Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec proprietas conveniat Deo in summo, id est, utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.

1. Et quod sic, videtur per Anselmum¹, qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse, quam quod potest: ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit², divinum esse ita est, quod non potest cogitari non esse.

2. Item, Damascenus³ dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaliter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nec assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse.

3. Item, maior est veritas in esse divino quam in aliqua dignitate⁴; sed aliqua dignitas ita est vera, quod non est ei contradicere corde, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia; unde non potest cogitari non esse: ergo multo fortius hoc erit verum dicere de prima veritate.

4. Item, intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem⁵, ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare, non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse.

5. Item, quod contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare⁶; sed non contingit enuntiare, primam veritatem non esse: ergo nec cogitare. Probatio: omnis sermo enuntiativus asserit, se esse verum; unde sequitur: si homo est asinus, hominem esse asinum est verum; sed omne quod ponit veritatem, ponit primam veritatem, quia omnis veritas infert illam: ergo omnis sermo asserit, primam veritatem esse: ergo etc.

6. Item, omnis sermo enuntiativus⁷ aut affirmativus est, aut negativus; sed affirmativus affirmat hoc de hoc; sed sequitur: si est ens quod est hoc, est ens quod non est hoc, quia cum dico ens hoc, dico ens limitatum, finitum et arctatum; et tali posito, ponitur ens summum: ergo omnis sermo affirmativus circa creaturam infert Deum.

7. Item, negativus similiter, quia nullus sermo est magis negativus quam iste: nulla est veritas. Sed Augustinus in Soliloquiis⁸ probat, quod sermo iste ponit, aliquam veritatem esse; quia si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, aliqua veritas est: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Damascenus⁹: «In tantum praevaluit perniciosa hominum malitia, ut dicat, Deum non esse, secundum illud Psalmi: Dixit insipiens etc.»

2. Item, idolatra dicit, quod non est alius Deus nisi idolum, et hoc credit et cogitat; sed constat idolum non esse Deum: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, quo intellecto non esse, potest aliquid intelligi, potest cogitari non esse. Sed dicit Boethius in libro de Hebdomadibus¹⁰, quod in-

tellecto esse impossibile, summum bonum non esse, adhuc potest aliquid intelligi rotundum et album: ergo similiter in summo vero, et sic poterit cogitari non esse.

4. Item, illud quod maxime nos latet, de facili potest cogitari non esse: sed veritas divini esse est huiusmodi, quia Deus habitat lucem inaccessibilem¹¹: ergo etc.

5. Item, quaero, quid est dicere, Deum non posse cogitari non esse? Si quia non potest aliquo modo cogitari¹² nec vero nec false, illud est manifeste falsum: si quia non potest vere, similiter nec anima nec caelum et huiusmodi.

6. Item, quod contingit exprimere contingit¹³ et cogitare; sed contingit exprimere, divinum esse non esse: ergo et cogitare. Quod contingat, hoc patet, cum dicitur in speciali: Deus non est, et in generali: nihil est; et quod neutra istarum inferat, Deum esse, patet, quia oppositum non infert oppositum¹⁴, et quod nihil ponit nihil infert; quaelibet autem istarum nihil ponit.

Conclusio.

Tanta est veritas divini esse, ut non possit cum assensu cogitari non esse nisi propter defectum ex parte intelligentis, qui ignorat, quid sit Deus; ex parte vero intelligibilis non potest esse defectus nec praesentiae nec evidentiae, sive in se, sive in probando.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid cogitare¹⁵ non esse est dupliciter. Aut in ratione falsi, sicut cogito de hac: homo est asinus; et hoc cogitare nihil aliud est quam quid est, quod dicitur, intelligere. Hoc modo potest cogitari non esse veritas divini esse.

Alio modo est cogitare cum assensu, sicut cogito aliquid non esse, et credo non esse: et hoc modo aliquid cogitare non esse, quod est, potest venire aut ex defectu intelligentis, aut ex defectu intelligibilis.

Defectus autem intelligentis est caecitas vel ignorantia, ob quam, quia ignorat rem, cogitat¹⁶ ipsam non esse. Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet si est et quid est¹⁷.

Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem, quid est, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem, si est. Unde Hugo¹⁸: «Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, quid esset, poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam, quia esset, poterat ignorari». Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei, si est, ideo nec potest ignorare, ipsum esse simpliciter¹⁹, nec cogitare non esse.

Quia vero deficit in cognitione, quid est, ideo frequenter cogitat, Deum esse quod non est, sicut idolum, vel non esse quod est, sicut Deum iustum²⁰. Et quia qui cogitat, Deum non esse quod est, ut iustum, per consequens cogitat, ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat, beatitudinem esse in Deo, negat eum²¹ esse.

Hoc autem modo procedunt rationes probantes, quod aliquis intellectus cogitat vel cogitare²² potest, divinum esse non esse.

Alio modo potest cogitari, aliquid non esse propter defectum a parte intelligibilis, et huiusmodi defectus potest esse dupliciter: aut defectus praesentiae, aut defectus evidentiae; defectus praesentiae, utpote quia non semper, non ubique²³, non ubique totaliter. Quod non semper est, aliquando est, aliquando non: et ideo aliquando vere potest cogitari non esse. Similiter de eo quod non est ubique, quia eadem ratione, qua potest cogitari non esse hic, potest cogitari non esse alibi. Similiter de eo quod secundum partem adest, secundum partem abest.

Deus autem est semper et ubique et totus semper et ubique: ideo non potest cogitari non esse. Hanc rationem assignat Anselmus in libro contra in-

Non solum propter defectum praesentiae²⁴ potest cogitari aliquid non esse, sed etiam propter defectum evidentiae, quia non est evidens in se, nec est evidens in probando. Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et in se et in probando. In se, quia sicut principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos²⁵, et quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, ideo se ipsis sunt evidentia; sic et in proposito. Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto. Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex²⁶ se, sed etiam ex probatione, quoniam divinam veritatem esse probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura creata, quia si est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam. Probat iterum ipsam et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas, quae est causa omnis veri²⁷. Propositio autem negativa non probat ipsam nisi sophistice, ut dicunt. Unde ex hoc quod est nihil, esse, vel nullam veritatem esse, non contingit concludere nec inferre, veritatem esse. Haec enim propositio: nihil esse²⁸, destruit omnem veritatem. Et ideo ad ipsam non sequitur aliqua affirmatio, et haec est falsa: si nihil est, nihil esse est verum. Et si dicatur, quod omnis propositio infert dictum, verum est, sed si nihil est, nulla propositio est nec aliquid. Augustinus autem tale argumentum non facit approbando, sed inquirendo.

Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, qui ignorat, quid est quod per nomen Dei²⁹ dicitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae sint sophisticae.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: In tantum praevaluit etc.; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de cogitatione, quae venit ab excaecatione; quod patet ex ipso verbo eius, cum dicit malitia.

2. Similiter ad illud de idolo, dicendum, quod ideo errat³⁰, quia ignorat, quid sit; unde non cogitat, Deum non esse in universali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellecto Deo non esse, possunt alia³¹ intelligi; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de intellectu, quo per impossibile aliquid cogitamus, sed non assentimus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxime nos latet; patet responsio, quia³² maxime nos latet, quid est, sed tamen maxime patet, si est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quid est dicere, divinam veritatem non posse cogitari non esse? dicendum, quod hoc est dicere, quod³³ aliquis non potest credere, quod Deus non sit, dummodo utatur ratione. Non sic de creaturis; quia etsi certum est, unam creaturam esse praesentem uni, non tamen omnibus, quia non est virtutis tantae, ut se omnibus offerat aequaliter, sicut prima veritas.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod potest accipi cogitare generaliter pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentientis sive non; et tunc est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione cum assensu; et sic est falsum, quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus in libro Posteriorum³⁴.

Question II. Whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.

Secondly it is asked whether this property belongs to God in the highest degree, that is, whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.

1. And that it is so, seems [proved] through Anselm¹, who says that God, according to the common conception of the mind, is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can; therefore, since nothing greater than God can be thought², the divine being is such that it cannot be thought not to be.

2. Likewise, Damascene³ says that the knowledge of God's existing is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not desert us nor grow accustomed to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed upon the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore it cannot be thought not to be.

3. Likewise, there is greater truth in the divine being than in any axiom⁴; but some axiom is so true that one cannot contradict it in the heart, as, every whole is greater than its part, and the like; whence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first truth.

4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first light and truth⁵; therefore every action of the intellect, which consists in thinking something not to be, is through the first light; but through the first light it does not happen [one] to think the first light or truth not to be: therefore in no way does it happen [one] to think the first truth not to be.

5. Likewise, what it happens [one] to think, it happens [one] to enunciate⁶; but it does not happen [one] to enunciate the first truth not to be: therefore neither to think it. Proof: every enunciative speech asserts itself to be true; whence it follows: if man is an ass, that man is an ass is true; but everything which posits truth posits the first truth, because every truth implies it: therefore every speech asserts that the first truth is: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every enunciative speech⁷ is either affirmative or negative; but the affirmative affirms this of this; but it follows: if there is a being which is this, there is a being which is not this, because when I say "this being," I say a being limited, finite, and constricted; and with such posited, the highest being is posited: therefore every affirmative speech concerning the creature implies God.

7. Likewise, the negative similarly, because no speech is more negative than this: there is no truth. But Augustine in the Soliloquies⁸ proves that this speech posits some truth to be; because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, some truth is: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Damascene⁹: «So far has the pernicious malice of men prevailed, that he says God is not, according to that of the Psalm: The fool hath said etc.»

2. Likewise, the idolater says that there is no other God except the idol, and this he believes and thinks; but it is established that the idol is not God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every such thing, with which understood not to be, something can be understood, can be thought not to be. But Boethius in the book de Hebdomadibus¹⁰ says that with [it] understood to be impossible that the highest good is not, something round and white can still be understood: therefore similarly in the highest true, and thus it will be able to be thought not to be.

4. Likewise, that which is most hidden from us can easily be thought not to be: but the truth of the divine being is of this sort, because God dwells in inaccessible light¹¹: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, I ask, what is it to say that God cannot be thought not to be? If because he cannot in any way be thought¹² either truly or falsely, that is manifestly false; if because he cannot truly, similarly neither the soul nor the heaven and the like [can be thought not to be].

6. Likewise, what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also¹³ to think; but it happens [one] to express the divine being not to be: therefore also to think it. That it does so happen is clear, when it is said in particular: God is not, and in general: nothing is; and that neither of these implies God to be is clear, because the opposite does not imply the opposite¹⁴, and what posits nothing implies nothing; but each of these posits nothing.

Conclusion.

So great is the truth of the divine being, that it cannot be thought not to be with assent except on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding, who is ignorant of what God is; but on the part of the intelligible there can be no defect either of presence or of evidence, whether in itself or in proving.

I respond: It must be said that to think¹⁵ something not to be is twofold. Either in the manner of the false, as I think concerning this: man is an ass; and this thinking is nothing other than to understand what is said. In this way the truth of the divine being can be thought not to be.

In another way it is to think with assent, as I think something not to be, and I believe it not to be: and in this way to think something not to be which is, can come either from a defect of the one understanding, or from a defect of the intelligible.

Now the defect of the one understanding is blindness or ignorance, on account of which, because he is ignorant of the thing, he thinks¹⁶ it not to be. But it happens that the thinking concerning some being is twofold, namely whether it is and what it is¹⁷.

Our intellect, however, fails in the thinking of the divine truth as to the cognition of what it is, yet does not fail as to the cognition of whether it is. Whence Hugh¹⁸: «God so from the beginning tempered the knowledge of himself in man, that just as never could what he is be comprehended, so never could that he is be ignored». Since therefore our intellect never fails in the cognition of God, whether he is, therefore neither can it be ignorant that he is simply¹⁹, nor think him not to be.

But because it fails in the cognition of what he is, therefore it frequently thinks God to be what he is not, as the idol, or not to be what he is, as a just God²⁰. And because he who thinks God not to be what he is, e.g. just, consequently thinks him not to be: therefore by reason of the defect of the intellect God can be thought not to be, or [thought to be] the highest truth [not to be]; not however simply or generally, but as a consequence, as he who denies blessedness to be in God denies him²¹ to be.

In this way proceed the reasons proving that some intellect thinks or can think²² the divine being not to be.

In another way it can be thought that something is not on account of a defect on the part of the intelligible, and a defect of this sort can be twofold: either a defect of presence, or a defect of evidence; a defect of presence, inasmuch as [a thing] is not always, not everywhere²³, not everywhere wholly. What is not always, sometimes is, sometimes is not: and therefore sometimes truly can be thought not to be. Similarly concerning that which is not everywhere, because by the same reason by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Similarly concerning that which is present in part, is absent in part.

But God is always and everywhere and wholly always and everywhere: therefore he cannot be thought not to be. This reason Anselm assigns in the book against the [insipient]…

Not only on account of a defect of presence²⁴ can something be thought not to be, but also on account of a defect of evidence, because it is not evident in itself, nor evident in being proved. But the truth of the divine being is evident both in itself and in being proved. In itself, because just as we know principles insofar as [we know] the terms²⁵, and because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject, therefore they are evident through themselves; so also in the matter at hand. For God or the highest truth is being itself, than which nothing better can be thought: therefore it cannot not be, nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is enclosed in the subject. Nor does it have evidence only from²⁶ itself, but also from proof, since every truth and created nature proves and concludes the divine truth to be, because if there is a being by participation and from another, there is a being by essence and not from another. Every right understanding also proves and concludes the same, because the cognition of him is impressed upon every soul, and every cognition is through him. Again, every affirmative proposition proves and concludes the same; for every such posits something; and with something posited, the true is posited; and with the true posited, truth is posited, which is the cause of every true²⁷. The negative proposition, however, does not prove it except sophistically, as they say. Whence from this — that nothing is, or that no truth is — it does not happen to conclude or to infer that truth is. For this proposition: nothing is²⁸, destroys all truth. And therefore no affirmation follows upon it, and this is false: if nothing is, "nothing is" is true. And if it be said that every proposition implies a dictum, this is true, but if nothing is, no proposition is, nor anything. Augustine, however, makes such an argument not by approving, but by inquiring.

It must therefore be granted, that so great is the truth of the divine being, that with assent it cannot be thought not to be except on account of the ignorance of the one thinking, who is ignorant of what that is which is said by the name of God²⁹. And the reasons to this effect must be granted, even though some are sophistical.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: So far has etc.; it must be said that Damascene speaks of the thinking which comes from being blinded; which is clear from his own word, when he says malice.

2. Similarly to that about the idol, it must be said that [the idolater] errs³⁰, because he is ignorant of what [God] is; whence he does not think God not to be universally.

3. To that which is objected, that with God understood not to be, other things³¹ can be understood; it must be said that Boethius speaks of the understanding by which we think something through the impossible, but do not assent.

4. To that which is objected, that [God] is most hidden from us; the response is clear, because³² what he is is most hidden from us, but yet whether he is is most manifest.

5. To that which is objected, what is it to say that the divine truth cannot be thought not to be? it must be said that this is to say that³³ no one can believe that God is not, so long as he uses reason. Not so concerning creatures; because although it is certain that one creature is present to one [thing], not however to all, because it is not of such power that it offers itself equally to all, as the first truth does.

6. To that which is objected, that what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also to think; it must be said that "to think" can be taken generally for an act of the mind, whether erring or not, whether assenting or not; and then that [statement] is true; or for thinking with assent; and thus it is false, because to axioms it happens [one] to contradict as to the outer reasoning, not however as to the inner, as the Philosopher says in the book of the Posteriora³⁴.