Dist. 5, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima dubitatio est de rationibus Magistri.
Dub. I
Nam prima eius ratio ducit ad hoc inconveniens, scilicet quod, si essentia generaretur a Patre, essentia poneretur pro relativo; et haec ratio ponitur ibi: Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam. Sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens. Si enim magis convenit essentia cum supposito, quam universale cum singulari; si non est inconveniens, quod universale ponatur1 pro singulari, nec est inconveniens, quod essentia ponatur pro relativo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si essentia poneretur pro relativo, esset inconveniens, non a parte
rei, sed a parte expressionis fidei. Tunc enim videretur et2 notaretur unitas essentiae in quadam distinctione. Esset etiam inconveniens, quia quod ponitur pro relativo in quantum huiusmodi, non indicat essentiam. Si ergo3 essentia poneretur pro relativo, essentia aliquando non indicaret essentiam, quod est omni rationi contrarium.
Dub. II
Item secundo dubitatur de secunda ratione, in qua ducit ad hoc inconveniens, quod eadem res gigneret se ipsam, et ponitur, ibi: Item cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius quod ipse est, quia essentia dicit quid commune, sicut et hoc nomen Deus; sed si dicatur: homo4 Petrus generat hominem, et ipse est homo: ergo generat se, argumentum istud nihil valet. Similiter videtur hic: Pater generat Deum: ergo etc., pari ratione nec in proposito.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod commune dicitur quod est in multis; sed hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quod plurificatur in multis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad suppositum, ut hoc nomen homo; et tale habet unitatem rationis, quae admittit distinctionem et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum. Unde bene dicitur homo esse ab homine5, et: duos esse homines. Alio modo est commune quod plurificatur quantum ad suppositum, non quantum ad formam, ut hoc nomen Deus; et tale habet unitatem rei, secundum quod res nominat naturam cum multiplicatione suppositorum: et ideo recipit distinctivum6 quod importat distinctionem ut modum, non ut rem. Unde conceditur: Deus de Deo, sed non: Deus est alius a Deo. Est tertio modo commune secundum nomen, quod est in multis, nec tamen plurificatur quantum ad formam, quia est unum in multis, nec quantum ad supposita, quia pro illis non supponit, ut hoc nomen essentia. De tali communi verum est dicere, quod non recipit distinctionem nec quantum ad modum, nec quantum ad rem; tunc enim notaretur idem distingui a se. Et ita argumentum Magistri est bonum: si Pater genuit essentiam, Pater genuit se; et7 loquitur de communi a parte vocis significantis, non a parte rei, quia a parte rei eadem communitas est in hoc quod est Deus et in hoc quod est essentia.
Dub. III
Item tertio obiicitur contra tertiam rationem: si Pater genuit divinam essentiam, tunc genitum gignenti causa est, ut sit et Deus sit, et ponitur ibi: Et si ita est, non genito gignens etc. Sed haec ratio nihil videtur valere, quia ratio causae non cadit in divinis; «causa enim est cuius esse sequitur aliud»8; sed in divinis non est aliud: ergo etc.
Item, non sequitur: Pater genuit sapientiam: ergo est sapiens sapientia genita: ergo pari ratione nec praedicta locutio9 valet.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sumendo nomen causae proprie, non cadit in divinis10, cadit tamen et recipitur ratio principiantis et ratio informantis, et pro his accipitur nomen causae. Quoniam igitur ratio essendi significatur per hoc nomen essentia: ideo essentia significat11 quodam modo in ratione causae respectu entis. Si ergo essentia esset genita ab ente, significaretur in ratione effectus sive principiati, et idem esset tunc principium et principiatum respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile; et in hoc fundatur ratio Magistri.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia; dicendum, quod tactum est de ipsa in quaestionibus extra litteram12, quia nomen ita abstractum, sicut essentia, non supponit pro relativo, sapientia bene supponit pro relativo; et ita est ibi accidens: Pater est sapiens sapientia et genuit sapientiam: ergo est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, vel sapientia genita. In nomine autem essentiae non est accidens, quoniam idem significat et supponit.
Dub. IV
Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium. Contra hoc obiicit Ioachim, tam contra positionem quam contra rationem. Contra positionem, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit: ergo in divinis est res generans et genita et procedens, et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est ibi13 quaternitas, si sunt quatuor res.
Item, irridet rationem Magistri: si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res: ergo una res generat se ipsam. Similiter, inquit Ioachim, potuisti dicere, Petre: Deus generat Deum, et14 unus est Deus: ergo eadem res generat se ipsam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Ioachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia res non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur res primo modo, ibi accipitur res pro re naturae; sed cum dicitur15 secundo modo, accipitur pro ipsa natura divina. Praeterea, deficit ab insufficienti, quia non valet: si aliquid dicitur de aliquo16, et non dicitur de alio, quod propter hoc illa faciant numerum. Unde non valet: Petrus est individuum: homo non est individuum: ergo Petrus et homo sunt duo. Habere enim proprietatem et non habere non sufficit ad distinguendum.
Ad instantiam eius dicendum, quod non recte instat; quia essentia est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum; non enim supponit personas; sed Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum. Et ideo ignoranter Ioachim reprehendit Magistrum, et quia17, cum esset simplex, non est reveritus Magistrum, ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata18.
Dub. V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: Nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit. Quaeritur ergo de hoc verbo accepit, utrum dicat substantiam vel relationem. Si substantiam: ergo Pater similiter accepit; si relationem: ergo19 cum essentiam acceperit Filius, essentia est accepta: ergo essentia refertur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accipere dicit duo, scilicet habere et esse ab alio; quantum ad habere respicit essentiam; sed quantum ad hoc quod est esse ab alio, respicit personam: unde per verbum accipiendi significatur, quod essentia habetur a persona, quae est ab alio20.
Dub. VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et ideo non refertur ad aliud, quod in uno subsistit ex uno, quia videtur falsum; quoniam Filius subsistit a Patre, tamen refertur ad Spiritum sanctum21.
Respondeo: Hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quod Filius non habet respectum nisi ad unam personam; et hoc intelligitur in quantum Filius, quia in quantum spirans est, refertur ad alium; vel quod persona Filii non habet respectum nisi ad unam naturam; et hoc verum est, quia Filius non habet in se nisi naturam Patris.
Dub. VII
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus. In divinis enim non est prius nec posterius, et ita nec praecedere nec sequi. Si tu dicas, quod est secundum rationem intelligendi; hoc nihil est, quia Deus gignens nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum sequitur aliquid22.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius improprie loquitur, et ideo addit determinationem: ut ita dicam; et tantum vult dicere sequi, quantum inseparabiliter comitari23 et consociare et ab illo non recedere, et hoc patet per sequens.
Dub. VIII
Item quaeritur de auctoritatibus Augustini, primo de hoc quod dicit, quod Deus semel genuit Filium. Videtur enim male dicere semel, quia semel dicit vicissitudinem; sed in generatione aeterna nulla cadit vicissitudo: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod semel potest dicere nunc temporis, vel nunc aeternitatis. Et si dicat nunc temporis, cum tempus habeat diversa nunc,
notat intercisionem; si autem nunc aeternitatis, et24 illud nunc semper est et invariabile et unum, semel dicit omnimodam invariabilitatem, perfectionem et unitatem.
Dub. IX
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Filii caritatis suae, utrum caritas accipiatur ibi essentialiter, aut notionaliter. Si essentialiter: ergo Christus Filius est essentiae, quod non conceditur. Si tu dicas, quod est impropria locutio, et est sensus: Filii essentiae, id est, qui est essentia; tunc nullus videtur sensus, et pro nihilo additum25 hoc quod est caritatis. Et rursus Augustinus exponit, Filii caritatis, id est Filii dilecti; sed Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto: ergo etc. Si propter hoc dicas, quod tenetur notionaliter; tunc ergo Filius Dei est Filius Spiritus sancti, quod absurdum est omnino.
Respondeo: Ad26 hoc dicunt aliqui, quod ille genitivus nec proprie essentialiter nec proprie notionaliter, sed medio modo tenetur, id est appropriate. Licet enim caritas sit omnibus communis et proprium Spiritus sancti, uno tamen modo appropriate convenit Patri, quia caritas est amor gratuitus; et sic dicit Richardus, quia amor gratuitus est, qui tantum dat et nihil accipit27, et hoc est in persona Patris, ideo appropriatur Patri. Alio modo dici potest, quod caritas ibi tenetur essentialiter, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod28 nihil aliud est dicere Filii caritatis quam Filii substantiae; sed genitivus non construitur in ratione principii, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae29, et est sensus: Filii caritatis, id est Filii cari; et Filii substantiae vel naturae, hoc est Filii consubstantialis et naturalis.
Dub. X
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius est de substantia Patris homoousion, quia — cum filius naturalis partem substantiae trahat a patre, partem a matre in his inferioribus, et in Deo totam substantiam trahat a Patre — videtur quod Pater non tantum deberet dici pater, sed etiam mater, et multo fortius mater, quia mater plus dat quam pater. Item, Filius Dei vocat se sapientiam et sapientiam, quae concipitur et parturitur, Proverbiorum octavo30. Ergo cum hoc proprium sit matris, videtur quod Pater proprius deberet dici mater quam pater.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen matris non transfertur ad divina. Et unam rationem assignat Anselmus in Monologio31: quia principium maternum praeexigit aliud principium prius. Et ratio huius est, quia mater est principium passivum, et omne tale movetur ab alio: ergo ante ipsum est principium aliud. Quoniam igitur principium generationis Filii est primum et est pure actuale, ideo nullo modo transfertur maternum principium; transfertur tamen actus maternus, ut concipere et parturire, pro eo quod ibi agit unum principium quod32 hic duo.
Dub. XI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus non est de nihilo. Videtur enim falsum, quia illud quod de nulla praeiacente materia est, de nihilo est; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt de aliquo, ut de Patre; quaeritur tunc, utrum Pater sit ex nihilo; et videtur quod sic, quia non aliquid et nihil convertuntur; sed Pater non est ex33 aliquo: ergo est ex nihilo. Item, quia Pater non habet principium effectivum, ideo dicitur esse a nullo: ergo34 cum non habeat materiam, debet dici de nihilo. Si conceditur de Patre; contra: omne quod habet esse de nihilo, est creatum35: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid esse de nihilo, secundum Anselmum in Monologio36 tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative, ut cum dicitur de tacente: iste loquitur de nihilo; alio modo positive, ut si ita dicatur vel intelligatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, sicut cultellus de ferro; tertio modo partim positive, partim privative, ut si dicatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, quia post nihil est aliquid, sicut dicitur: de paupere fit dives.
Dicendum ergo, quod secundum primum sensum Deus potest dici de nihilo esse, sive Pater sive divina essentia; tamen hic modus non est usitatus. Quantum ad secundum modum, omnino nihil fit ex nihilo, quia nihil nullius est materia. Quantum ad tertium modum, secundum quem loquitur Augustinus, quod sola creatura fit de nihilo sive est de nihilo, quia de notat ibi ordinem, ut habeat esse post non esse — hoc quod est de nihilo privat materiam praeiacentem. Quamvis ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non habeant materiam praeiacentem, quia tamen non habent esse post non esse, ideo non dicuntur esse ex nihilo. Et ideo non valet primum argumentum, quia procedit ab insufficienti.
Secundum vero et tertium argumentum, de Patre factum, procedit, secundum quod negatio eius quod est nihil, fertur extra ad verbum et facit orationem negativam; et secundum hunc sensum, sicut conceditur, quod Pater a nullo sit, ita de nihilo. Tamen, sicut dictum est, sensus iste non est usitatus; communiter enim utimur hac locutione, secundum quod negatio de nihilo sistit intra, et hoc quod est de accipitur ibi ordinaliter.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
In this part doubts arise concerning the text, and the first doubt is about the Master's reasonings.
Doubt I
For his first reasoning leads to this incongruity — namely that, if the essence were begotten by the Father, the essence would be set down for a relative; and this reasoning is set down at: «Therefore it must not be said that the Father begot the divine essence». But this seems no incongruity. For if the essence agrees more with the supposit than the universal does with the singular; if it is no incongruity that the universal be set down1 for the singular, neither is it an incongruity that the essence be set down for a relative.
I respond: It must be said that if the essence were set down for a relative, it would be incongruous — not on the side of
the thing, but on the side of the expression of the faith. For then the unity of the essence in a certain distinction would be seen and2 noted. It would also be incongruous, because what is set down for a relative as such does not indicate the essence. If, then3, the essence were set down for a relative, the essence sometimes would not indicate the essence — which is contrary to all reason.
Doubt II
Likewise, second, doubt is raised about the second reasoning, by which he leads to this incongruity — that the same thing would beget itself — and which is set down at: «Likewise, since God the Father is the divine essence, if He were its begetter, He would surely be the begetter of that which He Himself is, because essence expresses something common, just as does this name God »; but if it were said: «Man[^4] Peter begets a man, and he himself is a man: therefore he begets himself», that argument has no force. The same seems to hold here: «The Father begets God: therefore» etc. — by parity of reason, neither does it [hold] in the case proposed.
I respond: It must be said that common is what is in many; but this can be in three ways: either what is multiplied in many both as to form and as to supposit, as the name man; and such has unity of account (unitas rationis), which admits distinction both as to thing and as to mode. Hence one rightly says: man is from man5, and: there are two men. In another way the common is what is multiplied as to supposit, not as to form, as the name God; and such has unity of thing (unitas rei), according as thing names the nature with a multiplication of supposits; and therefore it admits a distinctive6 which imports distinction as a mode, not as a thing. Hence is conceded: God from God, but not: God is other than God. There is, third, the common according to name, which is in many — yet is not multiplied as to form, because it is one in many, nor as to supposits, because it does not supposit for them, as the name essence. Of such a common it is true to say that it admits no distinction, neither as to mode nor as to thing; for then the same would be noted as distinguished from itself. And so the Master's argument is good: «if the Father begot the essence, the Father begot Himself»; and7 he speaks of the common on the side of the signifying word, not on the side of the thing — because on the side of the thing the same commonness is in God and in essence.
Doubt III
Likewise, third, an objection is made against the third reasoning: «if the Father begot the divine essence, then the begotten is the cause to the begetter, that He should be and be God», which is set down at: «And if it is so, the begetter is not [cause] to the begotten» etc. But this reasoning seems to have no force, because the account of cause does not fall in God; «for cause is that whose being some other thing follows»8; but in God there is no other: therefore, etc.
Likewise, it does not follow: «The Father begot wisdom: therefore He is wise by a begotten wisdom»: therefore by parity of reason neither does the said expression9 hold.
I respond: It must be said that, taking the name cause properly, it does not fall in God10; yet the account of that which gives a principle (principians) and the account of informing (informans) do fall and are received [there], and under these the name of cause is taken. Since, then, the account of being (ratio essendi) is signified by this name essence, therefore essence signifies11 in some way in the account of cause with respect to being (ens). If, then, the essence were begotten by being, it would be signified in the account of effect or principled (principiatum), and the same would then be principle and principled with respect to the same — which is impossible; and on this is founded the Master's reasoning.
To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it must be said that this has been touched on concerning it in the questions outside the text12; because a name so abstract as essentia does not supposit for a relative, [whereas] sapientia does indeed supposit for a relative; and so there is an accident there: «The Father is wise by wisdom, and He begot wisdom; therefore He is wise by the wisdom which He begot, or by a begotten wisdom». But in the name essentia there is no accident, since the same thing signifies and supposits.
Doubt IV
«Likewise, it must not be said that the divine essence begot the Son». Against this, Joachim objects, both against the position and against the reasoning. Against the position: because if the essence neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, then in God there is a thing generating and generated and proceeding, and a thing neither generating nor generated nor proceeding; and so there is, there13, a quaternity, if there are four things.
Likewise, he ridicules the Master's reasoning: if essence generates essence, and essence is one thing — therefore one thing generates itself. Similarly, says Joachim, you could have said, Peter: «God generates God, and14 one is God»: therefore the same thing generates itself.
I respond: It must be said that Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reasoning fails — because thing (res) is not taken uniformly: when thing is said in the first way, thing is taken there for thing of nature; but when said15 in the second way, it is taken for the very divine nature itself. Furthermore, his argument fails from the insufficient, because it does not hold: «if something is said of one thing16, and is not said of another, that on this account those should make a number». Hence it does not hold: «Peter is an individual; man is not an individual; therefore Peter and man are two». For to have a property and not to have [it] does not suffice for distinguishing.
To his counter-instance it must be said that he does not press rightly; because the essence is one thing as to supposit and signified — for it does not supposit for the persons; but God is one thing as to the signified, but several as to supposit. And therefore Joachim ignorantly rebuked the Master, and because17, being a simple man, he did not revere the Master, therefore by the just judgment of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council, and the Master's position was approved18.
Doubt V
Likewise it is asked about that which Hilary says: «The Son has nothing except what He received in being born». It is asked, then, about this verb received, whether it expresses substance or relation. If substance: then the Father similarly received; if relation: then19 since the Son received the essence, the essence is received: therefore the essence is referred.
I respond: It must be said that to receive says two things — namely to have and to be from another; as to having it regards the essence, but as to that which is to be from another it regards the person: hence by the verb receiving it is signified that the essence is had by a person who is from another20.
Doubt VI
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: «And therefore He is not referred to another, who in one subsists from one» — because this seems false, since the Son subsists from the Father, yet is referred to the Holy Spirit21.
I respond: This can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the Son does not have a respect except to one person; and this is understood insofar as He is Son, because insofar as He spirates, He is referred to another; or that the person of the Son does not have a respect except to one nature; and this is true, because the Son does not have in Himself anything except the Father's nature.
Doubt VII
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: «And the unchangeable God, as it were, follows His own nature». For in God there is no prior or posterior, and so neither to precede nor to follow. If you say that this is according to the account of understanding — this is nothing, because God begetting follows nothing either in reality or in understanding22.
I respond: It must be said that Hilary speaks improperly, and therefore he adds the qualifier as it were; and by to follow he wishes to say only as much as inseparably to accompany23 and to consort with and not to depart from it, and this is plain by what follows.
Doubt VIII
Likewise it is asked about Augustine's authorities — first, about that which he says, that «God begot the Son once». For once seems to be said badly, because once expresses succession; but in eternal generation no succession occurs: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that once can express either now of time or now of eternity. And if it expresses now of time, since time has diverse nows,
it denotes interruption; but if now of eternity — and24 that now is always invariable and one — once expresses every kind of invariability, perfection, and unity.
Doubt IX
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: «Of the Son of His charity» — whether charity is taken there essentially or notionally. If essentially: then Christ the Son is of the essence, which is not conceded. If you say that it is an improper expression, and the sense is Son of essence — that is, who is essence — then no sense seems to remain, and of charity is added25 for nothing. And again Augustine expounds: «Of the Son of charity» — that is, of the beloved Son; but the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit: therefore, etc. If for this reason you say that it is taken notionally — then therefore the Son of God is the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is altogether absurd.
I respond: To26 this some say that this genitive is taken neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in an intermediate way — that is, appropriately. For although charity is common to all and proper to the Holy Spirit, yet in one mode it suitably belongs to the Father by appropriation, because charity is gratuitous love; and so Richard says, because gratuitous love is that which only gives and receives nothing27, and this is in the person of the Father — therefore it is appropriated to the Father. In another way it can be said that charity is there taken essentially, as Augustine says, that28 to say «of the Son of charity» is no other than «of the Son of substance»; but the genitive is not construed in the account of principle, but by force of declaration of essence29, and the sense is: «of the Son of charity» — that is, of the dear Son; and «of the Son of substance» or «of nature», that is, of the Son consubstantial and natural.
Doubt X
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that «the Son is of the substance of the Father, homoousion» — because, since a natural son draws part of his substance from the father and part from the mother in these inferior things, and in God draws the whole substance from the Father, it seems that the Father should not only be called father but also mother, and much more mother, since the mother gives more than the father. Likewise, the Son of God calls Himself wisdom, and wisdom which is conceived and brought forth, in Proverbs 830. Therefore, since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father should more properly be called mother than father.
I respond: It must be said that the name mother is not transferred to divine things. And one reason Anselm assigns in the Monologion31: that the maternal principle pre-supposes another, prior, principle. And the reason for this is that the mother is a passive principle, and every such is moved by another: therefore there is another principle before it. Since, then, the principle of the generation of the Son is first and is purely actual, the maternal principle is in no way transferred [to God]; the maternal act is, however, transferred — as to conceive and to bring forth — for this reason, that there one principle does what32 here two [do].
Doubt XI
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that «the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing». For this seems false, because that which is from no pre-existing matter is from nothing; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are such: therefore, etc. If you say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from something — namely from the Father — it is then asked whether the Father is from nothing; and it seems so, because not-something and nothing are convertible; but the Father is not from33 something: therefore He is from nothing. Likewise, because the Father has no effective principle, He is therefore said to be from no one: therefore34, since He has no matter, He must be said to be from nothing. If this is conceded of the Father — on the contrary: everything that has being from nothing is created35: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that when it is said that something is from nothing, according to Anselm in the Monologion36 it can be understood in three ways. In one way, that nothing be taken simply privatively, as when it is said of one silent: «he speaks of nothing»; in another way positively, as if it be so said or understood that something is made from nothing — as a knife from iron; in a third way partly positively, partly privatively, as when it is said that something is made from nothing because after nothing is something — as is said: «from a poor man comes a rich man».
It must therefore be said that according to the first sense God can be said to be from nothing — whether the Father or the divine essence; yet this mode is not customary. As to the second mode, nothing at all is made from nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing. As to the third mode — according to which Augustine speaks, that only the creature is made from nothing or is from nothing, because from there denotes order, that it has being after non-being — this from nothing removes pre-existing matter. Although, then, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have pre-existing matter, yet because they do not have being after non-being, they are not said to be from nothing. And therefore the first argument has no force, because it proceeds from the insufficient.
But the second and third arguments, made about the Father, do hold according as the negation of that which is nothing is carried outside to the verb and makes a negative sentence; and according to this sense, just as it is conceded that the Father is from no one, so [also] from nothing. Yet, as has been said, this sense is not customary; for we commonly use this expression according as the negation from nothing stays within, and that from (de) is taken there ordinally.
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- Vat. cum cod. cc cum universale ponitur, sed minus bene et contra alios codd., quorum tamen aliqui, retenta particula quod, legunt ponitur loco ponatur.The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] cum universale ponitur (when the universal is set down), but less well and against other codices — some of which, however, retaining the particle quod, read ponitur in place of ponatur.
- Ed. 1 quod loco et; aliqui codd. ut GUdd connotaretur pro notaretur.Edition 1 [reads] quod in place of et; some codices, as G U dd, [read] connotaretur for notaretur.
- Meliorem lectionem damus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo ergo pro enim.We give a better reading from the manuscripts and edition 1, putting ergo in place of enim.
- Vat. hoc modo pro homo, sed castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. Paulo infra Vat. contra multos codd. ut ACFGHISTW etc. illud non loco istud nihil.The Vatican edition [reads] hoc modo in place of homo, but is corrected from the manuscripts and the first six editions. A little further on the Vatican edition, against many codices such as A C F G H I S T W etc., [reads] illud non in place of istud nihil.
- Supple: se habendi. Vide supra d. 1. dub. 1. — Paulo post aliqui codd. ut ABDFGHK etc. cum Vat. ponunt Homo est ab homine. — De communi in Deo et creaturis cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2; d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 2.Supply: se habendi (of holding itself). See above d. 1, dub. 1. — A little later some codices, as A B D F G H K etc., with the Vatican edition put Homo est ab homine (Man is from man). — On the common in God and in creatures cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 2.
- Cod. T bene addit secundum; nonnulli codd. ut FGHK ee ff distinctionem loco distinctivum, in qua lectione quod cum cod. H sumendum esset pro quia. Paulo infra mss. cum ed. 1 Deus esse alius pro Deus est alius; cod. O post a Deo addit vel duo dii.Codex T well adds secundum; some codices as F G H K ee ff [read] distinctionem in place of distinctivum, on which reading quod (with codex H) would have to be taken for quia. A little further on the manuscripts with edition 1 [read] Deus esse alius in place of Deus est alius; codex O after a Deo adds vel duo dii (or two gods).
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 quia loco et.The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] quia in place of et.
- In hac communiter recepta causae definitione, quae ex Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-38. (c. 3.), II. Metaph. text. 6. seq. (I. brevior. c. 2.), V. Metaph. text. 2-4. (IV. c. 2.) colligi potest, Vat. hic et alibi contra codd. ac ed. 1 relativo cuius praefigit praepositionem ad.In this commonly received definition of cause, which can be gathered from Aristotle, Physics II, text 28–38 (c. 3); Metaphysics II, text 6ff. (I, shorter version, c. 2); Metaphysics V, text 2–4 (IV, c. 2) — the Vatican edition, here and elsewhere, against the codices and edition 1, prefixes the preposition ad to the relative cuius.
- Substituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 locutio pro solutio.We have substituted, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, locutio in place of solutio.
- Cfr. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo ante cod. K post causae addit de se.Cf. d. 29, a. 1, q. 1. — A little before, codex K after causae adds de se.
- Vat. contra multos codd. ut ACFGHKLOSTUY etc. et ed. 1 modo passivo signatur.The Vatican edition, against many codices such as A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc. and edition 1, [reads] in the passive voice signatur.
- Hic q. 1. — Plura de ista propositione: sapiens sapientia genita, vide d. 32. a. 2. q. 4. et dub. 1. ac 2. — Paulo infra ex cod. W adiecimus sapientia bene supponit pro relativo, quod certe supplendum et in aliis mss. forte omissum est propter huius et praecedentis propositionis communem desinentiam pro relativo; et mox ex eodem cod. W addidimus ibi.Here [in] q. 1. — On more concerning this proposition sapiens sapientia genita (wise by a begotten wisdom), see d. 32, a. 2, q. 4, and dub. 1 and 2. — A little further on, from codex W, we have added sapientia bene supponit pro relativo — which certainly must be supplied, and was perhaps omitted in the other manuscripts on account of the common ending pro relativo of this and the preceding proposition; and shortly after, from the same codex W, we have added ibi.
- Vat. refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit ibi post si sunt.The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes ibi after si sunt.
- Restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.We have restored, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, the particle et.
- Substituimus fide nonnullorum codd. VXY et ed. 1 dicitur pro accipitur.We have substituted, on the witness of some codices V X Y and edition 1, dicitur in place of accipitur.
- Vat. minus bene et contra antiquos mss. ac ed. 1 altero pro aliquo.The Vatican edition, less well and against the ancient manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] altero in place of aliquo.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 4 hic omittit quia, et paulo infra pro ideo ponit et sic.The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 4, here omits quia, and a little further on in place of ideo sets et sic.
- Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. Scholion.See above a. 1, q. 1, Scholion.
- Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ergo, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 ergo, which the Vatican edition less well omits.
- De eisdem Hilarii verbis cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1. ad 8.On the same words of Hilary cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, ad 8.
- Fide mss. addidimus sanctum.On the witness of the manuscripts we have added sanctum.
- Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 aliud, et paulo infra contra eosdem omittit dicendum.The Vatican edition, against very many codices and edition 1, [reads] aliud, and a little further on, against the same, omits dicendum.
- Vat. communicare et consonare; plurimi codd. communicari et consonare. Haec autem verba in codd. ob abbreviatam scripturam saepe vel sunt dubiae lectionis vel cum verbis in textum nostrum receptis confunduntur. Verbum comitari recepimus ex ed. 1 et consociare ex cod. Z. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. et per hoc patet sequens, sed minus bene.The Vatican edition [reads] communicare et consonare; very many codices [read] communicari et consonare. These words, however, in the codices, on account of the abbreviated script, are often either of doubtful reading or are confused with the words received into our text. The word comitari we have received from edition 1, and consociare from codex Z. Then the Vatican edition, without authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] et per hoc patet sequens (and through this the following is plain) [in place of et hoc patet per sequens], but less well.
- Vat. clarius cum, cui lectioni obstant omnes codd. et ed. 1 ac forma indicativi in verbo est. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 verbo invariabile praefixum est expunximus, et fide antiquiorum mss. ac ed. 1 substituimus invariabilitatem pro invarietatem; lectio mss. certe praeferenda.The Vatican edition more clearly [reads] cum; against which reading all the codices and edition 1 are opposed, as is the indicative form in the verb est. A little further on, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have expunged the est prefixed to the verb invariabile, and on the witness of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted invariabilitatem for invarietatem; the reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred.
- Vat. adiungit est, sed contra antiquiores codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3. Codd. RX additur. Paulo infra post id est Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus codd., omittit Filii. Verba August., XV. de Trin. c. 19. n. 37. sunt: Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intelligitur, quam Filii sui dilecti.The Vatican edition adds est, but against the older codices and editions 1, 2, 3. Codices R X [read] additur. A little further on, after id est, the Vatican edition, contradicting the older codices, omits Filii. The words of Augustine, de Trin. XV, c. 19, n. 37, are: «By «of the Son of His charity» nothing else is understood than «of His beloved Son»».
- Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 quod propter pro Ad.The Vatican edition, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] quod propter in place of Ad.
- Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc post caritas omittit est ac dein et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus; demum pro nihil ponit non. — Textum Richardi vide supra d. 2. q. 4.Thus the ancient codices with edition 1, while the Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc after caritas omits est, and then et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus; finally in place of nihil sets non. — For Richard's text, see above d. 2, q. 4.
- Vat. cum cod. cc quia pro quod, sed obstant antiquiores [codd.].The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] quia in place of quod, but the older [codices] are opposed.
- De significatione genitivi vide supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post sensus addit et ac post vel adiicit etiam, quae particulae absunt a vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.On the signification of the genitive, see above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3. — Then the Vatican edition with codex cc after sensus adds et, and after vel adds etiam — which particles are absent from the older manuscripts and edition 1.
- Vers. 24. 25. — Paulo ante Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 sapientia est, quae pro sapientiam, quae.[Proverbs 8,] verses 24–25. — A little before, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] sapientia est, quae in place of sapientiam, quae.
- Cap. 42: Quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit: nimis est incongruum, ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit. — De proxime sequenti ratione vide Aristot., I. de Generat. animal. c. 19. 20. et ibid. II. c. 4. — Nonnulli codd. post principium omittunt prius, et Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit et, quod fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 voci ratio praefiximus.[Anselm, Monologion] c. 42: «Because the first and principal cause of the offspring is always in the father. For if the maternal cause is in any way always preceded by the paternal: it is exceedingly incongruous that the name of mother be applied to that parent for whom no other cause either is associated with [it] or precedes [it] in begetting offspring». — On the immediately following reason, see Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals I, c. 19–20, and ibid. II, c. 4. — Some codices after principium omit prius; and the Vatican edition with some manuscripts omits et, which on the witness of many manuscripts and edition 1 we have prefixed to the word ratio.
- Vat. cum cod. cc et loco quod, sed minus bene et contra antiquiores codd. Sub ibi intellige: in generatione Filii.The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] et in place of quod, but less well and against the older codices. Under ibi understand: in generatione Filii (in the generation of the Son).
- Aliqui codd. ut aa bb dd ff cum ed. 1 hic et immediate post de loco ex.Some codices as aa bb dd ff with edition 1, here and immediately after, [read] de in place of ex.
- Vat. cum cod. cc simili modo pro ergo, quod tamen alii codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent.The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] simili modo in place of ergo, which however the other codices with edition 1 exhibit.
- Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatum loco creatura. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit tale argumentum: Item quod est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum: ergo etc.From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted creatum in place of creatura. Then the Vatican edition, without authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds the following argument: «Likewise, what is from nothing is convertible into nothing: therefore» etc.
- Cap. 8.[Anselm, Monologion] c. 8.