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Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2

Contents
  1. Article I. On the measure of the angelic nature in itself.
  2. Question I. Whether spiritual things have their own proper measure.
  3. Conclusio
Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 55

Articulus I. De mensura angelicae naturae in se.

Quaestio I. Utrum spiritualia habeant propriam mensuram.

Circa primum sic proceditur. Quod habeant propriam mensuram, primo videtur:

1. Per Philosophum in libro de Causis, in penultima propositione: «Inter rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in aeternitate, et rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in tempore, est res media, cuius substantia est in aeternitate et actio in tempore»; sed hoc non potest intelligi de aeternitate increata: ergo de creata; et hanc distinguit a tempore et ponit1 mensuram substantiarum spiritualium et incorruptibilium: ergo videtur etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici primo2: Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est, usque ibi, ante aevum: ergo si ante aevum dicit quid increatum, aevum dicit quid creatum; non substantiam: ergo mensuram; non rerum materialium, sed spiritualium; et haec differt a tempore, unde Boethius de Consolatione3:

Qui tempus ab aevo Ire iubes:

ergo etc. Omne enim quod exit ab alio, differt ab eo.

3. Item, Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus in capitulo de aevo4: «Proprietas aevi est antiquum, inveteratum, secundum totum esse mensurans, temporis vero in alteratione aliter et aliter se habens»: ergo si idem non se habet sic et aliter simul et semel, non est eadem mensura tempus et aevum. Sed aevum est mensura durantium perpetuo, et talis est natura angelica: ergo.

4. Item, sicut se habet unitas ad distinctionem, ita nunc ad durationem; sed in spiritualibus non solum est reperire distinctionem secundum substantiam, verum etiam5 eius mensuram: ergo pari ratione et esse Angeli mensuram durationis habet; sed non tempus, cum non varietur nec mutetur: ergo aliam mensuram propriam.

5. Item, omne quod habet esse limitatum actu, habet mensuram6, per quam potest cognosci eius limitatio; sed tale est esse omnis creati: ergo etc.; arguatur ut prius.

6. Item, mensura durationis respicit modum durandi; sed spiritualia habent modum suae durationis differentem a corporalibus, maxime a mutabilibus, cum durent perpetualiter et immutabiliter: ergo per istam mensuram habent mensurari.

Contra:

1. Augustinus ad Orosium7: «Deus movet spiritualem naturam per tempora, corporalem vero per loca et tempora»: ergo spiritualis naturae mensura est tempus.

2. Item, Beda8: «Quatuor fuerunt primo creata: angelica natura, materia prima, caelum empyreum et tempus». Si ergo tempus stat pro mensura, ergo aut spiritualia in principio non habuerunt mensuram, aut non habuerunt aliam a corporalibus, aut Beda fuit insufficiens in illa enumeratione.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Unus est locus, qui est continentia visibilium et invisibilium, ut empyreum: ergo si mensura, quae est tempus, non est minoris9 appropriationis quam locus, ergo videtur quod unum sit tempus, in quo sint spiritualia et corporalia: non ergo habent mensuram propriam.

4. Item, sicut10 idem est numerus, quo mensurantur decem canes et decem homines, sic idem est numerus, quo numerantur decem Angeli et decem homines: si ergo spiritualia non habent aliam mensuram distinctionis quam corporalia, ergo nec aliam mensuram durationis.

5. Item, homo beatus et Angelus mensurantur eadem mensura, quia omnes beati; sed homo beatus habet idem esse cum se non beato, ergo et eandem mensuram: ergo eadem mensura mensuratur homo viator, qua Angelus, ergo et quaelibet natura corporalis: non ergo habet mensuram propriam.

p. 566. Item, per impossibile: si habet mensuram, aut est substantia, aut est accidens; non substantia: ergo accidens. Si accidens, in quo genere? Non nisi in genere quantitatis; non discretae: ergo continuae. Sed non est linea neque superficies, nec corpus nec locus: ergo vel est tempus, vel nihil11: aut ergo angelica natura nullam habet mensuram, aut si habet, non habet propriam.

Conclusio

Creaturae spirituales secundum earum esse immutabile habent propriam mensuram, diversam a tempore, quae dicitur aeviternitas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum angelica natura habeat mensuram propriam, diversam a tempore, distinguendum est, quia aut loquimur de mensura spiritualium secundum esse, quod non mutatur, aut secundum affectiones. Si ergo de mensura loquimur, quae respicit esse, quae dicitur aevum, hoc modo consuevit ab antiquis doctoribus responderi: aut loqueris de diversitate in genere mensurae, aut in genere entis. Si in genere mensurae, sic oportet ponere differentiam, sicut ostendunt auctoritates et rationes ad primam partem12 inductae. Si vero loqueris de diversitate in genere entis, sic triplex fuit opinio.

Nam quidam dixerunt, quod sicut locus et superficies idem sunt per essentiam, differentia secundum comparationem, sic idem est nunc aevi et temporis, sola comparatione differens. Nunc enim respicit substantiam rei13; substantia autem primi mobilis quantum ad esse omnino est immobilis: comparata autem ad situm, est mobilis. Et primo modo mensuratur nunc aevi, secundo modo nunc temporis, ita quod idem est nunc, diversimode comparatum, sicut idem ultimum, comparatum ad corpus ambiens, est superficies, comparatum ad corpus ambitum, est locus14. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia circa ultimum corporis illae duae comparationes non sunt incompossibiles; sed nunc temporis et aevi habent proprietates incompossibiles circa idem. Nam, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum15, hoc, scilicet nunc aevi, est stabile, illud, scilicet nunc temporis, est fluxibile; sed impossibile est, quod unum et idem et secundum idem simul moveatur et stet.

Et ideo est secunda positio, quod ipsum nunc sequitur essentiam materiae primae. Sicut igitur materia in omnibus est eadem per essentiam, differens per esse16; sic nunc temporis et aevi idem est per essentiam, non sicut individuum, sed ad modum materiae idem per essentiam17, differens autem solum quantum ad esse. Et hi posuerunt, quod omnis rei quidditas mensura eadem per essentiam mensuratur. — Sed nec illud multum est intelligibile. Cum enim aevum esse stabile et quietum respiciat, quod quidem habet materia a forma perfecta, et haec mensura non respiciat nisi esse actuale et modum essendi completum; videtur, quod aevum non possit sic accipi ex parte materiae, quidquid sit de tempore. Cum ergo modus durandi essentialiter et formaliter differat hinc inde, patet etiam, quod mensura propria.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod spiritualia habent mensuram diversam a tempore, non solum in genere mensurae, verum etiam in genere entis; et hoc non solum comparatione, sed etiam secundum substantiam et formam. Quidquid autem sit de diversitate in genere entis, diversitatem tamen secundum modum mensurandi nemo est qui negare possit. Et hoc sufficit quaestioni praesenti, qua quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram diversam a corporalibus. Dicendum enim, quod sic.

Quod si quaeras, quae sit illa; respondendum secundum Sanctos et philosophos18, quod dicitur aeternitas creata aut aevum; sed quoniam aeternitas proprie accipitur pro increato, et aevum frequenter accipitur pro tempore, ideo proprio nomine potest aeviternitas appellari. Sic respondendum est, si quaeratur de mensura, quae respicit ipsum esse spiritualis creaturae, esse, inquam, immutabile et perpetuum.

p. 57— Si autem quaeratur de mensura angelicarum affectionum, utrum illa sit a tempore diversa; hoc habebit quaestionem infra19. Nunc autem planum est, quod illa mensura, quae dicitur aeviternitas, variationem affectionum non mensurat, ut dicit Augustinus ad Orosium20. Aevum enim solius esse incommutabilis est mensura.

Concedendum igitur, sicut ostendunt rationes, quod aliquo modo spiritualia habent mensuram propriam respectu temporis et temporalium.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod spiritualis natura movetur per tempora; iam patet responsio: hoc enim dicit quantum ad affectiones, non quantum ad esse.

2. Quod obiicitur de quatuor primo creatis, dicendum, quod nomen temporis extenditur ibi ad omnis durationis mensuram, cuius est ponere principium; unde valde large accipitur et comprehendit aevum, ut melius infra patebit21.

3. Quod obiicitur de loco, non valet, quia locus corporalis non est mensura spiritualium, quamvis contineat22; aevum autem mensurat et conformatur; ideo non valet: est unus locus non mensurans, ergo unum tempus mensurans. — Si quaeras a me, unde hoc; dicendum, quod Angelus vere habet durationem, sed non habet extensionem; et ideo habet mensuram durationis, non extensionis.

4. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia idem est modus distinctionis in spiritualibus et corporalibus; sed non est idem modus durationis. Ideo eadem est secundum speciem mensura distinctionis, non sic eadem mensura durationis.

5. Quod obiicitur de homine beato et Angelo, dicendum, quod mensura consimili mensurantur, scilicet aevo, quia consimilem habent modum durandi; sed homo viator non mensuratur consimili mensura, quia, quamvis habeat idem esse, habet tamen modum essendi et durandi alium; et mensura non tantum esse, sed etiam modum durandi respicit.

6. Quod quaeritur: in quo genere sit mensura angelicae durationis; aliqui dicunt, quod non est quantitas nisi quantitas virtutis, et ideo non est in genere quantitatis proprie23. — Sed si vere mensura est, quomodo non est quantitas vera?

Ideo dicunt alii, quod est in genere quantitatis sicut principium. — Si tamen quaeratur, cuius sit principium, cum dicat mensuram diversam a tempore, ut ostensum est; difficile erit assignare24.

Et ideo sanius potest dici, quod sicut tempus ponitur in substantiis spiritualibus quantum ad affectiones, secundum Augustinum, licet consideratio Philosophi ad illud non conscenderit; sic et25 mensura ponitur differens specie ab aliis quantitatibus, licet de illa non loquatur Philosophus, quia mensuras rerum inferiorum determinare intendebat. Nec ponitur ex hoc in ipso insufficientia; et si etiam poneretur, non esset propter hoc a veritatis tramite aliquatenus discedendum26.

Article I. On the measure of the angelic nature in itself.

Question I. Whether spiritual things have their own proper measure.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus. That they have their own proper measure seems true, first:

1. Through the Philosopher in the book de Causis, in the next-to-last proposition: «Between a thing whose substance and operation is in eternity, and a thing whose substance and operation is in time, there is a middle thing, whose substance is in eternity and whose action is in time»; but this cannot be understood of uncreated eternity: therefore of created [eternity]; and he distinguishes this from time and posits1 it as the measure of spiritual and incorruptible substances: therefore it seems so, etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter one2: All wisdom is from the Lord God, up to the place, before the ages: therefore if before the ages signifies something uncreated, the age (aevum) signifies something created; not a substance: therefore a measure; not of material things, but of spiritual ones; and this differs from time, whence Boethius, On Consolation3:

You who bid time go forth from the age:

therefore, etc. For everything that goes forth from another differs from it.

3. Likewise, Dionysius, On the Divine Names, in the chapter on the age4: «It is the property of the age to be ancient, of old standing, measuring according to its whole being, but [the property] of time to hold itself otherwise and otherwise in alteration»: therefore if the same thing does not hold itself thus and otherwise at once and at the same moment, time and the age are not the same measure. But the age is the measure of things enduring perpetually, and such is the angelic nature: therefore [it has its own measure].

4. Likewise, as unity stands to distinction, so now stands to duration; but in spiritual things one finds not only distinction according to substance, but also5 its measure: therefore by parity of reasoning the being of an Angel also has a measure of duration; but not time, since it is not varied nor changed: therefore [it has] another, proper measure.

5. Likewise, everything that has a being limited in act has a measure6, by which its limitation can be known; but such is the being of everything created: therefore, etc.; let it be argued as before.

6. Likewise, the measure of duration regards the mode of enduring; but spiritual things have a mode of their duration differing from corporeal things, especially from changeable ones, since they endure perpetually and immutably: therefore they must be measured by that measure.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine to Orosius7: «God moves the spiritual nature through times, but the corporeal nature through places and times»: therefore the measure of the spiritual nature is time.

2. Likewise, Bede8: «Four things were created first: the angelic nature, prime matter, the empyrean heaven, and time». If, then, time stands for the measure, then either spiritual things in the beginning had no measure, or they had none other than corporeal things, or Bede was deficient in that enumeration.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason. There is one place that is the container of visible and invisible things, namely the empyrean: therefore if the measure, which is time, is not of less9 appropriation than place, then it seems that there is one time in which spiritual and corporeal things exist: therefore they do not have their own proper measure.

4. Likewise, just as10 it is the same number by which ten dogs and ten men are measured, so it is the same number by which ten Angels and ten men are numbered: if, then, spiritual things do not have a measure of distinction other than corporeal things, then neither another measure of duration.

5. Likewise, a beatified man and an Angel are measured by the same measure, since all the blessed [are]; but a beatified man has the same being as himself not beatified, therefore also the same measure: therefore a wayfaring man is measured by the same measure as an Angel, therefore also any corporeal nature: therefore it does not have its own proper measure.

p. 566. Likewise, by way of the impossible: if it has a measure, it is either a substance or an accident; not a substance: therefore an accident. If an accident, in what genus? In none but the genus of quantity; not discrete: therefore continuous. But it is not a line nor a surface, nor a body nor place: therefore it is either time, or nothing11: therefore either the angelic nature has no measure, or, if it has one, it does not have its own proper one.

Conclusio

Spiritual creatures, according to their immutable being, have their own proper measure, distinct from time, which is called aeviternity.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether the angelic nature has its own proper measure, distinct from time, a distinction must be made, because either we are speaking of the measure of spiritual things according to being, which is not changed, or according to affections. If, then, we are speaking of the measure that regards being, which is called the age, in this mode it has been customary among the ancient doctors to reply: either you are speaking of diversity in the genus of measure, or in the genus of being. If in the genus of measure, then a difference must be posited, as the authorities and reasons adduced for the first part12 show. But if you are speaking of diversity in the genus of being, then there was a threefold opinion.

For some have said that, just as place and surface are the same by essence, differing according to comparison, so the now of the age and of time are the same, differing by comparison alone. For the now regards the substance of the thing13; but the substance of the first movable, as to being, is wholly immobile: yet compared to position, it is mobile. And in the first mode the now of the age is measured, in the second mode the now of time, so that the now is the same, compared in diverse ways, just as the same outermost [surface], compared to the containing body, is a surface, [and] compared to the contained body, is place14. — But that cannot stand, because around the outermost [point] of a body those two comparisons are not incompossible; whereas the now of time and of the age have incompossible properties about the same thing. For, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions15, the one, namely the now of the age, is stable, the other, namely the now of time, is flowing; but it is impossible that one and the same thing, and in the same respect, should at once be moved and stand still.

And therefore there is a second position, that the now itself follows the essence of prime matter. As, therefore, matter is the same in all things by essence, differing by being16; so the now of time and of the age is the same by essence, not as an individual, but after the manner of matter the same by essence17, differing however only as to being. And these have held that the quiddity of every thing is measured by a measure the same by essence. — But neither is that very intelligible. For since the age regards stable and quiet being, which indeed matter has from a perfected form, and this measure regards only actual being and the completed mode of being; it seems that the age cannot be taken thus from the side of matter, whatever may be the case concerning time. Since, then, the mode of enduring differs essentially and formally on both sides, it is also clear that [there is] a proper measure.

And therefore there is a third position, that spiritual things have a measure distinct from time, not only in the genus of measure, but also in the genus of being; and this not only by comparison, but also according to substance and form. But whatever may be the case concerning diversity in the genus of being, the diversity according to the mode of measuring there is no one who can deny. And this suffices for the present question, in which it is asked whether spiritual things have a measure distinct from corporeal things. For it must be said that they do.

But if you ask what that [measure] is; it must be answered, according to the Saints and the philosophers18, that it is called created eternity or the age; but since eternity is properly taken for the uncreated, and the age is frequently taken for time, therefore by its proper name it can be called aeviternity. Thus it must be answered, if it is asked about the measure that regards the very being of a spiritual creature — being, I say, immutable and perpetual.

p. 57— But if it is asked about the measure of angelic affections, whether that is distinct from time; this will have its question below19. Now, however, it is plain that the measure called aeviternity does not measure the variation of affections, as Augustine says to Orosius20. For the age is the measure of immutable being alone.

It must therefore be conceded, as the reasons show, that in some way spiritual things have their own proper measure with respect to time and temporal things.

1. As to what is objected, then, that the spiritual nature is moved through times; the response is already clear: for this is said as to affections, not as to being.

2. As to what is objected about the four things created first, it must be said that the name time is there extended to the measure of every duration that has a beginning; whence it is taken very broadly and includes the age, as will better appear below21.

3. As to what is objected about place, it does not hold, because corporeal place is not the measure of spiritual things, although it contains them22; but the age measures and conforms; therefore it does not hold: there is one place that does not measure, therefore one time that measures. — If you ask me whence this; it must be said that an Angel truly has duration, but does not have extension; and therefore it has a measure of duration, not of extension.

4. As to what is objected about number, it must be said that it is not similar, because the mode of distinction is the same in spiritual and corporeal things; but the mode of duration is not the same. Therefore the measure of distinction is the same according to species, [but] the measure of duration is not the same in that way.

5. As to what is objected about a beatified man and an Angel, it must be said that they are measured by a like measure, namely the age, because they have a like mode of enduring; but a wayfaring man is not measured by a like measure, because, although he has the same being, he yet has another mode of being and of enduring; and the measure regards not only being, but also the mode of enduring.

6. As to what is asked, in what genus the measure of angelic duration is; some say that it is not a quantity except a quantity of power, and therefore it is not properly in the genus of quantity23. — But if it is truly a measure, how is it not a true quantity?

Therefore others say that it is in the genus of quantity as a principle. — Yet if it is asked of what it is the principle, since it states a measure distinct from time, as has been shown, it will be difficult to assign24.

And therefore it can more soundly be said that, just as time is posited in spiritual substances as to affections, according to Augustine, although the consideration of the Philosopher did not ascend to that; so too25 a measure is posited differing in species from the other quantities, although the Philosopher does not speak of it, because he intended to determine the measures of lower things. Nor on this account is there posited any insufficiency in him; and even if it were posited, one would not on this account have to depart in any way from the path of truth26.

Scholion

I. De multis mensurae speciebus copiose tractat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Mensura, de qua hic agitur, refertur ad existentiam actualem. Differt autem valde existentia in creatis rebus corruptibilibus, in incorruptibilibus et in Deo. Hinc est etiam triplex existentiae duratio, quae importat permanentiam existentiae, et triplex durationis mensura, scil. tempus, aevum, aeternitas. — Patet autem, quod etiam rerum corruptibilium motibus continuo fluentibus substat aliquod esse permanens, licet variabile et transmutabile tum secundum existentiam, tum secundum operationem. Harum propria mensura est tempus, quod secundum Aristotelem definitur: numerus motus secundum prius et posterius (cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 1). — In Deo vero essentia, existentia, operatio idem sunt et invariabile; unde divinae existentiae mensura est aeternitas, carens initio, fine, mutabilitate, unde cum Boethio apte definitur: interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio (cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.). — Aevum denique, quasi medium tenens inter tempus et aeternitatem, mensurat durationem entis creati, quod quidem naturaliter quoad esse habet incorruptibilitatem, initium tamen, et quoad operationes et affectiones variationem. — Doctores, exceptis paucis Nominalibus, recte tenent, tum aevum realiter differre a tempore, tum rationi aevi et temporis respondere aliquid reale, sive, ut dicit S. Bonav. (hic q. 2. in corp.), est «dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae», licet actualis numeratio sit a parte animae. Hinc a Stephano Parisiensi Episc. a 1276 condemnata est thesis, «quod aevum et tempus nihil sunt in re, sed solum in apprehensione». (Collect. iudic. t. I. pag. 197 Cap. XI. Errores de mundo etc. n. 19.).

p. 58II. Pro faciliore intelligentia plurium locorum in hac et seqq. quaest., ex Richardo a Med. (loc. cit.) notamus, quod in existentia rerum corruptibilium est triplex mensura: «una intrinseca existens in ipso [scil. in esse variabili] sicut in subiecto. Haec est propria continuatio illius, quae extenso nomine temporis tempus posset vocari [apud recentiores tempus intrinsecum], quamvis improprie, quia sic possent dici multa tempora, eo quod numerantur secundum numerationem motuum. — Alia extrinseca et in genere; et illa est tempus proprie dictum, quod idem est quod continuatio durationis motus, ab anima numerata, qua, mediante motu, cuius est passio, mensurat anima durationes motuum aliorum [tempus extrinsecum]. Et haec est in motu primi mobilis manifeste nobis noti, sicut in subiecto. Ad alios autem motus non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde illius solius motus, in quo est sicut in subiecto, est mensura intrinseca; aliorum autem motuum est mensura extrinseca. — Praedicto etiam esse debetur mensura extrinseca et extra genus, et illa Deus est sub ratione, qua est in se habens superexcellenter quidquid est perfectionis in durationibus omnium motionum». — Simili modo Richardus in esse uniformiter se habente et stabili sive aeviterno triplicem distinguit mensuram: «una intrinseca, scil. propria duratio cuiuslibet aeviterni, existens in suo esse sicut in subiecto, quae extenso nomine aevi posset vocari aevum, quamvis non proprie; et sic tot sunt aeva, quot aeviterna. Alia est extrinseca et in genere; et illa est duratio nobilissimi aeviterni, existens in esse illius sicut in subiecto, ad esse autem aliorum aeviternorum non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum [in hoc non consentit S. Bonav., hic q. 2.], quamvis non ita plene habeat rationem mensurae, sicut tempus respectu temporalium... Tertia est extrinseca et extra genus; et illa est ipse Deus, sub ratione qua aeternitas». Ex his facile intelligitur, quid Seraphico sit «diversitas in genere entis et in genere mensurandi» (hic in corp.).

III. In solutione huius quaestionis doctores communiter conveniunt; sed in determinandis seqq. et aliis quaestionibus de aevo diversae fuerunt opiniones. Ad rem Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.): «Multa, quae de ea materia dicuntur, certitudine carent et opinative promuntur magis quam assertive». — Alii auctores plerumque hanc praecise quaestionem non explicite tractant, excepto Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.); plures de eadem re loquuntur in duabus seqq. qq., vel in quaest. de differentia aeternitatis, aevi et temporis, ut Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 4. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. dub. lat. 6. 7. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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Scholion

I. Of the many species of measure Richard of Middleton treats copiously (here a. 2, q. 1). The measure here treated of is referred to actual existence. Now existence differs greatly in created corruptible things, in incorruptible things, and in God. Hence there is also a threefold duration of existence, which implies the permanence of existence, and a threefold measure of duration, namely time, the age, eternity. — Now it is plain that even under the continuously flowing motions of corruptible things there underlies some permanent being, though variable and transmutable both according to existence and according to operation. The proper measure of these is time, which according to Aristotle is defined: the number of motion according to before and after (cf. above p. 20, note 1). — But in God essence, existence, operation are the same and invariable; whence the measure of the divine existence is eternity, lacking beginning, end, mutability, whence with Boethius it is aptly defined: the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life (cf. I Sent., d. 9, q. 3). — The age, finally, as holding a kind of middle between time and eternity, measures the duration of created being, which indeed naturally has incorruptibility as to being, yet a beginning, and as to operations and affections variation. — The doctors, except a few Nominalists, rightly hold both that the age really differs from time, and that to the formal account of the age and of time there corresponds something real, or, as St. Bonaventure says (here q. 2, in the body), it is «a disposition of the thing outside, not a fiction of the soul», although the actual numbering is on the part of the soul. Hence by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in the year 1276, the thesis was condemned, «that the age and time are nothing in reality, but only in apprehension». (Collect. iudic., t. I, p. 197, Cap. XI, Errors concerning the world etc., n. 19.).

p. 58II. For the easier understanding of several passages in this and the following questions, we note from Richard of Middleton (loc. cit.) that in the existence of corruptible things there is a threefold measure: «one intrinsic, existing in the thing itself [namely, in variable being] as in a subject. This is the proper continuation of that thing, which by an extended use of the name of time could be called time [among more recent [writers], intrinsic time], though improperly, because in this way many times could be spoken of, in that they are numbered according to the numbering of motions. — Another extrinsic and in a genus; and this is time properly so called, which is the same as the continuation of the duration of motion, numbered by the soul, by which, through the mediation of motion, of which it is a property, the soul measures the durations of other motions [extrinsic time]. And this is in the motion of the first movable, manifestly known to us, as in a subject. But to other motions it is not compared as an accident to a subject, but as a measure to the measured. Whence of that motion alone, in which it is as in a subject, it is the intrinsic measure; but of other motions it is the extrinsic measure. — To the aforesaid being also there is owed an extrinsic and extra-generic measure, and that is God, under the account by which He is in Himself possessing super-excellently whatever there is of perfection in the durations of all motions». — In a like manner Richard, in being uniformly disposed and stable, that is, in the aeviternal, distinguishes a threefold measure: «one intrinsic, namely the proper duration of each aeviternal thing, existing in its own being as in a subject, which by an extended use of the name of the age could be called the age, though not properly; and thus there are as many ages as there are aeviternal things. Another is extrinsic and in a genus; and this is the duration of the noblest aeviternal thing, existing in its being as in a subject, but to the being of other aeviternal things it is not compared as an accident to a subject, but as a measure to the measured [in this St. Bonaventure does not agree, here q. 2], though it does not so fully have the account of a measure as time [has] with respect to temporal things... The third is extrinsic and extra-generic; and this is God Himself, under the account by which [He is] eternity». From these things it is easily understood what for the Seraphic [Doctor] is «the diversity in the genus of being and in the genus of measuring» (here in the body).

III. In the solution of this question the doctors commonly agree; but in determining the following and other questions about the age the opinions were diverse. To the point, Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2): «Many things that are said about that matter lack certitude and are put forward by way of opinion rather than assertively». — Other authors for the most part do not explicitly treat this question precisely, except Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1); several speak of the same matter in the two following questions, or in the question on the difference of eternity, the age, and time, as Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 10, a. 4, 5. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, dub. lat. 6, 7. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 9, q. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 interserunt esse.
    Some codices, with ed. 1, insert esse.
  2. 2
    Vers. 1: Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum illo fuit semper et est ante aevum. — In sequente propositione ex cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus verba si ante aevum dicit quid increatum, quibus additis argumentatio redditur planior et magis congruit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. arg. 1.
    Verse 1: All wisdom is from the Lord God and was always with Him and is before the ages. — In the following proposition, from codex cc and ed. 1 we have supplied the words if "before the ages" signifies something uncreated, with which added the argument is rendered plainer and agrees better with Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, arg. 1.
  3. 3
    Libr. III. Metro 9. — Paulo inferius codd. P Q exit ab aliquo pro exit ab alio.
    Book III, metre 9. — A little below, codices P Q [read] goes forth from something for goes forth from another.
  4. 4
    Cap. 10. § 3.
    Chapter 10, § 3.
  5. 5
    Plures codd. ut F L U cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt secundum. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 105. (c. 11.).
    Several codices, as F L U cc and ed. 1, add according to. — On the major, cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 105 (c. 11).
  6. 6
    Cod. aa limitatam habet mensuram; in cod. F autem hic additur propriam.
    Codex aa [reads] has a limited measure; but in codex F there is here added proper.
  7. 7
    Quaest. 63 ad Oros. q. 40: Movet itaque se ipsum sine tempore et loco, movet creatum spiritum sine loco temporaliter, movet creaturam corpoream temporaliter et localiter. Cfr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 39.
    Question 63 to Orosius, q. 40: He therefore moves Himself without time and place, He moves the created spirit without place, temporally, He moves the corporeal creature temporally and locally. Cf. On Genesis to the Letter VIII, c. 20, n. 39.
  8. 8
    Exposit. in c. 1. Gen., ubi etiam a Lyrano allegatur.
    Exposition on Genesis ch. 1, where it is also cited by [Nicholas of] Lyra.
  9. 9
    Vat. maioris. In multis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur particula non.
    The Vatican edition [reads] of greater. In many manuscripts and ed. 1 the particle not is omitted.
  10. 10
    Cod. O sicut vult Philosophus, qui IV. Phys. text. 134. (c. 14.) ait: Dicitur autem recte, quod numerus quidem est idem ovium [versio Arabico-latina hominum] et canum, si aequalis uterque sit; denarius autem non idem, neque decem eadem. Cfr. ibid. text. 132. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post mensurantur adiungit et numerantur.
    Codex O [reads] just as the Philosopher holds, who in Physics IV, text 134 (c. 14) says: But it is rightly said that the number is indeed the same of sheep [the Arabic-Latin version: of men] and of dogs, if each is equal; but ten is not the same, nor are ten [units] the same. Cf. ibid., text 132. — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, after are measured adds and are numbered.
  11. 11
    Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate, ubi hae species enumerantur.
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quantity, where these species are enumerated.
  12. 12
    Verba ad primam partem supplevimus fide cod. cc et ed. 1.
    The words for the first part we have supplied on the faith of codex cc and ed. 1.
  13. 13
    Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104. (c. 11.): «Nunc sequitur id quod fertur, ut tempus motum». Quae verba S. Thomas in Commentario super hunc locum (lect. 18.) ita exponit: «Sicut tempus ad motum (se habet), ita et nunc ad mobile... Ex hac autem consideratione de facili potest accipi intellectus aeternitatis. Ipsum enim nunc, in quantum respondet mobili se habenti aliter et aliter, discernit prius et posterius in tempore et suo fluxu tempus facit, sicut punctus lineam. Sublata igitur alia et alia dispositione a mobili, remanet substantia semper eodem modo se habens; unde intelligitur nunc ut semper stans, et non ut fluens nec habens prius et posterius». Secundum Fr. Gulielmum de Marra, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. propositio de substantia primi mobilis, quae modo sequitur, est Averrois (VIII. Metaph. text. 12. et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 95.), qui etiam IV. Phys. text. 104. ait: Instans quodammodo est quasi idem et nunquam transmutabile, et quodammodo est transmutabile et multiplicabile, et causa in hoc est, quia translatum est tale. — Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 Nunc aevi pro Nunc enim.
    Aristotle, Physics IV, text 104 (c. 11): «The now follows that which is carried along, as time [follows] motion». Which words St. Thomas, in his Commentary on this passage (lect. 18), expounds thus: «As time (is disposed) to motion, so too the now to the movable... And from this consideration the understanding of eternity can easily be grasped. For the now itself, insofar as it answers to the movable disposed otherwise and otherwise, discerns before and after in time and by its flux makes time, as a point [makes] a line. When, therefore, the one and the other disposition is removed from the movable, the substance remains, ever disposed in the same way; whence the now is understood as ever standing, and not as flowing nor as having before and after». According to Friar William of Marra, II Sent., d. 2, q. 1, the proposition concerning the substance of the first movable, which now follows, is Averroes' (Metaphysics VIII, text 12, and On the Heavens and the World I, text 95), who also in Physics IV, text 104 says: The instant is in a way as it were the same and never transmutable, and in a way it is transmutable and multipliable, and the cause of this is that what is transferred is such. — The Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] the now of the age for for the now.
  14. 14
    Qui ideo ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.) definitur: terminus corporis continentis.
    Which therefore by Aristotle, Physics IV, text 39 ff. (c. 4), is defined: the limit of the containing body.
  15. 15
    Quaest. 72: An tempora aeterna aevum significavit, inter quod et tempus, hoc distat, quod illud stabile est, tempus autem mutabile?
    Question 72: Whether "eternal times" signified the age, between which and time this is the difference, that the former is stable, but time mutable?
  16. 16
    Cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.
    Cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3.
  17. 17
    Solummodo Vat. omittit idem per essentiam.
    Only the Vatican edition omits the same by essence.
  18. 18
    Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 100. (c. 9.), ubi caelo et rebus caelestibus attribuit hoc nomen αἰών, quod diversimode vertitur: aeternitas, sempiternitas, saeculum, aevum. — Paulo superius Vat. a tempore pro a corporalibus.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens and the World I, text 100 (c. 9), where he attributes to the heaven and to celestial things this name αἰών, which is variously rendered: eternity, sempiternity, saeculum, the age. — A little above, the Vatican edition [reads] from time for from corporeal things.
  19. 19
    Art. 2. q. 1. et 2.
    Article 2, q. 1 and 2.
  20. 20
    Quaest. 40. et 41, ubi affectionibus Angelorum assignat tempus tanquam mensuram earum. Cfr. supra argum. 1. ad opp. et eius solutio, una cum verbis Augustini, 83 Qq. q. 72, hic in corp. citatis.
    Questions 40 and 41, where he assigns time to the affections of the Angels as their measure. Cf. above, argument 1 to the contrary and its solution, together with the words of Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 72, cited here in the body.
  21. 21
    Art. 2. q. 3.
    Article 2, q. 3.
  22. 22
    Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 115. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi ostendit, in tempore esse idem esse ac tempore mensurari, non autem idem esse cum tempore esse, sicut nec idem est in loco esse et cum loco esse, adeoque sempiterna, licet sint cum tempore, non esse in tempore. — Mox aliqui codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 in sensu obiectionis mensurans pro non mensurans, quod explicat Vat. ponendo continens. Paulo superius post quamvis contineat supplet cod. N spiritualia.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 115 ff. (c. 12), where he shows that to be in time is the same as to be measured by time, but not the same as to be with time, just as neither is to be in a place the same as to be with a place, and so sempiternal things, although they are with time, are not in time. — Soon after, some codices with editions 2, 3, 4 [read], in the sense of the objection, measuring for not measuring, which the Vatican edition explains by putting containing. A little above, after although it contains, codex N supplies spiritual things.
  23. 23
    Huius sententiae videtur fuisse Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. ad 3. Cfr. infra q. 3. fund. 4. et in corp. — De quantitate virtutis I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1, d. 19. p. I. q. 2; infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 3.
    Of this opinion Alexander of Hales seems to have been, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, ad 3. Cf. below, q. 3, fund. 4, and in the body. — On the quantity of power, I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, d. 19, p. I, q. 2; below, d. 15, a. 1, q. 3.
  24. 24
    Cod. aa rationem assignare. — Cfr. q. 3. fundam. 4.
    Codex aa [reads] to assign the account. — Cf. q. 3, fundamentum 4.
  25. 25
    Subaudi: quantum ad esse substantiarum spiritualium. Hinc cod. O mox perperam indifferens pro differens.
    Understand: as to the being of spiritual substances. Hence codex O soon after wrongly [reads] indifferent for differing.
  26. 26
    Guliel. de Mara (Marra) hic q. 1, ad eandem obiectionem respondet: Dicendum, quod Philosophus non enumerat omnes species quantitatis in libro Praedicamentorum, sed tantum famosas, sicut ait Commentator (Averroes), V. Metaph. cap. de Quantitate (text. 18.), ubi ponit Philosophus, motum esse speciem quantitatis.
    William of Mara (Marra) here, q. 1, to the same objection replies: It must be said that the Philosopher does not enumerate all the species of quantity in the book of the Categories, but only the famous ones, as the Commentator (Averroes) says, Metaphysics V, the chapter on Quantity (text 18), where the Philosopher posits motion to be a species of quantity.
Cite this

St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in II librum Sententiarum, Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1885), tom. II, pp. 55–58.

English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/2/d2/p1-a1-q1. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.

Authorities cited here

Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica (Summa Halensis) (2) · Aristotle, Categoriae (Praedicamenta) (2), De caelo, Physica (5) · Augustine of Hippo, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII (2), De Genesi ad litteram, Dialogus quaestionum LXV (2) · Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Commentarium in De caelo, Commentarium in Metaphysicam (2), Commentarium in Physicam · Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae · Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), De divinis nominibus · Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum

Cited by

10 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

What relation that unformed matter had to place
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
supra pag. 55, nota 8
Doubts concerning the Master's text (d. XII)
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the age in any way precedes time
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2
supra pag. 55, nota 8
Whether between time and the age there is any middle measure
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2 · 2× · via ibid.
ibid.
Whether the matter of which the Angels are composed is the same as the matter of corporeal things
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3 · 2×
supra d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether forgetfulness falls upon the demons
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 7
supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
On the steps of the ascent into God and on the speculation of him through his vestiges in the universe
Itinerarium mentis in Deum · Cap. I: De gradibus ascensionis in Deum et de speculatione ipsius per vestigia eius in universo
II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the divine being is eternal
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio V: Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate · 2×
II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom itself
Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio VI: Utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsam sapientiam increatam
II. Sent. d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
On the kingdom of God described in the gospel parables
Sermones selecti de rebus theologicis · Sermo II: De regno Dei descripto in parabolis evangelicis
II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

6 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.