Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 18
Quaestio V. Utrum communicans cum excommunicato sit excommunicatus.
Quinto quaeritur de excommunicatione quantum ad communicationem, et quaeritur, utrum communicans cum excommunicato sit excommunicatus. Et quod sic, ostenditur:
1. Quia iura1 istud dicunt.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia accedere ad unum oppositorum est recedere a reliquo; sed excommunicatus est extra communionem2 positus: ergo qui ei communicat a communione recedit.
3. Item, excommunicatio infligitur in poenam erubescentiae; sed nulla est erubescentia, ubi alii communicant: ergo ad hoc, quod sententia illa sit alicuius valoris, necesse est ipso iure alios arcere3: ergo si censura ecclesiastica est in excommunicatione, videtur, quod talis iuste et debite sit excommunicatus.
4. Item, aut licet communicare excommunicato, aut non. Si sic; ergo tales non sunt vitandi; et hoc est contra illud primae ad Corinthios quinto4: Si quis frater etc.; et post: Cum huiusmodi nec cibum sumere. Si non licet; ergo per aliquam sententiam alii arcentur communicare cum isto, et non nisi per sententiam excommunicationis: ergo qui communicant ei incidunt in excommunicationis sententiam: ergo sunt excommunicati.
Contra:
1. Communicans cum infideli sive cum altero peccatore sive in cibo sive in potu non incurrit illud vitium, nisi communicet in actu consimili sive in crimine: ergo pari ratione nullus participans cum excommunicato est excommunicatus, nisi participet in crimine.
2. Item, excommunicatio aut est morbus contagiosus, aut non. Si sic; ergo qua ratione iste primo excommunicatus inficit participantem pari vitio, ita et alius alium, et sic deinceps: ergo si hoc falsum est et contra iura5, non est morbus contagiosus: ergo non videtur, quod communicans excommunicato sit excommunicatus. Si tu dicas, quod hoc facit institutio, non contagio; contra: institutio ista ab homine est, sicut et excommunicatio; sed nullus debet infligere poenam nisi pro culpa: ergo si non communicat in merito sive in culpa, nec in poena: ergo institutio illa, quae facit communicari in poena sine culpa, est iniusta.
3. Item, filius communicans patri aut est excommunicatus, aut non. Si sic; ergo debet vitare patrem. Sed si patrem non potest vitare sine suo detrimento, ergo filius portat iniquitatem patris, quod est contra ius divinum6. Si autem non est excommunicatus, ergo licet alicui ex familiaritate communicare cum excommunicato. Sed laudabilior est societas et amicitia et caritas: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod ex sociali amore vel aliquo tali licet excommunicato communicare, et ita non videtur communicans excommunicato esse excommunicatus.
4. Item, excommunicatio omnis, sive maior sive minor, separat a Sacramentis; sed nullus separandus est a Sacramentis nisi pro culpa mortali: ergo omnis communicans excommunicato peccat mortaliter. Sed si hoc verum est; cum ista medicina sit occasio multorum periculorum, videtur tunc, quod non sit medicina, sed morbus; et quod quicumque infert eam, cum ponat multos in gravi periculo, quod graviter peccat.
Conclusio. Communicantes temere cum excommunicato sive non propter necessitatem, aut ignorantiam, vel excommunicati utilitatem, incidunt in excommunicationem minorem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut tactum est7, duplex est excommunicatio, scilicet minor et maior. Minor tantum separat a Sacramentis; maior vero non tantum a Sacramentis separat, sed etiam ab actibus legitimis cum aliis personis. Et ideo excommunicatio minor est morbus respiciens personam absolute; excommunicatio vero maior est morbus respiciens personam, ut est pars communitatis, et separans a communitate. Haec autem separatio, cum sit relatio aequiparantiae8, locum non haberet, nisi ubi separarentur ab eo. Ergo ad hoc, quod ista excommunicatio sit efficax, statuit ius, ut alii eum vitent. Et quia homines ut in pluribus magis timent poenam quam culpam, in firmitatem sententiae adiunxit poenam consimilem, sed minorem; unde non separat a communione fidelium, sed Sacramentorum. Et hoc totum dictat ratio recta esse convenienter factum et statutum.
Sed quoniam periculum est omnes a communicatione, utpote qui necessitate, vel ignorantia communicant, prohibere; ideo debuerunt tales personae excipi. Unde qui communicant necessitate, sicut filii et filiae, quamdiu sunt sub manu parentum, sicut uxor, sicut servi et servientes et ancillae, sicut peregrini et pauperes, quando unde sustententur non habent, in talibus ius sententiam relaxat. — Similiter, qui communicant ex utilitate, ut convertatur peccator a via sua mala9 et corrigatur; cum secundum legem caritatis ambulent, non arcentur. — Similiter, qui communicant ex ignorantia, excommunicati non sunt, pro eo quod talis ignorantia facti excusat; dicitur autem hic ignorare, quamdiu homo nescit vel per denuntiationem, vel per famam. Unde non debet sibi quis de facili conscientiam facere, quia de quolibet praesumendum est bonum, nisi probetur contrarium10. — Et hae circumstantiae hoc versu continentur:
Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse.
In quo tangitur haec triplex causa, et necessitas comprehendit tria membra11. His personis exceptis et sic communicantibus, sine aliqua harum conditionum intervenientium communicantes excommunicatis secundum regulam iuris excommunicati sunt minori excommunicatione; et hoc quidem rationabile est, ut visum est.
1. 2. 3. Ex his patent obiecta. Quod enim obiicitur de aliis peccatis et de contagione et de filio, in omnibus patet responsio: quia hoc facit institutio; et ratio institutionis dicta est et convenientia exceptionis, et quare maior transit, et minor non. Et ideo regula est, quod excommunicatio non transit in tertiam personam12. Patet etiam, quod communicans non communicat in culpa; sed quia non adhibet debitam reverentiam sententiae, hinc est, quod iustum est, quod reportet poenam.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ista est poena tantum mortaliter peccantium; dicendum, quod secundum aliquos conclusio conceditur. Dicunt enim, quod praeter casus exceptos mortaliter peccat, quia facit contra Ecclesiae mandatum et scienter videtur contemnere sententiam Ecclesiae13. — Sed quia valde durum videtur illud dicere, et maximum periculum esset, omnes communicantes excommunicari; ut declinemus periculum utrumque, sine praeiudicio hic distinguendum videtur. Dicere enim, quod tantum sit peccatum veniale, non videtur conveniens, cum communiter parvam vim faciant homines in peccatis venialibus. Dicere iterum, quod pro quolibet verbo humanitatis, quod amicus amico dicit, peccet mortaliter, durum videtur.
Et ideo dicendum, quod qui communicat scienter aut communicat in actu exteriori in contemptum sententiae latae, et tunc peccat mortaliter; aut non communicat in contemptum, sed tamen rationabiliter videre potest, quod sententia veniat in contemptum, et adhuc credendum est, eum mortaliter pec-
care; aut probabiliter credit, quod ex hoc nunquam magis sententia contemnetur, et ipse cum timore hoc facit et ex quadam affabilitate vel societate aliqua verba praeter necessitatem dicit, vel alio modo in casibus non exceptis communicat; tunc credendum est, circa tales sententiam temperari14.
Unde si quis quaerat, utrum homo debeat magis dimittere, se interfici, quam aliquod verbum dicere; dico, quod si ex hoc in contemptum veniret sententia, deberet utique. Sed quis iudicaret, istum male facere, cum ante debeat de furto comedere15 quam fame perire? — Si qui ergo dicunt, quod peccat mortaliter; intelligendum est, quando contemptus intervenit. Et quia vix potest frequentari sine contemptu, ideo sanum consilium est unicuique, ut se a talibus elonget propter vitandum periculum, sicut dicit Augustinus16, quod faciendum est de iuramento.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non privantur Sacramentis nisi mortaliter peccantes; dicendum, quod hoc factum est propter terrorem, ne forte per assuetudinem et periculum contemptus incideretur17.
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Question 5. Whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated.
Fifthly there is inquiry concerning excommunication as regards communication, and it is asked whether one who communicates with an excommunicate is [himself] excommunicated. And that he is, is shown:
1. Because the laws1 say this.
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for to approach one of two opposites is to withdraw from the other; but the excommunicate is placed outside the communion2: therefore one who communicates with him withdraws from the communion.
3. Likewise, excommunication is inflicted as a penalty of shame; but there is no shame where others communicate [with the person]: therefore, in order that that sentence be of any value, it is necessary by the law itself to keep others away3: therefore, if the ecclesiastical censure consists in excommunication, it seems that such a one is justly and duly excommunicated.
4. Likewise, either it is permitted to communicate with an excommunicate, or it is not. If yes; then such persons are not to be avoided; and this is against that text of First Corinthians, chapter five4: If any brother etc.; and afterwards: With such a one not even to take food. If it is not permitted; then by some sentence others are kept from communicating with this person, and only by a sentence of excommunication: therefore those who communicate with him incur the sentence of excommunication: therefore they are excommunicated.
On the contrary:
1. One who communicates with an unbeliever or with another sinner, whether in food or in drink, does not incur that fault unless he communicates in a like act or in the crime: therefore by like reasoning no one who participates with an excommunicate is excommunicated, unless he participates in the crime.
2. Likewise, excommunication either is a contagious disease, or it is not. If yes; then by the same reasoning by which this person, first excommunicated, infects the participant with a like fault, so also the one [infects] the other, and so on in succession: therefore if this is false and against the laws5, it is not a contagious disease: therefore it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated. If you say that institution does this, not contagion; to the contrary: that institution is from man, just as excommunication is; but no one ought to inflict a penalty except for fault: therefore if he does not communicate in the merit or in the fault, neither [does he] in the penalty: therefore that institution, which causes one to share in the penalty without fault, is unjust.
3. Likewise, a son communicating with his father either is excommunicated, or not. If yes; then he ought to avoid his father. But if he cannot avoid his father without his own detriment, then the son bears the iniquity of the father, which is against divine law6. But if he is not excommunicated, then it is permitted to someone out of familiarity to communicate with the excommunicate. But fellowship and friendship and charity are more praiseworthy: therefore it seems by like reasoning that out of social love or some such thing it is permitted to communicate with the excommunicate, and thus it does not seem that one who communicates with an excommunicate is excommunicated.
4. Likewise, every excommunication, whether greater or lesser, separates from the Sacraments; but no one is to be separated from the Sacraments except for mortal fault: therefore everyone who communicates with an excommunicate sins mortally. But if this is true; since this medicine is the occasion of many dangers, it then seems that it is not a medicine but a disease; and that whoever inflicts it, since he places many in grave danger, sins gravely.
Conclusion. Those who communicate rashly with an excommunicate — not for the sake of necessity, or ignorance, or the excommunicate's advantage — incur the lesser excommunication.
I respond: It must be said that, as has been touched on7, excommunication is twofold, namely lesser and greater. The lesser separates only from the Sacraments; the greater however separates not only from the Sacraments but also from lawful acts with other persons. And therefore the lesser excommunication is a disease regarding the person absolutely; the greater excommunication is a disease regarding the person as he is a part of the community, and separating [him] from the community. But this separation, since it is a relation of equiparance8, would have no place except where they are separated from him. Therefore, in order that this excommunication be effective, the law established that others avoid him. And because men for the most part fear penalty more than fault, for the firmness of the sentence it added a like penalty, but a lesser one; whence it does not separate from the communion of the faithful, but [from the communion] of the Sacraments. And right reason dictates that this whole thing was suitably done and established.
But since it is dangerous to forbid all from communicating, inasmuch as some communicate by necessity, or by ignorance; therefore such persons had to be excepted. Whence those who communicate by necessity — such as sons and daughters, so long as they are under the hand of their parents, such as a wife, such as menservants and serving-folk and maidservants, such as pilgrims and the poor, when they do not have wherewith to be sustained — in such cases the law relaxes the sentence. — Likewise, those who communicate out of advantage, that a sinner may be converted from his evil way9 and corrected; since they walk according to the law of charity, they are not kept away. — Likewise, those who communicate out of ignorance are not excommunicated, because such ignorance of fact excuses; and here one is said to be ignorant so long as a man does not know either by denunciation or by report. Whence no one ought lightly to make a [bad] conscience for himself, because of anyone the good is to be presumed, unless the contrary be proved10. — And these circumstances are contained in this verse:
Useful, law, humble, a thing unknown, necessity.
In which is touched this threefold cause, and necessity comprises three members11. These persons being excepted and thus communicating, those communicating with excommunicates without any of these conditions intervening are, according to the rule of law, excommunicated with the lesser excommunication; and this indeed is reasonable, as has been seen.
1. 2. 3. From these things the objections are clear. For as to what is objected concerning other sins and concerning contagion and concerning the son, in all of them the response is clear: because institution does this; and the ground of the institution has been stated, and the fittingness of the exception, and why the greater passes [to a third person] and the lesser does not. And therefore the rule is that excommunication does not pass to a third person12. It is clear also that one who communicates does not communicate in the fault; but because he does not show due reverence to the sentence, hence it is that it is just that he carry the penalty.
4. To that which is objected, that this is the penalty only of those sinning mortally; it must be said that according to some the conclusion is granted. For they say that, apart from the excepted cases, he sins mortally, because he acts against the command of the Church and seems knowingly to contemn the sentence of the Church13. — But because it seems very hard to say that, and there would be the greatest danger were all who communicate to be excommunicated; in order that we may avoid both dangers, without prejudice a distinction seems here to be made. For to say that it is only a venial sin does not seem fitting, since commonly men make little of venial sins. To say again that for every word of humanity which a friend says to a friend he should sin mortally, seems hard.
And therefore it must be said that one who knowingly communicates either communicates in an exterior act in contempt of the sentence passed, and then he sins mortally; or he does not communicate in contempt, yet can reasonably see that the sentence comes into contempt, and still it is to be believed that he sins mortally;
or he probably believes that by this the sentence will never more be contemned, and he himself does this with fear and out of a certain affability or fellowship says some words beyond necessity, or in some other way communicates in non-excepted cases; then it is to be believed that regarding such persons the sentence is tempered14.
Whence if someone should ask whether a man ought rather to allow himself to be killed than to say some word; I say that if by this the sentence would come into contempt, he certainly ought [to allow it]. But who would judge that this man does wrong, since he ought rather to eat of [what is] stolen15 than to perish of hunger? — If therefore some say that he sins mortally; it is to be understood [as holding] when contempt intervenes. And because [communication] can scarcely be frequented without contempt, therefore it is sound counsel for everyone to keep himself far from such things, for the sake of avoiding danger, as Augustine says16 must be done concerning an oath.
To that therefore which is objected, that they are not deprived of the Sacraments except those sinning mortally; it must be said that this was done for the sake of terror, lest perhaps through habituation and the danger of contempt one should fall [into it]17.
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- 1Iura siquidem determinant, communicantem cum excommunicato excommunicatione maiori non hanc communiter [nisi communicet in ipso crimine] incurrere, sed excommunicationem minorem [cfr. C. Nuper a nobis (29.) et C. Si concubinae (53.) et seq., X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.)]; cum excommunicato autem excommunicatione minori non prohibent communicationem. Vide infra solut. huius obiect. — Inferius post sicut edd. omittunt et, pro quo cod. P est.For indeed the laws determine that one who communicates with an excommunicate by the greater excommunication does not commonly incur this [unless he communicate in the very crime], but [incurs] the lesser excommunication [cf. C. Nuper a nobis (29) and C. Si concubinae (53) and following, X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39)]; but with one excommunicated by the lesser excommunication they do not forbid communication. See below in the solution of this objection. — Further on, after sicut the editions omit et, in place of which cod. P has est.
- 2In edd. additur ab excommunicati communione.In the editions there is added from the communion of the excommunicate.
- 3Ita multi codd., in aliis et edd. communicationem.Thus many codices; in others and in the editions, communication.
- 4Vers. 11: Si is qui frater nominatur, est fornicator... cum eiusmodi nec cibum sumere.Verse 11: If he who is named a brother is a fornicator... with such a one not even to take food.
- 5Vide C. Praecipue (3.), seqq. et C. Sicut Apostoli (16.), seqq. C. 11. q. 3. et C. Nuper a nobis (29.), seqq., X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.).See C. Praecipue (3) and following, and C. Sicut Apostoli (16) and following, C. 11, q. 3; and C. Nuper a nobis (29) and following, X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39).
- 6Ezech. 18, 20: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris. — Superius pro Sed si [multi codd. Et si] patrem non potest vitare edd. Sed si pater non potest vitari. Inferius post caritas in cod. K secunda manus addidit: quae fit inter extraneos, quam inter patrem et filium, quia nemo laudatur de dilectione filii, sed extranei.Ezekiel 18:20: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father. — Above, in place of Sed si [many codices Et si] he cannot avoid his father, the editions [read] But if the father cannot be avoided. Further on, after charity, in cod. K a second hand added: which arises between strangers, [more] than between father and son, because no one is praised for the love of a son, but of a stranger.
- 7Quaest. I. ad I. — Aliquanto inferius pro pars communitatis plurimi codd. pars communicans.Question 1, reply to 1. — A little further on, in place of part of the community, very many codices [read] communicating part.
- 8Relatio aequiparantiae est illa, quae in utroque extremo fundamentum eiusdem rationis habet, sive quae reperitur inter duos terminos, qui sunt eiusdem rationis et nominis v. g. similitudo vel aequalitas, qua simile vel aequale refertur simili vel aequali. Huic opponitur relatio disquiparantiae v. g. relatio patris ad filium, domini ad servum. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 537, nota 3. — Inferius voci consimilem cod. bb praemittit non et pro communione edd. et plures codd. communicatione.A relation of equiparance is one which in each extreme has a foundation of the same character, or which is found between two terms which are of the same character and name, e.g. likeness or equality, by which the like or equal is referred to the like or equal. To this is opposed a relation of disquiparance, e.g. the relation of father to son, of master to servant. Cf. tome I, page 537, note 3. — Further on, before the word like, cod. bb prefixes not, and for communion the editions and several codices [read] communication.
- 9Ion. 3, 8: Convertatur vir a via sua mala. — De his exceptionibus cfr. C. Quoniam multos (103.) et C. Sanctis quippe (110.), C. 11. q. 3; C. Inter alia (31.) et C. Cum voluntate (34.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39.). — Inferius post ignorantia cod. F addit facti (cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 7.).Jonah 3:8: Let the man be converted from his evil way. — On these exceptions cf. C. Quoniam multos (103) and C. Sanctis quippe (110), C. 11, q. 3; C. Inter alia (31) and C. Cum voluntate (34), X. on the Sentence of excommunication (book V, title 39). — Further on, after ignorance, cod. F adds of fact (cf. above page 86, note 7).
- 10Ut insinuatur C. Ex parte tua (1.), X. de Scrutinio etc. (lib. I. tit. 12.) et C. Dudum (16.), X. de Praesumt. (lib. II. tit. 23.). Per oppositionem dicitur de Regul. iuris in VI. regul. 8: Semel malus semper praesumitur esse malus.As is intimated in C. Ex parte tua (1), X. on Scrutiny etc. (book I, title 12) and C. Dudum (16), X. on Presumptions (book II, title 23). By contrast it is said in the Rules of law in [the] Sixth [book], rule 8: Once evil, [one] is always presumed to be evil.
- 11Scilicet legem (matrimonialem, ut uxor cum marito), humile (sive subiectio, ut filii cum patre) et necesse (pauperes et peregrini). — Cod. A (G a secunda manu) huic versui alium subiungit: Haec anathema quidem faciunt ne possit obesse.Namely law (matrimonial, as a wife with her husband), humble (or subjection, as sons with their father) and necessity (the poor and pilgrims). — Cod. A (G by a second hand) subjoins another [verse] to this one: These things indeed make the anathema, lest it be able to harm.
- 12Colligitur ex C. Quoniam multos (103.), C. 11. q. 3, in quo Gregor. VII. decernit, etiam illos non incurrere excommunicationem, «qui communicant cum eis, qui excommunicatis communicant». — Inferius post non adhibet [cod. H exhibet] cod. R addit finem debitum et.It is gathered from C. Quoniam multos (103), C. 11, q. 3, in which Gregory VII decrees that even those do not incur excommunication «who communicate with those who communicate with the excommunicated». — Further on, after does not show [cod. H exhibits], cod. R adds the due end and.
- 13Allegatur pro hac sententia C. Sacris est canonibus (8.), X. de His quae vi etc. (lib. I. tit. 40.), ubi Innocent. III. ait: Licet metus attenuet culpam, quia tamen non eam prorsus excludit, cum pro nullo metu debeat quis mortale peccatum incurrere, excommunicationis labe credimus inquinari.For this opinion is alleged C. Sacris est canonibus (8), X. on Things [done] by force etc. (book I, title 40), where Innocent III says: Although fear lessens fault, yet because it does not entirely exclude it — since for no fear ought anyone to incur a mortal sin — we believe [him] to be stained with the blemish of excommunication.
- 14Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. in periculum contemptus incideret. Vide tamen Forcellini Lexicon sub verbo incido, quod incido etiam cum solo accusativo construitur. Hinc formam passivi, quam habent fere omnes codd., retinendam esse censuimus; praecedens particula et idem est ac etiam. — Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.The Vatican [edition], with one and another codex, [reads] would fall into the danger of contempt. See, however, Forcellini's Lexicon under the word incido, [where it appears] that incido is also construed with the accusative alone. Hence we judged that the passive form, which almost all the codices have, should be retained; the preceding particle et is the same as etiam [also]. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article.
- 15In cod. V secunda manus addidit quilibet. Cfr. supra pag. 333, nota 3.In cod. V a second hand added anyone. Cf. above page 333, note 3.
- 16Ut dicitur C. Cum cessante (60.), X. de Appellat. (lib. II.). Vide supra pag. 73, nota 2.As is said in C. Cum cessante (60), X. on Appeals (book II). See above page 73, note 2.
- 17Matth. 16, 19. — Vide infra dub. 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro ferre plurimi codd. inferre.Matthew 16:19. — See below, dubium 2. — A little further on, in place of to bear, very many codices [read] to inflict. ---