Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2
Quaestio III. Utrum spiritualia habeant permanentem, vel successivam mensuram.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram permanentem, aut successivam. Et quod permanentem, carentem priori et posteriori, videtur primo auctoritate, deinde ratione.
1. Et auctoritate sic: Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate Dei1: «Immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore nec est praeterita, quasi iam non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit»: ergo tota est praesens, ergo permanens, non succedens.
2. Item, Augustinus undecimo Confessionum2: «Si praesens tempus staret et non transiret in praeteritum, esset aeternitas»; sed non propter hoc esset aeternitas increata: ergo esset aeternitas creata; et hoc est aevum: ergo aevum habet nunc non transiens: ergo etc.
3. Item, Philosophus3: «In perpetuis non differt esse et posse»: ergo potentia est in toto suo actu, ergo nihil exspectat, ergo totum simul: ergo nulla est ibi successio vel prioritas.
4. Item ratione: proprietas debet respondere substantiae, ergo substantiae simplicis mensura debet esse simplex; sed substantia spiritualis est simplex: ergo et eius mensura. Sed eius mensura est aevum: ergo simplex est: ergo non habet prius et posterius.
5. Item, omne successivum reducitur ad permanens, ergo prius et posterius successivum ad prius et posterius permanens4; sed prius et posterius permanens est in sola magnitudine: ergo quod caret priori et posteriori permanente caret et successivo. Sed talis est Angelus: ergo etc.
6. Item, ubi est prius et posterius, ibi necessario cadit aliquid novum, quod de posteriori fit prius, et per hoc lapsus in praeteritum, et aliquid novum; sed in perpetuis non est aliqua mutatio5: ergo nec successio.
7. Item, ubi est prius, ibi est aliqua exspectatio respectu eius quod posterius est et nondum habitum est; sed in Beatis perfecte nulla cadit exspectatio, quia evacuatur omnino fides et spes, et habetur omne quod habituri sunt6: ergo nullo modo est ibi prius et posterius.
Contra:
1. Hieronymus ad Marcellam7: «Tantum est, qui non novit fuisse vel futurum»: omnis ergo creatura in sui esse habet praeteritionem sive fuisse et fore: ergo habet in sui duratione successionem.
2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio8 tractans illud verbum: Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra, propter hoc dictum est, non quia post aeternitatem sit aliquid, sed quia Dei aeternitas, quae tota simul est, excedit aeternitatem creaturae, quae non omnino est tota simul; ista est sententia: ergo idem quod prius.
p. 623. Item, ratione videtur: unitas angelica deficit ab unitate divina, ergo simplicitas aeternitatis creatae a simplicitate aeternitatis increatae: si ergo hoc verum est, ergo habet compositionem aliquo modo. Sed compositio in duratione ponit prius et posterius: ergo etc.
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur, quia mensura durationis angelicae non est ipse Angelus, immo differt ab Angelo, sicut mensura a mensurato; sed mensura secundum veritatem est in genere quantitatis9, et talis est divisibilis, ergo habens partes: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod est quantitatis principium sicut punctus; contra: punctus non habet complete rationem mensurae, sed est principium mensurae; aevum autem vere et proprie est mensura: ergo non potest esse sicut principium.
5. Item, Angeli duratio est infinita: si ergo est tota simul in actu, ergo aliquod creatum est infinitum actu. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.
6. Item, in eo quod habet totum esse simul, idem est fuisse et esse et futurum esse; sed quod fuit, impossibile est cogitari non fuisse, si intelligatur fuisse: ergo si in aeviterno idem est fuisse et fore, ergo impossibile est cogitari non fore. Hoc autem falsum est, quia hoc est proprium solius Dei: ergo etc.
7. Item, si totum esse praesens est, ergo non differt esse et fuisse: ergo quod nunc non est, nunquam fuit, et si fuit, est. Sed Deus non potest facere, quod fuit non fuisse10: ergo non potest facere, aeviternum non esse. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo etc.
8. Item, si totum esse aeviterni simul est, et tota duratio sine priori et posteriori, ergo non est ibi magis longum et minus longum; ergo anima beati Petri nec prius nec diutius fuit in gloria quam anima beati Francisci. Si ergo hoc manifeste falsum est, patet etc.
Conclusio
In aevo est aliqua successio, quae non importat prius et posterius cum variatione et innovatione, ut in tempore, sed tantum durationis extensionem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod aevum est totum simplex, sicut et illud quod mensurat; et esse substantiae aeviternae et eius duratio est tota simul, non habens successionem prioris et posterioris. Unde dixerunt, aevum non esse proprie quantitatem, sed in genere quantitatis solum esse per reductionem; unde simplex est extensione, sed tamen est quantum virtute, et adeo quantum, quod sua virtute excedat omne esse temporale ad similitudinem aeternitatis increatae. Nam sicut anima simplex est quantum ad quantitatem molis, tamen propter suam virtutem et simplicitatem est in qualibet parte sui corporis; sic in proposito intelligendum est. — Sed, sicut in opponendo tactum est, si quis ponat aevum omnino simplex, ponet ex hoc non esse veram mensuram; ponet etiam durationem creatam actu infinitam; ponet etiam durationem creatam adeo entem11, quod nec Deus destruere, nec intellectus possit cogitare non esse; quae omnia, cum non sint intelligibilia, faciunt, praedictam positionem nec esse rationabilem nec intelligibilem.
Et ideo, cum Sanctorum auctoritates aliud videantur sonare, est aliorum positio probabilior et intelligibilior, quod in aevo est ponere prius et posterius, et est ponere aliquam successionem, aliam tamen successionem quam in tempore. In tempore enim est successio cum variatione, et prius et posterius cum inveteratione et renovatione. In aevo vero est prius et posterius, quod dicit durationis extensionem, quod tamen nullam dicit variationem nec innovationem. Et per hanc distinctionem ad omnia obiecta in contrarium facile est solvere, si quis eam intelligat.
Quod si forte quaeratur: quomodo potest esse prius et posterius sine novitate circa esse; dicendum, quod sicut videmus, quod aliter egreditur rivulus12 a fonte, aliter radius a sole, sic in proposito videmus. Nam rivulus sic egreditur a fonte, quod nova aqua semper exit, non eadem; radius a sole continue egreditur, non quia semper novum aliquid emittatur, sed quia quod emissum est continuatur; unde solis influentia non est aliud quam continuatio dati. Similiter in motu, et in esse rei mobilis aliqua proprietas habita amittitur, vel non habita acquiritur; sed in esse rei aeviternae quod primo datum est per continuam Dei influentiam continuatur. Nulla enim aevi creatura est omnino actus, nec aliqua eius virtus, unde continue indiget divina virtute cooperante. Ideo, etsi esse totum habeat, tamen continuationem esse non habet totam simul, et ideo est ibi successio sine aliqua innovatione circa esse vel proprietatem absolutam; tamen ibi est vera continuatio, respectu cuius creatura habet esse quodam modo in potentia, ac per hoc habet successionem.
p. 63Solus igitur Deus, qui est actus purus, est actu infinitus, et totum esse et possessionem sui esse simul habet13. His visis, satis de facili solvuntur obiecta.
1. 2. Quod enim obiicitur de praeterito et futuro et de transitu, dicendum breviter, quod intelligitur de istis, ut dicunt variationem.
3. Quod obiicitur, quod non differt esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est de posse et esse, quod non differt, id est, quod non distat; motus enim et tempus facit distare; in solo autem aeterno verum est, quod potentia omnino sit actus, non in aliqua creatura14.
4. Quod obiicitur, quod substantiae simplicis proprietas non potest esse composita; dicendum, quod verum est, si illa proprietas habeat compositionem partium simul entium15; nunc autem non est sic, immo de aevo nunquam est nisi nunc, prius, sicut et de tempore dicitur. Et ita bene potest esse in simplici, ut in composito; unde tantam extensionem habet duratio unius grani milii, sicut et unius montis.
5. Quod obiicitur, quod prius et posterius reducitur ad permanens; dicendum, quod verum est, quod ad permanens reducitur; sed non oportet, quod ad prius et posterius permanens. Empyreum enim durationem habet aeviternam et aeque simplex est sicut duratio Angeli: ergo prius et posterius in partibus permanentibus non facit aliquid ad hoc.
6. Quod obiicitur de novo et veteri, iam patet: quia nihil est ibi alterationis, est tamen ibi crementum durationis absque omni alteratione absolutae proprietatis. Verum enim est dicere, quod diutius fuit anima Petri, quam anima Francisci16, quando in gloriam introivit, sed non est ita circa Deum; non enim diutius duravit hodie quam ante heri.
7. Quod obiicitur de exspectatione, dicendum, quod, sicut est successio non per novi acquisitionem, sed per prius dati continuationem, ita etiam est exspectatio non novi habendi, sed continuationis prius habiti, quod quia iam habent, et certi sunt se habituros, ideo potius dicitur tentio et comprehensio quam exspectatio. Et sic patet illud.
Question III. Whether spiritual things have a permanent or a successive measure.
Thirdly it is asked whether spiritual things have a permanent or a successive measure. And that [they have] a permanent one, lacking before and after, seems true first by authority, then by reason.
1. And by authority thus: Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the City of God1: «The immortality of the Angels does not pass in time, nor is it past, as though it now were not, nor future, as though it were not yet»: therefore it is wholly present, therefore permanent, not successive.
2. Likewise, Augustine, eleventh book of the Confessions2: «If the present time were to stand and not pass into the past, it would be eternity»; but not on that account would it be uncreated eternity: therefore it would be created eternity; and this is the age: therefore the age has a now that does not pass: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher3: «In perpetual things being and being able do not differ»: therefore the potency is in its whole act, therefore it awaits nothing, therefore [it is] all at once: therefore there is no succession or priority there.
4. Likewise by reason: a property must correspond to the substance, therefore the measure of a simple substance must be simple; but a spiritual substance is simple: therefore also its measure. But its measure is the age: therefore it is simple: therefore it does not have before and after.
5. Likewise, every successive thing is reduced to a permanent one, therefore the successive before-and-after to a permanent before-and-after4; but the permanent before-and-after is in magnitude alone: therefore what lacks a permanent before-and-after lacks also the successive one. But such is the Angel: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, where there is before and after, there necessarily falls something new, which from being later becomes earlier, and through this a lapse into the past, and something new; but in perpetual things there is no change5: therefore neither succession.
7. Likewise, where there is a before, there is some expectation with respect to that which is later and not yet possessed; but in the Blessed no expectation at all falls, because faith and hope are wholly emptied out, and all that they will have is had6: therefore in no way is there before and after there.
On the contrary:
1. Jerome to Marcella7: «He alone is, who does not know to have been or to be about to be»: every creature, therefore, in its own being has a pastness, that is, a having been and a going to be: therefore it has in its own duration a succession.
2. Likewise, Anselm in the Proslogion8, treating that word: The Lord shall reign forever and beyond, [says] this is said not because there is something after eternity, but because God's eternity, which is wholly at once, exceeds the eternity of the creature, which is not wholly at once; this is the sense: therefore the same as before.
p. 623. Likewise, it seems so by reason: angelic unity falls short of the divine unity, therefore the simplicity of created eternity [falls short] of the simplicity of uncreated eternity: if then this is true, then it has composition in some way. But composition in duration posits before and after: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, this same thing seems so, because the measure of angelic duration is not the Angel itself, but rather differs from the Angel, as a measure from the measured; but a measure, in truth, is in the genus of quantity9, and such a thing is divisible, therefore having parts: therefore, etc. If you say that it is the principle of quantity, like a point; on the contrary: a point does not have completely the account of a measure, but is the principle of a measure; but the age is truly and properly a measure: therefore it cannot be like a principle.
5. Likewise, the duration of an Angel is infinite: if then it is wholly at once in act, then some created thing is infinite in act. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, in that which has its whole being at once, to have been and to be and to be about to be are the same; but what has been, it is impossible to think not to have been, if it is understood to have been: therefore if in the aeviternal to have been and to be going to be are the same, then it is impossible to think it not going to be. But this is false, because this is proper to God alone: therefore, etc.
7. Likewise, if the whole being is present, then being and having been do not differ: therefore what now is not, never was, and if it was, [now] is. But God cannot bring it about that what has been should not have been10: therefore He cannot bring it about that the aeviternal not be. But this is manifestly false: therefore, etc.
8. Likewise, if the whole being of the aeviternal is at once, and the whole duration without before and after, then there is not there a longer and a shorter; therefore the soul of blessed Peter was neither earlier nor longer in glory than the soul of blessed Francis. If, then, this is manifestly false, it is plain, etc.
Conclusio
In the age there is some succession, which does not imply before and after with variation and innovation, as in time, but only an extension of duration.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.
For some have said that the age is wholly simple, just as also that which it measures; and the being of the aeviternal substance and its duration is wholly at once, not having a succession of before and after. Whence they said that the age is not properly a quantity, but is in the genus of quantity only by reduction; whence it is simple as to extension, but is nevertheless quantitative in power, and so quantitative that by its power it exceeds all temporal being in likeness to uncreated eternity. For just as the soul is simple as to the quantity of mass, yet on account of its power and simplicity is in every part of its body; so it must be understood in the matter at hand. — But, as was touched on in objecting, if anyone posits the age as wholly simple, he will posit from this that it is not a true measure; he will also posit a created duration actually infinite; he will also posit a created duration so much a being11 that neither could God destroy it, nor could the intellect think it not to be; all of which, since they are not intelligible, make that aforesaid position to be neither reasonable nor intelligible.
And therefore, since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound otherwise, the position of the others is more probable and more intelligible, that in the age one must posit before and after, and one must posit some succession, yet a succession other than that in time. For in time there is succession with variation, and before and after with aging and renewal. But in the age there is before and after, which states an extension of duration, which nevertheless states no variation nor innovation. And by this distinction it is easy to solve all the objections to the contrary, if one understands it.
But if perchance it be asked: how can there be before and after without newness about being; it must be said that, as we see that a brook flows forth from a spring in one way12, a ray from the sun in another, so we see in the matter at hand. For the brook flows forth from the spring in such a way that new water always goes out, not the same; the ray flows forth continuously from the sun, not because something new is always emitted, but because what has been emitted is continued; whence the sun's influence is nothing other than the continuation of what is given. Likewise in motion, and in the being of a movable thing, some property possessed is lost, or one not possessed is acquired; but in the being of an aeviternal thing what was first given is continued through God's continual influence. For no creature of the age is wholly act, nor any power of it, whence it continually needs the divine power cooperating. Therefore, even though it has its whole being, it nevertheless does not have the continuation of being wholly at once, and therefore there is succession there without any innovation about being or absolute property; yet there is there a true continuation, with respect to which the creature has being in a certain way in potency, and through this it has succession.
p. 63God alone, therefore, who is pure act, is infinite in act, and has the whole being and possession of His being at once13. These things being seen, the objections are quite easily solved.
1, 2. As to what is objected, then, about the past and the future and about transit, it must be said briefly that these are understood as they state a variation.
3. As to what is objected, that being and being able do not differ; it must be said that it is true of being able and being that they do not differ, that is, that they are not apart; for motion and time make [them] apart; but in the eternal alone is it true that the potency is wholly act, not in any creature14.
4. As to what is objected, that the property of a simple substance cannot be composite; it must be said that it is true, if that property has a composition of parts existing at once15; but now it is not so, indeed of the age there is never anything but now, before, just as is said also of time. And so it can well be in the simple as in the composite; whence the duration of a single grain of millet has as great an extension as that of a single mountain.
5. As to what is objected, that before and after is reduced to a permanent thing; it must be said that it is true that it is reduced to a permanent thing; but it is not necessary that [it be reduced] to a permanent before-and-after. For the empyrean has an aeviternal duration and is equally simple as the duration of an Angel: therefore before and after in permanent parts does nothing toward this.
6. As to what is objected about the new and the old, it is already clear: because there is nothing of alteration there, yet there is there an increment of duration without any alteration of an absolute property. For it is true to say that the soul of Peter was [in glory] longer than the soul of Francis16, when it entered into glory, but it is not so with regard to God; for He has not endured longer today than before yesterday.
7. As to what is objected about expectation, it must be said that, just as there is succession not through the acquisition of something new, but through the continuation of what was given before, so too there is expectation not of having something new, but of the continuation of what was had before, which, because they already have it, and are certain they will have it, is therefore rather called a holding and comprehension than an expectation. And thus that [objection] is plain.
I. Haec quaestio etiam sub his terminis proponitur: utrum aevum sit mensura simplex sive indivisibilis. S. Thom. in solutione eius cum communiore sententia contra S. Bonaventuram tenet, quod, sicut essentia et existentia Angeli simplex est et tota simul, sic etiam mensura ipsius excludat omnem successionem, nisi forte quatenus connotat coexistentiam ad tempus. — Sententia S. Bonaventurae duabus innititur distinctionibus. 1. Aliter sentiendum est de esse substantiali Angeli, aliter de duratione eius: illud esse in instanti creationis accipit ac indivisibile et totum simul, non autem durationem eius, quae, quia creatura continuo dependet a Deo conservante, non est indivisibilis, sed habet aliquam suo modo successionem. 2. Duplex est successio: propria, quae competit tempori secundum prius et posterius et habet variationem et renovationem, quia semper aliquid amittitur, et aliquid acquiritur; et impropria, quae competit aevo et non importat nisi durationis extensionem sine variatione vel innovatione. Per creationem res proprie fit et acquirit initium existentiae et durationis; per conservationem vero non fit, sed continuatur in existentia et acquirit maiorem durationem, quin in esse eius fiat innovatio vel additio. Unde aeviternum in instanti suae creationis totum suum esse substantiale habuit, sed non totam suam durationem, immo non nisi durationis initium. — Admissis his distinctionibus, quas contrariae sententiae fautores non approbant, facile intelligitur, in solo Deo idem esse essentiam, existentiam, durationem; in omnibus creaturis autem haec tria distinguenda esse.
II. Sententiam S. Thomae sequuntur inter antiquos Scholasticos Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth. aliique. — B. Albertus consentit S. Bonaventurae. Richard. a Med. utriusque sententiae argg. ponit et solvit, magis tamen inclinat in sententiam S. Thomae. Aegid. R. in re parum a S. Bonav. discedit. Scotus vero (hic q. 1.) in utramque partem disputat et anceps haeret, tamen, testibus Lycheto pluribusque aliis Scotistis, magis inclinat in sententiam S. Bonaventurae. Idem etiam de Rerum princip. q. 22. n. 8. ait: «Vel forte habet [aevum] aliquam naturam successionis, scil. quae est esse et modus essendi et durandi illorum substantiarum». Nec inter recentiores desunt viri doctissimi, qui sententiam S. Bonaventurae praeferant, vel valde probabilem censent, ut cl. P. Kleutgen S. I., Philosophie der Vorzeit tom. I. Abhandl. 4. c. 1. § 2, qui ut huius opinionis sequaces laudat Conimbricenses Phys. IV. c. 14. q. 2, et P. Silv. Maurum, Quaest. philos. tom. II. q. 32.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3. — Scot., locc. citt. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 13. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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I. This question is also proposed under these terms: whether the age is a simple or indivisible measure. St. Thomas, in his solution of it, holds, with the more common opinion, against St. Bonaventure, that, just as the essence and existence of the Angel is simple and wholly at once, so too its measure excludes all succession, except perhaps insofar as it connotes a coexistence with time. — The opinion of St. Bonaventure rests on two distinctions. 1. One must judge otherwise about the substantial being of the Angel, otherwise about its duration: that being it receives in the instant of creation as indivisible and wholly at once, but not its duration, which, because the creature continuously depends on God conserving [it], is not indivisible, but has in its own mode some succession. 2. Succession is twofold: proper, which belongs to time according to before and after and has variation and renewal, because something is always lost and something acquired; and improper, which belongs to the age and implies only an extension of duration without variation or innovation. By creation a thing properly comes to be and acquires the beginning of existence and duration; but by conservation it does not come to be, but is continued in existence and acquires a greater duration, without any innovation or addition occurring in its being. Whence the aeviternal in the instant of its creation had its whole substantial being, but not its whole duration, indeed nothing but the beginning of duration. — These distinctions being admitted (which the supporters of the contrary opinion do not approve), it is easily understood that in God alone essence, existence, duration are the same; but in all creatures these three are to be distinguished.
II. The opinion of St. Thomas is followed, among the ancient Scholastics, by Alexander of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Dionysius the Carthusian, and others. — Bl. Albert agrees with St. Bonaventure. Richard of Middleton sets out and solves the arguments of both opinions, yet inclines more to the opinion of St. Thomas. Giles of Rome departs little in substance from St. Bonaventure. But Scotus (here q. 1) disputes on both sides and remains in doubt, yet, on the testimony of Lychetus and several other Scotists, inclines more to the opinion of St. Bonaventure. The same [Scotus] also says, On the Principle of Things, q. 22, n. 8: «Or perhaps [the age] has some nature of succession, namely that which is the being and the mode of being and of enduring of those substances». Nor among more recent [writers] are there lacking most learned men who prefer the opinion of St. Bonaventure, or judge it very probable, as the distinguished P. Kleutgen S.J., Philosophie der Vorzeit, vol. I, Treatise 4, c. 1, § 2, who as followers of this opinion cites the Conimbricenses, Physics IV, c. 14, q. 2, and P. Silvester Maurus, Quaestiones philosophicae, vol. II, q. 32.
III. Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — Scotus, locc. citt. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 10, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 13. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- 1Cap. 13. n. 2.Chapter 13, n. 2.
- 2Cap. 11. n. 17.Chapter 11, n. 17.
- 3Libr. III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.). — Post primum ergo cod. N supplet in perpetuis, dein cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt toto; Vat. ponit exspectatur pro exspectat et in fine argumenti adiungit et posterioritas.Physics III, text 32 (c. 4). — After the first therefore, codex N supplies in perpetual things, then codex cc and ed. 1 omit whole; the Vatican edition puts is awaited for awaits and at the end of the argument adds and posteriority.
- 4Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate, duplicem quantitatem distinguit, scil. permanentem et successivam; prior competit iis, «quae constant ex partibus, quae in eis sunt, positionem habentibus ad se invicem» i. e. quae constant ex partibus simul existentibus v. g. linea, superficies; posterior vero convenit iis, quae constant ex non habentibus positionem, sed magis ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis v. g. tempus. Libr. IV. Phys. text. 99. (c. 11.) dicit, quod prius et posterius in loco, qui habet positionem, primum sunt, deinde etiam in motu et in tempore.Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quantity, distinguishes a twofold quantity, namely permanent and successive; the former belongs to those things «which consist of parts that, being in them, have a position with respect to one another», i.e. which consist of parts existing at once, e.g. a line, a surface; the latter belongs to those which consist of [parts] not having position, but rather an order of priority and posteriority, e.g. time. Physics IV, text 99 (c. 11) says that before and after are first in place, which has position, then also in motion and in time.
- 5Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 97. seqq. (c. 11.).Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 97 ff. (c. 11).
- 6Vide I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.See 1 Cor. 13:10 ff.
- 7Verba, quae sequuntur, non sunt Hieronymi, sed Isidori, VII. Etym. c. 1. n. 12. Cfr. de hoc tom. I. pag. 146, nota 4.The words that follow are not Jerome's, but Isidore's, Etymologies VII, c. 1, n. 12. Cf. on this vol. I, p. 146, note 4.
- 8Cap. 20, ubi tripliciter exponitur, quod Deus sit etiam ultra ea, quae finem non habebunt, scil. quia ipsa sine Dei conservatione esse non possunt, tum quia ipsa cogitari possunt habere finem, tum quia ipsa de sua aeternitate nondum habent quod futurum est, et iam non habent quod est praeteritum, cum Dei et illorum aeternitas sit Deo tota praesens. — Textus s. Scripturae est Exod. 15, 18. — Circa finem argumenti cod. cc et ed. 1 excedit creaturam pro excedit aeternitatem creaturae.Chapter 20, where it is expounded in three ways that God is even beyond those things which will not have an end, namely because they cannot be without God's conservation, both because they themselves can be thought to have an end, and because they themselves, of their own eternity, do not yet have what is future, and now do not have what is past, since God's eternity and theirs is wholly present to God. — The text of Scripture is Exod. 15:18. — Near the end of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 [read] exceeds the creature for exceeds the eternity of the creature.
- 9Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2. (IX. c. 1.): Maxime autem mensuram esse cuiusque generis primum et maxime proprie quanti; hinc enim et ad alia advenit; mensura enim id est, quo quantum cognoscitur. Cfr. q. 1. ad 6.Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 2 (IX, c. 1): But that the measure is most of all the first of each genus and most properly of the quantitative; for hence it comes also to the others; for a measure is that by which the quantitative is known. Cf. q. 1, ad 6.
- 10Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3.Cf. I Sent., d. 42, q. 3.
- 11Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. existentem; Vat. insuper a Deo pro adeo.Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition [read] existing; the Vatican edition moreover [reads] by God for so much.
- 12Multi codd. cum Vat. fluvius contra codd. A cc et ed. 1. Mox non pauci codd. videndum, aliqui vide, cod. aa esse videtur, cod. cc et ed. 1 videtur pro videmus.Many codices with the Vatican edition [read] river against codices A cc and ed. 1. Soon after, not a few codices [read] it must be seen, some see, codex aa it seems to be, codex cc and ed. 1 it seems for we see.
- 13Alluditur ad illam Boethii, V. de Consol. prosa 6, definitionem: Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. — Vat. posse pro possessionem.Allusion is made to that definition of Boethius, On Consolation V, prose 6: Eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life. — The Vatican edition [reads] to be able for possession.
- 14Aliis verbis: In perpetuis non differt esse et posse i. e. potentia non distat ab actu sive non praecedit actum, sed simul sunt; non autem intelligitur ita, quod in substantiis spiritualibus, excepto Deo, non differant actus et potentia, immo vere differunt; sed potentia non praecedit actum sicut in istis inferioribus, quae motui et tempori subiiciuntur. Dictio «tempus facit distare» est ex Aristotele. Cfr. infra pag. 66, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 quod verum est de posse ad esse pro quod verum est de posse et esse.In other words: In perpetual things being and being able do not differ, i.e. potency is not apart from act, or does not precede act, but they are at once; it is not, however, understood thus, that in spiritual substances, except God, act and potency do not differ — indeed they truly differ; but potency does not precede act as in these lower things, which are subject to motion and time. The phrase «time makes [them] apart» is from Aristotle. Cf. below, p. 66, note 2. — Somewhat above, not a few codices with editions 1, 3, 4 [read] that it is true of being able toward being for that it is true of being able and being.
- 15Cod. cc et ed. 1 in aevo; cod. aa hic. Immediate ante Vat. existentium pro entium. Paulo inferius post potest esse in cod. cc et ed. 1 suppletur duratio aevi.Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] in the age; codex aa here. Immediately before, the Vatican edition [reads] existing for being [parts]. A little below, after can be, in codex cc and ed. 1 there is supplied the duration of the age.
- 16Fide plurium codd. ut A K L O V Z bb adiecimus anima Francisci, quae verba etiam in ult. fundam. inveniuntur. Paulo superius cod. aa Unde nunc pro Verum enim, qui dein post Petri bene adiungit in gloria.On the faith of several codices, as A K L O V Z bb, we have added the soul of Francis, which words are also found in the last fundamentum. A little above, codex aa [reads] Whence now for For it is true, which then, after Peter, well adds in glory.
St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in II librum Sententiarum, Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1885), tom. II, pp. 61–63.
English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/2/d2/p1-a1-q3. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.
Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion · Aristotle, Categoriae (Praedicamenta), Metaphysica, Physica (3) · Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones, De civitate Dei