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Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2

Contents
  1. Question II. Whether of all aeviternal things there is one age.
  2. Conclusio
Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 58

Quaestio II. Utrum omnium aeviternorum sit unum aevum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram unam per essentiam; et hoc est quaerere, utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus1: «Ipse est aevum aevorum»: ergo plura sunt aeva: non per interruptionem, ita quod unum post aliud: ergo per diversitatem simul existentium.

2. Item, unitas accidentis venit ab unitate subiecti2; sed non est ponere unum subiectum omnium aeviternorum, cum quaedam spiritualia non habeant aliquod commune, ad cuius aspectum mensurentur: ergo non est ponere, aevum esse unum. Quod autem nullum habeant tale subiectum, quod sit contentivum spiritualium, hoc apparet, quia illud haberet excellentiam et influentiam et continentiam respectu aeviternorum, sicut primum mobile respectu temporalium; sed tale respectu substantiarum spiritualium inveniri non potest, ut patet discurrenti per singula: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnibus aliis3 corruptis, possibile est unicum Angelum remanere, cum non dependeat ab aliis; et si remanet in esse completo, habet mensuram consequentem illud esse, et hoc est aevum: ergo remanet aevum, quolibet Angelo remanente, et totum remanet et perfectum: ergo quot sunt Angeli, tot sunt aeva.

4. Item, aevum est mensura rei perfectae et multum habentis de specie sive de forma: si ergo4 aevum maxime consequitur esse completum, cum illud non sit unum numero, sed tantum specie, videtur, quod aevum sit unum tantum secundum speciem.

Contra hoc:

1. Arguitur a simili. Sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia, ita aevum ad aeviterna; sed tempus est unum, quod mensurat omnia temporalia, sicut Anselmus5 dicit et Philosophus: ergo similiter unum est aevum, quod mensurat omnia aeviterna.

2. Item, hoc videtur a minori. Maior est varietas et difformitas in rebus mutabilibus quam in rebus immutabilibus: si ergo mutabilia omnia possunt unica mensura per essentiam mensurari, ergo multo fortius aeviterna.

3. Item, hoc videtur a causa. Positio enim multorum est, quare tempus unum potest esse: quia, quamvis sit accidens, tamen est mensura extrinseca, sicut locus, et quia non est accidens situale; sed hoc totum invenitur in aevo: ergo etc.

p. 594. Item, si plura sunt aeva, aut ergo simul, aut consequenter. Non consequenter, quia quodlibet sit infinitum a parte post; non simul, quia quae sunt simul, sunt in eodem instanti, ergo si aeviterna sunt simul, sunt in eodem nunc aevi: ergo si omnium aeviternorum est unum nunc, ergo unum aevum per essentiam.

Conclusio

Licet omnium temporalium sit unum tempus, tamen quot sunt aeviterna, tot sunt aeva.

Respondeo: Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam praenotandum est, qualiter intelligitur unitas in tempore. Sciendum autem, quod tripliciter tentaverunt aliqui unitatem temporis accipere, secundum quod accidens habet tripliciter comparari ad subiectum. Habet enim ibi causam, existentiam et apparentiam.

Dixerunt ergo aliqui, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo est et per se, quo remoto, removetur et tempus. Unde dixerunt, quod tempus est unum, quia est in primo mobili, cuius motu cessante, cessat et tempus6. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, si cessaret motus primi mobilis, adhuc posset moveri rota figuli; et constat, quod mensuraretur ille motus: ergo non tantum est ibi, immo et in aliis rebus mobilibus. Item, tempus est in affectionibus et cogitationibus liberi arbitrii, quod non subest motui caelesti, sicut vult Augustinus7.

Et ideo dixerunt alii, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet. Cum enim tempus sit numerus sive mensura motuum, et numerus iste secundum essentiam et habitum sit in re mobili vel mota, in qua est prius et posterius, secundum actualem vero numerationem sit a parte animae, sicut vult Philosophus8 et Augustinus, cum anima omnes motus et mutationes numeret aspiciendo ad mensuram motus primi mobilis, scilicet per diem, annum et horam; voluerunt dicere, quod unum est tempus ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet; quia, etsi omnia habeant proprias periodos, tamen omnia numerantur et mensurantur per mensuram motus regularis et certi et nobis notissimi, scilicet motus mobilis primi. — Sed illud non sufficit, quia dicit Philosophus de Caelo et mundo9, quod si essent duo mobilia prima, adhuc unum esset tempus. Tunc non posset dici unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo esset, nec in quo primo appareret, cum utrumque esset aeque primum et evidens; nec ratione animae, quia tempus non est numerus numerans, sed numeratus, ut Philosophus10 vult, et tempus est dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae.

Et ideo dixerunt tertii profundius, quod unitas temporis sumitur ab unitate subiecti, a quo causatur; subiectum autem, a quo causatur, est materia ut mutabilis, et ita ut ens in potentia. Nam materia, ut est in acquisitione formae, mutatur, et sic est ens in potentia; et ideo tempus maxime inter omnia accidentia se tenet plus cum materia. Sicut igitur materia una est per essentiam, differens per esse, una non unitate universalitatis nec singularitatis, sed medio modo, sic et tempus in omnibus temporalibus11.

Et si quaeras, unde est hoc, quod tempus est unum, cum tamen motus sint varii; dicendum, quod motus definitur per id ad quod est12, unde motus respicit motorem et mobile et terminum; tempus autem respicit ipsam durationem variam et successivam, quae venit ex potentia rei mobilis. Et quia motus naturae durantis consimilis est13, et natura una, supra quam fundatur, est una numero; ideo tempus non tantum est unum specie in omnibus temporalibus, immo etiam quantum ad essentiam unum numero, differens per esse, sicut posuerunt omnes sapientes, qui circa hanc materiam locuti sunt.

Si autem quaeras, quare non sic est in aliis quantitatibus14; omnes respiciunt materiam; dicendum, quod omnes aliae, etsi esse incompletum habeant in materia — nam sunt in materia dimensiones infinitae — tamen esse completum ipsarum est a materia existente sub forma. Tempus autem habet esse ex hoc, quod materia tendit ad formam, propter hoc quod causatur a motu, qui est «entelechia existentis in potentia15», et ideo tenet se maxime ex parte materiae, et ideo minime distinctum.

p. 60Nec dico, quod tempus sit in ipsa materia, omni forma circumscripta, quia hoc esset contra Augustinum, duodecimo Confessionum16, quia non est vicissitudo aliqua in materia, nisi cum in ea est aliqua forma; sed quamvis sit in materia, quae est sub forma et ab ipsa causatur, magis tamen causatur a materia, ut tendit ad formam, et hoc est in materia ratione suae potentiae.

Secundum hunc triplicem modum nisi sunt aliqui qui unitatem in aevo ponere, primo ratione subiecti, in quo primo est. Posuerunt enim ordinem in intelligentiis secundum continentiam virtualem, sicut in visibilibus est reperire continentiam localem. Et sicut tempus in primo mobili fundatur, sic aevum17 in prima intelligentia, quae virtualiter alias continet, in alias influit. — Sed ista positio non potest stare. Primo, quia omnes intelligentiae in incorruptione habent aequalitatem, sicut in sequenti distinctione dicitur18. Secundo, quia conservatio intelligentiarum immediate pendet ex Deo. Tertio, quia, si illa intelligentia destrueretur, tunc fundamentum aevi periret; et possibile fuit, illam peccasse, immo forte peccavit, cum diabolus credatur fuisse excellentissimus Angelorum19.

Et ideo alii conati sunt assignare unitatem ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet, quod quidem est caelum empyreum, in quo non cadit variatio; immo omnimode quietum est20. — Sed nec illud sufficit, quoniam immortalitas et immutabilitas per prius est in substantiis spiritualibus quam corporalibus, cum sint digniores; et dignius non habeat mensurari per aspectum ad minus dignum.

Et ideo tentaverunt alii accipere unitatem ex parte causae, qui dixerunt, quod duratio intelligentiarum continuatur et conservatur per divinam influentiam, quae quoniam una est, unum est aevum mensurans ipsam. — Sed nec illud potest stare, quoniam influentia illa aut active, aut passive intelligitur. Si de activa, non est aliud quam Deus, qui non habet aevum mensuram. Si de passiva, tot sunt aeva, quot sunt suscipientes.

Et ideo non restat alius modus nisi per unitatem materiae, sicut prius dictum est de tempore. Sed multi negant, intelligentias habere materiam, et ideo minime distinctum. Nec dico, quod tempus sit in ipsa materia, omni forma circumscripta, quia hoc esset contra Augustinum, duodecimo Confessionum, quia non est vicissitudo aliqua in materia, nisi cum in ea est aliqua forma; sed quidquid sit de hoc, tamen aevum respicit esse actuale et esse stabile, sed tempus materiam ut in potentia. Et ideo sicut unitas temporis conformatur materiae, sic unitas aevi conformatur formae, non inquam formae, in quantum haec vel illa, sed in quantum immutabilis.

Unde sicut linea in corporibus quantumcumque diversis ponitur eadem specie, sic aevum habet unitatem universalis, non unitatem, quam habet tempus.

Et sic concedendae sunt rationes probantes, non esse unum aevum aeviternorum, sed multa21.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur: sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum tempus, quantum est de se, respiciat variationem et motum, consequitur ipsa, quorum est mensura, ratione illius principii22, per quod sunt entia in potentia; et quia illud unicum dicitur esse per essentiam, ideo et tempus. Aevum autem de sui ratione propria respicit esse completum et stabile, et ideo magis respicit formam: et ideo non habet unitatem nisi universalitatis sive conformitatis, sicut et alia accidentia.

2. Quod arguitur a minori, quod temporalia habent unam mensuram; iam patet23, quod non est locus a minori, quia illa variatio, ratione qua dicitur esse in potentia, respicit ipsum materiale principium, et ideo facit recedere a distinctione; non sic est in aevo.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod tempus est unum, quia est accidens extrinsecum, non situatum vel situale; dicendum, quod falsum est: ista enim non est causa, sed magis illa quae praedicta est.

4. Quod obiicitur: si sunt plura aeva, aut simul, aut non simul; dicendum, quod simul. — Quod ergo obiicitur: ergo in eodem nunc; dicendum, quod esse simul in duratione est dupliciter: aut per mensurae concomitantiam, aut per mensurae unitatem et indifferentiam. Cum autem dicitur Deus, homo et Angelus esse simul; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur per mensurae concomitantiam. Cum autem dicitur: Petrus et Paulus simul sunt vel currunt, hoc potest dici per mensurae unitatem et indifferentiam; et ideo non sequitur, quod si aeva aeviternorum sunt simul, quod sint unum.

Question II. Whether of all aeviternal things there is one age.

Secondly it is asked whether spiritual things have one measure by essence; and this is to ask whether there is one age of all aeviternal things. And that there is not seems true.

1. Dionysius, On the Divine Names1: «He is the age of ages»: therefore there are several ages: not by interruption, so that one [is] after another: therefore by the diversity of things existing simultaneously.

2. Likewise, the unity of an accident comes from the unity of the subject2; but one cannot posit one subject of all aeviternal things, since certain spiritual things do not have anything in common at the regard of which they would be measured: therefore one cannot posit that the age is one. And that they have no such subject which would be containing of spiritual things, this appears, because that [subject] would have an excellence and an influence and a containment with respect to aeviternal things, just as the first movable [has] with respect to temporal things; but no such thing can be found with respect to spiritual substances, as is plain to one running through them singly: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, all other things being corrupted, it is possible for a single Angel to remain, since it does not depend on the others3; and if it remains in complete being, it has a measure consequent upon that being, and this is the age: therefore the age remains, with any Angel whatever remaining, and it remains whole and perfect: therefore as many as the Angels are, so many are the ages.

4. Likewise, the age is the measure of a perfect thing and of one having much of species or of form: if therefore4 the age most of all follows complete being, since that is not one in number, but only in species, it seems that the age is one only according to species.

Against this:

1. It is argued from a likeness. As time stands to temporal things, so the age to aeviternal things; but time is one, which measures all temporal things, as Anselm5 says, and the Philosopher: therefore likewise the age is one, which measures all aeviternal things.

2. Likewise, this seems so from the lesser. There is greater variety and disformity in changeable things than in unchangeable things: if therefore all changeable things can be measured by a single measure by essence, then much more so aeviternal things.

3. Likewise, this seems so from the cause. For it is the position of many why time can be one: because, although it is an accident, it is nevertheless an extrinsic measure, like place, and because it is not a positional accident; but all this is found in the age: therefore, etc.

p. 594. Likewise, if there are several ages, then either simultaneously or successively. Not successively, because each would be infinite on the side of the after; not simultaneously, because things that are simultaneous are in the same instant, therefore if aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are in the same now of the age: therefore if of all aeviternal things there is one now, then one age by essence.

Conclusio

Although of all temporal things there is one time, nevertheless as many as the aeviternal things are, so many are the ages.

I respond: For the understanding of this question it must be premised how unity is understood in time. Now it must be known that in three ways some have attempted to take the unity of time, according as an accident can be compared in three ways to its subject. For it has there a cause, an existence, and an appearance.

Some, then, have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily and per se is, on the removal of which time too is removed. Whence they said that time is one because it is in the first movable, on whose motion ceasing, time too ceases6. — But it does not suffice to say that, because, as Augustine says, if the motion of the first movable were to cease, a potter's wheel could still be moved; and it is evident that that motion would be measured: therefore it is not only there, but also in other movable things. Likewise, time is in the affections and thoughts of free choice, which is not subject to the celestial motion, as Augustine holds7.

And therefore others have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily appears. For since time is the number or measure of motions, and that number, according to essence and habit, is in the movable or moved thing, in which there is before and after, but according to actual numbering is on the part of the soul, as the Philosopher holds8 and Augustine — since the soul numbers all motions and changes by looking to the measure of the motion of the first movable, namely by day, year, and hour — they wished to say that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily appears; because, even if all things have their own periods, nevertheless all are numbered and measured by the measure of the regular and certain motion best known to us, namely the motion of the first movable. — But that does not suffice, because the Philosopher says, On the Heavens and the World9, that if there were two first movables, there would still be one time. Then it could not be called one by reason of the subject in which it primarily was, nor in which it primarily appeared, since each would be equally primary and evident; nor by reason of the soul, because time is not numbering number, but numbered, as the Philosopher10 holds, and time is a disposition of the thing outside, not a fiction of the soul.

And therefore a third group said more profoundly that the unity of time is taken from the unity of the subject by which it is caused; but the subject by which it is caused is matter as changeable, and so as a being in potency. For matter, as it is in the acquisition of form, is changed, and so is a being in potency; and therefore time, among all accidents, holds itself most with matter. As, therefore, matter is one by essence, differing by being, one not by the unity of universality nor of singularity, but in a middle way, so too time in all temporal things11.

And if you ask whence this is, that time is one, while yet the motions are various; it must be said that motion is defined by that to which it tends12, whence motion regards the mover and the movable and the terminus; but time regards the very duration, varied and successive, which comes from the potency of the movable thing. And because the motion of an enduring nature is alike13, and the one nature on which it is founded is one in number; therefore time is not only one in species in all temporal things, but even as to essence one in number, differing by being, as all the wise have held who have spoken about this matter.

But if you ask why it is not so in the other quantities14 — they all regard matter — it must be said that all the others, even if they have incomplete being in matter — for there are infinite dimensions in matter — nevertheless their complete being is from matter existing under form. But time has being from this, that matter tends toward form, on account of the fact that it is caused by motion, which is «the entelechy of what exists in potency15», and therefore it holds itself most on the side of matter, and therefore is least distinct.

p. 60Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the Confessions16, since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but although it is in matter, which is under form and is caused by it, it is nevertheless caused more by matter, as it tends toward form, and this is in matter by reason of its potency.

According to this threefold mode there were some who [tried] to posit the unity in the age, first by reason of the subject in which it primarily is. For they posited an order in the intelligences according to virtual containment, just as among visible things one finds local containment. And as time is founded in the first movable, so the age17 in the first intelligence, which virtually contains the others [and] flows into the others. — But this position cannot stand. First, because all the intelligences in incorruption have equality, as is said in the following distinction18. Second, because the conservation of the intelligences depends immediately on God. Third, because, if that intelligence were destroyed, then the foundation of the age would perish; and it was possible for it to have sinned, indeed perhaps it did sin, since the devil is believed to have been the most excellent of the Angels19.

And therefore others tried to assign the unity by reason of the subject in which it primarily appears, which indeed is the empyrean heaven, in which no variation falls; rather it is wholly at rest20. — But neither does that suffice, since immortality and immutability is prior in spiritual substances than in corporeal ones, since they are worthier; and the worthier should not be measured by regard to the less worthy.

And therefore others attempted to take the unity on the side of the cause, who said that the duration of the intelligences is continued and conserved by the divine influence, which, since it is one, the age measuring it is one. — But neither can that stand, since that influence is understood either actively or passively. If of the active, it is nothing other than God, who does not have the age as a measure. If of the passive, there are as many ages as there are receivers.

And therefore no other mode remains except by the unity of matter, as was said before about time. But many deny that the intelligences have matter, and therefore [it is] least distinct. Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the Confessions, since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but whatever may be the case concerning this, the age nevertheless regards actual being and stable being, but time [regards] matter as in potency. And therefore, just as the unity of time is conformed to matter, so the unity of the age is conformed to form — not, I say, to form insofar as it is this or that, but insofar as it is immutable.

Whence just as a line in bodies however diverse is posited as the same in species, so the age has the unity of a universal, not the unity which time has.

And thus the reasons proving that there is not one age of aeviternal things, but many, are to be conceded21.

1. As to what is objected, then: as time stands to temporal things; it must be said that it is not similar, because, since time, so far as it is of itself, regards variation and motion, it follows the very things of which it is the measure, by reason of that principle22 by which they are beings in potency; and because that single [principle] is said to be by essence, therefore time too [is one]. But the age, from its own proper account, regards complete and stable being, and therefore regards form more: and therefore it does not have unity except of universality or of conformity, like the other accidents.

2. As to what is argued from the lesser, that temporal things have one measure; it is already clear23 that there is no place for [an argument] from the lesser, because that variation, by reason of which it is said to be in potency, regards the material principle itself, and therefore makes [it] recede from distinction; it is not so in the age.

3. As to what is objected, that time is one because it is an extrinsic accident, not situated or positional; it must be said that it is false: for this is not the cause, but rather that which has been said before.

4. As to what is objected: if there are several ages, then either simultaneously or not simultaneously; it must be said simultaneously. — As to what is then objected: therefore in the same now; it must be said that to be simultaneous in duration is twofold: either by concomitance of measure, or by unity and indifference of measure. When it is said that God, man, and Angel are simultaneous, it must be said that this is said by concomitance of measure. But when it is said: Peter and Paul are or run simultaneously, this can be said by unity and indifference of measure; and therefore it does not follow that, if the ages of aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are one.

Scholion

I. Hic agitur de unitate tum temporis, tum aevi, et non de unitate specifica, sed de unitate secundum numerum, ut pluries notatur in corp. — Loquendo de tempore, quatenus est mensura rei successivae et non eiusdem intrinseca duratio, communior sententia unitatem temporis affirmabat. In quo autem huiusmodi unitas rationem suam habeat, disputabatur.

p. 61Tres opiniones hic recensitas affert etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 10. a. 6.), et ipse cum Richard. a Med. primam opinionem approbat, quae rationem unitatis ponit in unitate primi mobilis; tertia vero (quam praefert S. Bonav.), quae hanc unitatem repetit ab unitate subiecti, a quo causatur, quod est materia, iuxta eundem «non sufficiens videtur». Sententiae S. Thomae adhaeret B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2.), et quoad perfectam rationem temporis etiam Scotus, IV. Sent. d. 48. q. 2, et praecipue de Rerum princ. q. 20, in quo opere a quaestione 18. usque ad q. 24. de tempore et annexis quaestionibus diffuse et subtiliter disputat.

II. Quoad unitatem aevi, utrum sit admittenda, et quae sit eius ratio, maior fuit opinionum dissensus. Et praenotandum est, opinionem Aristotelis, quod etiam corpora caelestia, saltem primum mobile, inter incorruptibilia et aeviterna locum obtineant, illa aetate communiter receptam fuisse. S. Thom. in Commentar. et cum quadam restrictione etiam in Summa («concedimus ad praesens») docet, quod aevum «est unum ab unitate esse simplicissimi aeviternorum, quod est primus Angelus». Hanc sententiam aliquatenus approbat Richard. a Med. («quodam modo habet rationem mensurae, quamvis non plenam»). Sed Petr. a Tar. praefert opinionem secundam, «quod primum subiectum aevi est primum immobile, id est caelum empyreum». Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 2.) unitatem aevi sustinet, et quoad rationem eius tertiae opinioni innititur. — E contrario S. Bonav. negat unitatem aevi et aevum ut mensuram extrinsecam. Si autem accipitur aevum pro mensura intrinseca, patet quod tot sunt admittenda aeva, quot aeviterna. Huic sententiae assentit etiam Aegid. R., et favet etiam Scotus, quia praefert opinionem, non esse unum aevum omnium aeviternorum ut mensura extrinseca, sicut est unum tempus omnium temporalium (hic q. 3. n. 5, q. 2. n. 10; Report. hic q. 1. n. 2, ubi dicit: «Mensurare Angelum inferiorem per esse Angeli superioris est aequivocare vocabulum ad mensuram perfectionis»). Tamen idem censet, etiam opinionem S. Thomae esse probabilem, si intelligitur de mensura extrinseca.

III. Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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Scholion

I. Here the subject is the unity both of time and of the age, and not the specific unity, but the unity according to number, as is noted several times in the body. — Speaking of time, insofar as it is a measure of a successive thing and not the intrinsic duration of that thing, the more common opinion affirmed the unity of time. But in what this unity has its ground was disputed.

p. 61The three opinions here reviewed are also reported by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2; S. I, q. 10, a. 6), and he himself, with Richard of Middleton, approves the first opinion, which places the ground of the unity in the unity of the first movable; but the third (which St. Bonaventure prefers), which traces this unity back to the unity of the subject by which it is caused, which is matter, according to the same [Thomas] «seems insufficient». To the opinion of St. Thomas adheres Bl. Albert (S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 3, a. 2), and as to the perfect account of time also Scotus, IV Sent., d. 48, q. 2, and especially On the Principle of Things, q. 20, in which work from question 18 to q. 24 he disputes about time and annexed questions diffusely and subtly.

II. As to the unity of the age, whether it is to be admitted, and what its ground is, there was greater dissension of opinions. And it must be premised that the opinion of Aristotle, that even the celestial bodies, at least the first movable, hold a place among incorruptible and aeviternal things, was commonly received in that age. St. Thomas, in the Commentary and, with a certain restriction, also in the Summa («we concede for the present»), teaches that the age «is one by the unity of the being of the simplest of aeviternal things, which is the first Angel». This opinion Richard of Middleton in some measure approves («it has in a certain way the account of a measure, though not a full one»). But Peter of Tarentaise prefers the second opinion, «that the first subject of the age is the first immobile [thing], that is, the empyrean heaven». Alexander of Hales too (S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 2) maintains the unity of the age, and as to its ground relies on the third opinion. — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure denies the unity of the age and the age as an extrinsic measure. But if the age is taken for an intrinsic measure, it is plain that as many ages are to be admitted as there are aeviternal things. To this opinion Giles of Rome also assents, and Scotus too favors it, because he prefers the opinion that there is not one age of all aeviternal things as an extrinsic measure, just as there is one time of all temporal things (here q. 3, n. 5, q. 2, n. 10; Reportatio, here q. 1, n. 2, where he says: «To measure a lower Angel by the being of a higher Angel is to equivocate the term as to a measure of perfection»). Yet the same [Scotus] judges that the opinion of St. Thomas also is probable, if it is understood of an extrinsic measure.

III. Besides those praised: Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Cap. 5. § 5, et c. 10. § 3. in fine, ubi loquitur de Deo ut est origo et auctor omnis temporis et aevi.
    Chapter 5, § 5, and c. 10, § 3, at the end, where he speaks of God as the origin and author of all time and of the age.
  2. 2
    Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.), de quo vide tom. I. pag. 511, nota 6. Cfr. etiam Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.
    Aristotle, Topics I, c. 6 (c. 5), on which see vol. I, p. 511, note 6. Cf. also Boethius, On Unity and the One.
  3. 3
    Cod. Q interserit Angelis, quod Vat. ponit inferius post ab aliis.
    Codex Q inserts to the Angels, which the Vatican edition places lower down, after on the others.
  4. 4
    Plurimi codd. minus congrue enim.
    Very many codices, less fittingly, [read] for (enim).
  5. 5
    Dialog. de Veritate, c. 13. in fine, ubi ad probandum quod veritas improprie dicatur huius vel illius rei, cum secundum illam sint, adducit simile de tempore: «Quemadmodum dicitur tempus huius vel illius rei, cum unum et idem sit tempus omnium, quae sunt in eodem tempore simul; et si non esset haec vel illa res, non minus esset idem tempus». Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 93. (c. 10.), contra opinionem Platonis, secundum quam tempus est motus totius caeli, et partes eius sunt partes temporis, arguit sic: «Si plures essent caeli, similiter utique esset tempus cuiuslibet ipsorum motus; quare multa tempora simul». Ex quibus verbis deducitur, iuxta mentem Aristotelis unum tantum esse tempus, etiamsi essent plures caeli. Cfr. etiam XII. Metaph. text. 49. (XI. c. 8.).
    Dialogue on Truth, c. 13, at the end, where, to prove that truth is improperly said [to be] of this or that thing, since they are according to it, he brings forward a likeness from time: «Just as the time of this or that thing is spoken of, although the time of all things that are simultaneously in the same time is one and the same; and if this or that thing did not exist, it would be no less the same time». Aristotle, Physics IV, text 93 (c. 10), against the opinion of Plato, according to which time is the motion of the whole heaven, and its parts are parts of time, argues thus: «If there were several heavens, likewise there would be the time of the motion of any one of them; wherefore many times simultaneously». From which words it is deduced that, according to the mind of Aristotle, there is only one time, even if there were several heavens. Cf. also Metaphysics XII, text 49 (XI, c. 8).
  6. 6
    Cfr. Averroes, IV. Phys. text. 98. et 130, ubi dicit, tempus sequi motum corporis caelestis et primo inveniri in caelo. — Verba Augustini, quae mox allegantur, sumta sunt ex XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 29: Audivi a quodam homine docto, quod solis et lunae ac siderum motus ipsa sunt tempora; et nil annui. Cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora? An vero, si cessarent caeli lumina, et moveretur rota figuli, non esset tempus, quo metiremur eos gyros? etc.
    Cf. Averroes, Physics IV, text 98 and 130, where he says that time follows the motion of the celestial body and is primarily found in the heaven. — The words of Augustine that are soon adduced are taken from Confessions XI, c. 23, n. 29: I heard from a certain learned man that the motions of the sun and moon and stars are themselves the times; and I did not assent. For why are the motions of all bodies not rather the times? Or indeed, if the lights of heaven were to cease, and a potter's wheel were moved, would there not be a time by which we might measure its turns? etc.
  7. 7
    Libr. XI. Confess. c. 27. n. 36; VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. 24. 26; Quaest. 65 ad Orosium, q. 41.
    Confessions XI, c. 27, n. 36; On Genesis to the Letter VIII, c. 20, 24, 26; Questions to Orosius 65, q. 41.
  8. 8
    Libr. IV. Phys. text. 100. seqq. et 130. seq. (c. 11. et 14.). — August., XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 30. seqq. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 1. seq.
    Physics IV, text 100 ff. and 130 f. (c. 11 and 14). — Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 23, n. 30 ff., and On the City of God XII, c. 15, n. 1 f.
  9. 9
    In cod. T ad marg. a manu quasi suppari habetur: Immo hoc dicit Philosophus quarto Physicorum (text. 93.); unde haec auctoritas male citatur hic. Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 58, nota 5. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 recti pro certi.
    In codex T, at the margin, by an almost contemporary hand, there stands: Rather, the Philosopher says this in the fourth [book] of the Physics (text 93); whence this authority is wrongly cited here. For the words of Aristotle see above, p. 58, note 5. — A little above, codex cc and ed. 1 [read] right (recti) for certain (certi).
  10. 10
    Libr. IV. Phys. text. 102. et 131. seq. (c. 11. et 14.).
    Physics IV, text 102 and 131 f. (c. 11 and 14).
  11. 11
    Cod. cc cum ed. 1 adiungit est unum per essentiam, differens per esse. Paulo superius plures codd. cum ed. 1 universalis nec singularis pro universalitatis nec singularitatis. — De unitate materiae cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.
    Codex cc with ed. 1 adds is one by essence, differing by being. A little above, several codices with ed. 1 [read] universal nor singular for of universality nor of singularity. — On the unity of matter cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3.
  12. 12
    Aristot., V. Phys. text. 4: Magis autem ab eo in quod, quam ex quo movetur, denominatur mutatio.
    Aristotle, Physics V, text 4: But change is denominated more from that into which than from that out of which it is moved.
  13. 13
    Vat. Et quia tempus naturae duranti consimilius est; collectioni etiam cod. bb concordat in verbis naturae duranti.
    The Vatican edition [reads] And because time is more alike to an enduring nature; codex bb too agrees with this collation in the words to an enduring nature.
  14. 14
    Quae supra q. 1. argum. ult. ad opp. enumeratae sunt.
    Which were enumerated above, q. 1, in the last argument to the contrary.
  15. 15
    Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.). Cfr. supra pag. 34, nota 6.
    Aristotle, Physics III, text 6 (c. 1). Cf. above, p. 34, note 6.
  16. 16
    Cap. 12. n. 15: Duo reperio, quae fecisti carentia temporibus, cum tibi neutrum coaeternum sit. Unum, quod ita formatum est, ut sine ullo defectu contemplationis, sine ullo intervallo mutationis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua aeternitate atque incommutabilitate perfruatur. Alterum, quod ita informe erat, ut ex qua forma in quam formam mutationis vel stationis mutaretur, quo tempori subderetur, non haberet. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. et sic est pro et hoc est.
    Chapter 12, n. 15: I find two things which Thou hast made lacking times, although neither is coeternal with Thee. One, which is so formed that, without any defect of contemplation, without any interval of change, although changeable, yet unchanged, it enjoys to the full Thy eternity and immutability. The other, which was so formless that it had not [the means] by which it might be changed from what form into what form of change or of rest, by which it might be subject to time. — Somewhat lower the Vatican edition [reads] and so it is for and this is.
  17. 17
    Non pauci codd. supplent est.
    Not a few codices supply is.
  18. 18
    Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, et dub. 4.
    Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and dub. 4.
  19. 19
    Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cf. below, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1.
  20. 20
    Vide p. II. huius dist. a. 1. q. 1.
    See p. II of this distinction, a. 1, q. 1.
  21. 21
    Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. adiungunt sicut sunt plures formae.
    Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition add just as there are several forms.
  22. 22
    Scilicet materiae, quae per essentiam una dicitur, infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.
    Namely, of matter, which is said to be one by essence, below, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3.
  23. 23
    Ed. 1 cum cod. cc patet responsio. Dein non pauci codd. quia pro quod.
    Ed. 1 with codex cc [reads] the response is clear. Then not a few codices [read] because (quia) for that (quod).
Cite this

St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in II librum Sententiarum, Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1885), tom. II, pp. 58–61.

English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/2/d2/p1-a1-q2. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.

Authorities cited here

Anselm of Canterbury, De veritate · Aristotle, Metaphysica, Physica (6), Topica · Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones (4), De civitate Dei, De Genesi ad litteram, Dialogus quaestionum LXV · Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Commentarium in Physicam · Boethius, De unitate et uno · Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), De divinis nominibus