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Quaest. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio I: Utrum scientia Christi, secundum quod est Verbum, actu se extendat ad infinita

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio I. Utrum scientia Christi, secundum quod est Verbum, actu se extendat ad infinita.

Quaeritur de scientia Christi, secundum quod Verbum, utrum actu se extendat ad infinita1. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini, duodecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo octavo capitulo: « Infinitas numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cuius intelligentiae non est numerus ».

2. Item, idem undecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo capitulo2, loquens de sapientia Dei, ait sic: « Neque multae, sed una est sapientia, in qua sunt infinita quaedam eique finiti thesauri rerum intelligibilium » etc.

3. Item, per rationem ostenditur sic. Quanto substantia simplicior, tanto plurium est cognoscitiva3: ergo substantia, quae in infinitum magis simplex est quam aliqua substantia creata, in infinitum plura scit quam aliqua creatura: ergo etc.

4. Item, Deus comprehendit actualiter et suam essentiam et suam potentiam; sed Deus potest infinita: ergo si actualiter cognoscit totum suum posse, actualiter comprehendit infinita: ergo etc.

5. Item, nobilitatis est in creatura cognoscere multa, et maioris nobilitatis adhuc scire plura4: ergo scientia, quae est infinitae nobilitatis, ad infinita se extendit: ergo etc.

6. Item, Deus scit plura, quam possit, quia scit mala culpae, quae non potest facere; sed potest infinita: ergo et scit plura infinitis.

7. Item, qui cognoscit punctum secundum suam substantiam et virtutem cognoscit illum non solum in se, sed etiam illa quae possunt ab eo emanare; sed infinitae lineae possunt emanare ab uno puncto: ergo si in qualibet linea sunt infinita puncta, et a quolibet puncto infinitae possunt exire lineae, et Deus posse omnis creaturae5 comprehendit; ergo non tantum scit infinita, sed etiam infinities infinita.

8. Item, quidquid intellectus humanus intelligit in potentia vel habet in potentia, intellectus divinus habet in actu et amplius, quia creatum nec actu nec potentia aequari potest increato; sed intellectus humanus possibilis est ad infinita, quia nunquam tot scit, quin plura possit scire: ergo si intellectus divinus actu est in plura quam intellectus humanus, actualiter se extendit ad plura6 quam infinita.

9. Item, per impossibile: quia, si Deus tantum sciret finita, cum omni finito possit aliquid maius excogitari, aliquid posset cogitari maius divina scientia7; sed non potest: ergo etc.

10. Item, si finita sciret, aut posset aliquid ultra scire, aut non. Si non; ergo limitata esset eius scientia; si sic; sed qui potest aliquid scire, quod nescit, potest addiscere; quod de Deo nefas est dicere: ergo8 etc.

11. Item, si sciret tantum ea quae sunt9, et non ea quae possunt fieri; cum artifex creatus cognoscat multa, quae potest facere et nunquam fa-

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ciet, aliquid sciret homo, quod lateret Deum; sed hoc est falsum et impossibile: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Omne scitum verum, omne verum ens1: ergo si infinita sunt scita, infinita sunt entia; sed consequens est impossibile: ergo et antecedens.

2. Item, quaecumque Deus scit iudicat; sed quaecumque iudicat talia sunt, qualia iudicat, et tot; quaecumque autem Deus iudicat accipit ut finita: ergo quaecumque cognoscit sunt finita. — Si tu dicas, quod non sequitur: quia est finitum Deo, ergo est finitum; contra: tale est unumquodque in se, quale est apud iudicium veritatis: ergo si aliquid est finitum Deo, necesse est, quod sit finitum simpliciter.

3. Item, omne infinitum est impertransibile tam ab infinito quam a finito2, quia a quocumque pertransiretur acciperet terminum: ergo esset finitum; sed quaecumque divinus intellectus cognoscit comprehendit et pertransit: ergo si infinita sunt impertransibilia, infinita sunt incognoscibilia.

4. Item, quaecumque Deus cognoscit distincte cognoscit; sed quaecumque distinguit numerat, quaecumque autem numerantur mensurantur, et omnia talia sunt finita3: ergo quaecumque cognoscuntur a Deo sunt finita.

5. Item, omnis numerus aut est par, aut impar: ergo quaecumque numerantur a Deo numerantur numero pari, vel impari; sed omnis numerus par est divisibilis in duo aequalia, similiter et omnis numerus impar, unitate sublata; omnis autem talis numerus est finitus: ergo si Deus numerat quaecumque scit, necesse est, quod illa numeret numero finito: ergo sunt finita: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaecumque Deus scit ordinate scit; sed ubicumque est ordo, ibi est ratio primi et ultimi4, quae est ratio finiti: si ergo ubicumque est ratio ordinis est ratio finitatis, et Deus nulla novit sine ordine, quia nulla scit inordinate; impossibile est, Deum infinita scire.

7. Item, si Deus scit infinita, aut infinita sibi, aut nobis, aut in se. Si infinita nobis, hoc non est magnum quid dicere, quia illa sunt finita simpliciter. Si sibi; sed quaecumque sunt infinita alicui non sunt ab illo cognoscibilia nec ab illo comprehenduntur: ergo si Deus scit infinita, non comprehendit infinita. Si infinita in se; sed res alia a Deo, hoc ipso quod est alia, est creatura, et hoc ipso quod creatura, est limitata5: ergo scire res alias infinitas, hoc est scire finita infinita; quod falsum est et non intelligibile, quia implicat in se contradictionem.

8. Item, si Deus scit infinita, aut infinita in causa, aut in proprio genere. Si infinita in causa; sed omne, quod est in causa, est unum6: ergo quaecumque cognoscit ut in causa cognoscit per modum unius, non ergo per modum infinitorum. Si infinita actu et in proprio genere; sed esse infinita actu in proprio genere est falsum et impossibile: ergo falsum est et impossibile, Deum infinita scire.

9. Item, omne scibile a Deo appelletur A; tunc quaero sic: A aut est Deus, aut aliud a Deo. Si est Deus: ergo scitum a Deo est Deus: ergo asinus est Deus. Si aliud a Deo; omne tale est actu finitum: ergo A est actu finitum; et A nominat omnia scibilia: ergo omnia scibilia sunt finita: ergo etc.

10. Item, A aut est aequale Deo, aut est minus, aut maius. Si minus Deo: ergo finitum; si aequale, vel maius; ergo est Deus: ergo si Deus scit infinita, Deus non scit nisi Deum; et si non scit nisi Deum, non scit infinita: ergo si scit infinita, non scit infinita.

11. Item, cum sit potentia faciendi et potentia cognoscendi in Deo, et utraque infinita, et potentia faciendi semper faciat7 finita; videtur, quod potentia cognoscendi semper cognoscat finita actu; aut si non, quare non? Hoc est quaerere, cum in Deo sit velle, scire et facere, et velle et facere non se extendant ad infinita; quomodo scire se extendat ad infinita, cum medium non excedat extrema.

Conclusio. Deus scientia simplicis intelligentiae scit et comprehendit infinita.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod secundum doctores antiquos compellimur ponere, Deum scire infinita, Propheta David dicente in Psalmo8: Magnus Dominus noster et magna virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus; et Augustino non solum istud asserente, verum etiam probante duodecimo de Civitate Dei, decimo octavo capitulo, ubi ait sic: « Illud ergo, quod dicunt quidam, scilicet philosophi, nec Dei scientia posse infinita comprehendi; restat eis, ut dicere audeant atque huic9 se voragini impietatis immergant,

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quod non omnes numeros Deus noverit. Eos quippe infinitos esse, certissimum est, quoniam in quocumque numero finem ponendum putaveris, idem ipse, non dico, uno addito augeri, sed quantumlibet sit magnus et quamlibet ingentem multitudinem continens, in ipsa ratione atque scientia numerorum non solum duplicari, verum etiam multiplicari potest. Ita vero suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuiquam alteri possit: ergo et dispares inter se atque diversi sunt, et singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. Itane numeros propter infinitatem nescit Deus omnes, et usque ad quandam summam numerorum scientia Dei pervenit et ceteros ignorat? Quis hoc vel dementissimus dixerit »? Et parum infra: « Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cuius intelligentiae non est numerus1. Quapropter, si quidquid scientia comprehenditur scientis comprehensione finitur; profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius incomprehensibilis non est. Quare si infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, qua comprehenditur, esse non potest infinita; qui tandem nos sumus homunculi, qui eius scientiae figere limitem praesumamus »? — His ergo, tanquam certissimis testibus compellimur dicere vel ponere, Deum scire infinita.

Modus autem istius positionis assignatur2 per doctores moderniores, qui dixerunt, quod triplex est modus divinae cognitionis, non propter diversitatem divinae scientiae in se, sed in connotatione. Est enim in Deo cognitio approbationis, visionis et intelligentiae. Cognitio approbationis est bonorum tantum et finitorum. Cognitio visionis est malorum et bonorum, sed finitorum, pro eo quod concernit tempus; est enim eorum solum, quae fuerunt, sunt et futura sunt. Cognitio vero intelligentiae est infinitorum, pro eo quod Deus intelligit non tantum futura, verum etiam possibilia; possibilia autem Deo non sunt finita, sed infinita3.

Ratio autem huius positionis, quare videlicet ponimus, Deum scire infinita et non facere vel velle vel disponere, est, quia divinum scire secundum tertium modum accipiendi est actus Dei intrinsecus. Intrinsecum autem dico non tantum, quia fit ab intrinseco, sed etiam, quia est ad intrinsecum et per intrinsecum et secundum modum intrinsecum. Ad intrinsecum, inquam, est, quia divinus aspectus in cognoscendo non desilit extra se, sed aspiciendo se ut veritatem cognoscit omnem veritatem. — Per intrinsecum, quia per rationes aeternas, quae sunt idem quod ipse, cognoscit quaecumque cognoscit4. — Secundum modum intrinsecum, quia divinum scire non solum abstrahit a ratione causae actualis, sed etiam causae simpliciter. Scit enim mala, quorum non est causa; scit etiam futura, quae nondum facit; scit etiam possibilia, quae nunquam faciet. Et ideo, quia ipsum scire non concernit neque connotat aliquid actuale exterius, ideo dicit ibi actum per modum habitus, actum, inquam, ipsi potentiae adaequatum — quidquid enim Deus potest scire scit — actum etiam dicit in nullo coarctatum nec quantum ad se nec quantum ad connotatum, ideo universalem quantum ad loca, quantum ad tempora et quantum ad obiecta. Quidquid enim alicubi scivit ubique novit, et quidquid semel scit semper scit, et sicut unum novit, ita omnia scibilia novit5. Unde quia scibilia non tantummodo sunt entia actu, sed etiam in potentia; cum non sit inconveniens ponere infinita in potentia, non est inconveniens ponere infinita actu a Deo scita. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem et ad obiecta.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur: omne scitum verum etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est scientia, scilicet causans res et causata a rebus. Scitum a scientia causata a rebus est verum in se et in effectu; scitum autem a scientia causante res est verum in causa et in potentia, et illud verum non infert ens actu, sed ens in potentia causae; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quodsi Deus scit infinita, quod infinita sunt entia, sed quod infinita Deo sunt possibilia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus quaecumque scit iudicat etc.; dicendum, quod Deus in cognoscendo infinita iudicat illa infinita simpliciter, sed finita sibi; et hoc non est inconveniens. Sicut enim non sequitur, quodsi aliquid est infinitum finito, quod sit infinitum simpliciter; sic non sequitur, quodsi aliquid est finitum infinito, quod sit finitum simpliciter; et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in praemissa auctoritate6.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne infinitum est impertransibile etc.; dicendum, quod pertransibile dicitur duobus modis: uno modo per modum discursivum ab uno in aliud; et hoc modo habet veritatem verbum praemissum, et sic intelligit Philosophus in sexto Physicorum7; alio modo per universalem et plenarium contuitum eius quod cognoscitur ab intelligentia; et sic infinitum, cum non sit incomprehensibile infinito, non est ei impertransibile, sed finito tantum.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque scit et cognoscit distincte cognoscit etc.; dicendum, quod illa consequentia deficit in hoc, quod dicit: quaecumque distinguit numerat; quia distinguere est in plus1 quam numerare. — Vel dic, quod quaecumque distinguit numerat numero finito, vel infinito; sed tunc non sequitur, quod mensuret, quia mensura dicit quid finitum tantum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: si numerat, aut numero pari, vel impari etc.; dicendum, quod illa consequentia non tenet, pro eo quod numerus infinitus comprehendit utrumque; unde sicut non tenet ista consequentia: homo et asinus sunt animalia, ergo rationalia, vel irrationalia; sic nec consequentia praedicta.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque Deus cognoscit ordinate cognoscit etc.; dicendum, quod divina cognitio habet comparationem et ad cognoscentem et ad cognitum; per comparationem ad cognoscentem quidquid cognoscit simul cognoscit, sicut simul et semel dicit quidquid dicit2; per comparationem autem ad cognitum, dico, quod ordinate cognoscit; sed sicut cognitum a Deo non tantum est praesens, sed etiam futurum et possibile; sic et ordo ille non est tantum ordo actualis, sed etiam potentialis, quia non tantum cognoscit res ordinate ordine, qui factus est, sed etiam ordine, quem potest facere. — Quod ergo dicit, quod omnis ordo habet primum et ultimum; verum est de ordine actuali, non de ordine potentiali; sicut patet in numeris, qui infinitatem habent, et tamen sunt ordinati; habent enim ordinem possibilem, sicut et infinitatem.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut scit infinita nobis etc.; dicendum, quod scit infinita in se, non quidem actu infinita, sed in potentia; quae autem sunt in potentia sunt actu a Deo scita. Unde infinitas potentialis in cognitis sufficit ad infinitatem actualem divinae comprehensionis; sicut ergo infinitas in potentia3 non repugnat finitati actuali in creatura, sic nec infinitas actualis cognitionis divinae repugnat finitati creaturae.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut scit infinita in causa etc.; dicendum, quod utroque modo. — Et si obiicias, quod in causa sunt unum; non valet, quia, licet sit una ars et potentia, tamen plures sunt rationes rerum cognoscendarum4. — Si obiicias, quod in proprio genere sint finita; verum est secundum esse, quod habent; sed tamen secundum esse, quod possunt habere, sunt saltem infinita in potentia, et sic infinita a Deo scita, quia, ut saepe dictum est, quae sunt in potentia sunt actu a Deo scita.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur: A aut est Deus, aut aliud a Deo etc.; dicendum, quod scitum a Deo aliquando nominat ipsam rationem cognoscendi, aliquando ipsum cognitum extra. Primo modo est Deus, quia, ut dicit Anselmus in Monologio5, « creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia ». Secundo autem modo est aliud a Deo; sed tunc non sequitur, quod sit infinitum actu, quia ad hoc, quod infinita sint actu scita a Deo, non oportet, quod sint actu infinita, sed sufficit, quod sint infinita in potentia in proprio genere.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur: aut A est aequale Deo etc.; dicendum secundum distinctionem praedictam, quod primo modo est idem quod Deus; secundo modo est aliud a Deo, pro eo quod, licet habeat infinitatem in potentia, non tamen habet infinitatem actualem; Deus autem habet actualem.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de potentia faciendi et sciendi et de velle sicut et facere, patet responsio ex principali solutione6.

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English Translation
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Question I. Whether the knowledge of Christ, insofar as he is the Word, actually extends to infinite things.

The question is asked concerning the knowledge of Christ, insofar as he is the Word, whether it actually extends to infinite things1. And that it does is shown as follows:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, On the City of God XII, chapter eighteen: "The infinity of number, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to him of whose intelligence there is no number."

2. Likewise, the same author, On the City of God XI, chapter ten2, speaking of the wisdom of God, says thus: "Nor are there many, but there is one wisdom, in which there are certain infinite and, to it, finite treasures of intelligible things," etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reasoning as follows. The simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing3: therefore a substance which is infinitely more simple than any created substance knows infinitely more things than any creature: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God actually comprehends both his own essence and his own power; but God can do infinite things: therefore if he actually knows the whole of his being-able, he actually comprehends infinite things: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it belongs to nobility in a creature to know many things, and to a greater nobility still to know more4: therefore a knowledge which is of infinite nobility extends to infinite things: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, God knows more things than he can do, since he knows the evils of guilt, which he cannot do; but he can do infinite things: therefore he also knows more things than infinite things.

7. Likewise, whoever knows a point according to its substance and power knows it not only in itself, but also those things which can emanate from it; but infinite lines can emanate from one point: therefore if in any line whatever there are infinite points, and from any point whatever infinite lines can issue, and God comprehends the being-able of every creature5; therefore he not only knows infinite things, but even infinitely infinite things.

8. Likewise, whatever the human understanding understands in potency or has in potency, the divine understanding has in act and more besides, since the created can be equalled to the uncreated neither in act nor in potency; but the human understanding is capable of infinite things, since it never knows so many that it could not know more: therefore if the divine understanding is actually directed to more things than the human understanding is, it actually extends to more things6 than infinite things.

9. Likewise, by way of the impossible: because, if God knew only finite things, then, since with respect to every finite thing something greater can be thought out, something could be thought greater than the divine knowledge7; but this cannot be: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, if he knew finite things, either he could know something beyond them, or not. If not, then his knowledge would be limited; if so, then — but one who can know something which he does not know is able to learn; which it is impious to say of God: therefore8, etc.

11. Likewise, if he knew only those things which are9, and not those which can come to be — then, since a created craftsman knows many things which he can make and never will

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make, a man would know something that lay hidden from God; but this is false and impossible: therefore, etc.

Contra: 1. Everything known is true, and everything true is a being1: therefore if infinite things are known, infinite things are beings; but the consequent is impossible: therefore so is the antecedent.

2. Likewise, whatever God knows he judges; but whatever things he judges are such as he judges them to be, and as many; and whatever God judges he takes as finite: therefore whatever he knows is finite. — If you say that it does not follow — because a thing is finite to God, therefore it is finite — on the contrary: each thing is in itself such as it is in the judgment of truth: therefore if something is finite to God, it is necessary that it be finite without qualification.

3. Likewise, everything infinite is untraversable both by the infinite and by the finite2, since by whatever it were traversed it would receive a limit: therefore it would be finite; but whatever the divine understanding knows it comprehends and traverses: therefore if infinite things are untraversable, infinite things are unknowable.

4. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows distinctly; but whatever he distinguishes he numbers, and whatever things are numbered are measured, and all such things are finite3: therefore whatever things are known by God are finite.

5. Likewise, every number is either even or odd: therefore whatever things are numbered by God are numbered by an even or an odd number; but every even number is divisible into two equals, and likewise every odd number, once unity has been subtracted; but every such number is finite: therefore if God numbers whatever he knows, it is necessary that he number those things by a finite number: therefore they are finite: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows in an ordered way; but wherever there is order, there is the account of a first and a last4, which is the account of the finite: if therefore wherever there is the account of order there is the account of finitude, and God knows nothing without order, since he knows nothing in a disordered way — it is impossible that God should know infinite things.

7. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, then either things infinite to himself, or to us, or in themselves. If things infinite to us, this is nothing great to say, since those things are finite without qualification. If to himself — but whatever things are infinite to someone are not knowable by him nor comprehended by him: therefore if God knows infinite things, he does not comprehend infinite things. If things infinite in themselves — but a thing other than God, by the very fact that it is other, is a creature, and by the very fact that it is a creature, is limited5: therefore to know other things that are infinite is to know infinite finite things; which is false and unintelligible, since it implies a contradiction in itself.

8. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, then either infinite things in their cause, or in their proper genus. If infinite things in their cause — but everything which is in a cause is one6: therefore whatever things he knows as in a cause he knows after the manner of one, and therefore not after the manner of infinite things. If infinite things in act and in their proper genus — but to be infinite in act in one's proper genus is false and impossible: therefore it is false and impossible that God should know infinite things.

9. Likewise, let everything knowable by God be called A; then I ask thus: A is either God, or other than God. If it is God, then what is known by God is God: therefore an ass is God. If other than God, then every such thing is actually finite: therefore A is actually finite; and A names all knowable things: therefore all knowable things are finite: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, A is either equal to God, or less, or greater. If less than God, then it is finite; if equal or greater, then it is God: therefore if God knows infinite things, God knows nothing but God; and if he knows nothing but God, he does not know infinite things: therefore if he knows infinite things, he does not know infinite things.

11. Likewise, since there is in God a power of making and a power of knowing, and each is infinite, and the power of making always makes7 finite things, it seems that the power of knowing always knows finite things in act; or if not, why not? This is to ask — since in God there is willing, knowing and making, and willing and making do not extend to infinite things — how knowing extends to infinite things, when the mean does not exceed the extremes.

Conclusion. By the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows and comprehends infinite things.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, according to the ancient doctors, we are compelled to hold that God knows infinite things, since the Prophet David says in the Psalm8: Great is our Lord, and great is his power, and of his wisdom there is no number; and since Augustine not only asserts this but even proves it in On the City of God XII, chapter eighteen, where he says thus: "That, then, which certain men — namely the philosophers — say, that not even by God's knowledge can infinite things be comprehended: it remains for them to dare to say and to plunge themselves into this9 abyss of impiety, namely

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that God does not know all numbers. That these are infinite is most certain, since in whatever number you should think a limit is to be set, that very number can — I do not say, be increased by the addition of one, but, however great it may be and however immense a multitude it may contain, in the very account and knowledge of numbers it can not only be doubled but even multiplied. Yet each number is so bounded by its own properties that none of them can be equal to any other: therefore they are unlike one another and diverse, and each single one of them is finite, and all of them are infinite. Is it then the case that God does not know all numbers on account of their infinity, and that the knowledge of God reaches up to a certain sum of numbers and is ignorant of the rest? Who, however demented, would say this?" And a little further down: "The infinity of number, therefore, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to him of whose intelligence there is no number1. Wherefore, if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the knower, then assuredly all infinity too is in some ineffable way finite to God, since it is not incomprehensible to his knowledge. And so, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God by which it is comprehended, who at last are we manikins, that we should presume to fix a limit to his knowledge?" — By these, therefore, as by the most certain witnesses, we are compelled to say or to hold that God knows infinite things.

But the manner of this position is assigned2 by the more modern doctors, who said that the manner of divine cognition is threefold, not on account of any diversity in the divine knowledge in itself, but in what it connotes. For there is in God a cognition of approval, of vision and of intelligence. The cognition of approval is of good things only, and of finite things. The cognition of vision is of evil and of good things, but of finite ones, for the reason that it concerns time; for it is only of those things which have been, are, and will be. But the cognition of intelligence is of infinite things, for the reason that God understands not only future things but also possible ones; and possible things are not finite to God, but infinite3.

But the ground of this position — that is, why we hold that God knows infinite things and does not make or will or dispose them — is that divine knowing, taken according to the third manner, is an intrinsic act of God. And I call it intrinsic not only because it comes about from what is intrinsic, but also because it is toward what is intrinsic and through what is intrinsic and according to an intrinsic manner. It is toward what is intrinsic, I say, because the divine gaze in knowing does not leap outside itself, but by looking upon itself as truth it knows all truth. — It is through what is intrinsic, because it is through the eternal reasons, which are the same as himself, that he knows whatever he knows4. — It is according to an intrinsic manner, because divine knowing abstracts not only from the account of an actual cause, but even from that of a cause without qualification. For he knows evils, of which he is not the cause; he knows also future things, which he does not yet make; he knows also possible things, which he never will make. And therefore, since knowing itself neither concerns nor connotes anything actual outside, therefore it denotes there an act after the manner of a habit — an act, I say, adequate to the power itself, for whatever God can know he knows — and it also denotes an act that is in no way constricted, neither as regards itself nor as regards what it connotes, and therefore one that is universal as regards places, as regards times and as regards objects. For whatever he knew anywhere he knows everywhere, and whatever he knows once he knows always, and as he knows one thing, so he knows all knowable things5. Hence, since knowable things are not only beings in act but also in potency, and since it is not unfitting to posit infinite things in potency, it is not unfitting to posit infinite things actually known by God. — And by this the answer to the question and to the objections is clear.

1. To that, then, which is objected — everything known is true, etc. — it must be said that knowledge is twofold, namely that which causes things and that which is caused by things. What is known by a knowledge caused by things is true in itself and in effect; but what is known by a knowledge causing things is true in its cause and in potency, and that truth does not entail a being in act, but a being in the potency of the cause; and therefore from this it does not follow that, if God knows infinite things, infinite things are beings, but rather that infinite things are possible to God.

2. To that which is objected, that God judges whatever he knows, etc., it must be said that God, in knowing infinite things, judges them infinite without qualification, but finite to himself; and this is not unfitting. For just as it does not follow that, if something is infinite to a finite thing, it is infinite without qualification, so it does not follow that, if something is finite to an infinite thing, it is finite without qualification; and this is what Augustine says in the authority set out above6.

3. To that which is objected, that everything infinite is untraversable, etc., it must be said that traversable is said in two ways: in one way after a discursive manner, from one thing to another; and in this way the aforesaid statement holds true, and thus the Philosopher understands it in Physics VI7; in another way, by a universal and full intuition of that which is known by the intelligence; and in this way the infinite, since it is not incomprehensible to the infinite, is not untraversable to it, but only to the finite.

p. 6

4. To that which is objected, that whatever he knows and knows distinctly he knows, etc., it must be said that that consequence fails in this, that it says: whatever he distinguishes he numbers; because to distinguish extends to more1 than to number. — Or say that whatever he distinguishes he numbers by a finite or an infinite number; but then it does not follow that he measures, since measure states only something finite.

5. To that which is objected — if he numbers, then either by an even or an odd number, etc. — it must be said that that consequence does not hold, for the reason that an infinite number comprehends both; hence, just as this consequence does not hold — man and ass are animals, therefore they are rational or irrational — so neither does the aforesaid one.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever God knows he knows in an ordered way, etc., it must be said that divine cognition has a relation both to the knower and to the known; by relation to the knower, whatever he knows he knows all at once, just as all at once and at one stroke he says whatever he says2; but by relation to the known, I say that he knows in an ordered way; yet just as what is known by God is not only present but also future and possible, so too that order is not only an actual order but also a potential one, since he knows things in an ordered way not only by the order which has been made, but also by the order which he can make. — As to what is said, then, that every order has a first and a last: this is true of actual order, not of potential order; as is clear in numbers, which have infinity and are nevertheless ordered; for they have a possible order, just as they have infinity.

7. To that which is objected — either he knows things infinite to us, etc. — it must be said that he knows infinite things in themselves, not indeed infinite in act, but in potency; and those things which are in potency are actually known by God. Hence a potential infinity in the things known suffices for the actual infinity of the divine comprehension; therefore, just as infinity in potency3 is not repugnant to actual finitude in a creature, so neither is the actual infinity of the divine cognition repugnant to the finitude of the creature.

8. To that which is objected — either he knows infinite things in their cause, etc. — it must be said that it is in both ways. — And if you object that in the cause they are one, this is of no force, since, although the art and the power be one, nevertheless the accounts of the things to be known are many4. — If you object that in their proper genus they are finite, this is true according to the being which they have; but nevertheless according to the being which they can have, they are at least infinite in potency, and thus infinite things are known by God, since, as has often been said, those things which are in potency are in act known by God.

9. To that which is objected — A is either God or other than God, etc. — it must be said that what is known by God sometimes names the very account of knowing, and sometimes the thing known outside. In the first way it is God, since, as Anselm says in the Monologion5, "the creature in the Creator is creating essence." But in the second way it is other than God; yet then it does not follow that it is infinite in act, because for infinite things to be actually known by God it is not required that they be actually infinite, but it suffices that they be infinite in potency in their proper genus.

10. To that which is objected — either A is equal to God, etc. — it must be said, according to the aforesaid distinction, that in the first way it is the same as God; in the second way it is other than God, for the reason that, although it has infinity in potency, it does not on that account have actual infinity; whereas God has actual infinity.

11. To that which is objected last, concerning the power of making and of knowing and concerning willing as also making, the answer is clear from the principal solution6.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    De scientia Christi in genere cfr. III. Sent. d. 14; de hac vero quaestione I. Sent. d. 35. q. 5, d. 39. a. 1. q. 1-3, d. 43. q. 1-4, et infra Quaest. disp. de Trin. q. 6. a. 1. — Haec quaestio deest in cod. C.
    On the knowledge of Christ in general compare III Sentences, d. 14; but on this question in particular, I Sentences, d. 35, q. 5; d. 39, a. 1, qq. 1–3; d. 43, qq. 1–4; and below, Disputed Questions on the Trinity, q. 6, a. 1. — This question is missing in codex C.
  2. 2
    Num. 3, ubi textus originalis immensi quidam atque infiniti pro infinita quaedam eique finiti. Idem locus occurrit infra q. 2. in corp., ubi nostri codd. fere omnes idem repetunt. Eadem lectio a Maurinis in nota adiecta refertur.
    Number 3, where the original text has immensi quidam atque infiniti in place of infinita quaedam eique finiti. The same passage occurs below in q. 2, in the body, where nearly all our codices repeat the same thing. The same reading is reported by the Maurists in an appended note.
  3. 3
    Cfr. tom. III. pag. 314, nota 4. — Infra pro in infinitum D E H bis infinita, et pro creatura G substantia creata.
    Compare tome III, p. 314, note 4. — Below, in place of in infinitum, D E H twice have infinita, and in place of creatura, G has substantia creata.
  4. 4
    Secundum Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2, sapientis est omnia, ut possibile est, scire.
    According to Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2, it belongs to the wise man to know all things, so far as is possible.
  5. 5
    D H omnis creati plenarie.
    D H have omnis creati plenarie.
  6. 6
    Pro ad plura F ergo scit plura actu. Superius pro ergo si intellectus divinus B ergo intellectus divinus, qui. Fortasse post intellectus humanus excidit potentia.
    In place of ad plura, F has ergo scit plura actu. Above, in place of ergo si intellectus divinus, B has ergo intellectus divinus, qui. Perhaps potentia has dropped out after intellectus humanus.
  7. 7
    F sapientia (Ps. 146, 5: Sapientiae eius non est numerus).
    F has sapientia (Ps. 146:5: of his wisdom there is no number).
  8. 8
    D H potest addiscere: ergo Deus posset addiscere; quod falsum est.
    D H have potest addiscere: ergo Deus posset addiscere; quod falsum est ("he is able to learn: therefore God could learn; which is false").
  9. 9
    D H quae fiunt. Inferius pro sed F quodsi.
    D H have quae fiunt. Below, in place of sed, F has quodsi.
  10. 1
    Vide tom. I. pag. 685, nota 7. et pag. 690, nota 2. verba August. et Aristot.
    See tome I, p. 685, note 7, and p. 690, note 2, the words of Augustine and Aristotle.
  11. 2
    Cfr. tom. II. pag. 21, nota 6. — Inferius pro esset finitum F esse finitum, et pro sunt incognoscibilia substituit non sunt cognoscibilia.
    Compare tome II, p. 21, note 6. — Below, in place of esset finitum, F has esse finitum, and for sunt incognoscibilia it substitutes non sunt cognoscibilia.
  12. 3
    Secundum Aristot., V. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.), et X. Metaph. text. 2-5. (IX. c. 1.). — D pro distinguit habet distincte cognoscit, deinde legit et quaecumque mensurantur sunt finita.
    According to Aristotle, Physics V, text 24 (c. 3), and Metaphysics X, texts 2–5 (IX, c. 1). — In place of distinguit, D has distincte cognoscit, and then reads et quaecumque mensurantur sunt finita.
  13. 4
    Vide tom. II. pag. 21, nota 3. — Immediate post pro quae D H sed ubi est hoc, ibi.
    See tome II, p. 21, note 3. — Immediately after, in place of quae, D H have sed ubi est hoc, ibi.
  14. 5
    F addit et hoc ipso est finita, et mox vocibus finita infinita D H interserunt et.
    F adds et hoc ipso est finita, and presently D H insert et between the words finita infinita.
  15. 6
    Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 12. — Immediate post pro ergo quaecumque D H ergo qui. Subinde post sed esse infinita actu G addit et.
    Compare the Book of Causes, proposition 12. — Immediately after, in place of ergo quaecumque, D H have ergo qui. Presently, after sed esse infinita actu, G adds et.
  16. 7
    D H supplent actu.
    D H supply actu.
  17. 8
    Psalm. 146, 5.
    Psalm 146:5.
  18. 9
    Pro atque huic A B E G aut huic. Inferius pro ponendum textus originalis faciendum, et quamlibet pro quantumlibet. Voci multitudinem A B E F praefigunt magnitudinem vel. In fine textus post Quis hoc B G habent nisi pro vel.
    In place of atque huic, A B E G have aut huic. Below, in place of ponendum, the original text has faciendum, and quamlibet for quantumlibet. Before the word multitudinem, A B E F prefix magnitudinem vel. At the end of the text, after Quis hoc, B G have nisi in place of vel.
  19. 1
    Psalm. 146, 5. Pro intelligentiae H scientiae, Vulgata sapientiae. — Inferius pro qui tandem D E H quid tandem.
    Psalm 146:5. In place of intelligentiae, H has scientiae, the Vulgate sapientiae. — Below, in place of qui tandem, D E H have quid tandem.
  20. 2
    D H assignatus est. Subinde pro moderniores A H modernos.
    D H have assignatus est. Presently, in place of moderniores, A H have modernos.
  21. 3
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. et III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Ante Deo codd., exceptis D H, addunt a.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, and III Sentences, d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Before Deo the codices, except D H, add a.
  22. 4
    Vide infra q. 2. De seqq. cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.
    See below, q. 2. On what follows compare I Sentences, d. 35, q. 1.
  23. 5
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. — Superius post connotat B legit aliquid actuale exterius in Deo, dicit ibi etc; D H omittunt primum ideo.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 45, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, after connotat, B reads aliquid actuale exterius in Deo, dicit ibi, etc.; D H omit the first ideo.
  24. 6
    In principio corp. — Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 15. et I. Sent. d. 35. q. 5. ad 1.
    At the beginning of the body. — Compare Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 15, and I Sentences, d. 35, q. 5, ad 1.
  25. 7
    Text. 19. seqq. et text. 60. seqq. (c. 2. et 7.).
    Text 19 and following, and text 60 and following (cc. 2 and 7).
  26. 1
    De hac Aristot. dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 348, nota 5. — Superius post quod quaecumque D supplet Deus.
    On this Aristotelian expression compare tome I, p. 348, note 5. — Above, after quod quaecumque, D supplies Deus.
  27. 2
    Psalm. 61, 12: Semel locutus est Deus; cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2. explicatio huius verbi.
    Psalm 61:12: God hath spoken once; compare I Sentences, d. 27, p. II, q. 2, for the explanation of this word.
  28. 3
    D H infinitas potentialis.
    D H have infinitas potentialis.
  29. 4
    Vide infra q. 3.
    See below, q. 3.
  30. 5
    Cap. 34. et 36. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 623, nota 3. — In fine solut. verbis in proprio genere B praemittit vel.
    Chapters 34 and 36. For the words see tome I, p. 623, note 3. — At the end of the solution, before the words in proprio genere, B prefixes vel.
  31. 6
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 45, a. 1, q. 2, at the end. ---
Cited by

3 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether trinity and infinity can stand together
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate · 2×
supra pag. 4, nota 2
Whether the divine being is immutable
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VI: Utrum trinitas possit stare cum summa immutabilitate
supra pag. 4, nota 1
Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends
Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi · Quaestio VII: Utrum anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata
supra pag. 3, nota 4