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Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De veritate Dei.

Quaestio I. Utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.

Quod veritas sit proprietas divini esse, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus.

1. Primo modo sic: Hieronymus ad Marcellam, et habetur in littera1: « Solus Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est »; sed quod alicui soli convenit, est proprium illi: ergo veritas est proprium divini esse.

2. Item, Augustinus de Vera Religione2: « Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imitantur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt ». Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas.

3. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis et de Vera Religione3 dicit, quod lux increata est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia cognoscibilia: ergo si veritas est ratio cognoscendi, et sola lux increata est veritas: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

4. Item, Anselmus in libro de Veritate4 dicit, quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate: aut ergo intelligit effective, aut formaliter; non effective, quia similiter omnia possent dici vera5 prima bonitate: ergo intelligitur formaliter: ergo non est alia veritas quam veritas increata: ergo si illa est in Deo et Deus, veritas est solius Dei proprietas.

5. Item, rationibus probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem6 et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas.

6. Item, veritas opponitur umbrae. Quod enim est umbra rei, non habet veritatem7; sed creaturae sunt umbrae illius summi esse: ergo non habent veritatem in esse.

7. Item, veritas est, qua aliquid est verum; sed veritas est vera, cum sit cognoscibilis; sed constat quod non alio quam se, quia alias8 esset abire in infinitum; sed quod est verum se ipso, est verum per essentiam: ergo omnis veritas est vera per essentiam; sed sola veritas increata est vera per essentiam: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

Contra:

1. Si veritas est Dei proprietas, aut ergo veritas complexa, aut incomplexa. Non complexa; quia talis est cum compositione, in Deo autem non est compositio aliqua. Non incomplexa; quia haec convertitur cum ente9: ergo cum entitas non sit Dei proprietas, pari ratione nec veritas erit.

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2. Item, verum aeque commune est ut bonum, et quodam modo magis10; sed bonitas non est Dei proprietas: ergo pari ratione nec veritas.

3. Item, veritas est ratio discernendi Creatorem a creatura et creaturam a creatura11; sed quod est ratio discernendi et distinguendi est diversum in diversis: ergo alia veritas est in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura quam in alia: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

4. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis12: « Verum est id quod est », ergo veritas est ipsa entitas: ergo non est proprium essentiae, quia si sic, qua ratione dicitur: Veritas est13 proprietas essentiae, posset dici e converso, cum omnino idem sint.

Conclusio. Veritas, quatenus opponitur falsitati, invenitur etiam in creaturis secundum triplicem suam comparationem ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, ad intellectum quem excitat; quatenus vero opponitur permixtioni, est proprietas solius Dei.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod veritas habet triplicem comparationem. Habet enim comparari ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, et ad intellectum quem excitat. In comparatione ad subiectum veritatis dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad principium dicitur veritas summae unitatis14 et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad intellectum dicitur veritas ratio discernendi.

Et in omnibus istis comparationibus dupliciter potest accipi veritas: uno modo, prout distinguitur contra falsitatem; alio modo, prout distinguitur contra permixtionem, secundum quod verum dicitur purum et impermixtum.

Prout veritas dividitur contra falsitatem, quae est privatio indivisionis et imitationis et15 expressionis, sic cum in creatura sit aliquo modo invenire et indivisionem et imitationem et expressionem, sic est veritas non tantum in Creatore, sed etiam in creatura; et sic non assignatur Dei proprietas.

Alio modo, prout veritas dividitur contra permixtionem sive impuritatem, sic est in solo Deo. Nam in solo Deo est indivisio pura, non permixta alicui diversitati; in solo Deo est imitatio et similitudo pura non permixta alicui dissimilitudini; et in solo Deo est expressio luminis non permixta obscuritati16. In creatura autem est indivisio cum actus et potentiae diversitate et imitatio cum dissimilitudine; est ulterius in ea expressio cum obscuritate. Et ideo hoc modo veritas est divini esse proprietas; et sic accipit Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse, quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate, nihil de non entitate. Et ideo in Deo non cadit praeteritio et futuritio, quae aliquo modo non entia sunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1, 2, 5, 6. Et sic procedunt duae primae auctoritates et rationes.

Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non sit alia veritas quam aeterna, quia ipsa sola facit intelligere; dicendum, quod sicut color est obiectum visus et motivum visus — tamen non sine actu lucis — et differt ab17 ipsa luce; sic dicendum, quod veritas creata, quamvis non possit movere sine veritate increata, nihilominus est motiva suo modo et alia veritas ab illa.

Ad 4 et 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima; dicendum, quod verum de sui impositione dicit comparationem ad causam exemplarem, sicut bonum ad causam finalem. Sicut enim dicitur bonum ratione ordinis, sic verum ratione expressionis; et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris. Sicut igitur, cum dicitur de bonis creatis, quod sunt bona bonitate increata, bonitas praedicat finem in ablativo, non formam, quia Dei bonitas18 nullius creati est forma; similiter, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt vera veritate increata, ablativus dicit causam formalem exemplarem19. Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem; et per hoc patet ultimum.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est proprietas; patet responsio: quoniam

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obiicit de veritate, secundum quod habet oppositionem ad defectum falsitatis, non ad permixtionem possibilitatis; praedicto enim modo convenit non tantum Creatori, sed etiam creaturae.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est idem quod divina essentia; dicendum, quod de ratione proprietatis in creatura sunt ista tria: primum est, quod convenit soli; secundum est, quod est ratio innotescendi; tertium est, quod differt ab eo cuius est proprietas20. Duo prima sunt perfectionis, ultimum vero imperfectionis, quia excludit simplicitatem. Et ideo veritas dicitur divinae essentiae proprietas, non quia differat vel sit inhaerens divinae essentiae, sicut accidens21 subiecto, sed quia soli convenit et est ratio cognoscendi eam. Et haec est causa, quare e converso essentia non est proprietas veritatis, quia non est ratio innotescendi eam, sicut e converso.

Si autem quaeras, cum idem significent essentia et veritas, quare unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et non e converso; ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod quamvis idem significent essentia et veritas, tamen unum, scilicet veritas, est magis ratio cognoscendi ratione connotati. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia veritas nihil connotat. Dicendum ergo, quod hoc est ratione modi significandi et intelligendi.

Et notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de his nominibus: uno modo ratione eius quod nominant22 seu significant; alio modo ratione eius, in quo significatur poni quod nominant. Unde differt dicere sensum et sensum hominis; quia primo dicitur commune ad sensum hominis et bruti, secundo proprium hominis. Si ergo accipimus huiusmodi nomina secundum se, alia est ratio essentiae, alia veritatis, quoniam essentia dicit quid, veritas conditionem entis. Cum vero essentiam et veritatem trahimus ad Deum, quamvis idem sint, tamen ratione generalium significatorum unum accipitur ut proprietas alterius; et non est ibi synonymia nec sunt nomina synonyma, sed manet ratio subiecti et proprietatis secundum modum significandi, et manet etiam secundum modum intelligendi; quia per essentiam in creatura intelligimus essentiam in Creatore, et per veritatem creaturae intelligimus veritatem increatam. Unde sicut veritas creata est proprietas et ratio cognoscendi essentiam creatam, sic veritas increata secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi est ratio cognoscendi et intelligendi essentiam increatam.

Scholion

I. Sensus quaestionis est, utrum veritas competat Deo tanquam proprium, sive utrum sit de essentia Dei et proprietas Dei solius. Veritas hic accipitur, non prout est formaliter in intellectu, nec etiam pro re, quatenus est obiectum intellectus, sed in ordine ad ipsam rem, cuius est actus, sive quatenus dicit indivisionem entis et esse. — Ad intelligentiam terminorum, qui in prima ratione pro parte negativa et alibi saepe occurrunt, notandum, quod complexum et incomplexum idem sunt ac compositum et incompositum. Veritas complexa est passio sive proprietas propositionis, quae dicit connexionem praedicati cum subiecto, et habetur in secunda mentis operatione, nempe in iudicio. Veritas autem incomplexa est passio simplex cuiuslibet entis et definitur per hoc, quod sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum, qui rem cognoscit sicuti est. Haec habetur in qualibet prima mentis operatione, quae est simplex apprehensio.

II. Alibi S. Bonav. cum sententia communi distinguit veritatem tripliciter, scil. sumtam vel formaliter, quae est veritas in intellectu, vel radicaliter sive causaliter, quae est in rebus, vel prout est in oratione tanquam in signo. Cfr. infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. q. 2; Hexaem. Serm. 5. De veritate signi, infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 19. q. 5; de Verit. q. 1. a. 1. et seqq.; S. I. q. 16. a. 1. 2. 3. 5. — Hoc loco et in Prolog. ad Comment. in Ecclesiast. circa finem agit solummodo de veritate in rebus, sive prout veritas est proprietas entis. Haec veritas in rebus iterum triplici modo considerari potest: primo quidem respectu subiecti; et sic veritas est indivisio actus et potentiae, vel cum Avicenna in XI. Metaph. c. 2: Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est rei; sive veritas est illa res, quae est in actu; et sub hoc respectu definitur: indivisio esse et quod est. — Secundo consideratur respectu sui principii, quod est exemplar divinum, cui res assimilantur; et sub hoc respectu definitur secundum Augustinum in libr. de Vera Religione c. 36. n. 66: Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est, unde falsitas oritur. — Tertio modo consideratur respectu ad effectum consequentem, quatenus obiectum in intellectu causat veritatem; et sic est ratio cognoscendi rem eamque distinguendi, et sub hoc respectu definitur ab Augustino (loc. cit.): Veritas est quae ostendit id quod est; et ab Hilario: Veritas est declarativum esse. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 15. m. 3; S. Thom., de Veritate q. 1. a. 1. — Alia distinctio veritatis contra falsitatem et contra permixtionem patet ex textu.

III. Quoad ordinem argumentorum pro et contra notandum, quod prima propositio, quae agit de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra falsitatem, probatur tribus prioribus argumentis pro parte negativa. Secunda vero, quae est de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra permixtionem, probatur 3. et 6. argumento pro parte affirmativa. Cetera argumenta per distinctionem in recto sensu explicantur. — Attentione digna sunt, quae hic in corp. et in solut. ad 1. 2. et ad ult. de veritate creata dicuntur, scil. quod nulla veritas creata sit veritas per essentiam, sed per participationem, et quod nihilominus suo modo est ratio cognoscendi distincta a veritate increata. Quod dictum est contra rigidos Ontologistas.

IV. Quoad 1. et 2. concl. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 5; et q. 17. m. 4. — Pro explicatione loci sumti ex Anselmo (4. fundam.) cfr. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 16. a. 6.) et praecipue Richard. (hic q. 2. ad 4.), qui in extenso et bene rem tractat, licet alia via incedat ac S. Bonav. — De differentia inter esse divinum et esse creatum cfr. hic dub. 8.

De tota quaestione: S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 60; S. I. q. 16. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. et d. 46. a. 11. seqq., ubi diffuse multas de hac re quaestiones solvit; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. et 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et d. 19. 2. princ. q. 2. et 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. per tot. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the truth of God.

Question I. Whether truth is a property of the divine being.

That truth is a property of the divine being is shown by authorities and reasons.

1. First, thus: Jerome to Marcella, and it is found in the text1: "God alone truly is, to whose essence our being, compared, is not"; but what belongs to one alone is proper to it: therefore truth is proper to the divine being.

2. Likewise, Augustine in On True Religion2: "Falsity is from those things which imitate that One, by which whatever is, is one, inasmuch as they cannot fulfill it." If therefore no creature can fulfill that supreme One, truth is not in any creature, but falsity is in all.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the Soliloquies and in On True Religion3 says that the uncreated light is the ground of knowing itself and all knowable things: therefore if truth is the ground of knowing, and the uncreated light alone is truth: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

4. Likewise, Anselm in the book On Truth4 says that all things are true by the first truth: he understands this either effectively or formally; not effectively, because likewise all things could be called true5 by the first goodness: therefore it is understood formally: therefore there is no other truth than the uncreated truth: therefore if it is in God and is God, truth is the property of God alone.

5. Likewise, it is proved by reasons thus: truth and vanity are opposed; but every creature has vanity6 and admixture with non-being, since it is from nothing, and God alone is wholly free of this: therefore truth is in God alone.

6. Likewise, truth is opposed to shadow. For what is the shadow of a thing does not have truth7; but creatures are shadows of that supreme being: therefore they do not have truth in their being.

7. Likewise, truth is that by which something is true; but truth is true, since it is knowable; but it is established that it is so not by another than itself, because otherwise8 there would be an infinite regress; but what is true by itself is true by essence: therefore every truth is true by essence; but the uncreated truth alone is true by essence: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

On the contrary:

1. If truth is a property of God, then truth is either complex or incomplex. Not complex; for such is with composition, but in God there is no composition. Not incomplex; for this is convertible with being9: therefore since entity is not a property of God, by parity of reason neither will truth be.

2. Likewise, the true is equally common as the good, and in a certain way more so10; but goodness is not a property of God: therefore by parity of reason neither is truth.

3. Likewise, truth is the ground of discerning Creator from creature, and creature from creature11; but what is the ground of discerning and distinguishing is diverse in diverse things: therefore there is one truth in God and another in the creature, and one in one creature and another in another: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the Soliloquies12: "True is that which is," therefore truth is entity itself: therefore it is not proper to essence, because if so, by the same reasoning by which it is said: Truth is13 a property of essence, it could be said conversely, since they are entirely the same.

Conclusion. Truth, insofar as it is opposed to falsity, is also found in creatures according to its threefold comparison — to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, to the intellect which it excites; but insofar as it is opposed to admixture, it is a property of God alone.

I respond: It must be said that truth has a threefold comparison. For it has comparison to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, and to the intellect which it excites. In comparison to the subject of truth, truth is called the indivision of act and potency. In comparison to the principle, truth is called the representation or imitation of the supreme unity14 and the first [exemplar]. In comparison to the intellect, truth is called the ground of discerning.

And in all these comparisons truth can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is distinguished against falsity; in another way, as it is distinguished against admixture, according as the true is called pure and unmixed.

As truth is divided against falsity, which is the privation of indivision and imitation and15 expression, so since in the creature there is in some way to be found indivision and imitation and expression, thus truth is not only in the Creator, but also in the creature; and so it is not assigned [as] a property of God.

In another way, as truth is divided against admixture or impurity, so it is in God alone. For in God alone there is pure indivision, not mixed with any diversity; in God alone there is pure imitation and likeness, not mixed with any unlikeness; and in God alone there is expression of light not mixed with obscurity16. But in the creature there is indivision with diversity of act and potency, and imitation with unlikeness; and further in it there is expression with obscurity. And therefore in this way truth is a property of the divine being; and thus the Master and Augustine and Jerome take it. For they call true that being which has nothing of possibility, nothing of vanity, nothing of non-entity. And therefore in God past and future do not fall, which are in some way non-beings.

To the arguments for the affirmative:

To 1, 2, 5, 6. And thus proceed the first two authorities and reasons.

To 3. But to that which is objected, that there is no other truth than the eternal, because it alone causes understanding; it must be said that just as color is the object of sight and the moving cause of sight — yet not without the act of light — and differs from17 light itself; so it must be said that created truth, although it cannot move without uncreated truth, is nevertheless moving in its own way and another truth than that one.

To 4 and 7. To that which is objected from Anselm, that all things are true by the first truth; it must be said that the true by its imposition states a comparison to the exemplary cause, just as the good to the final cause. For just as something is called good by reason of order, so true by reason of expression; and the ground of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself. Just as therefore, when it is said of created goods that they are good by uncreated goodness, goodness predicates the end in the ablative, not the form, because God's goodness18 is the form of no created thing; likewise, when it is said that all things are true by uncreated truth, the ablative states the formal exemplary cause19. For all true things are and are born to express themselves through the expression of that supreme light; and if it ceased to flow in, the rest would cease to be true. Therefore no created truth is true by essence, but by participation; and through this the last point is clear.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To that which is objected in the contrary, that it is not a property; the response is clear: because

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he objects concerning truth as it has opposition to the defect of falsity, not to the admixture of possibility; for in the aforesaid way it belongs not only to the Creator, but also to the creature.

To 4. To that which is objected, that truth is the same as the divine essence; it must be said that of the account of property in the creature there are these three: first, that it belongs to one alone; second, that it is the ground of becoming known; third, that it differs from that whose property it is20. The first two pertain to perfection, but the last to imperfection, because it excludes simplicity. And therefore truth is called a property of the divine essence, not because it differs or is inhering in the divine essence as an accident21 in a subject, but because it belongs to it alone and is the ground of knowing it. And this is the cause why, conversely, essence is not a property of truth, because it is not the ground of making it known, as conversely.

But if you ask, since essence and truth signify the same, why one is the ground of knowing the other, and not conversely; to this some have said that, although essence and truth signify the same, nevertheless one — namely, truth — is more a ground of knowing by reason of what is connoted. But this cannot stand, because truth connotes nothing. Therefore it must be said that this is by reason of the mode of signifying and understanding.

And it should be noted that there is a twofold way of speaking about these names: in one way, by reason of that which they name22 or signify; in another way, by reason of that in which what they name is signified as posited. Hence it differs to say sense and sense of man; because the first is said in common of the sense of man and of brute, the second properly of man. If therefore we take such names according to themselves, the account of essence is one thing, and of truth another, since essence states what, truth the condition of being. But when we draw essence and truth to God, although they are the same, yet by reason of the general things signified one is taken as a property of the other; and there is no synonymy there, nor are they synonymous names, but the account of subject and property remains according to the mode of signifying, and remains also according to the mode of understanding; because through essence in the creature we understand essence in the Creator, and through the truth of the creature we understand uncreated truth. Hence just as created truth is a property and the ground of knowing created essence, so uncreated truth, according to the account of signifying and understanding, is the ground of knowing and understanding uncreated essence.

Scholion

I. The sense of the question is whether truth belongs to God as a proper [attribute], or whether it pertains to the essence of God and is the property of God alone. Truth is here taken not as it is formally in the intellect, nor even for the thing insofar as it is the object of the intellect, but in relation to the thing itself, whose act it is, or insofar as it states the indivision of being and to-be. — For the understanding of the terms which occur in the first argument for the negative side and often elsewhere, it should be noted that complex and incomplex are the same as composite and incomposite. Complex truth is the affection or property of a proposition, which states the connection of predicate with subject, and is had in the second operation of the mind, namely in judgment. Incomplex truth, however, is the simple affection of any being whatever, and is defined as the adequation of the thing to the intellect which knows the thing as it is. This is had in any first operation of the mind whatever, which is simple apprehension.

II. Elsewhere St. Bonaventure with the common opinion distinguishes truth in three ways, namely as taken either formally (which is truth in the intellect), or radically or causally (which is in things), or as it is in speech as in a sign. Cf. below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; II Sent. d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; Hexaemeron Serm. 5. On the truth of the sign, see below d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 19, q. 5; On Truth q. 1, a. 1, and following; Summa I, q. 16, a. 1, 2, 3, 5. — In this place and in the Prologue to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes near the end, he treats only of truth in things, or as truth is a property of being. This truth in things can again be considered in three ways: first indeed with respect to the subject; and thus truth is the indivision of act and potency, or with Avicenna in Metaphysics XI, c. 2: The truth of each thing is the property of its being, which has been established for the thing; or truth is that thing which is in act; and under this respect it is defined as: the indivision of being and of that which is. — Secondly, it is considered with respect to its principle, which is the divine exemplar, to which things are assimilated; and under this respect it is defined according to Augustine in On True Religion c. 36, n. 66: Truth is the supreme likeness of the principle, which is without any unlikeness, whence falsity arises. — In the third way, it is considered with respect to the consequent effect, insofar as the object in the intellect causes truth; and so it is the ground of knowing the thing and distinguishing it, and under this respect it is defined by Augustine (loc. cit.): Truth is that which shows that which is; and by Hilary: Truth is declarative being. Cf. above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alex. of Hales, p. I, q. 15, m. 3; St. Thomas, On Truth q. 1, a. 1. — Another distinction of truth — against falsity and against admixture — is clear from the text.

III. As to the order of the arguments for and against, it should be noted that the first proposition, which treats of truth insofar as it is distinguished against falsity, is proved by the first three arguments for the negative side. But the second, which is about truth insofar as it is distinguished against admixture, is proved by the 3rd and 6th argument for the affirmative side. The remaining arguments are explained by the distinction in their proper sense. — Worthy of attention are the things which are said here in the body and in the solution to 1, 2, and to the last, concerning created truth, namely that no created truth is truth by essence, but by participation, and that nonetheless in its own way it is a ground of knowing distinct from uncreated truth. Which is said against the rigid Ontologists.

IV. As to the 1st and 2nd conclusions, cf. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 15, m. 5; and q. 17, m. 4. — For the explanation of the passage taken from Anselm (4th fundamental), cf. St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 16, a. 6) and especially Richard (here q. 2, ad 4), who treats the matter in extenso and well, although he proceeds by another route than St. Bonaventure. — On the difference between divine being and created being, cf. here dub. 8.

On the whole question: St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 60; Summa I, q. 16, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 46, a. 11, and following, where he diffusely solves many questions on this matter; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1 and 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1 and 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1, and d. 19, 2. princ. q. 2 and 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 34, throughout. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 1. circa initium. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 4 auctoritate Hieronymi pro Hieronymus.
    Chapter 1, near the beginning. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 4, reads by the authority of Jerome in place of Jerome.
  2. Cap. 36. n. 66: Si enim falsitas ex iis est, quae imitantur unum, non in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt. — Et ibid. paulo ante ait: At si corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo principio unum est, quidquid est. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. summe loco summum.
    Chapter 36, n. 66: For if falsity is from those things which imitate the One, not insofar as they imitate it, but insofar as they cannot fulfill it. — And in the same place a little before he says: But if bodies deceive insofar as they do not fulfill that One which they are convicted of imitating, by which principle whatever is, is one. — The Vatican edition, against most of the codices, reads supremely in place of supreme.
  3. Libr. I. Soliloq. c. 8. n. 15. — De Vera Religione c. 31. n. 64. et c. 36. n. 66. — Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit verba se et omnia usque cognoscendi.
    Book I, Soliloquies c. 8, n. 15. — On True Religion c. 31, n. 64, and c. 36, n. 66. — The Vatican edition, without any authority from the manuscripts and edition 1, omits the words itself and all things down to of knowing.
  4. Cap. 13, ubi probat omnium rerum unam solum esse rectitudinem, ex qua concludit: una igitur in omnibus illis est veritas.
    Chapter 13, where he proves that there is only one rectitude of all things, from which he concludes: one therefore in all those things is truth.
  5. Ita cum ed. 1 antiquiores codd., quorum quidem aliqui possunt legunt pro possent; Vat. autem cum cod. cc possunt dici bona, quo posito argumentum destruitur; recte siquidem omnia effective dicuntur et sunt bona bonitate prima. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc post si illa est repetit verbum est, et immediate post Vat. sola pro et Deus ponit etc. ergo; sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
    Thus with edition 1 the older codices, of which indeed some read they can for they could; but the Vatican edition with codex cc reads they can be called good, by positing which the argument is destroyed; for indeed rightly all things are called and are good effectively by the first goodness. Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex cc, after if that is, repeats the word is, and immediately after the Vatican edition puts alone in place of and God, then etc. therefore; but the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 stands against this.
  6. Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. Cfr. etiam Ecclesiastes 3, 19.
    Romans 8:20: For the creature was made subject to vanity. Cf. also Ecclesiastes 3:19.
  7. Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 29.). — Mox post summi supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 male omissum esse.
    See Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 34 (IV, c. 29). — Shortly after of the supreme we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the word being, which had been wrongly omitted.
  8. Codd. cum ed. 1 tunc pro alias, sed non ita bene.
    The codices, with edition 1, read then in place of otherwise, but not so well.
  9. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 4 (the shorter [book] I, c. 1): Each thing, just as it stands with respect to being, so also with respect to truth.
  10. Ratio communiter allegata est, quia verum est enti propinquius et in se abstractius.
    The reason commonly alleged is that the true is closer to being and more abstract in itself.
  11. August., de Vera Religione, c. 7. n. 13: Omnis enim res vel essentia... simul haec tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat.
    Augustine, On True Religion, c. 7, n. 13: For every thing or essence... at once has these three: that it be some one thing, and that it be discerned from the rest by its proper species, and that it not exceed the order of things.
  12. Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.
    Book II, c. 5, n. 8: The true seems to me to be that which is.
  13. Multi codd. ut BDFIPQTXYZ cum ed. 1 omittunt est.
    Many codices, such as BDFIPQTXYZ, with edition 1, omit is.
  14. Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic pro veritatis substituimus unitatis, et paulo infra pro distinguendi posuimus discernendi, quae lectio etiam comprobatur argumento secundo pro affirmativa parte et argumento tertio pro negativa parte supra allato.
    From nearly all the older manuscripts and from edition 1 we have here substituted of unity for of truth, and a little below we have put of discerning for of distinguishing, which reading is also confirmed by the second argument for the affirmative side and the third argument for the negative side cited above.
  15. Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis particulam et.
    From the majority of manuscripts and from edition 1 we have twice supplied the particle and.
  16. Vat. cum cod. cc permixti obscuritate, sed contra antiquiores codd., quorum tamen nonnulli etiam habent obscuritate, sed minus bene et contra immediate praecedentia.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc reads of mixed [light] in obscurity, but against the older codices, some of which nevertheless also read in obscurity, but less well and contrary to what immediately precedes.
  17. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 ipsa a luce, sed incongrue, et in fine argumenti contra antiquiores mss. post veritas addit est.
    The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, reads from light itself, but unfittingly, and at the end of the argument, against the older manuscripts, adds is after truth.
  18. Vat. contra antiquiores codd. bonitas increata pro Dei bonitas.
    The Vatican edition, against the older codices, reads uncreated goodness in place of God's goodness.
  19. Codd. DT expressius ablativus non dicit causam formalem esse rerum complectivam, sed exemplarem. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra alios et ed. 1, expressione loco per expressionem, et in fine Vat. sola patent ultima pro patet ultimum, sed falso.
    Codices DT [read] more expressly: the ablative does not state the formal cause as that which embraces things, but the exemplary [cause]. A little below the Vatican edition with codex cc, but against the others and edition 1, [reads] by expression in place of through the expression, and at the end the Vatican edition alone [reads] the last things are clear in place of the last point is clear, but falsely.
  20. Cfr. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1. et 2. ac Porphyr., de Praedicabil. c. de Proprio.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics V, c. 1 and 2, and Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On the Proper.
  21. Mendum Vat. antecedens loco accidens correximus fide mss. et trium primarum edd. Paulo infra post veritatis nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 non apte addunt particulam et.
    We have corrected the Vatican edition's blunder antecedent in place of accident on the faith of the manuscripts and the first three editions. A little below, after of truth, some codices with edition 1 not aptly add the particle and.
  22. Plerique codd. ut ARSTY etc. denominant. Unde differret, et paulo infra deinde pro secundo et accipiamus loco accipimus.
    Most codices such as ARSTY etc. read they denominate. Hence it would differ, and a little below thereafter in place of secondly and let us take in place of we take.
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