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Dist. 7

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 170

Distinctio VII.

Pars I.

Cap. I. Utrum boni Angeli possint peccare, vel mali recte vivere.

Supra1 dictum est, quod Angeli, qui perstiterunt, per gratiam confirmati sunt, et qui ceciderunt, a gratia Dei deserti sunt. Et boni quidem in tantum confirmati sunt per gratiam, quod peccare nequeunt; mali vero per malitiam adeo sunt obstinati, quod bonam voluntatem habere sive bene velle non valent, etsi bonum sit quod aliquando volunt. Volunt enim aliquando aliquid fieri, quod Deus vult fieri, et utique illud bonum est et iustum fieri, nec tamen bona voluntate illud volunt, nec bene illud volunt2.

Cap. II. Quod cum utrique habeant liberum arbitrium, non tamen ad utrumque flecti possunt.

Sed cum nec boni peccare possint, nec mali bene velle vel bene operari, videtur, quod iam non habeant liberum arbitrium, quia in utramque partem flecti non possunt, cum liberum arbitrium ad utrumque se habeat. Unde Hieronymus3 in tractatu de prodigo filio dicit: «Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum cadere non potest; cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt». — Hic videtur dicere, quod omnis creatura in libero arbitrio constituta flecti potest ad bonum et ad malum. Quod si est, ergo et boni p. 171Angeli et mali ad utrumque flecti possunt: ergo et boni possunt fieri mali, et mali boni. — Ad quod dicimus, quia boni tanta gratia confirmati sunt, ut nequeant fieri mali, et mali in malitia adeo obdurati sunt, ut non valeant fieri boni; et tamen utrique habent liberum arbitrium, quia non aliqua cogente necessitate, sed propria ac spontanea voluntate, per gratiam quidem adiuti, bonum eligunt et malum respuunt; et mali similiter spontanea voluntate, a gratia destituti, bonum vitant et malum sequuntur; et habent mali liberum arbitrium, sed depressum atque corruptum, quod surgere ad bonum non valent4.

Cap. III. Quod boni post confirmationem liberius habent arbitrium quam ante.

Boni vero arbitrium habent multo liberius post confirmationem quam ante. Ut enim Augustinus tradit in Enchiridio5: «Non ideo carent libero arbitrio, quia male velle non possunt; multo quippe liberius est arbitrium, quod non potest servire peccato. Neque culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic volunt, ut esse miseri non solum nolint, sed nec prorsus velle possint». Non possunt itaque boni Angeli velle malum, vel velle esse miseri; neque hoc habent ex naturae, sed ex gratiae beneficio. Ante gratiae namque confirmationem potuerunt peccare Angeli, et quidam etiam peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt. Unde Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum6: «Creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum diabolus est princeps, et qui non peccaverunt peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Ideoque solus Deus est, qui non gratia cuiusquam, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest nec poterit peccare». — Ecce hic insinuatur, quod Angeli ante confirmationem peccare potuerunt, sed post confirmationem non possunt. Et quod potuerunt, fuit eis ex libero arbitrio, quod est eis naturale; quod vero modo non possunt peccare, non est eis ex natura, id est libero arbitrio, sed ex gratia, ex qua gratia etiam est, ut ipsum liberum arbitrium iam non possit servire peccato.

Cap. IV. Quod non possunt ex natura peccare, sicut ante.

Non ergo post confirmationem Angeli de natura, sicut ante, peccare potuerunt, non quod liberum arbitrium eorum debilitatum sit per gratiam, sed ita potius confirmatum, ut iam per illud non possit bonus Angelus peccare; quod utique non est ex ipso7 libero arbitrio, sed ex gratia Dei. Quod ergo Hieronymus ait: «Cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, possunt flecti in utramque partem», accipi oportet secundum statum, in quo creata sunt. Talis enim et homo et Angelus creatus est, qui ad utrumque flecti poterat; sed postea boni Angeli per gratiam ita sunt confirmati, ut peccare non possint; et mali ita in vitio obdurati, ut bene vivere nequeant. Similiter etiam illud Isidori8 intelligendum est: «Angeli mutabiles natura, immutabiles sunt gratia», quia ex natura in primordio suae conditionis mutari potuerunt ad bonum, sive ad malum; sed post per gratiam ita bono addicti sunt, ut inde mutari nequeant. Ad hoc enim repugnat gratia, non natura.

Pars II.

Cap. V. Quibus modis mali angeli noscant veritatem temporalium rerum.

Et licet mali angeli ita per malitiam sint obdurati, vivaci tamen sensu non penitus sunt privati. Nam, ut tradit Isidorus9, triplici acumine scientiae vigent daemones, scilicet subtilitate naturae, experientia temporum, revelatione superiorum10 spirituum. De hoc etiam Augustinus11 ait: «Spiritus mali quaedam vera de temporalibus rebus noscere permittuntur, partim subtilitate sensus, partim experientia temporum, callidiores propter tam magnam longitudinem vitae, partim a sanctis Angelis, quod ipsi ab omnipotenti Deo discunt, iussu eius sibi revelantibus. Aliquando autem iidem nefandi spiritus et quae ipsi facturi12 sunt, velut divinando, praedicunt».

Cap. VI. Quod magicae artes virtute et scientia diaboli valent, quae est eis a Deo.

Quorum scientia atque virtute etiam magicae artes exercentur; quibus tamen tam scientia quam potestas a Deo data est vel ad fallendum fallaces, vel ad monendum fideles, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustorum patientiam. Unde Augustinus in libro tertio de Trinitate13: «Video, inquit, infirmae cogitationi p. 172quid possit occurrere; cur scilicet ista miracula etiam magicis artibus fiant. Nam et magi Pharaonis serpentes fecerunt et alia. Sed illud est amplius admirandum, quomodo magorum potentia, quae serpentes facere potuit, ubi ad muscas minutissimas, scilicet cinifes, ventum est, omnino defecit; qua tertia plaga Aegyptus caedebatur. Ibi certe defecerunt magi dicentes: Digitus Dei est hic. Unde datur intelligi, ne ipsos quidem transgressores angelos et aereas potestates, in imam istam caliginem tanquam in sui generis carcerem ab illius sublimis aethereae puritatis habitatione detrusos, per quos magicae artes possunt quidquid possunt, aliquid14 valere, nisi data desuper potestate. Datur autem vel ad fallendum fallaces, sicut in Aegyptios — et in ipsos etiam magos data est, ut in eorum spirituum operatione viderentur admirandi, a quibus fiebant damnandi — vel ad monendum fideles, ne tale aliquid facere pro magno desiderent, propter quod etiam nobis in Scriptura sunt prodita; vel ad exercendam, probandam manifestandamque iustorum patientiam».

Cap. VII. Quod malis angelis non servit ad nutum materia visibilium rerum.

«Nec putandum est, istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed Deo potius, a quo haec potestas datur, quantum incommutabilis iudicat15».

Cap. VIII. Quod non sunt creatores, licet per eos magi ranas et alia fecerint; sicut nec boni, etsi per eorum ministerium fiant creaturae.

«Nec sane creatores illi mali angeli dicendi sunt, quia per illos magi ranas et serpentes fecerunt; non enim ipsi eas creaverunt. Omnium quippe rerum, quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in corporeis mundi huius elementis latent, quae Deus originaliter eis indidit. Ipse ergo creator est omnium rerum, qui creator est invisibilium seminum; quia quaecumque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi hic primordia et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus, ut ita dicam, regulis sumunt. Sicut ergo nec parentes dicimus creatores hominum, nec agricolas creatores frugum, quamvis, eorum extrinsecus adhibitis motibus, ista16 creanda Dei virtus interius operetur; ita non solum malos, sed nec bonos Angelos fas est putare creatores; sed pro subtilitate sui sensus et corporis semina istarum rerum nobis occultiora noverunt et ea per congruas temperationes elementorum latenter spargunt, atque ita et gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum incrementorum praebent occasiones. Sed nec boni haec, nisi quantum Deus iubet, nec mali haec iniuste faciunt, nisi quantum iuste ipse permittit. Nam iniqui malitia voluntatem suam habet iniustam; potestatem autem non nisi iuste accipit, sive ad suam poenam, sive ad aliorum, vel poenam malorum, vel laudem bonorum17».

Cap. IX. Quod solus Deus sic operatur creationem rerum, sicut iustificationem mentis.

«Sicut ergo mentem nostram iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, praedicare autem extrinsecus Evangelium etiam homines possunt, non solum boni per veritatem, sed etiam mali per occasionem; ita creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur. Exteriores autem operationes atque contemperationes sive occasiones ab Angelis tam bonis quam malis, vel etiam ab hominibus adhibentur18». «Sed haec ab hominibus tanto difficilius adhibentur, quantum desunt sensuum subtilitates et corporum mobilitates in membris terrenis et pigris. Unde qualibuscumque Angelis vicinas causas ab elementis contrahere quanto facilius est, tanto mirabiliores in huiusmodi operibus eorum existunt celeritates. Sed non est creator, nisi qui principaliter ista format; nec quisquam hoc potest nisi unus creator Deus19». «Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo causarum cardine condere ac ministrare creaturam, quod facit solus creator Deus; aliud autem pro distributis ab illo viribus et facultatibus aliquam operationem forinsecus admovere, ut tunc vel tunc, sic vel sic exeat quod creatur. Ista quippe originaliter et primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta iam creata sunt, sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt20».

Cap. X. Quod angeli mali multa possunt per naturae vigorem, quae non possunt propter Dei prohibitionem.

Illud quoque sciendum est, quod angeli mali quaedam possunt per naturae subtilitatem, quae tamen non possunt propter Dei, vel bonorum Angelorum prohibitionem, id est, quia non permittuntur illa facere a Deo, vel ab Angelis bonis. Possent utique fecisse cinifes qui ranas serpentesque fecerunt. Quaedam vero non possunt facere, etiamsi permittuntur ab Angelis superioribus, quia non permittit Deus. Unde Augustinus in libro tertio de Trinitate21: «Ex ineffabili potentatu Dei fit, ut quod possent mali angeli, si permitterentur, ideo non possunt, quia non permittuntur. p. 173Neque enim occurrit alia ratio, cur non potuerunt facere cinifes qui ranas serpentesque fecerunt, nisi quia maior aderat dominatio prohibentis Dei per Spiritum sanctum; quod etiam magi confessi sunt dicentes: Digitus Dei est hic. Quid autem per naturam possint, nec tamen possint propter prohibitionem, et quid per ipsius naturae suae conditionem facere non sinantur, homini explorare difficile est, immo impossibile». «Novimus, hominem posse ambulare, et neque hoc posse, si non permittatur; volare autem non posse, etiamsi permittatur. Sic et illi angeli quaedam possunt facere, si permittantur ab Angelis potentioribus ex imperio Dei; quaedam vero non possunt, etiamsi ab eis permittantur, quia ille non permittit, a quo illis est talis naturae modus, qui etiam per Angelos suos illa plerumque non permittit, quae concessit, ut possint».

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English Translation
p. 170

Distinction VII.

Part I.

Chap. I. Whether the good Angels are able to sin, or the evil ones to live rightly.

It was said above1 that the Angels who stood fast were confirmed by grace, and those who fell were forsaken by the grace of God. And the good are indeed so far confirmed by grace that they cannot sin; the evil, however, are so obstinate through malice that they cannot have a good will or will well, even though what they sometimes will is good. For they sometimes will that something be done which God wills to be done, and that thing is assuredly good and just to be done, yet they do not will it with a good will, nor do they will it well2.

Chap. II. That, although each has free choice, they cannot nevertheless be bent toward either side.

But since neither can the good sin, nor the evil will well or act well, it seems that they no longer have free choice, because they cannot be bent toward either side, whereas free choice is disposed toward both. Hence Jerome3, in the treatise on the prodigal son, says: «God alone is the one into whom sin cannot fall; the rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent toward either side». — Here he seems to say that every creature established in free choice can be bent toward good and toward evil. And if that is so, then both the good p. 171Angels and the evil can be bent toward either side: therefore the good too can become evil, and the evil good. — To which we say that the good are confirmed by such great grace that they cannot become evil, and the evil are so hardened in malice that they cannot become good; and yet each has free choice, because not by any compelling necessity, but by their own and spontaneous will — aided indeed by grace — they choose good and reject evil; and the evil likewise by spontaneous will, deprived of grace, shun good and follow evil; and the evil have free choice, but depressed and corrupted, so that they cannot rise to the good4.

Chap. III. That the good, after confirmation, have a freer choice than before.

The good, however, have a much freer choice after confirmation than before. For as Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion5: «They do not therefore lack free choice because they cannot will evil; for that choice is much freer which cannot serve sin. Nor is that will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be called not free, by which they so will to be blessed that they not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot at all so wish». And so the good Angels cannot will evil, nor will to be wretched; nor do they have this from nature, but from the benefit of grace. For before the confirmation of grace the Angels were able to sin, and some even did sin and became demons. Hence Augustine in the book Against Maximinus6: «The nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin. For the Angels also sinned and became demons, of whom the devil is the prince, and those who did not sin were able to sin; and to whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature, but of the grace of God. Therefore God alone is the one who, not by anyone's grace but by his own nature, neither could nor can nor will be able to sin». — Behold, here it is intimated that the Angels before confirmation were able to sin, but after confirmation they cannot. And that they were able was theirs from free choice, which is natural to them; but that they now cannot sin is not theirs from nature, that is from free choice, but from grace — by which grace it also comes about that free choice itself can no longer serve sin.

Chap. IV. That they cannot sin from nature, as before.

Therefore the Angels, after confirmation, were not able to sin from nature as before — not because their free choice was weakened by grace, but rather so confirmed that through it a good Angel can no longer sin; which assuredly is not from free choice itself7, but from the grace of God. And so what Jerome says, «The rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent in either direction», ought to be taken according to the state in which they were created. For both man and Angel were created such that they could be bent toward either side; but afterward the good Angels were so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, and the evil so hardened in vice that they cannot live well. Likewise also that saying of Isidore8 is to be understood: «The Angels are mutable by nature, immutable by grace», because by nature, in the beginning of their condition, they could be changed toward good or toward evil; but afterward by grace they were so devoted to the good that they cannot be changed from it. For grace, not nature, is opposed to this.

Part II.

Chap. V. By what means the evil angels know the truth of temporal things.

And although the evil angels are so hardened through malice, they are nevertheless not wholly deprived of a lively perception. For, as Isidore9 teaches, the demons are vigorous with a threefold keenness of knowledge, namely by subtlety of nature, by experience of the ages, and by revelation of the higher10 spirits. Of this Augustine11 also says: «The evil spirits are permitted to know certain true things concerning temporal matters, partly by subtlety of perception, partly by experience of the ages — being more cunning because of the great length of [their] life — partly from the holy Angels, what they themselves learn from almighty God, he revealing it to them at his command. Sometimes, however, those same execrable spirits foretell, as by divining, even the things which they themselves12 are going to do».

Chap. VI. That the magic arts have force by the virtue and knowledge of the devil, which is theirs from God.

By whose knowledge and virtue even the magic arts are practiced; to whom, nevertheless, both the knowledge and the power has been given by God, either to deceive the deceitful, or to admonish the faithful, or to exercise and prove the patience of the just. Hence Augustine in the third book On the Trinity13: «I see, he says, what can occur to a weak understanding — p. 172namely, why these miracles are wrought even by magic arts. For the magicians of Pharaoh too made serpents and other things. But this is the more to be wondered at: how the power of the magicians, which could make serpents, when it came to the tiniest flies, namely the gnats, wholly failed; by which third plague Egypt was being struck. There certainly the magicians failed, saying: This is the finger of God. Hence it is given to understand that not even those transgressor angels and the aerial powers — thrust down into this lowest murk as into a prison of their own kind, from the dwelling of that sublime ethereal purity, [those] through whom the magic arts can do whatever they can — avail anything14 unless power be given from above. And it is given either to deceive the deceitful, as upon the Egyptians — and it was given even upon the magicians themselves, that in the working of their spirits they might appear admirable, by whom they were [made] to be damned — or to admonish the faithful, lest they desire to do any such thing as something great, on account of which these things have also been handed down to us in Scripture; or to exercise, to prove, and to make manifest the patience of the just».

Chap. VII. That the matter of visible things does not serve the evil angels at their beck.

«Nor is it to be thought that this matter of visible things serves these transgressor angels at their beck, but rather God, by whom this power is given, as far as he, the immutable one, judges15».

Chap. VIII. That they are not creators, although through them the magicians made frogs and other things; just as neither are the good [creators], even if through their ministry creatures come to be.

«Nor truly are those evil angels to be called creators because through them the magicians made frogs and serpents; for they did not themselves create them. For of all things which are born corporeally and visibly, certain hidden seeds lie concealed in the corporeal elements of this world, which God implanted in them at the origin. He therefore is the creator of all things, who is the creator of the invisible seeds; since whatever things, in being born, come forth to our eyes, take from the hidden seeds their beginnings of advancing here and their increments of due magnitude, and draw the distinctions of their forms from the original rules, so to speak. Just as therefore we do not call parents the creators of men, nor farmers the creators of crops — although, by their externally applied motions, the power of God inwardly works these things16 to be created — so it is not lawful to suppose not only the evil but even the good Angels to be creators; but by the subtlety of their perception and of their body they know the seeds of these things, more hidden from us, and scatter them secretly through fitting temperings of the elements, and thus afford occasions both for the begetting of things and for the hastening of their increments. But neither do the good [do] these things except in so far as God commands, nor do the evil do them unjustly except in so far as he himself justly permits. For the iniquitous one's malice has its own will unjust; but the power it does not receive except justly, whether for its own punishment, or for that of others, either the punishment of the evil or the praise of the good17».

Chap. IX. That God alone so works the creation of things, as [he works] the justification of the mind.

«As therefore our mind cannot be formed by justification except by God — whereas to preach the Gospel outwardly even men can do, not only the good through truth, but also the evil through occasion — so the creation of visible things God works inwardly. But the outward operations and temperings or occasions are applied by Angels, both good and evil, or even by men18». «But these are applied by men so much the more difficultly, the more the subtleties of the senses and the mobilities of the bodies are lacking in earthly and sluggish members. Hence the swifter it is for Angels of whatever kind to draw the proximate causes from the elements, the more wonderful are the speeds that arise in their operations of this sort. But there is no creator save he who principally forms these things; nor can anyone do this save the one creator God19». «For it is one thing to found and minister a creature from the innermost and highest hinge of causes — which the creator God alone does — and another to apply some outward operation, by the powers and faculties distributed by him, that what is created may come forth then or then, thus or thus. For these things, originally and primordially, have all been created already in a certain weaving of the elements, but come forth when the opportunities are received20».

Chap. X. That the evil angels can do many things by the vigor of nature, which they cannot do because of God's prohibition.

It is also to be known that the evil angels can do certain things by the subtlety of nature, which nevertheless they cannot do because of the prohibition of God or of the good Angels — that is, because they are not permitted to do those things by God or by the good Angels. Those who made frogs and serpents could indeed have made gnats. Certain things, however, they cannot do, even if they are permitted by the higher Angels, because God does not permit it. Hence Augustine in the third book On the Trinity21: «By the ineffable power of God it comes about that what the evil angels could do, if they were permitted, they therefore cannot do, because they are not permitted. p. 173For no other reason occurs why those who made frogs and serpents could not make gnats, except that a greater dominion of the prohibiting God was present, through the Holy Spirit; which the magicians too confessed, saying: This is the finger of God. But what they can do by nature, and yet cannot do because of the prohibition, and what by the very condition of their nature they are not allowed to do, it is difficult — nay, impossible — for man to explore». «We know that a man can walk, and cannot even do this if he be not permitted; but cannot fly, even if he be permitted. So also those angels can do certain things, if they be permitted by the more powerful Angels at God's command; but certain things they cannot do, even if they be permitted by them, because he does not permit, by whom there is for them such a mode of nature — [he] who also through his Angels does not for the most part permit those things which he granted [they] should be able [to do]».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. V. c. 1. Cfr. de hoc cap. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 2. c. 4.
    Distinction V, c. 1. Cf. on this chapter Hugh [of St. Victor], Summa Sententiarum tr. 2, c. 4.
  2. Vat. cum cod. D et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 omittit haec ultima verba: nec bene illud volunt.
    The Vatican edition, with codex D and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, omits these last words: nor do they will it well.
  3. Epist. 21. ad Damas. n. 40, in quo loco pro cadere non potest originale non cadit, et in fine possunt suam flectere voluntatem pro flecti possunt. Cfr. infra d. XXV. c. 3. 4.
    Letter 21, to Damasus, n. 40, in which place for cannot fall the original [reads] does not fall, and at the end can bend their own will for can be bent. Cf. below, Distinction XXV, c. 3, 4.
  4. Vat. cum paucis edd. et cod. B valet.
    The Vatican edition, with a few editions and codex B, [reads] avails [valet, sing.].
  5. Cap. 5. n. 105, n. 28, in quo textu pro qua beati Vat. cum paucis edd. quia beati. — Paulo inferius pro ex naturae eadem Vat. cum aliquibus edd. ex natura.
    Chap. 5, n. 105, n. 28, in which text for by which [they are] blessed the Vatican edition, with a few editions, [reads] because [they are] blessed. — A little below, for of nature the same Vatican edition, with some editions, [reads] from nature.
  6. Lib. II. c. 12. n. 2. — In fine aliqua verba textus omissa sunt.
    Book II, c. 12, n. 2. — At the end some words of the text have been omitted.
  7. Auctoritate codd. ACD nec non edd. 1, 8 inseruimus ipso.
    On the authority of codices ACD and also of editions 1, 8, we have inserted itself [ipso].
  8. Sent. (de Sum. Bono) I. c. 10. n. 2. — Paulo ante pro in vitio codd. ABCD cum edd. 1, 8 vitio.
    Sentences (on the Highest Good) I, c. 10, n. 2. — A little before, for in vice codices ABCD with editions 1, 8 [read] by vice.
  9. Loc. cit. n. 17.
    Loc. cit., n. 17.
  10. Ita ed. 1 et originale; in aliis supernorum. Pro spirituum originale potestatum.
    Thus edition 1 and the original; in others of the supernal [spirits]. For of the spirits the original [reads] of the powers.
  11. Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 37, nonnullis omissis et interpositis.
    Book II, On Genesis according to the letter, c. 17, n. 37, with several things omitted and interposed.
  12. Vat. cum aliquibus edd. facturi, omissa voce ipsi.
    The Vatican edition, with some editions, [reads] going to do [facturi], the word they themselves [ipsi] being omitted.
  13. Cap. 7. n. 12. Locus s. Scripturae, qui deinde respicitur, est Exod. 7, 8.
    Chap. 7, n. 12. The passage of sacred Scripture which is then referred to is Exod. 7, 8.
  14. Vat., refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, incongrue praefigit non autem. Mox pro operatione Vat. sola seductione, et subinde cum edd. 6, 8 verbo damnandi praemittit a Dei veritate.
    The Vatican edition, the codices and editions 1, 8 disagreeing, incongruously prefixes but not. Soon, for working the Vatican edition alone [reads] seduction, and thereupon, with editions 6, 8, prefixes to the word to be damned [the phrase] by the truth of God.
  15. August., loc. cit. c. 8. n. 13.
    Augustine, loc. cit., c. 8, n. 13.
  16. Vat. cum paucis edd. voci ista praefigit ad, et paulo post sola Vat. si pro sed, subtilitate pro subtilitate [?].
    The Vatican edition, with a few editions, prefixes ad to the word ista, and a little after, the Vatican edition alone [reads] si for sed, and subtilitate for subtilitate [?]. (The terminal orthographic variant pair in this note is indistinct at 450 dpi — parked for the d.10 polish-blocker.)
  17. Hoc totum cap. mutuatum est ex August., loc. cit., pluribus omissis et mutilis.
    This whole chapter is borrowed from Augustine, loc. cit., with many things omitted and abridged.
  18. Ibid. n. 14, nonnullis omissis. — In Vat. sola desiderantur verba: atque contemperationes sive occasiones.
    Ibid., n. 14, with several things omitted. — In the Vatican edition alone the words and the temperings or occasions are wanting.
  19. Ibid. c. 9. n. 17 et n. 16, multis mutatis et omissis.
    Ibid., c. 9, n. 17 and n. 16, with many things changed and omitted.
  20. Ibid. n. 16. — In hoc cap. plura correximus ex codd. simul cum originali.
    Ibid., n. 16. — In this chapter we have corrected several things from the codices together with the original.
  21. Cap. 9. n. 18. In hoc textu ed. August. exhibet Digitus Dei est hoc (secund. Septuag.).
    Chap. 9, n. 18. In this text the edition of Augustine exhibits This is the finger of God [hoc] (according to the Septuagint). ---
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