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Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2

Contents
  1. ARTICLE II.
  2. On the mode in which the angels are in a place.
  3. Question I. Whether the angels are in a corporeal place.
  4. Conclusion
Textus Latinus
English Translation
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ARTICULUS II.

De modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco.

Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeruntur quatuor.

Primum est, utrum substantiae spirituales sint in loco corporeo.

Secundum est, utrum Angelus sit in pluribus locis simul, aut tantum in uno.

Tertium est, utrum sit in loco punctali, an composito.

Quartum est, utrum plures Angeli possint simul esse1 in eodem loco primo.

Quaestio I. Utrum Angeli sint in loco corporeo.

Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum loci corporalis sit locare Angelos. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Dicit Strabus2: «Statim ut factum est caelum empyreum, repletum est Angelis».

2. Item, Damascenus3: «Caelum est continentia visibilium et invisibilium»; loquitur de empyreo: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne creatum est de universo, ergo est intra primum continens sive ultimum corpus; sed supremum corpus ambiens dicitur empyreum4: ergo omnis creatura continetur infra ipsum: ergo et angelicus spiritus.

4. Item, nulla substantia operatur, nisi ubi est eius virtus5; sed nulla virtus potest elongari a substantia nisi distantia proportionali — nam virtus infinita nullo modo elongatur, virtus finita non potest elongari nisi finite — ergo necesse est, Angelum esse ubi operatur, vel prope. Ergo cum operatur in loco corporali, ut patet in corpore, quod movet, ergo ibi est, vel in loco proximo est: ergo si locus maxime aptus contemplationi est empyreum, videtur, quod ibi sit.

5. Item, spiritus maligni in eodem loco tormentorum habebunt collocari, in quo et homines p. 76damnati, sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto6: Ite maledicti etc.; ergo ab oppositis vel a simili in contrario Angeli cum beatis hominibus in eodem loco corporali erunt; sed locus aptus hominibus beatis est ille qui praedictus est, scilicet caelum empyreum, quod est supremum, quietum, clarum, uniforme et spatiosum: ergo etc.

6. Item, maior requiritur proportio perfectionis ad perfectibile quam locati ad locum; sed videmus, quod substantia spiritualis adeo proportionari potest corporali, et e converso, quod una unitur alteri ut perfectio, ut patet in homine: ergo multo fortius potest una uniri alteri ut locatum loco. Ergo cum caelum empyreum sit nobilissimum corporum simplicium, vel erit in Angelo, vel Angelus in eo; sed ipsum non est in Angelo: ergo e converso.

Sed contra:

1. Boethius de Hebdomadibus7: «Communis animi conceptio, quae omnibus videtur, est, incorporeum in loco non esse».

2. Item, Gregorius8: «Locus animae Deus est»; sed non est spiritualior locus animae quam Angeli: ergo si Deus est locus animae, et Angeli.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia loci ad locatum est mutua indigentia, sicut patet — locatum enim indiget loco suo, ut terra centro; et locus etiam indiget locato, unde refugit vacuitatem; et impossibile est, quod locus sit sine locato, quin aliquid suppleat indigentiam loci9 — sed caelum empyreum non indiget Angelis nec aliquis locus, nec similiter Angelus loco, quia, omni corpore circumscripto, adhuc Angelus remaneret et secundum substantiam et secundum operationem, quae est contemplatio: ergo nullo modo est locus Angeli.

4. Item, locus habet influentiam et potentiam super locatum — unde superiora nobiliora locant minus nobilia, sicut patet ex hoc10 quod aqua terram, aer aquam, et sic de aliis — sed corporale non habet influere in spirituale nisi secundum ordinem iustitiae, sicut in anima peccatrice vel spiritu: ergo spiritus non habet locum in corpore nisi per culpam.

5. Item, omne locatum habet pondus et inclinationem ad locum; sed Augustinus11 dicit: «Quod est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus»; sed inclinatio amoris angelici est ad bonum spirituale, non ad locum corporalem: ergo non habent locum corporaliter, sed solum spiritualiter.

Conclusio

Caelum empyreum locat Angelos ut locus continens, non autem ut mensurans vel conservans.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caelum empyreum locat Angelos et est locus Angelorum, sicut probant rationes ad primam partem.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum est notandum, quod locus habet triplicem comparationem ad locatum. Comparatur enim primo in ratione continentis, secundo in ratione mensurantis et tertio in ratione conservantis. Continet enim ut vas, mensurat ut quantitas, sed conservat ut natura12. — Secundum hanc triplicem habitudinem sunt in loco substantiae finitae, corporales et corruptibiles: quia finitae et limitatae, sunt in loco continente; quia corporales, in mensurante; quia corruptibiles, in loco conservante. Secundum comparationes duas primas sunt in loco substantiae finitae et corporales, sed incorruptibiles. Secundum primam vero sunt in loco substantiae finitae, spirituales et incorruptibiles, ut Angeli. Et hoc dico in loco corporali; nam Angelus habet locum spiritualem conservantem, scilicet Dei virtutem; locum mensurantem sive circumscribentem, propriae substantiae et13 virtutis limitationem sive clausionem; locum vero continentem, non tantum spiritualem, sed etiam corporalem.

Ratio autem, quare Angeli continentur loco sive aliquo ambiente, est ordinatio partium universi. Si enim non haberent aliquid continens, non esset eorum existentia ordinata ad invicem14, nec haberet ordinem unus ad alterum; hoc autem non decet universum nec summum opificem. — Ratio autem, quare continentur loco corporali, duplex est: una, scilicet limitatio ipsius spiritus creati. Cum enim spiritus increatus, qui Deus est, habeat in se simplicitatem, per quam est intra omnia, et immensi-p. 77tatem, per quam continet omnia et est extra omnia15, communicat illas conditiones creaturae eatenus, quatenus nata est recipere. Unde simplicitatem communicat spiritui; sed spiritus non potuit recipere virtutem continentiae. Quia enim simplicitas eius finita est, ideo est hic et nunc16; et quia non habet partem et partem, ideo secundum totum est hic et nunc: et ideo non potest habere universalem capacitatem rerum. Corpus autem, quia compositum est et habet partes innumerabiles, non potuit participare simplicitatem, sed propter partium extensionem potuit recipere capacitatem; ideo Deus fecit unum corpus nobilissimum, quod esset natum omnia ambire, et extra quod omnino nihil esset; et hoc est empyreum; et ideo necesse est, Angelum esse intra ipsum. — Alia ratio est, quia in solo corpore est distinctio. Nam si gratis statur, ceterae creaturae ordinem habent in mundo, distinctionem et positionem habent secundum gradus perfectionum, et ita quod una est hic, et alia ibi, una sursum, et alia deorsum, et17 in solo corpore est potentialis distinctio secundum hic et ibi: ideo inter creaturas soli corpori debuit dari universalis potentia locandi, et respectu visibilium et invisibilium, ut sic universum esset unum in omnibus suis partibus ordinatum.

Et sic patet ratio duplex, quare data est corpori potentia locandi spiritum, et spiritum contineri a corpore. Hoc enim exigebat ordo universi tum propter limitationem spiritus creati, tum quia in solo corpore distinctio est secundum hic et ibi.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes monstrantes, quod caeli empyrei est locare Angelos.

1. Quod enim obiicitur in contrarium primo, quod incorporeum non est in loco; dicendum, quod intelligit18 de esse in loco, sicut mensuratum est in mensura.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod locus Angeli et animae Deus est; dicendum, quod intelligit19 de loco conservante, non de loco definiente. Et iterum ratio non cogit: quod si Deus est locus20, quod nihil creatum locet spiritum.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod loci ad locatum est mutua indigentia; dicendum, quod verum est de his quae locantur propter defectum sui; sed non est verum de his quae locantur propter servandum ordinem universi. — Unde si quaeratur, utrum lapis possit esse extra caelum; dicendum, quod non, tum propter suam indigentiam, quia non haberet locum conservantem, tum quia non patitur hoc ordo universi. Sed de Angelo, quod caelum non exeat, non est ratio loci corporalis indigentia, sed corporis ultimi universalis continentia, secundum quam universum est perfectum et ordinatum.

4. 5. Et ad alias duas21 rationes patet responsio, quod22 procedunt de esse in loco tanquam in conservante, ratione cuius ponitur influentia in locante, ponitur etiam inclinatio in locato; iste autem modus essendi in loco non convenit Angelo.

p. 78

ARTICLE II.

On the mode in which the angels are in a place.

Consequently, concerning the second article, four [things] are asked.

The first is, whether spiritual substances are in a corporeal place.

The second is, whether an Angel is in several places at once, or only in one.

The third is, whether [an Angel] is in a punctual place or a composite [one].

The fourth is, whether several Angels can be at once1 in the same primary place.

Question I. Whether the angels are in a corporeal place.

It is asked, therefore, first, whether it belongs to a corporeal place to locate Angels. And that [it does] so, it seems.

1. Strabus says2: «As soon as the empyrean heaven was made, it was filled with Angels».

2. Likewise, Damascene3: «Heaven is the containment of visible and invisible [things]»; he speaks of the empyrean: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every created thing is of the universe, therefore is within the first container or the ultimate body; but the supreme encompassing body is called the empyrean4: therefore every creature is contained within it: therefore also the angelic spirit.

4. Likewise, no substance operates except where its power is5; but no power can be distanced from the substance except by a proportional distance — for an infinite power is in no way distanced, a finite power cannot be distanced except finitely — therefore it is necessary that the Angel be where it operates, or near. Therefore since it operates in a corporeal place, as is plain in a body which it moves, therefore it is there, or is in the nearest place: therefore if the place most apt for contemplation is the empyrean, it seems that it is there.

5. Likewise, the malign spirits will have to be placed in the same place of torments in which also the men p. 76[who are] damned [will be], as is said in Matthew twenty-five6: Go, you cursed etc.; therefore from the opposites or from the like in the contrary, the Angels with the blessed men will be in the same corporeal place; but the place apt for blessed men is that which was aforesaid, namely the empyrean heaven, which is supreme, quiet, bright, uniform, and spacious: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, a greater proportion of the perfection to the perfectible is required than of what is located to the place; but we see that a spiritual substance can be so proportioned to a corporeal one, and conversely, that the one is united to the other as a perfection, as is plain in man: therefore much more strongly can the one be united to the other as what is located to the place. Therefore since the empyrean heaven is the noblest of the simple bodies, either it will be in the Angel or the Angel in it; but it is not in the Angel: therefore conversely.

But on the contrary:

1. Boethius, On the Hebdomads7: «It is a common conception of the mind, which seems [true] to all, that the incorporeal is not in a place».

2. Likewise, Gregory8: «The place of the soul is God»; but there is not a more spiritual place for the soul than for the Angels: therefore if God is the place of the soul, [he is] also [the place] of the Angels.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason, because there is a mutual need of the place to what is located, as is plain — for what is located needs its place, as earth [needs] the center; and the place too needs what is located, whence it flees emptiness; and it is impossible that a place be without what is located, but that something supply the need of the place9 — but the empyrean heaven does not need the Angels, nor does any place [need them], nor likewise [does] the Angel [need] a place, because, every body being removed, the Angel would still remain both according to substance and according to operation, which is contemplation: therefore in no way is it the place of the Angel.

4. Likewise, the place has influence and power over what is located [there] — whence the higher, nobler [things] locate the less noble, as is plain from this10, that water [locates] earth, air water, and so of the rest — but the corporeal does not have [the power] to influence the spiritual except according to the order of justice, as in a sinful soul or spirit: therefore the spirit does not have a place in a body except through fault.

5. Likewise, everything located has weight and inclination toward the place; but Augustine11 says: «What weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits»; but the inclination of angelic love is toward the spiritual good, not toward a corporeal place: therefore they do not have a place corporeally, but only spiritually.

Conclusion

The empyrean heaven locates the Angels as a containing place, but not as measuring or conserving.

I respond: It must be said that the empyrean heaven locates the Angels and is the place of the Angels, as the reasons for the first part prove.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that the place has a threefold comparison to what is located. For it is compared, first, in the character of containing, secondly in the character of measuring, and thirdly in the character of conserving. For it contains as a vessel, it measures as a quantity, but conserves as a nature12. — According to this threefold relation, finite, corporeal, and corruptible substances are in a place: because finite and limited, they are in a containing place; because corporeal, in a measuring [one]; because corruptible, in a conserving place. According to the first two comparisons, finite and corporeal but incorruptible substances are in a place. According to the first only, finite, spiritual, and incorruptible substances, like the Angels, are in a place. And this I say [as to being] in a corporeal place; for the Angel has a spiritual conserving place, namely the power of God; a measuring or circumscribing place, the limitation or enclosure of its own substance and13 power; but a containing place, not only spiritual but also corporeal.

But the reason why the Angels are contained by a place or by something encompassing [them] is the ordering of the parts of the universe. For if they did not have something containing [them], their existence would not be ordered to one another14, nor would one have order to another; but this does not befit the universe nor the highest Maker. — But the reason why they are contained by a corporeal place is twofold: one, namely the limitation of the created spirit itself. For since the uncreated spirit, who is God, has in himself simplicity, through which he is within all things, and immensity, p. 77through which he contains all things and is outside all things15, he communicates those conditions to the creature in so far as it is born to receive [them]. Hence he communicates simplicity to the spirit; but the spirit could not receive the power of containment. For because its simplicity is finite, therefore it is here and now16; and because it does not have part and part, therefore it is here and now according to [its] whole: and therefore it cannot have a universal capacity of things. But the body, because it is composite and has innumerable parts, could not participate simplicity, but on account of the extension of [its] parts it could receive capacity; therefore God made one most noble body, which was born to encompass all [things], and outside of which there would be nothing at all; and this is the empyrean; and therefore it is necessary that the Angel be within it. — Another reason is that distinction is in body alone. For, if it is granted freely, the other creatures have order in the world, [and] have distinction and position according to grades of perfections, and so that one is here and another there, one above and another below, and17 in body alone is there a potential distinction according to here and there: therefore among creatures to body alone had to be given the universal power of locating, with respect both to visible and invisible [things], so that thus the universe might be one [thing] ordered in all its parts.

And so the twofold reason is clear, why the power of locating a spirit was given to body, and [why] a spirit is contained by a body. For the order of the universe demanded this, both on account of the limitation of the created spirit, and because in body alone is distinction according to here and there.

The reasons showing that it belongs to the empyrean heaven to locate the Angels are therefore to be granted.

1. For what is objected to the contrary first, that the incorporeal is not in a place; it must be said that it is understood18 of being in a place as what is measured is in a measure.

2. To what is objected, that the place of the Angel and of the soul is God; it must be said that it is understood19 of a conserving place, not of a defining place. And again the reason does not compel: that if God is the place20, [it does not follow] that nothing created locates a spirit.

3. To what is objected, that there is a mutual need of the place to what is located; it must be said that this is true of those [things] which are located on account of a defect of themselves; but it is not true of those which are located for the sake of preserving the order of the universe. — Whence if it is asked whether a stone can be outside the heaven; it must be said no, both on account of its [own] need, because it would not have a conserving place, and because the order of the universe does not allow this. But concerning the Angel, that it does not leave the heaven, the reason is not the need of a corporeal place, but the universal containment of the ultimate body, according to which the universe is perfect and ordered.

4. 5. And to the other two21 reasons the response is clear, that22 they proceed [on the supposition] of being in a place as in a conserving [one], by reason of which an influence is posited in what locates, and an inclination also is posited in what is located; but this mode of being in a place does not befit the Angel.

p. 78
Scholion

I. Iam 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. tractatum est de motu Angelorum, ubi plura dicta sunt, quae servire possunt ad intelligendas quatuor hic propositas quaestiones de modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco. De proprietatibus loci cfr. ibid. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, in specie de differentia inter esse in loco, esse locatum, esse localem (ibid. q. 1. ad 1.). Ibidem in corp. enumerantur quatuor leges loci, scil. continendi, mensurandi, salvandi, terminandi, hic autem tantum tres, omissa ultima, fortasse quia sub vocabulo continendi comprehenditur etiam vocabulum terminandi, minus aptum ad significandum modum, quo Angeli in loco definitive sunt praesentes. Manifestum autem est, a loco non posse nec mensurari nec conservari nisi substantiam corporalem. Mensuratur autem Angelus a limitatione propriae substantiae (S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 1. ad 3.) et altiori modo a Deo, qui est omnium mensura extra genus. Conservatur autem Angelus a solo Deo, cuius virtutem S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) vocat locum spiritualem, consentiente S. Thoma (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 3.). Porro Angelus in stricto sensu etiam non continetur in loco, i. e. sicut mensuratum in mensura, sed continetur in eo «quodam modo», nempe definitive (1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.). S. Thom. (S. I. q. 52. a. 1.) vocabulum continere non admittere videtur, dicens: «Angelus dicitur esse in loco corporeo non ut contentum, sed ut continens aliquo modo». — Ceterum de ista qualicumque praesentia Angeli in loco non mediocriter illa aetate disputatum est, et quidem tum de facto, utrum sit revera praesens in loco, atque de necessitate, utrum indigeat loco, tum de ratione in genere, quare determinetur ad aliquem locum, tum de modo sive ratione formali huius praesentiae in loco.

II. Quoad quaestionem de facto exortae sunt duae opiniones extremae et in verbis quidem oppositae, sed fere in eodem errore sibi propinquae. Quidam enim inter philosophos Arabes dixerunt, quod substantiae separatae nusquam sunt secundum substantiam; quae propositio, si intelligitur, quod substantia non sit in loco, reprobata est ab Episc. Paris. a. 1276 (Collect. iudicior. p. 192. cap. 7. n. 27.), et a S. Thoma (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 1.) nominatur «haeretica, quia secundum fidem nostram ponimus, Angelos immediate circa nos operari» (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 32. m. 2, et propositio a. 1240 damnata, quae 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in Scholio est relata). E contrario Durandus (1. Sent. d. 37. q. 1.) Angelos esse ubique opinatur, sed «absque assertione; solummodo inquirendo et dando occasionem peritioribus ulterius inquirendi». Hanc autem ubiquitatem idem intelligit omnino diversam esse a divina, eamque ponit in eo, quod pro libitu possint ubique operari, in quo totam rationem praesentiae consistere putat. Media autem sententia, quod Angeli nec sint ubique nec nusquam, sed aliquo modo in loco, communissime sustinetur.

III. Altera quaestio, utrum Angelus indigeat ex se, quod ad aliquem corporalem locum definiatur, a S. Bonav. (hic ad 3. et clarius infra q. 4. in corp.) in sensu negativo solvitur. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. (loco cit.), S. Thom. (1. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. ad 4.) et Scotus (hic q. 6. n. 11.), qui dicit: «Quod Angelus non necessario est in loco, quia multo magis posset fieri Angelus sine creatione creaturae corporalis, vel facta creatura corporali, posset fieri et esse extra omnem creaturam corporalem. Et tamen in Angelo est potentia passiva, qua posset esse in loco. Et ista potentia vel fundatur immediate in eius substantia, qua posset esse in loco, vel in ipsa, in quantum est natura limitata, actualiter existens, vel in aliquo extrinseco ipsi Angelo, quidquid sit illud. Et ideo non oportet quaerere aliquam intrinsecam rationem essendi Angelum in loco necessario». Sed his suppositis, iterum duplex se offerebat quaestio: 1. quare et quomodo Angelus determinetur in genere, ut sit in aliquo loco et intra mundum; et 2. quid sit illud, per quod actualiter Angelus praesentiam habeat in hoc loco et non in alio. Primam quaestionem hic et infra q. 4. solvit S. Bonav. ita, ut causa finalis sit ordo universi servandus, et causa efficiens divina ordinatio, quae corporali naturae dedit quandam capacitatem continendi universalem, et Angelo quandam potentiam passivam, ut possit contineri in loco. Haec autem ordinatio divina habet rationem tum in limitatione substantiae angelicae, tum quia in solo corpore est et capacitas continendi et distinctio secundum hic et ibi. Eodem modo respondet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 32. m. 1.) et addit, quod illa proprietas in corporali natura, qua capax est continendi aliquo modo spiritus, «non sit corporalis, ex parte corporis proveniens, sed potius est divinitus data». Item, quod «spiritus angelicus habet ad minus ex parte sua, quod debeat definiri loco, et quod sit hic, ita quod non ibi». Tamen «posset esse, etsi non esset in loco corporali, quoniam ab hac ratione continendi [scil. passive] non dependet esse Angeli, sed solum ab hac ratione continendi, qua dicimus, quod Deus continet omnia». Idem autem de hac solutione ait: «Hoc dicimus sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae, quia hoc non invenimus plane determinatum in s. Scriptura nec a Sanctis nec ab expositoribus s. Scripturae». Etiam Scotus hanc doctrinam approbare videtur et (loc. cit. n. 15.) concludit: «Illud quo primo (Angelus) potest esse in loco, est a Deo producente ipsum super creaturam corporalem continentem; sed ex tunc potest reducere se ipsum ad actum istum (scil. ut sit actualiter in loco, et in hoc loco vel illo). — Posteriores scholastici, neglecta hac quaestione, potius disputant de sequenti.

IV. Quoad modum huius praesentiae, omnes doctores conveniunt, quod Angelus est in loco non circumscriptive, sed definitive, sive, ut ait Caietanus (in S. I. q. 52. a. 1.), conveniunt «in hoc, quod Angelus est in loco non per quantitatem molis nec per contactum quantitativum, sed per quantitatem et contactum virtualem. Et rursus in hoc etiam convenire omnes videntur, quod contactus ille sit relatio praesentiae Angeli ad locum causaliter, vel formaliter. Sed differentia opinionum et difficultas consistit in assignando, quod sit illius praesentiae fundamentum. Excedit enim evidentia eius humani ingenii capacitatem, propterea quod ex sacris eloquiis habemus, Angelos alicubi esse, et non apparet, quomodo tangant illum locum». — Durandus (loc. cit.) quatuor affert opiniones; sed duae prae aliis sunt celebres. S. Thom. in Summa (loc. cit.) docet, quod «per applicationem virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque dicitur Angelus esse in loco». Quomodo autem hoc intelligendum sit, a discipulis Angelici non eodem modo exponitur (cfr. Caietan., loc. cit.). Contra sententiam S. Thomae late disputat Scot. (hic q. 6. et Report. q. 2.) et in re convenire videtur cum Richardo a Med. (1. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.) dicente: «Ratio applicationis Angeli ad locum est sua simultas cum loco vel cum re in loco existente... sicut formalis ratio applicationis corporis ad locum est circumscriptio». Ambo afferunt articulum ab Episc. Paris. reprobatum, qui est: «Substantiae separatae sunt alicubi per operationem», qui censuratur sic: «Error, si intelligatur, sine operatione substantiam non esse in loco» (Collect. iudic. t. 1. p. 192. cap. 7. n. 25, sed cfr. supra Scholion pag. 30). De hac et de altera propositione damnata (supra n. II.) loquuntur etiam Durand. (loc. cit.) et praecipue Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 2. q. 9.), cuius verba notatu digna sunt: «In hoc enim concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus, unanimiter concedentes, quod substantia Angeli non est ratio, Angelum esse in loco secundum substantiam; et consimili ratione verum est indubitanter, quod si Angelus per potentiam suam, scil. intellectum ac voluntatem, virtutem suam non applicat ad locum operando circa ipsum, quod similiter potentia eius... non est ratio eius essendi ipsum in loco, nisi forte potentia eius sit minoris abstractionis, quam sit eius substantia». Idem in fine asserit, nullam se sustinere nec defendere specialem opinionem de hac re. De hac ultima quaest. S. Bonav., sicut nec Alex. Hal., explicite non tractat. Verba autem eius, incidenter prolata, favent sententiae Richardi, Scoti et Petri a Tar., ut hic q. 3. ad 2, q. 4. in corp.; 1. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.

V. Praeter locos iam citatos: S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 1; Quodl. 1. q. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 37. a. 26; S. p. I. tr. 18. q. 73. m. 2. a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 4. a. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Alii commentatores de hac et seqq. qq. plerumque agunt 1. Sent. d. 37.

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Scholion

I. Already in 1 Sent. d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, 2, 3, the motion of the Angels was treated, where many [things] were said which can serve for understanding the four questions here proposed concerning the mode in which the Angels are in a place. On the properties of place cf. ibid. a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3, in particular on the difference between being in a place, being located, being local (ibid. q. 1, ad 1). There in the body four laws of place are enumerated, namely of containing, of measuring, of saving, of terminating; here, however, only three, the last omitted, perhaps because under the word of containing is comprehended also the word of terminating, less apt for signifying the mode in which the Angels are definitively present in a place. But it is manifest that by a place neither can [anything] be measured nor conserved except a corporeal substance. The Angel, however, is measured by the limitation of its own substance (St. Thomas, S. I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 3) and in a higher mode by God, who is the measure of all [things] outside the genus. The Angel, moreover, is conserved by God alone, whose power St. Bonaventure (here in the body) calls a spiritual place, St. Thomas consenting (1 Sent. d. 37, q. 3, a. 3). Further, the Angel in the strict sense is also not contained in a place, i.e. as what is measured in a measure, but is contained in it «in a certain mode», namely definitively (1 Sent. d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body). St. Thomas (S. I, q. 52, a. 1) seems not to admit the word to contain, saying: «An Angel is said to be in a corporeal place not as contained, but as containing in some mode». — Moreover, about this presence of the Angel in a place, of whatever kind, there was no slight dispute in that age, and indeed both about the fact, whether it is really present in a place, and about the necessity, whether it needs a place, and about the reason in general, why it is determined to some place, and about the mode or formal character of this presence in a place.

II. As to the question of fact, there arose two extreme opinions, opposed indeed in words, but in nearly the same error close to one another. For some among the Arab philosophers said that separate substances are nowhere according to substance; which proposition, if it is understood [to mean] that the substance is not in a place, was reproved by the Bishop of Paris in the year 1276 (Collection of Judgments p. 192, cap. 7, n. 27), and by St. Thomas (1 Sent. d. 37, q. 3, a. 1) is named «heretical, because according to our faith we posit that the Angels operate immediately around us» (cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 32, m. 2, and the proposition condemned in the year 1240, which is reported in 1 Sent. d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the Scholion). On the contrary, Durandus (1 Sent. d. 37, q. 1) is of the opinion that the Angels are everywhere, but «without assertion; only by inquiring and giving occasion to the more skilled for inquiring further». This ubiquity, however, the same [author] understands to be wholly different from the divine, and posits it in this, that they can at pleasure operate everywhere, in which he thinks the whole character of presence consists. But the middle opinion, that the Angels are neither everywhere nor nowhere, but in a place in some mode, is most commonly maintained.

III. The other question, whether the Angel of itself needs to be defined to some corporeal place, is solved by St. Bonaventure (here ad 3 and more clearly below q. 4 in the body) in the negative sense. Alexander of Hales (loc. cit.), St. Thomas (1 Sent. d. 37, a. 1, ad 4), and Scotus (here q. 6, n. 11) consent, [the latter] saying: «That the Angel is not necessarily in a place, because much more could an Angel come to be without the creation of a corporeal creature, or, a corporeal creature having been made, [the Angel] could come to be and be outside every corporeal creature. And yet in the Angel there is a passive potency by which it could be in a place. And this potency is either founded immediately in its substance, by which it could be in a place, or in it in so far as it is a limited nature actually existing, or in something extrinsic to the Angel itself, whatever that be. And therefore there is no need to seek some intrinsic reason for the Angel's being necessarily in a place». But these [things] being supposed, again a twofold question offered itself: 1. why and how the Angel is determined in general, so that it is in some place and within the world; and 2. what that is, through which the Angel actually has presence in this place and not in another. The first question here and below q. 4 St. Bonaventure solves so that the final cause is the order of the universe to be preserved, and the efficient cause is the divine ordination, which gave to corporeal nature a certain universal capacity of containing, and to the Angel a certain passive potency, that it might be able to be contained in a place. But this divine ordination has its reason both in the limitation of the angelic substance, and because in body alone there is both a capacity of containing and a distinction according to here and there. In the same mode Alexander of Hales responds (S. p. II, q. 32, m. 1) and adds that that property in corporeal nature, by which it is capable of containing a spirit in some mode, «is not corporeal, coming from the part of the body, but rather is divinely given». Likewise, that «the angelic spirit has at least on its own part [the property] that it ought to be defined by a place, and that it is here, so that not there». Yet «it could be, even if it were not in a corporeal place, since on this reason of containing [namely passively] the being of the Angel does not depend, but only on this reason of containing by which we say that God contains all [things]». But the same [author] says of this solution: «We say this without prejudice to a better opinion, because we do not find this plainly determined in sacred Scripture nor by the Saints nor by the expositors of sacred Scripture». Scotus too seems to approve this doctrine and (loc. cit. n. 15) concludes: «That by which first (the Angel) can be in a place is from God producing it over the containing corporeal creature; but from then it can reduce itself to that act (namely that it be actually in a place, and in this place or that)». — The later scholastics, this question being neglected, rather dispute about the following [one].

IV. As to the mode of this presence, all the doctors agree that the Angel is in a place not circumscriptively but definitively, or, as Cajetan says (on S. I, q. 52, a. 1), they agree «in this, that the Angel is in a place not by quantity of mass nor by quantitative contact, but by virtual quantity and contact. And again in this also all seem to agree, that that contact is the relation of the Angel's presence to the place causally or formally. But the difference of opinions and the difficulty consists in assigning what is the foundation of that presence. For its evidence exceeds the capacity of human ingenuity, because from the sacred discourses we have [it] that the Angels are somewhere, and it does not appear how they touch that place». — Durandus (loc. cit.) brings forward four opinions; but two beyond the others are famous. St. Thomas in the Summa (loc. cit.) teaches that «by the application of angelic power to some place in whatever manner the Angel is said to be in a place». But how this is to be understood is not expounded in the same mode by the disciples of the Angelic [Doctor] (cf. Cajetan, loc. cit.). Against the opinion of St. Thomas Scotus disputes at length (here q. 6 and Reportatio q. 2) and in substance seems to agree with Richard of Middleton (1 Sent. d. 37, a. 2, q. 1) who says: «The reason of the application of the Angel to a place is its simultaneity with the place or with the thing existing in the place... just as the formal reason of the application of a body to a place is circumscription». Both bring forward the article reproved by the Bishop of Paris, which is: «Separate substances are somewhere through operation», which is censured thus: «An error, if it is understood [that] without operation the substance is not in a place» (Collection of Judgments t. 1, p. 192, cap. 7, n. 25, but cf. above the Scholion p. 30). On this and on the other condemned proposition (above n. II) speak also Durandus (loc. cit.) and especially Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 2, q. 9), whose words are worthy of note: «For in this all the masters of theology gathered upon this [matter], of whom I was one, agreed, unanimously conceding that the substance of the Angel is not the reason of the Angel's being in a place according to substance; and by a like reason it is undoubtedly true that, if the Angel by its potency, namely intellect and will, does not apply its power to a place by operating around it, that likewise its potency... is not the reason of its being in the place, unless perhaps its potency be of less abstraction than its substance is». The same [author] at the end asserts that he sustains nor defends no special opinion on this matter. On this last question St. Bonaventure, like Alexander of Hales, does not explicitly treat. But his words, incidentally uttered, favor the opinion of Richard, Scotus, and Peter of Tarentaise, as here q. 3 ad 2, q. 4 in the body; 1 Sent. d. 37, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.

V. Besides the places already cited: St. Thomas, 1 Sent. d. 37, q. 3, a. 1; Quodl. 1, q. 1, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, 1 Sent. d. 37, a. 26; S. p. I, tr. 18, q. 73, m. 2, a. 13. — Peter of Tarentaise, 1 Sent. d. 37, q. 4, a. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 2. — Other commentators on this and the following questions for the most part treat [them in] 1 Sent. d. 37.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Ita plures codd. ut U W Y bb; alii multi omittunt hoc loco simul, quod tamen infra in titulo quaestionis ponunt.
    So several codices, as U W Y bb; many others omit simul in this place, which however they put below in the title of the question.
  2. 2
    Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 4.
    Cf. the text of the Master, here c. 4.
  3. 3
    Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 6.
    Book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6.
  4. 4
    Cod. cc et ed. 1 caelum empyreum.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] caelum empyreum.
  5. 5
    De repugnantia actionis in distans cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. Ergo cum operetur pro Ergo cum operatur. De relatione angelicae operationis ad locum cfr. Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 13, cuius verba infra pag. 79, nota 5. referuntur.
    On the incompatibility of action at a distance cf. I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — Somewhat below several codices [read] Ergo cum operetur for Ergo cum operatur. On the relation of angelic operation to place cf. Damascene, I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 13, whose words are reported below p. 79, note 5.
  6. 6
    Vers. 41; Vulgata: Discedite a me maledicti etc. Ite [est] secundum translationem Benedicti Ariae Montani. Vide August., Enarrat. 1. in Ps. 36. n. 11.
    Verse 41; the Vulgate: Depart from me, you cursed etc. Ite ["Go"] is according to the translation of Benedictus Arias Montanus. See Augustine, Enarration 1 on Psalm 36, n. 11.
  7. 7
    Circa initium, ubi propositionem per se notam seu communem animi conceptionem ita distinguit: Nam ita una communis est, ut omnium hominum sit... alia vero est doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus venit, ut est: quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse.
    Near the beginning, where he distinguishes the self-evident proposition or common conception of the mind thus: For one is common in such a way that it is of all men... but another is of the learned only, which nevertheless comes from such common conceptions of the mind, as is: that the things which are incorporeal are not in a place.
  8. 8
    Libr. IV. Moral. c. 33. n. 67: Deus enim, qui sine situ omnia continet, nobis ad se venientibus locus non localis manet. Cfr. etiam VIII. c. 19. n. 35, ubi dicit, quod Deus [sit] locus hominis. — Ioan. de Rupella, Summa de Anima, p. I. c. 52. citat August., de Quant. animae, ubi c. 1. n. 2. legitur: Propriam quandam habitationem animae ac patriam Deum ipsum credo esse, a quo creata est.
    Book IV Morals, c. 33, n. 67: For God, who without position contains all [things], remains for us, as we come to him, a place not local. Cf. also VIII, c. 19, n. 35, where he says that God [is] the place of man. — John of La Rochelle, Summa on the Soul, p. I, c. 52, cites Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, where c. 1, n. 2 it is read: I believe God himself, by whom it was created, to be a certain proper dwelling and homeland of the soul.
  9. 9
    Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi principia huius argumenti ac seqq. tanguntur, et in notis adiectis verba Aristotelis adducuntur. — Vat. impleat pro suppleat.
    Cf. 1 Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where the principles of this argument and the following are touched on, and in the added notes the words of Aristotle are adduced. — The Vatican edition [reads] impleat for suppleat.
  10. 10
    Melius cum codd. aa bb cc et ed. 1 omitteretur ex hoc. Paulo inferius cod. T in animam peccatricem vel spiritum.
    It would be better, with codices aa bb cc and ed. 1, that ex hoc be omitted. A little below codex T [reads] in animam peccatricem vel spiritum.
  11. 11
    Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 28: Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Cfr. XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10, quem textum invenies tom. 1. pag. 544, nota 3. — Circa finem argumenti plures codd. cum Vat. non habent locari pro non habent locum.
    Book XI On the City of God, c. 28: For a body is borne by weight, just as a mind by love, wherever it is borne. Cf. XIII Confessions c. 9, n. 10, which text you will find in tom. 1, p. 544, note 3. — Near the end of the argument several codices with the Vatican edition [read] non habent locari for non habent locum.
  12. 12
    Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. 1 Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
  13. 13
    Vat. sola, omissa particula et, mutat interpunctionem legendo circumscribentem propriae substantiae, virtutis; lectio falsa.
    The Vatican edition alone, the particle et omitted, changes the punctuation, reading circumscribentem propriae substantiae, virtutis; a false reading.
  14. 14
    Vat. cum paucis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4 prosequitur quia ordinem non haberent in creatione, eo quod creata sunt simul, nec haberent ordinem unius ad alterum.
    The Vatican edition, with a few manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 4, continues because they would not have order in [their] creation, by the fact that they were created together, nor would they have the order of one to another.
  15. 15
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, et p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and p. II, a. 1, q. 2, at the end.
  16. 16
    Locus enim et tempus determinatum important per se quid limitatum, ideoque et inter notas individuantes obtinent primatum; cfr. tom. I. pag. 338, nota 1.
    For a determinate place and time imply of themselves something limited, and therefore among the individuating marks they obtain the primacy; cf. tom. 1, p. 338, note 1.
  17. 17
    Vat. secundum hic et ibi. Paulo inferius multi codd. secundum gradus positionem, cod. cc et ed. 1 secundum gradus pro secundum gradus perfectionum. Dein Vat. et ita una pro et ita quod una.
    The Vatican edition [reads] secundum hic et ibi. A little below many codices [read] secundum gradus positionem, codex cc and ed. 1 secundum gradus for secundum gradus perfectionum. Then the Vatican edition [reads] et ita una for et ita quod una.
  18. 18
    Supple cum Vat. quia.
    Supply, with the Vatican edition, quia.
  19. 19
    Vat. cum nonnullis mss. intelligitur.
    The Vatican edition, with some manuscripts, [reads] intelligitur.
  20. 20
    In Vat. suppletur animae.
    In the Vatican edition animae is supplied.
  21. 21
    Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 5.
    Cf. 1 Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 5.
  22. 22
    Plures codd. ut F I T W aa bb quia.
    Several codices, as F I T W aa bb, [read] quia.
Cite this

St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in II librum Sententiarum, Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1885), tom. II, pp. 75–78.

English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/2/d2/p2-a2-q1. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.

Authorities cited here

Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones, De civitate Dei, De quantitate animae, Enarrationes in Psalmos (2) · Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob · John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa (2) · John of La Rochelle, Summa de anima

Cited by

13 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether an angel can be moved locally without a body
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1
Whether things have a causal principle
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1 · 2×
pag. 78, nota 2
Commentary on Distinction 1. Part I — Division of the text and Treatment of the questions.
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1 · 2×
pag. 78, nota 2
Whether any Angels are sent.
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 10
supra d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether the Angels are sent to illuminate our intellect.
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 10
pag. 77
What relation that unformed matter had to place
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
supra pag. 77, nota 2
Whether the body of Adam ought to have been produced from a purely celestial nature.
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 17
supra d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
Whether an Angel is at once and at the same time in several places
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2
supra pag. 77, nota 2
Whether the matter of which the Angels are composed is the same as the matter of corporeal things
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1
Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXVI)
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36
supra pag. 76, nota 6
What is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38
supra pag. 76, nota 6
Whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39
supra pag. 76, nota 6
Whether the body of Christ is in every part of the host
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 10
II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

2 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.