, sic libertas inferior nullam arbitrio necessitatis voluntatem imponit.

Cap. III. Quae communia et aequalia habuerunt Angeli.

Et sicut in praedictis Angeli differebant, ita et quaedam communia et aequalia habebant: quod spiritus erant, quod indissolubiles et immortales erant, commune omnibus et aequale erat; in subtilitate vero essentiae et intelligentia sapientiae et libertate voluntatis differentes erant. Has discretiones4 intelligibiles invisibilium naturarum ille solus comprehendere potuit et ponderare, qui cuncta fecit in pondere, numero et mensura5.

Pars II.

Cap. IV. An boni, vel mali creati sint, et an aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum.

Illud quoque investigatione dignum videtur, quod et a pluribus quaeri solet, utrum boni vel mali, iusti vel iniusti creati sint Angeli, et an aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum, vel sine mora in ipso creationis exordio ceciderint. — Putaverunt enim quidam, Angelos, qui ceciderunt, creatos esse malos et non libero arbitrio in malitiam declinasse, sed in malitia a Deo factos esse, nec aliquam fuisse moram inter creationem et lapsum, sed ab initio apostatasse; alios vero creatos fuisse plene beatos. Qui opinionem suam muniunt auctoritate Augustini super Genesim6 ita dicentis: «Non frustra putari potest, ab initio temporis diabolum cecidisse nec cum sanctis Angelis pacatum aliquando vixisse et beatum, sed mox apostatasse; unde Dominus ait: Ille homicida erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, ut intelligamus, quia in veritate non stetit ex quo creatus est, qui staret, si stare voluisset». Idem in eodem7: «Non frustra, inquit, putandum est, ab ipso initio temporis vel conditionis suae diabolum cecidisse et nunquam in veritate stetisse. Unde quidam in hanc malitiam libero arbitrio non esse flexum, sed in hac, quamvis a Deo, putant esse creatum, secundum illud beati Iob: Hoc est, inquit, initium figmenti Dei, quod fecit Deus, ut illudatur ei ab Angelis eius; et Propheta ait: Draco iste, quem formasti ad illudendum ei, tanquam primo factus sit malus et invidus diabolus8, non voluntate depravatus». — His aliisque testimoniis utuntur qui dicunt, Angelos, qui ceciderunt, creatos fuisse malos et sine mora corruisse; eos vero, qui perstiterunt, perfectos et beatos fuisse creatos, astruunt auctoritate Augustini, qui super Genesim9 dicit, per caelum significari creaturam spiritualem, quae ab exordio, quo facta est, et perfecta et beata est semper.

Aliis autem videtur, omnes Angelos creatos esse bonos et in ipso creationis primordio10 bonos exstitisse, id est sine vitio, honestosque fuisse, id est innocentes, sed non iustos, id est virtutum exercitium habentes. Nondum enim praediti erant virtutibus, quae stantibus appositae fuerunt in confirmatione per gratiam, aliis per liberum arbitrium superbientibus, et ideo cadentibus. Aliquam etiam fuisse morulam aiunt inter creationem et lapsum ac confirmationem; et in illa brevitate temporis omnes boni erant, non quidem per usum liberi arbitrii, sed per creationis beneficium; et tales erant, qui stare poterant, id est, non cadere per bona creationis, et cadere per liberum arbitrium. Poterant enim peccare et non peccare, sed non poterant proficere ad meritum vitae, nisi gratia superadderetur, quae addita est quibusdam in confirmatione. Et ad hoc confirmandum utuntur testimonio Augustini, qui super Genesim11 dicit, angelicam naturam primo informiter creatam et caelum dictam, postea formatam et lucem appellatam, quando ad Creatorem est conversa, perfecta dilectione ei inhaerens. Unde prius dictum est: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, et postea subditum: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, quia in primo agitur de creatione spiritualis naturae informis, postea de formatione eiusdem. — Ratio quoque obviat illis qui dicunt, Angelos creatos fuisse malos. Non enim potuit non bonum esse, totum quod ex ipso illis erat, et totum bonum erat, quoniam ex ipso totum erat. Hoc modo probatur, quod boni erant omnes Angeli, quando primo facti sunt, sed ea bonitate, quam natura incipiens acceperat.

Ideoque Augustinus, exterminans opinionem eorum12 qui Angelos creatos fuisse malos putant, auctoritate et ratione probat, bonos fuisse creatos; et verba praemissa, quae illi pro se inducebant, quomodo sint intelligenda, aperit ita dicens super Genesim: «Omnia, inquit, fecit Deus valde bona. Naturam igitur Angelorum bonam fecit. Et quia iniustum est, ut nullo merito hoc in aliquo, quod creavit, Deus damnet; non naturam, sed voluntatem malam puniendam esse credendum est, nec eius naturam significatam esse, cum dicitur: Hoc est initium figmenti Dei etc., sed corpus aereum, quod tali voluntati aptavit Deus, vel ipsam ordinationem Dei, in qua eum etiam invitum fecit utilem bonis, vel ipsius Angeli facturam; quia, etsi praesciret Deus, voluntate malum futurum, fecit tamen eum, providens, quanta de illo sua bonitate esset facturus. Figmentum ergo Dei dicitur, quia, cum sciret Deus, eum voluntate malum futurum, ut bonis noceret, creavit tamen illum, ut de illo bonis prodesset; hoc autem fecit, ut illudatur ei. Illuditur enim ei, cum Sanctis proficit tentatio eius; sicut et mali homines, quos Deus, malos futuros praevidens, creavit tamen ad Sanctorum utilitatem, illuduntur, cum praestatur Sanctis eorum tentatione profectus. Sed ipse est initium, quia praecedit antiquitate13 et principatu malitiae. Haec autem illusio fit angelis malis et hominibus malis per Angelos sanctos, quia subdit eis angelos malos et homines malos, ut, non quantum nituntur, sed quantum sinuntur, possint». — Ecce aperte ostendit, qualiter praedicta verba Iob intelligenda sint, et angelicam naturam bonam creatam asseruit14.

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Deinde, qualiter verba Domini, quae supra posuit, accipienda sint, Augustinus aperit, ubi etiam sua quae praedixit verba determinat, evidenter docens, Angelos bonos fuisse creatos et post creationem, interposita aliqua morula, cecidisse, ita inquiens15: «Quod putatur diabolus nunquam in veritate stetisse, nunquam beatam vitam duxisse, sed ab initio cecidisse, non sic accipiendum est, ut malus a bono Deo creatus esse putetur, quia16 ab initio non cecidisse diceretur. Non enim cecidit, si talis, id est malus, factus est. A quo

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enim caderet? Factus ergo prius, statim a veritate se avertit, propria potestate delectatus, beataeque vitae dulcedinem non gustavit, quam acceptam non fastidivit, sed nolendo accipere amisit. Sui ergo casus praescius esse non potuit, quia sapientia fructus est pietatis17. Continuo autem ut factus est, cecidit, non ab eo quod accepit, sed ab eo quod accepisset, si Deo subdi voluisset». — Ecce hic aperte declarat, Angelos bonos esse creatos et post creationem cecidisse; et fuit ibi aliqua morula, licet brevissima. Quod Origenes confirmat super Ezechielem18 dicens: «Serpens hostis est contrarius veritati, non tamen a principio neque statim super pectus et ventrem suum ambulavit; sicut Adam et Eva non statim peccaverunt, ita et serpens aliquando fuit non serpens, cum in paradiso deliciarum moraretur; Deus enim malitiam non fecit». — Ecce aperte dicit, post creationem, interposita morula, cecidisse. Ideoque illa verba sic accipienda videntur: Homicida erat ab initio19 vel mendax, id est, statim post initium, quando sibi aequalitatem Dei promisit et se ipsum occidit, qui homo dicitur in Evangelio. Nec in veritate stetit, quia in ea non fuit, sed ab initio temporis, id est statim post initium temporis, apostatavit. Potest etiam sic accipi illud: Ab initio homicida fuit vel mendax, id est, ex quo homo fuit conditus, quem per invidiam in mortem praecipitavit et fallaciter seduxit. Ex praedictis ergo liquet, Angelos omnes bonos esse creatos, et post creationem quosdam cecidisse a bono, quod habuissent, si perstitissent.

Cap. V. De triplici sapientia Angelorum ante casum vel confirmationem.

Hic inquiri solet, quam sapientiam habuerunt ante casum vel confirmationem. Erat in eis triplex naturalis cognitio, qua sciebant, quod facti erant, et a quo facti erant, et cum quo facti erant, et habebant aliquam boni et mali notitiam, intelligentes, quid appetendum, vel respuendum illis foret.

Cap. VI. An aliquam habuerint Dei dilectionem vel sui ante casum.

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum aliquam Dei vel sui invicem dilectionem habuerint. Ad quod dici potest, quod20 naturalem dilectionem habebant, ut memoriam, intellectum et ingenium, qua Deum et se aliquatenus diligebant, per quam tamen non merebantur.

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English Translation

Distinction 3.

Part I.

Ch. I. Of what kind the Angels were made.

Behold, it has been shown where the Angels were, as soon as they were created. Now it is consequent to investigate of what kind they were made in the very first beginning of their condition. And four [things] indeed seem to have been attributed to the Angels in the beginning of their subsistence1, namely a simple essence, that is indivisible and immaterial; and personal distinction; and, by a reason naturally implanted, intelligence, memory, and will or love; also free choice, that is the free faculty of inclining the will either to good or to evil. For they could, through free choice, without violence and coercion, be turned to either alternative by their own will2.

Ch. II. Whether all the Angels were equal in essence, wisdom, [and] freedom of choice.

Here it must be considered whether in their spiritual substance and rational wisdom and freedom of choice, which were in all, all were equal — so that the first consideration is about substance, the second about form, the third about power. For the person is substance, wisdom is form, choice is power. And to substance indeed pertains the subtlety of nature, to form the perspicacity of intelligence, and to power the aptitude of the rational will. — Those rational essences, therefore, which were persons and were spirits and by nature simple and by life immortal, are rightly understood to have had a differing tenuity of essence and a differing perspicacity of wisdom and a differing aptitude of choice3; just as in bodies there is some difference according to essence and form and weight: for some have a better and worthier essence and form than others, and some are lighter and more agile than others. In this way, then, it must be believed that those spiritual natures received, befitting their purity and excellence, differences both in essence and in form and in faculty in the beginning of their condition, by which some were constituted higher, others lower, by the wisdom of God, bestowing greater gifts on some, lesser on others, so that those who then by natural goods excelled others, these also afterward by the gifts of grace would preside over the same. For those who were created by nature more subtle and by wisdom more perspicacious, these also were endowed with greater gifts of grace and constituted more excellent than others in dignity. But those who were made by nature less subtle and by wisdom less perspicacious, had lesser gifts of grace and were constituted lower by the wisdom of God, ordering all [things] with an equable governance. In the very faculty of choice a difference is to be noted according to the differing power of nature and the differing force of cognition and intelligence. And just as a differing vigor and subtlety of nature does not bring infirmity, and a lesser cognition does not introduce ignorance of wisdom, so a lower freedom imposes no [necessitated] will of necessity on the choice.

Ch. III. What [things] the Angels had in common and equally.

And just as in the aforesaid the Angels differed, so also they had certain [things] common and equal: that they were spirits, that they were indissoluble and immortal, was common to all and equal; but in the subtlety of essence and the intelligence of wisdom and the freedom of will they were differing. These intelligible distinctions4 of the invisible natures He alone could comprehend and weigh, who made all [things] in weight, number, and measure5.

Part II.

Ch. IV. Whether they were created good or evil, and whether there was any delay between creation and the fall.

That too seems worthy of investigation, which is also asked by many, whether the Angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any delay between creation and the fall, or whether without delay in the very beginning of creation they fell. — For some have thought that the Angels who fell were created evil and did not by free choice decline into malice, but were made by God in malice, nor was there any delay between creation and the fall, but from the beginning they apostatized; but others [they thought] were created fully blessed. Those who fortify their opinion by the authority of Augustine on Genesis6 thus saying: «Not without reason can it be thought that from the beginning of time the devil fell, and never lived at peace with the holy Angels and blessed, but soon apostatized; whence the Lord says: That one was a murderer from the beginning and stood not in the truth, that we may understand that he stood not in the truth from the time he was created, who would have stood, had he willed to stand». The same in the same [work]7: «It must not without reason, he says, be thought that from the very beginning of time or of his condition the devil fell and never stood in the truth. Whence some [hold] that he was not bent into this malice by free choice, but that he was created — though by God — in this [malice], according to that [text] of blessed Job: This, he says, is the beginning of the figment of God, which God made, that it might be mocked by His Angels; and the Prophet says: That dragon, which You formed to mock him — as though the devil were made evil and envious from the first8, not depraved by [his own] will». — These and other testimonies are used by those who say that the Angels who fell were created evil and fell without delay; but that those who persevered were created perfect and blessed, they establish by the authority of Augustine, who on Genesis9 says that by «heaven» is signified the spiritual creature, which from the beginning, when it was made, was always both perfect and blessed.

But to others it seems that all the Angels were created good and in the very first beginning of creation10 existed [as] good, that is without vice, and were honest, that is innocent, but not just, that is having the exercise of virtues. For they were not yet endowed with the virtues which were added to those who stood firm in [their] confirmation through grace, while others by free choice became proud, and therefore fell. They also say there was some little delay between creation and the fall and the confirmation; and in that brevity of time all were good, not indeed through the use of free choice, but through the benefit of creation; and they were such as could stand, that is, not fall, through the goods of creation, and [could] fall through free choice. For they could sin and not sin, but they could not advance to the merit of life, unless grace were superadded, which was added to some in [their] confirmation. And to confirm this they use the testimony of Augustine, who on Genesis11 says that the angelic nature was first created formless and called «heaven», afterward formed and called «light», when it was turned to the Creator, adhering to Him by perfect love. Whence first it was said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and afterward was subjoined: God said: Let there be light, and light was made, because in the first [statement] it treats of the creation of the formless spiritual nature, afterward of the formation of the same. — Reason too is opposed to those who say that the Angels were created evil. For that which was theirs from Him could not be not-good, and was wholly good, since it was wholly from Him. In this way it is proved that all the Angels were good when they were first made, but with that goodness which the beginning nature had received.

And therefore Augustine, exterminating the opinion of those12 who think the Angels were created evil, proves by authority and reason that they were created good; and the foregoing words, which they adduced for themselves, how they are to be understood, he opens, thus saying on Genesis: «All [things], he says, God made very good. The nature of the Angels, therefore, He made good. And because it is unjust that God condemn this in anything which He created, by no merit; it must be believed that not the nature but the evil will is to be punished, nor that his nature was signified when it is said: This is the beginning of the figment of God etc., but the airy body which God adapted to such a will, or the very ordination of God, in which He made him useful to the good even against his will, or the very making of the Angel; because, although God foreknew [him] to be evil by will, yet He made him, foreseeing how much good He would do from him by His goodness. It is therefore called the figment of God, because, since God knew that he would be evil by will, that he might harm the good, yet He created him, that from him He might profit the good; and He did this, that he might be mocked. For he is mocked when his temptation profits the Saints; just as also evil men, whom God, foreseeing them to be evil, yet created for the utility of the Saints, are mocked, when by their temptation an advance is afforded to the Saints. But he himself is the beginning, because he precedes in antiquity13 and in primacy of malice. But this mocking is done to the evil angels and evil men through the holy Angels, because He subjects to them the evil angels and evil men, that they may [prevail] not as much as they strive, but as much as they are permitted». — Behold, he plainly shows how the aforesaid words of Job are to be understood, and he asserted the angelic nature to have been created good14.

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Then, how the words of the Lord which he set forth above are to be taken, Augustine opens, where he also determines his own words which he had foretold, evidently teaching that the Angels were created good and after creation, some little delay being interposed, fell, thus saying15: «That it is thought the devil never stood in the truth, never led a blessed life, but fell from the beginning, is not to be so taken that he be thought created evil by the good God, because16 from the beginning he would not be said to have fallen. For he did not fall, if he was made such, that is evil. For from what

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would he fall? Made therefore first, he at once turned himself away from the truth, delighted by his own power, and did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, which, received, he did not loathe, but by not willing to receive it he lost. He could not therefore be foreknowing of his own fall, because wisdom is the fruit of piety17. But continuously, as he was made, he fell, not from that which he received, but from that which he would have received, had he willed to be subject to God». — Behold, here he plainly declares that the Angels were created good and after creation fell; and there was there some little delay, though very brief. Which Origen confirms on Ezekiel18, saying: «The serpent, an enemy contrary to the truth, did not however from the beginning nor at once walk upon his breast and belly; just as Adam and Eve did not at once sin, so also the serpent for a time was not a serpent, while he tarried in the paradise of delights; for God did not make malice». — Behold, he plainly says that after creation, a little delay being interposed, [the devil] fell. And therefore those words seem to be taken thus: He was a murderer from the beginning19 or a liar, that is, immediately after the beginning, when he promised himself equality with God and slew himself, who is called «man» in the Gospel. Nor did he stand in the truth, because he was not in it, but from the beginning of time, that is immediately after the beginning of time, he apostatized. It can also be taken thus: From the beginning he was a murderer or a liar, that is, from the time man was made, whom through envy he cast down into death and deceitfully seduced. From the aforesaid, then, it is clear that all the Angels were created good, and that after creation some fell from the good which they would have had, had they persevered.

Ch. V. Of the threefold wisdom of the Angels before the fall or confirmation.

Here it is wont to be inquired what wisdom they had before the fall or confirmation. There was in them a threefold natural cognition, by which they knew that they were made, and by whom they were made, and with whom they were made, and they had some knowledge of good and evil, understanding what was to be sought, or to be rejected, by them.

Ch. VI. Whether they had any love of God or of themselves before the fall.

It is also wont to be asked whether they had any love of God or of one another. To which it can be said that20 they had a natural love, like memory, understanding, and ingenuity, by which they loved God and themselves to some extent, by which however they did not merit.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Haec et fere totam distinctionem Magister accepit ex Hugone, I. de Sacram. p. 5. c. 6. seqq., et Sent. tr. 2. c. 3. seqq. — Paulo inferius codd. B C D E propter rationem loco per rationem.
    This, and almost the whole distinction, the Master took from Hugh, I On the Sacraments, p. 5, c. 6 ff., and Sentences tr. 2, c. 3 ff. — A little below codices B C D E [read] propter rationem in place of per rationem.
  2. Ed. 1 melius flecti.
    Ed. 1 [reads], better, flecti.
  3. Vat. cum edd., exc. 1, voci habilitatem praemittit libertatem et.
    The Vatican edition, with the editions except ed. 1, prefixes to the word habilitatem [the words] libertatem et.
  4. Vat. cum nonnullis edd. distinctiones.
    The Vatican edition, with some editions, [reads] distinctiones.
  5. Sap. 11, 21.
    Wisdom 11:21.
  6. Libr. XI. c. 16. n. 21, sed apud Magistr. contracte. — Deinde locus s. Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 44. — Paulo inferius ante voluisset codd., at non edd., omittunt stare.
    Book XI, c. 16, n. 21, but in the Master abridged. — Then the passage of sacred Scripture is John 8:44. — A little below, before voluisset, the codices, but not the editions, omit stare.
  7. Cap. 19. 20. n. 26. 27. Infra locus Iob est 40, 19 (secund. Septuag.) et sequens locus Ps. 103, 26. Cfr. in Ioan. tr. 42. n. 11.
    Chapters 19, 20, nn. 26, 27. Below the Job passage is 40:19 (according to the Septuagint) and the following passage is Ps. 103:26. Cf. on John, tractate 42, n. 11.
  8. Sic ed. 1; codd. cum Vat. et reliquis edd. minus bene malus, invidus et diabolus.
    So ed. 1; the codices, with the Vatican edition and the rest of the editions, less well [read] malus, invidus et diabolus.
  9. Libr. 1. c. 1. n. 3.
    Book 1, c. 1, n. 3.
  10. Vat. cum cod. A et nonnullis edd. initio. Aliquanto inferius post aliis omnes edd., excepta Vat., interiiciunt vero.
    The Vatican edition, with codex A and some editions, [reads] initio. Somewhat below, after aliis, all the editions except the Vatican insert vero.
  11. Libr. 1. c. 1. n. 3, c. 3. n. 7, c. 4. n. 9. Tamen August. potius inquirendo quam asserendo loquitur.
    Book 1, c. 1, n. 3, c. 3, n. 7, c. 4, n. 9. Yet Augustine speaks rather by inquiring than by asserting.
  12. Libr. XI. c. 21. n. 28, et c. 22. n. 29, sed cum additamentis et mutationibus. — Paulo ante pro exterminans ed. 1 examinans.
    Book XI, c. 21, n. 28, and c. 22, n. 29, but with additions and changes. — A little before, for exterminans, ed. 1 [reads] examinans.
  13. Respicitur Apoc. 12, 9: Serpens antiquus, qui vocatur diabolus et satanas. — Immediate ante pro est initium ed. 1 dicitur initium.
    Apocalypse 12:9 is referred to: the ancient serpent, who is called the devil and satan. — Immediately before, for est initium, ed. 1 [reads] dicitur initium.
  14. Vat. sola creatam esse asserit.
    The Vatican edition alone [reads] creatam esse asserit.
  15. Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30. (nonnullis additis). — Paulo ante pro docens Vat. cum paucis edd. dicens. — Ad verba post creationem cod. Erf. annotat: Illud non dicit Augustinus. Ad ea quae non multo post sequuntur verba: prius, statim idem cod. annotat: In originali non habetur prius, sed sic: sed factus, continuo etc.
    Book XI On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 23, n. 30 (with some additions). — A little before, for docens, the Vatican edition with a few editions [reads] dicens. — At the words post creationem the Erfurt codex annotates: Augustine does not say that. At the words which follow not much after: prius, statim, the same codex annotates: In the original prius is not had, but thus: sed factus, continuo etc.
  16. Vat. cum edd., exc. 1, 8, quasi, refragantibus codd. Deinde Vat. cum ed. 8 quam non utique acceptam fastidivit, ad quae verba cod. Erf. annotat, hanc esse lectionem originalis, simulque adiungit: istam quaestionem de morula determinat August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.
    The Vatican edition, with the editions except 1, 8, [reads] quasi, the codices being in opposition. Then the Vatican edition with ed. 8 [reads] quam non utique acceptam fastidivit, at which words the Erfurt codex annotates that this is the reading of the original, and adds at the same time: Augustine determines this question of the delay [in] XI On the City of God, c. 15.
  17. Respicitur Eccli. 1, 1: Et pie agentibus dedit sapientiam. — Paulo inferius pro accepisset codd. et edd., exc. 1, minus bene acciveret.
    Ecclesiasticus 1:1 is referred to: And to those acting piously He gave wisdom. — A little below, for accepisset, the codices and editions, except ed. 1, less well [read] acciveret.
  18. Hom. 1. n. 3. (nonnullis omissis).
    Homily 1, n. 3 (with some [things] omitted).
  19. Ioan. 8, 44. Verba sequentia aequalitatem Dei promisit alludunt ad Isai. 14, 13, et illa alia verba qui homo dicitur in Evangelio ad Matth. 13, 28. Denique verba paulo inferius occurrentia per invidiam etc. respiciunt Sap. 2, 24. — Ad verba Potest etiam etc. in cod. Erf. annotatur: Ista est sententia Augustini, XI. super Genesim, c. 8, [vide pag. 87, nota 2.], et haec expositio Augustini super Ioan. Hom. 42.
    John 8:44. The following words aequalitatem Dei promisit allude to Isaiah 14:13, and those other words qui homo [are] said in the Gospel at Matthew 13:28. Finally the words occurring a little below, per invidiam etc., refer to Wisdom 2:24. — At the words Potest etiam etc. in the Erfurt codex it is annotated: This is the opinion of Augustine, XI on Genesis, c. 8, [see p. 87, note 2], and this exposition of Augustine [is] on John, Homily 42.
  20. Codd. B C D E et edd. 1, 8 quoniam.
    Codices B C D E and editions 1, 8 [read] quoniam. ---
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